MELANCHOLY IMAGINATION IN AUSIAS MARCH AND THE FLORENTINE NEOPLATONISTS

Louis P. A. Maingon

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

1982

MELANCHOLY IMAGINATION IN AUSIAS MARCH AND THE FLORENTINE NEOPLATONISTS

by

Louis P. A. Maingon

I declare that this thesis has been composed by me on the basis of work done by me in St. Andrews, Edinburgh, Barcelona and Vancouver, and that it has not been accepted in any previous application for a higher degree. I was admitted as a candidate for the degree of Ph.D. under Resolution of the University Court, 1967, No. 1 (as amended), on October 1, 1975.

.....

I certify that the conditions of the Resolution of the University Court relating to the degree of Ph.D. have been fulfilled.

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Abstract

This thesis focuses primarily on the work of the Valencian poet, Ausias March (1398 - 1459), who was revered by the first two generations of Petrarquistas in Golden Age Spain, and in particular by Juan Boscán and Garcilaso de la Vega. It has long been contended that the introduction of Ficinian Neoplatonism in Spain by Boscán's translation of Il Cortegiano, and Garcilaso's assimilation of Bembo's Petrarchism, represents a radical shift in sensibility, unprecedented in the Iberian peninsula. The object of this thesis is to demonstrate that because Ausias March is a Lullian poet who manifests an evangelical-Platonic sensibility, and is not a "troubadour attardé" as Amédée Pagès thought, the introduction of the Italianate fashion by Boscán and Garcilaso is not a radical departure from their earlier allegiance, but a development.

The poetry of Ausias March is remarkable for its introspection. Consequently, the interpretation of his work must begin with an analysis of his use of the theory of imagination, which he inherited through the literary influence of the Chartrians and Victorines of the twelfth century, and,in particular, from Hughes de Saint Victor. The importance of introspection and imagination naturally entails the question of the extremes of melancholy, as it is understood in the mediaeval tradition of Aristotle's Problem XXX, i. After a survey of the role of melancholy imagination in Ausias March's poetry, the function of these two closely related concepts is analysed in Ficino's Commentarium in Convivium , Hebreo's Dialoghi, Bembo's Gli Asolani, and Castiglione's Il Cortegiano. This enables one to determine that the Florentine theory of love is not insulated from passion, as many literary critics imply. The dialectical relation of natural reason to Augustinian right reason evinces the extremes of imagination and melancholy, as either lunacy or divine rapture. These elements of Florentine Neoplatonism

reveal a deep concern for the difficult relation of the body to the soul, and, ultimately, a conscious search for ascesis.

These elements, which are common to Ausias March and the Florentine Neoplatonists, are an expression of the Augustinian doctrine of Charity. The common factor between Ausias March and the Florentines is the pseudo-Dionysian - Erigenian concept of beauty. The latter is fundamental to what M. D. Chenu has defined as the secular evangelical current in Europe. It is a sensibility based on a consciousness of the all-pervasive presence of grace in nature, which is articulated in the symbolic mentality of Christian Platonists. This aspect of Ausias March's work is central to Chapter V. In order to avoid creating the impression that this interpretation of Ausias March's poetry is anachronical this chapter studies the significance of an important segment of this poet's imagery. This serves to contrast Ausias March's use of the pseudo-Dionysian - Erigenian concept of beauty and his consequent handling of the concepts of melancholy and imagination to that used by Andreas Capellanus. Finally, this analysis illustrates Ausias March's predominantly symbolic mentality, as well as his exceptional use of medical theory which distinguishes him from the vast majority of Spanish cancionero poets, and emphasizes his many points of affinity with the Florentine Neoplatonists.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Though all errors in this thesis are mine, recognition for the merits of this work must undoubtedly go to Professor L. J. Woodward, for his kind assistance, encouragements and very illuminating comments, as well as, Dr. Mercedes Claraso, for giving me her assistance when, lost, I needed it; to Professor Douglas Gifford, without whose work on the mediaeval fool part of Chapter V might have been impossible, and also to Professor Arsenio Pacheco of the University of British Columbia, who lured me into writing on Ausias March and provided suggestions, research materials and, above all, encouragements. To all the members and staff of the Department of Spanish at St. Andrews University, and to many Canadian hispanists, I am greatly indebted for the inspiration. Thanks for their assistance must also be given to the librarians of St. Andrews, the National Library of Scotland, the Biblioteca Nacional de Catalunya, the University of British Columbia, and the University of Saskatchewan, especially to Mr. Patrick Dunn whose efforts always doubled my requests. Yet in all this my greatest indebtment is to the most self-effaced source of inspiration, my wife, Alison, who castigated my Latin, and without whose constant companionship this thesis would have come to nought.

FOREWORD

Some questions may arise in the mind of the reader concerning the order and style of this work. As a thesis it is intended for those already quite familiar with Ausiasmarquian scholarship. It is the demonstration of a hypothesis on literary history. As such, the style and order are determined by a sustained effort of logical argumentation (*par une logique serrée*) within the intended purpose. The style is often harsh, but, I hope, clear in its austerity.

My object was to demonstrate that, because Ausias March, as a Lullian poet, manifests an evangelical Platonic sensibility in his usage of the rhetorical theory of imagination according to Victorine-Chartrian canons, the introduction of the Platonico-Petrarchan sensibility in Golden Age Spain by his admirers, Juan Boscán and Garcilaso de la Vega, did not represent a radical shift in sensibility, but a development. In order to demonstrate this hypothesis, I had to shew that: *a)* Ausias March's poetry was based on a certain conception of Imagination, and what implications this had; *b)* that this conception also affects M. Ficino, and then, his followers whose works were the vehicles of the *Italianate* sensibility in Spain. Premiss *a* required that I evince the presence of the Victorine-Chartrian theory of imagination in Ausias March, and only subsequently that I illustrate the dynamics of this theory in the significance of his imagery. Premiss *b* required that I shew that imagination played an important role in the thought of the Florentine Neoplatonists, and that I demonstrate that their theory

of love does not presuppose a divorce from passion and instinct. The logical development of these themes was thus determined by reference to the concept of imagination and its correlative, melancholy.

Hence, Chapter I presents the hypothesis and background information. Chapter II re-assesses the biographical interpretation of Ausias March. Chapter III is an analysis of the Chartrian-Victorine rhetorical theory of imagination and its function in Ausias March's poetry. Chapter IV surveys the evangelical background of the Florentines and their usage of imagination, and is de facto the conclusion. In order to avoid the accusation of anachronism, and because many hispanists following O.H. Green associate "courtly love" with Platonism and Christian immorality, Chapter V substantiates my thesis. It analyses the implications of imagination in Andreas Capellanus, and how Ausias March diverges from this "courtly love" in his use of imagery. Chapter VI concludes with a final re-assessment.

In a book many things would differ, especially in the format; and this would affect the style. For instance, the background would be expanded considerably. Chapter II would have to repeat the biography of Ausias March, before presenting contrary arguments. Chapter III would also integrate much of the background information that I have put in referencial notes, and probably be split in two. Chapter V would also be split into at least two chapters, and precede the present Chapter IV, which would be a second part of the book, and split into four chapters. This would entail considerable expansion at the expense of the thesis' concision.

Four more points may need clarification. First the frightening bulk of the thesis is illusory. It actually consists

of some four hundred pages, one quarter of which are translations of the Latin texts quoted. Hence, this thesis is not as long as it may seem. Appendix I might have been a chapter, however, it only elucidates a point which is a foregone conclusion in the premiss that Ausias March is a Lullian poet, hence, it is accessory and not vital to the thesis. Appendix II represents a preliminary work, which I had to do in order to understand the function of Ausias March's imagery. As a reference work it is a convenient catalogue, which I do not accept as a thesis, for, although it might be considered so in certain places, it does not uphold a proposition, that is, it has no thesis. I have only included it here for the reader's convenience and curiosity. Finally, the footnote system that I follow in each chapter, is used to substantiate and clarify points made in the text, especially concerning the interpretation of difficult verses. These notes contain discussions and additional references, hence I did not use the PMLA style of thesis footnotes which would have led to an endless maze of brackets. In accordance with the regulations of this university consistency was my guide. I uniformly used a bibliographical note style in the footnotes, which has the advantage of being clear.

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

The literature of the fifteenth century portrays a period of extreme social crisis and reorientation in Europe. It is not only the period of humanist renewal, but also the culmination of the feudal disintegration begun in the twelfth century.[1] Perhaps more than in the two preceding centuries writers felt the need to re-assess social values. This change in sensitivity can be seen in certain authors by the return to philosophical poetry.[2] Hence, an important section of fifteenth-century poetry is directly affected by the "scientific" knowledge of that period, and adapts itself to the changing circumstances, within the medium of the courtly lyric, either by re-working old themes or seeking new alternatives. In the context of the study of Spanish literature, aspects of this problem seem to have become lost or confused by the critics' tendency to examine the culture of the Spanish peninsula as a unit. The particularities of regional cultural evolutions are overlooked. Perhaps in order to avoid complexities, it has been the custom of literary historians to stress "Spain's Cultural 'Belatedness'".[3] Although there is an element of truth in this concept, particularly applicable to Castile, one should note that this unilateral interpretation not only overlooks individual spontaneity, but also creates anachronisms.

Whereas it may be true that fifteenth-century Castile underwent a belated "troubadour-revival",[4] such an evaluation is hazardous in the Catalan context. Although very close political and cultural bonds unite Castile and Catalonia today, one must bear in mind that prior to the reign of Isabel and Ferdinand the extent of the subsequent cultural annexation of Catalonia could not be foreseen.

Indeed, in the hundred years prior to the accession of the Catholic Kings the insularity of Castile was in sharp contrast with the European expansionism of Catalonia. In his magistral study of that period Amédée Pagès has pointed out that through the marriage of Joan I el Humanista[5] and Violante de Bar French poetry came to play an important rôle in the intellectual development of fifteenth-century Catalonia. In spite of its noteworthy exactitude Pagès' study, La poésie française en Catalogne, has one serious defect. In accordance with the criticism prevalent at the time at which this book was written, Pagès interprets the works of Oton de Granson, Guillaume de Machaut and Alain Chartier as a direct prolongation of the "courtly love tradition" of the Provençal troubadours, which he opposes to the Italianate love tradition[6] and the incipient Petrarchism. Yet, in the fourteenth-century French literary modes were breaking away from the previous courtly love tradition. The influence of a nascent humanism re-oriented poetry towards a greater introspection, and away from the notion of poetry as a means of social entertainment only. It is primarily philosophical poetry. D. Porion defines this new direction of courtly poetry as the expression of a more personal experience:

> Le lyrisme est d'abord entraîné vers un enrichissement des images sensibles, puis vers une réévaluation de l'amour en fonction de la vie concrète, vers un approfondissement de la vie intérieure dans la tristesse, enfin vers une sagesse éclairée par une culture morale plus humaniste mais toujours orientée vers Dieu.[7]

Among the various contributions to the theory of courtly love developed by these poets, introspection, heightened by the anguish of rejection and solitude, is by far the most important. The popularity of La Belle Dame Sans Merci and the cultivation of the theme of "tristesse" in fifteenth-century Catalan literature[8] are definite evidence of the impact of French poetry on that culture. This

orientation of the theory of courtly love led to the study and cultivation of the medical and philosophical notions of melancholy, which are fundamental to the development of Florentine Neoplatonism.[9] The medical literature concerning melancholy is part of the uninterrupted, if temporarily submerged, bond that makes the Florentines the heirs of the Chartrian tradition.[10] As it became more philosophical the courtly lyric was a natural medium for the development of the theory of melancholy.

The evolution of courtly literature towards the description of the lover's "interior life" is paralleled by a development in the nature and significance of imagery. In this context one must note that the increased importance of Imagination in the image-making process, oriented poetic theory towards a kind of "Platonism". It is in the use and significance of this imagery that the double nature of melancholy can be found. Although this problem seems to have been overlooked, within the limits of the study of courtly love poetry, the discussion of the problem of melancholy in the Middle Ages[11] focused primarily on Aristotle's Problem XXX, I. The latter represents: "a point in history when Platonism and Aristotelianism interpenetrate and balance one another".[12] After the near eclipse of Chartrian Platonism in the thirteenth century, caused by the introduction of the Aristotelian corpus in thirteenth-century Europe,[13] it was, among other sources,[14] largely through medical and hermetic texts concerned with the problem of melancholy that Platonism survived through the fourteenth century before regaining its vitality at the end of the fifteenth in Florence.[15] Although I shall return below to the problem of melancholy in the development of courtly love theory,[16] it is important to point out here that the contribution of the French poets is to be found mainly in their usage of imagery,

rather than in the didactic part of their poetry. This imagery is not one-sided; although it may sometimes seem to repeat the traditional motifs of the troubadours, it brings new vitality and significance. Just as courtly love should not be viewed as a single and unchanging formula,[17] so must the imagery of courtly love be allowed semasiological variance. In a study on the function of mediaeval imagery Douglas Kelly has explicitly described this problem:

> The play of meaning and sentiment on the literal level elicits a more penetrating and refined understanding of the ideas the Images articulate, whether as metonymy or allegory. This allows for variation from one text or situation to another, in accordance with semantic adaptation, authorial intention and understanding, and consequently choice of Images - in short with authorial finesse. And it flies in the face of the oft-heard but superficial allegation that courtly poetry is monotonous and monolithic.[18]

An author's usage of imagery is not merely ornamental, it has an intrinsic significance of its own, that either complements or transcends the didactic or discursive sections of a literary text. It is in fact the section that best reveals "authorial intention".

An image can serve either as a mere rhetorical ornament, or as an instrument used to convey a particular meaning. The Chartrian philosophers, such as Alain de Lille, exploited the latter potential of the image, as a means of directing the attention of the reader beyond the formal presentation of the image as a symbol. The principal function of the image was to reveal an internal spiritual truth that lay bound in the poetic metaphor:

> ... in the shallow exterior of literature the poetic lyre sounds a false note, but within speaks to its hearers of the mystery of loftier understanding, so that, the waste of outer falsity cast aside, the reader finds, in secret within, the sweeter kernel of truth.[19]

This is the essence of the "mentalité symbolique"[20] that pervades the literary production of mediaeval Platonists. As the significance of the imagery moves towards the description of the interior life of the individual, the "authorial intention" shifts away from the external

descriptions of courtship. The kind of evolution in the "authorial intention" and sensitivity to which I am referring has been succinctly summed up in French literature by Jean Frappier:

> On ne confond pas le ton de Gace Brulé et celui du Châtelain de Couci quand ilsdisent leur tristesse et leur joie, les alternances de leur doute et de leur espoir. Plus tard chez un Guillaume de Machaut, il arrive que l'expression de l'amour revête une ampleur quasi cosmique et suggère les harmonies du microcosme et du macrocosme. Au XVe siècle un Charles d'Orléans rénovera le langage de l'amour courtois en l'introduisant dans l'intimité de son espace intérieur et en faisant d'un allégorisme traditionnel une mythologie mentale instrument d'analyse au surplus.[21]

It is this kind of evolution of individual sensitivity towards the problem of love that leads to a growing importance of the symbolic nature of imagery, and causes a return to the "mentalité symbolique" of the twelfth century, thereby preparing the way for the introduction of sixteenth-century Platonism.

The influence of the French poets of Guillaume de Machaut's generation therefore indicates that there was the possibility for a change of sensitivity in Catalonia, that was divorced from the "troubadour revival" of fifteenth-century Castile, although it might be formally mimetic. In the case of the Valencian poet, Ausias March[22] (1398-1459)[23] critics are generally divided in their approach. Some consider that he is possibly the last of the troubadours[24] while others see in him a harbinger of Renaissance Platonism.[25] In either case these judgements seem to me to be based on an anachronism.[26] The study of his poetry since the fundamental work of Amédée Pagès, Auzias March et ses prédécesseurs has generally been based on the possible influence of St. Thomas Aquinas' Summa Theologica, which both A. Pagès and J. Torras i Bages firmly believe Ausias March knew, to the point of being "un disciple"[27] of St. Thomas. The salient feature of the interpretation of the poetry of Ausias March in most previous studies has been to focus the investigation almost

exclusively on the "discursive" sections of each poem. The study of the meaning of the imagery has been for the most part omitted from these works. The few studies that have dealt with Ausias March's imagery have been limited to the problems of source and influence;[28] this basically furthers A. Pagès' approach to Ausias March which uses the source of this imagery to define Ausias March's production as "troubadouresque."[29] Conversely, those interpretations that have tried to bring into relief Ausias March's "Platonism" have focused their attention mainly on those poems in which the discursive section is inordinately reduced in favour of a lyrical usage of imagery, such as in Poem XVIII, of which M. Menéndez-Pelayo makes an extensive case.[30] Yet, in spite of efforts to "Platonize" Ausias March criticism has been generally in favour of the discursive approach.

Certain recent studies, still largely based on a renewed approach to the discursive section of Ausias March's work, such as P. Ramírez i Molas, La poesia d'Ausias March,[31] who denies the Thomist influence and replaces it with a predominantly Lullian influence, and Constanzo di Girolamo[32] who, through an analysis of the semantic use of troubadouresque terminology, demonstrates how Ausias March breaks with standard troubadour tradition, have given the discursive interpretation of Ausias March a new orientation. However, eminent critics, such as Lola Badia,[33] have pointed out that like their predecessors these critics do little to enlighten the reader's understanding of the meaning of Ausias March's poetry. I would contend that much of the significance of this poetry lies in a correct interpretation of Ausias March's imagery. In order to facilitate an approach and understanding of this vast facet of Ausias March's work, I found it necessary to establish a concordance of images and proverbs (Appendix II), in which I have added various additional sources

drawn from folklore, courtly poetry, religious prose, and the Nicomachean Ethics, sometimes overlooked by Pagès and Bohigas. This catalogue is meant to guide the reader through the sources, frequency and instances of usage of the various images in Ausias March's repertoire. It is obviously impossible for me to make full use of this catalogue in this thesis. I have consequently limited my research to what I felt were the most significant themes of Ausias March's poetry, all of which have a direct bearing on his subsequent influence in Spanish literature. These are his religious attitude and his manipulation of the themes of melancholy and love. This choice is determined by the following considerations.

One of the most remarkable aspects in the study of the works of Ausias March is undoubtedly that, owing to the union of Castile and Aragon, his importance does not rest principally on his influence on the fifteenth and sixteenth-century Catalan poets of the "Decadència",[34] but above all on the first two generations of "Petrarquistas" in Golden Age Spain.[35] The consequences of this particular situation are diverse, and even contradictory. Yet, they should be borne in mind in the assessment of Ausias March's poetry. The point that always remains to answer is the reason why this fifteenth-century Catalan poet seemed so important to the major Castilian poets of the sixteenth century. The fundamental, and immediately obvious, aspect of this phenomenon is that Ausias March's work represents a vital nexus in the merging of the two cultures of Aragon and Castile, precisely at the moment when the latter entered into the mainstream of the European Renaissance of the sixteenth century.[36] From this essential point the spectrum of implications broadens out to its particular cultural manifestations. Just as the "dolce stil nuovo" and Petrarchism became an inherent part of the

development of Italian Renaissance Neoplatonic love theory,[37] and continued to be a source of inspiration for European poets of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, so is the work of Ausias March an integral part of the development of this intellectual current in Golden Age Spain.[38] The contradiction in this matter seems to lie in that he is also considered to be one of the principal representatives of the Spanish "cancioneril" tradition.[39]

Much of the confusion in these concepts seems to arise out of the usual confrontation of courtly love - Renaissance Platonic love, or in other words, Aristotelianism-Platonism. The study of the discursive aspects of Ausias March's poetry has done much to incline critics to consider him as an Aristotelian, and, hence, as a courtly poet. In this context the main problem is that of the evolution, and transition, of the courtly love sensibility to Neoplatonic love theory. O. H. Green has attempted to resolve this problem by stressing the continuity of "cancionero" attitudes in such Golden Age poets as Quevedo.[40] Yet, this is only a partial solution to a problem which largely reflects an ongoing controversy in sixteenth-century Europe, concerning the nature of love,[41] and which may well be based on false premisses concerning Green's definition of courtly love.[42] The ambiguity of the latter term is such that some critics would dismiss it altogether.[43] This state of affairs does little to enlighten the problem of the transition. A recent work on Juan Boscán perpetuates the notion of a total opposition between courtly love and Neoplatonic love. The difficulty in accepting such a position is accentuated by the fact that Boscán was greatly influenced by Ausias March;[44] his sensibility was shaped by this influence, the suggestion that he broke from it, literally overnight,[45] is suspect. The terms used by this critic reveal the difficulty of understanding

such a transition:

> ... it is without question that the recognition of Boscán's greatness could rest solely on his miraculous ability to make the radical shift from the Aristotelian world of love as a physical orexis to the Platonic universe of love as a spiritual condition.[46] (the underlining is mine)

The "miracle" deserves an explanation. The poetry of Ausias March did make use of certain themes present in mediaeval Platonism, and, in my opinion, manipulated elements of standard medical, astrological, and hermetic texts, known to the West from Arabic sources since the eleventh century. These various sources find their expression both in the imagery, and a scholastic language reflecting the usual post-thirteenth century influence of the Nichomachean Ethics. The combination of these elements used to express very subtle notions of love's melancholy, and thereby furthering the influence of his French predecessors, makes of Ausias March a mediaeval poet whose sensitivity foreshadows that of the Italianate current in Spain.

As the above paragraph has tried to suggest the problem of the transition in Spain, from the tradition of the courtly lyric to a Neoplatonic Renaissance sensitivity, rests principally on a poor definition of terms. In order to bring the various problems in Ausias March's poetry into perspective, one has to examine the relation that exists between mediaeval Aristotelianism and Platonism, and their subsequent relation to Renaissance Platonism. In addition to this the notion of the predominance of St. Thomas Aquinas as "the encyclopedia of the Middle Ages",[47] will have to be reassessed in the light of modern scholarship. Moreover, owing to the current debate over the reality of courtly love, I will attempt to come to terms with some aspects of its meaning in order to focus on its relation to the Italianate Neoplatonic current. The point of departure for both of these discussions is the study of the basic

theory of Imagination that lies behind Ausias March's imagery. This theory of imagination is the pivot for Ausias March's "Platonism", found largely in the imagery, and his "Aristotelianism", expressed in the discursive passages, both of which contribute to the expression of the poet's melancholy.

NOTES TO CHAPTER I

1 M. D. Chenu, La Théologie au douzième siècle, Paris: Vrin, 1957, pp. 240-244.

2 Winthrop Wetherbee (Platonism and Poetry in the Twelfth Century: The Literary Influence of the School of Chartres, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972, p. 220.) has correctly remarked that: "The courtly poetry of the later twelfth century is social rather than philosophical." Much of the courtly poetry beyond this period, and especially after 1323 with the decline of the troubadours and their perpetuation in the "Consistori de Tolosa," became primarily social, although it indirectly continued to use certain philosophical themes (see A. Jeanroy, La poésie lyrique des troubadours vol. II, Paris: Didier, 1934, pp. 315-326; R. Nelli, L'Erotique des troubadours, Toulouse: Edouard Privat, 1963, pp. 265-274). What one witnesses in the work of Ausias March is the return to the writing of poetry with philosophical ends, as has been noticed by A. Pagès, Auzias March et ses prédécesseurs: Essai sur la poésie amoureuse et philosophique en Catalogne au XIVe et XVe siècles, Paris: Champion, 1912.

3 Ernst Curtius, European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, trans. W. R. Trask, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973, p. 541; in Castile this has been strongly substantiated by Nicholas Round, "Renaissance Culture and its Opponents in Fifteenth-Century Castile," M.L.R. LVII, 1962, pp. 205-215. Yet, in contrast to Professor Round's somewhat exclusive definition of humanism, one might consider the cultural adaptation of the classics in a mediaeval context as an inherent preservation of the classical tradition, as understood by Jean Frappier in "La peinture de la vie et des héros antiques dans la littérature française du XIIe et du XIIIe siècles," Histoire, Mythes et Symboles, Genève: Droz, 1976, pp. 21-54: "Il me paraît plus équitable et plus indiqué de discerner chez les auteurs des romans antiques les traits d'un véritable humanisme et leur apport positif à la longue et lente tradition d'un art littéraire fondé sur l'imitation des Anciens.... Ce sont des humanistes, ces clercs courtois parce qu'ils ont conscience de receuillir l'héritage de la culture antique..." (p. 25). This represents a "laïcisation de la culture antique..." (p. 26). This approach can be summed up in the words of J. Huizinga: "as long as the Renaissance lasted, the Middle Ages actually continued" (Men and Ideas: History, the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1960, p. 91).

4 Roger Boase, The Troubadour Revival: A Study of Social Change and Traditionalism in Late Medieval Spain, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978.

5 Amédée Pagès, La poésie française en Catalogne du XIIIe siècle à la fin du XVe, Paris: Didier, 1936; also, A. Rubió i Lluch, "Joan I Humanista i el Primer Periode de l'humanisme català," Estudis Universitaris Catalans vol. X, 1919, pp. 1-68; as well as, A. Rubió i Lluch, El Renacimiento Clásico en la literatura catalana, Barcelona: Jaime Roviralta, 1889; and M. de Riquer, "Alain Chartier y Ausias March," R.F.E. XXXIX, 1955, pp. 336-338.

6 Op. cit., pp. 100-101.

7 D. Porion, Le poète et le prince, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1965, p. 10.

8 See, A. Pagès, "La Belle Dame sans Merci d'Alain Chartier: Texte français et traduction catalane," Romania LXII, 1936, pp. 480-531; A. Pagès, "Le thème de la tristesse amoureuse en France et en Espagne du XIVe au XVe siècles," Romania LVII, 1932, pp. 29-43; and M. de Riquer, "La canción de San Valentín del poeta Pardo," R.F.E. XXXIX, 1955, pp. 338-352.

9 R. Klibansky, Erwin Panofsky, and Fritz Saxl, Saturn and Melancholy: Studies in the History of Natural Philosophy, Religion, and Art, London: Nelson, 1964, especially, pp. 94-96.

10 "These twelfth-century litterati, like their legitimate heirs, the Platonists of the Renaissance conceived of the true poet in such terms as Macrobius had used to characterize Vergil..." (W. Wetherbee, op. cit., p. 150). Chenu sees the lack of an obvious continuity of Chartrian Platonism as a "momentary setback": "Le syncrétisme trop court des néoplatoniciens du XIIe siècle ne sera qu'un échec momentané" (op. cit., supra, p. 141).

11 In their study of melancholy Klibansky, Panofsky and Saxl (note 9, op. cit.) remark that, "in general the Middle Ages took little interest in the interpretation of Problem XXX, i"(p. 72). To a greater extent R. Boase in The Origin and Meaning of Courtly Love, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1977, p. 67: "Aristotle's Problemata Physica were not known to the Middle Ages, but his ideas were preserved, modified and amplified by Arab physiologists, whose works were translated into Latin from the tenth century onwards." The latter statement is partially fallacious. Arabic scholarship was very influential in the Middle Ages and did make use of Aristotle's Problemata. However, it seems that the latter were known after the twelfth century, and also that they were fairly popular: "the contents of that influential pseudo-Aristotelian problem were made accessible to the West through a Latin translation by Bartholomew of Messina. Twelve codices of his version are listed as of the thirteenth century, and ten codices of his translation date from the beginning of the fourteenth" (R.S. Kinsman, "Folly, Melancholy, and Madness" in The Darker Vision of the Renaissance: Beyond the Fields of Reason, ed. R. S. Kinsman, Berkeley: U.C.L.A., 1974, p. 308). On this particular point see also Peter Dronke, "Review of Klibansky, Panofsky, Saxl, Saturn and Melancholy," Notes and Queries CCX, 1965, pp. 354-356.

12 Saturn and Melancholy, p. 41.

13 See M.D. Chenu, La théologie au douzième siècle, p. 141, note 2, and Fernand van Steenberghen, La philosophie au XIIIe siècle, Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1966; in particular, pp. 72-117 (Chapitre III, "Invasion de la philosophie païenne"). Since one of the prime concerns of this thesis is the introduction of the "Platonic" sensibility in pre-Golden Age Spanish poetry, it should be noted that the thirteenth century witnesses the birth of

philosophy as an independent discipline: "Les maîtres du XII^{e} siècle sont intellectuellement et institutionellement des théologiens et non des philosophes..." (Chenu, p. 139). The introduction of Aristotle brings about the secularization of philosophy, in which Augustinian-Platonic themes remain the keystone of theology (Chenu, pp. 116-117); both of these currents play an important role in the development of secular vernacular literature. (On the introduction of philosophy in vernacular poetry see Wetherbee, Platonism and Poetry, as well as, Richard McKeon, "Poetry and Philosophy in the Twelfth Century," Modern Philology XLIII (1945-1946), pp. 217-234.) My concern in this thesis will, therefore, be primarily with vernacular and secular sources, although I will inevitably have to turn to Latin theological sources.

14 Among the many other currents of Mediaeval Platonism, the twelfth century introduces the Erigenist-Dionysian, as well as that of the Victorines, and is affected by the introduction of the Greek Fathers, continued by Franciscan evangelism through Saint Bonaventure (see Chenu, La théologie, and Chapters III and IV of this thesis). These are the sources, as well as medical and hermetic texts, that lead us by the Lullian influence to the role played by Nicholas Cusanus in the "Christian Platonism" of the Florentines (see, Ernst Cassirer, The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy, trans. M. Domandi, New York: Harper Row, 1963).

15 As Wetherbee (Platonism and Poetry, p. 70) points out: "Though the subject remains virtually unexplored, the influence of medical writings was clearly considerable. They inspired much original scientific investigation, and they must surely have contributed immeasurably to that awareness of the complexity of human nature which is so strikingly displayed in twelfth-century poetry. They provide a physiological counterpart, for example, to the moral-philosophical concern for the kinds and degrees of love..." (underlining is mine). I believe that the secular developments can be traced in the evolution of the notion of melancholy, as studied by Klibansky, Panofsky and Saxl.

16 See Chapter V: Melancholy: Mirror of Courtly Love.

17 Jean Frappier, who points out the variations of courtly love between Northern France and Provence in "Vues sur les conceptions courtoises dans les littératures d'oc et d'oil au XII^{e} siècle" in Amour Courtois et Table Ronde, Genève: Droz, 1973, pp. 1-32, further develops this concept in his extensive survey of the problem: "Sur un procès fait à l'amour courtois" (Ibid., pp. 61-96). He defines courtly love as a matter of evolving sensibility: "On n'interprète pas Jaufré Rudel ou Bernard de Ventadorn en dissertant sur Guillaume de Machaut, sur Chaucer ou sur Charles d'Orléans, comme si du XII^{e} siècle à la fin du Moyen Age il s'agissait toujours du même "amour courtois" (p. 93); furthermore, "En fait, assez tôt, l'essence de la fine amor s'est altérée et le secret de sa poésie s'est peut-être irrémédiablement perdu. A une réaction d'esprit dévot contre des sublimités qui pouvaient paraître en fin de compte relever simplement d'un hédonisme mondain ne tarda guère à se mêler un souhait très

franc de concilier le raffinement de l'amour avec la rectitude morale. Des croisements se produisent aussi entre le fine amour et des éléments venus d'ailleurs que du domaine provençal. Ainsi naquirent des variétés dont chacune est à elle seule un certain "amour courtois" (p. 94). One of the logical conclusions of this often restrictive, and therefore, inadequate definition is that the majority of social evolutions of love and courtship in the Western world could then be considered manifestations of "courtly love."

18 Douglas Kelly, Medieval Imagination: Rhetoric and the Poetry of Courtly Love, Madison: The University of Wisconsin, 1978, p. 231.

19 Alain de Lille, The Complaint of Nature, trans. D. M. Moffat, Hamden, Connecticut: Archon, 1972 (reprint of Yale Studies in English, 1902), p. 40.

20 M. D. Chenu, La théologie, pp. 159-209.

21 Jean Frappier, Amour courtois et table ronde, pp. 95-96.

22 The graphic rendition of the name "Ausias" has been the subject of some controversy ever since the first editions of Ausias March's works. The controversy can be found summed up in A. Pagès, Auzias March et ses prédécesseurs, pp. 56-58. The latter inclined to the spelling "Auzias". Following the research of R. Aramòn i Serra, Pere Bohigas (ed. Ausias March, Poesies vol. I, Barcelona: Barcino, 1952, pp. 9-11, note 1) and Germán Colon ("El nom de fonts del poeta Ausias March," Boletín de la Sociedad Castellonense de Cultura XLVI num. 1, 1970, pp. 161-224, believe that the correct spelling is "Ausiàs." Finally, M. de Riquer, ("Ausias March," Historia de la literatura catalana vol. II, Barcelona: Ariel, 1964, pp. 471-472, note 1), and Rafael Ferreres (ed. Ausias March, Obra poética completa vol. I, pp. 16-21) suggest that "Ausias" is the best spelling. Other possible variations are listed in these works. For my part, of these three main spellings, I would be inclined to follow the orthography "Ausias," both because the arguments of Riquer and Ferreres seem to be the soundest, and in matters such as this, which are the subject of endless academic quibbling, simplicity is undoubtedly the best guide. Apart from this slight disagreement with Bohigas, his edition seems to me to be in many respects the soundest, therefore, all quotations of Ausias March in this thesis will proceed from this edition, unless otherwise indicated.

23 Ausias March's date of birth is a matter of some uncertainty. It is based mainly on the first documented dates concerning Ausias March. Critics generally suppose that at the moment of his emancipation in 1409 he must have been at least twelve years old. This places his birth somewhere about 1397 (see A. Pagès, Auzias March et ses prédécesseurs, p. 56; Bohigas, Poesies vol. I, p. 14; Riquer, "Ausias March," p. 472; R. Ferreres, Obra poética completa vol. I, pp. 21-22; as well as, F. Martí Grajales, Ensayo de un diccionario biográfico y bibliográfico de los poetas que florecieron en le Reino de Valencia, Madrid: Revista de Archivos, Bibliotecas y Museos, 1927, p. 286, and Luis Fullana,

"Los caballeros de apellido March en Cataluña y Valencia," Boletín de la Sociedad Castellonense de Cultura, t. XVII, 1936, pp. 136-137. The latter work is of great interest since it reviews the various theories on the birth of Ausias March by Gregorio Silvestre and A. Paz y Melía. This scholar has written "Noticias para la vida de Ausias March," Revista de Archivos y Museos vol. V, 1901, pp. 371-372 which presents interesting arguments for placing the date of birth in 1381.

24 A. Pagès, Auzias March et ses prédécesseurs, p. 233 ("en un mot c'est un troubadour attardé"), and more recently R. Ferreres, Obra poética completa vol. I, pp. 45-48. In the case of the latter it should be remarked that his reasoning is faulty. He merely repeats the obsolete point of view of Pagès, and then supports it with the authority of Pierre Le Gentil (La poésie lyrique espagnole et portuguaise à la fin du moyen âge vols. I-II, Rennes: Plihon, 1949-1952). In this work it is obvious that Le Gentil does not seem to have a first hand knowledge of Ausias March; each reference, such as that on page 460, explicitly relies on Pagès interpretation. (The same is true of René Nelli, L'Erotique des troubadours, pp. 273-274). Moreover, Ferreres states that: "Hasta la plena incorporación de la poesía española al renacimiento es evidente y poderosa la influencia provenzal y aun cuando triunfa el Renacimiento no se pierde completamente. El Cancionero de Baena, entre otras, ofrece gran cantidad de ejemplos. Si esto ocurría con los poetas castellanos a los que no les unía ni historia, ni lengua, ni tradición literaria, hay que pensar lo que fue para la poesía catalana y valenciana tan vinculada a la lírica provenzal" (p. 46). This argument is obviously based on the pre-supposed evaluation of Castilian poetry in the fourteenth century, or the generation prior to Ausias March. It overlooks what Frappier calls the Northern French influence, and the evolution from the troubadours to Ausias March (see notes 17 and 18). Moreover, the problem of the continued influence of Provenço-Catalan poetics affects all of Europe (see for instance, Roger Boase, The Origin and Meaning of Courtly Love, p. 8). That certain, generally lesser, poets continued to cultivate the Provençal lyric forms in Europe as a whole, is not to be questioned, however, before applying a general definition, each poet's work must be carefully considered. Constanzo di Girolamo ("Ausias March and the Troubadour Poetic Code," Catalan Studies in Memory of Josephine de Boer, eds. Joseph Gulsoy and Josep M. Sola-Solé, Barcelona: Hispam, 1977, pp. 223-237), has amply demonstrated Ausias March's complete semantic departure from Provençal poetic theory. For a more temperate view of Pagès' theory, see A. Rubió y Lluch's review: "Amédée Pagès - Auzias March et ses prédécesseurs," Anuari de l'Institut d'Estudis Catalans IV 1911-1912, pp. 729-738. It is the source of M. de Riquer's more balanced judgement on this matter in "Ausias March," Historia de la literatura catalana II, p. 514.

25 M. Menéndez-Pelayo has done the most to point out Ausias March's supposed Platonic roots, and by implication, although not always explicitly, he presents Ausias March as a harbinger in: "De las vicisitudes de la filosofía platónica en España," Obras completas t. 9, Madrid: Victoriano Suárez, 1918, p. 89,

and Historia de las ideas estéticas en España t. II, Madrid: Viuda e Hijos de M. Tello, 1910, pp. 223-233. Others consider him to be a precursor: J. Rubió y Ors, Ausias March y su época, Barcelona: J. Subirana, 1882, pp. 32-40; A. Rubió y Lluch, El Renacimiento clásico en la literatura catalana, Barcelona: J. J. Roviralta, 1889, pp. 34-36, and J. Rubió i Balaguer, De l'Edat Mitjana al Renaixement, Barcelona: Ayma, 1948, pp. 40, 44-49, 150-151. M. de Riquer ("Els poetes petrarquistes de Catalunya," Commentaris critics sobre clàssics catalans, Barcelona: La Revista, 1935, p. 9) suggests that Ausias March's use of the hendecasyllabic verse was compatible with the scansion of the Italian Renaissance hendecasyllable. In a more recent work José Alcina Clota ("Raices Helénicas," Homenaje a Ausias March, Barcelona: Instituto Nacional de Enseñanza Media "Ausias March", 1959, pp. 15-22) further elaborates on Ausias March's Platonism, although his arguments are not very convincing.

26 J. Huizinga, "The Problem of the Renaissance," Men and Ideas, pp. 260-261: "By marking someone as a precursor one lifts him out of the framework of his time, within which he should be understood, and in so doing one distorts history." The same judgement is applicable in the inverse direction, see Frappier as quoted in note 17.

27 This phrase is found in A. Pagès, Auzias March et ses prédécesseurs, p. 388, and warranted by the study of J. Torras i Bages, "El poeta Ausias March," La Tradició Catalana, Barcelona: Selecta, 1966 (original 1892), pp. 321-348.

28 These articles on the source and influence of Ausias March's imagery, also discuss Ausias March's usage of the latter in a very limited way: R. Leveroni, "Les images marines en la poesia d'Ausies March," B.H.S. XXVII, 1951, pp. 152-166; Miquel Dolç, "Ausiàs March, poeta mediterrani," Revista de Filología Valenciana VI, 1963, pp. 33-54; and Wendy Rolf, "Conflict and Choice: The Sea Storm in the Poems of Ausias March," H.R. (39), 1971, pp. 69-75. By far the most enlightening of these is that of R. Leveroni, who emphasizes Ausias March's original use of sea imagery as compared to the troubadours, however she loses herself in a comparison with contemporary poetry that adds little to the reader's knowledge. W. Rolf's study furthers that of Bohigas, "Metafísica y retórica en la obra de Ausiàs March," Revista Valenciana de Filología VI, 1963, pp. 3-25, which traces the evolution of marine imagery in Ausias March. I believe that this is based on a radical misunderstanding of the symbolic value of Ausias March's imagery; see Chapter V of this thesis. A very recent interpretation of Ausias March's usage of the "maldit" tradition: Marie-Claire Zimmerman, "Les métamorphoses du maldit chez Ausias March," Ibérica I: Cahiers Ibériques et Ibéro-américains de l'Université de Paris, Sorbonne, 1977, pp. 333-347, makes an extensive and enlightening comparison of Ausias March's handling of "maldit" imagery, but unfortunately loses herself in redundant structuralist jargon.

29 A. Pagès, Auzias March et ses prédécesseurs, p. 233.

30 M. Menéndez-Pelayo, Historia de las ideas estéticas II, p. 224.

31 Pere Ramírez i Molas, La poesia d'Ausias March: anàlisi textual, conologia, elements filosòfics (Ph.D.), Basle: University Publication, 1970, pp. 313-387.

32 See note 22.

33 Lola Badia, "Llegir a Ausias March," Serra d'Or, gener 1980: "Em sembla, en resum, que és lícit d'afirmar que les deficencies que presenta la divulgació de l'obra de March.... no és sinó el reflex de l'estat actual dels estudis generals sobra la poesia del valencià i que no podem queixar-nos massa del mercat bibliogràfic ni dels esforços dels crítics. El resultat, però, és que ara com ara no llegirem Ausiàs March sense patir" (p. 44).

34 For his influence on Catalan poets see in particular, A. Pagès, Auzias March et ses prédécesseurs, pp. 393-407, and P. Bohigas (ed.) Poesies vol. I, pp. 132-149.

35 As P. Bohigas has said: "el testimoni més eloquent de la pervivència d'Ausiàs March en els segles XVI i XVIII ens el dóna la literatura castellana;" on this subject see Poesies I, pp. 149-156 (quote, p. 149), and A. Pagès, Auzias March et ses prédécesseurs, pp. 403-422. Further contributions to the study of Auzias March's influence on Golden Age poetry can be found in: José María de Cossío, "De Ausiàs March y Bartolomé Argensola," R.F.E. XIX, 1932, pp. 187-188; R. Lapesa, La trayectoria poética de Garcilaso, Madrid: Revista de Occidente, 1948; Kathleen McNerney, The Influence of Ausias March on Castilian Golden Age Poetry (Ph.D. thesis), New Mexico: Albuquerque, May 1977, 128 pages (a catalogue based on a small part of Pagès' research, only looks at four poets, includes many translations of Ausias March); J. G. Fucilla, "Two Generations of Petrarchism and Petrarchists in Spain," Modern Philology XXVII, 1930, esp. pp. 277-279; by the same author, Estudios sobre el petrarquismo en España, Madrid: Revista de Filología Española (Anejo LXXII), 1960, pp. XIII-26; A. Comas, "Cuatro influencias de la literatura catalana medieval sobre la castellana de la edad media y del renacimiento," Ensayos sobre literatura catalana, Barcelona: Taber, 1968, pp. 30-40; M. de Riquer, "Influencia de Ausias March en la lírica castellana de la Edad de Oro," Revista Nacional de Educación I, 1941, pp. 49-74; also by the same author, Traducciones castellanas de Ausias March en la Edad de Oro, Barcelona: Instituto Español de Estudios Mediterráneos, 1946, pp. IX-XLI; Juan Manuel de Rozas, "Petrarca y Ausiàs March en los sonetos-prólogos amorosos del Siglo de Oro," Homenaje a Diez Taboada, Estudios de Filología Española, 1952, pp. 57-75; A. M. Withers, The Sources of the Poetry of Gutierre de Cetina, Philadelphia: Westbrook, 1923, pp. 47-82; A. M. Withers, "Further Influences of Ausias March on Gutierre de Cetina," M.L.N., 1936, pp. 373-379; J. P. Wickershaw Crawford, "Notes on the Sonnets in the Spanish Cancionero General de 1554," Romanic Review VII, 1916, pp. 328-337; most recently, Rafael Ferreres, "Ausias March en algunos poetas del Siglo de Oro," Estudios sobre literatura y arte: Dedicados al Profesor Emilio Orozco Díaz vol. I, Granada: Universidad de Granada, 1979, pp. 469-483, an interesting contribution which sets back the influence of Ausias March prior to Boscán.

36 This phrase is expedient. The transition was, perhaps more than anything else, the product of economic stability. All over Europe the distinction between "the Middle Ages" and "the Renaissance" is never too clear (Huizinga, Men and Ideas, p. 260). The concept of the Renaissance is mainly one of restauratio to the Golden Age. Therefore, one of the fundamental problems is the number of renaissances preceding the flourishing of the period known to us as the Renaissance. The whole concept of the restauratio to the Golden Age suggests that the development of the Renaissance is intimately related to that of the evangelical movement within the Church (see Chenu, La théologie, pp. 252-273). Owing to this problem, one can see in the Renaissance the culmination of late mediaeval culture: "The Renaissance cannot be understood as a pure contrast to medieval culture, not even as a frontier territory between medieval and modern times" (Huizinga, Ibid., p. 286). Hence, after the social turmoil of the latter half of the fifteenth century, Spain catches up to the social fashions of sixteenth-century Europe; in this context intellectual novelties also come to bear their influence.

37 On this point see John Charles Nelson, Renaissance Theory of Love, New York: Columbia, 1958, pp. 15-54 which traces the prose commentaries on Dante and Petrarch in the Florentine circle; Nesca A. Robb, Neoplatonism of the Italian Renaissance, New York: Octagon Books, 1968, pp. 1-56. Of particular interest in this process is the role played by Ramon Lull in the re-orientation of this sensibility. Although I will deal with part of this problem in the fourth chapter of this thesis, it should suffice to point out Lull's influence on Giordano Bruno (Nelson, p. 4); see also Chapter III, note 109.

38 In any discussion on this subject Ausias March cannot be overlooked, as is evident in M. Menéndez-Pelayo, "De las vicisitudes de la filosofía platónica en España" (see note 25). His role cannot be clearly understood, however, as long as his relation to fifteenth-century courtly poetry is not clarified.

39 The main responsibility for this lies in O. H. Green's "Courtly Love in the Spanish Cancioneros," P.M.L.A. LXIV, 1949 , pp. 247-301. In this article Green makes extensive reference to Ausias March in order to support his point. This use of Ausias March is tendentious and its validity is greatly undermined by the research of C. di Girolamo (see note 24). My first objection to Green is that, as the opening lines of this introduction suggest, Ausias March is not necessarily representative of the Spanish, that is, "Castilian," cancionero tradition. The second basic objection has been formulated by the late R. O. Jones in "Bembo, Gil Polo, Garcilaso: Three Accounts of Love," Revue de littérature comparée vol. 40, 1966, pp. 526-540: "... with its insistence that courtly love is essentially amor de lonh, "have and have not." This one sided interpretation (true perhaps of some poets but certainly not all) is now being abandoned -- just when Professor Green propagates it afresh among Hispanists in his Spain and the Western Tradition, vol. I (Madison, 1963)" (p. 535). Furthermore, it is interesting to note in this context that R. Lapesa, La trayectoria poética de Garcilaso, is always careful to distinguish between cancioneros and Ausias March:

"varios corrientes que confluyen en la poesía de Boscán y Garcilaso: clásicismo, petrarquismo, formas italianas, herencia de cancionero e influjo de Ausias March, se ofrecen imperfectadamente amalgadas en la obra del barcelonés..." (p. 20).

40 O. H. Green, El amor cortés en Quevedo, Zaragoza: Librería General, 1955.

41 See J. C. Nelson's review of the various Italian love treatises, and the fashionable controversy surrounding the nature of love, Renaissance Theory of Love, pp. 67-162. After Ficino's treatment of this matter in the In Convivium Platonis sive de Amore, the subject became a fashion, which never had the profound meaning of the original philosophical treatise, it became an artificial literary genre. Hence, in his conclusion Nelson points out, in reference to Castiglione's Il libro del cortegiano: "The ideal itself becomes merely a topic for polite conversation, and one wonders whether it means more to its proponents than to the scoffers, such as Signor Morello" (p. 261).

42 See note 37; Green's definition is greatly influenced by the theories of Alexander J. Denomy (summed up in The Heresy of Courtly Love, New York: The Declau X. McMullen Co., 1947) which are reviewed by Theodore Silverstein, "Andreas, Plato and the Arabs," Modern Philology XLVII, 1949-1950, pp. 117-126, as well as, Peter Dronke, Medieval Latin and the Rise of the European Love-Lyric vol. I, Oxford: Clarendon, 1968, p. 6.

43 See F.-X. Newman (ed.) The Meaning of Courtly Love, Albany: State University of New York, 1968, as well as Jean Frappier's response in Amour Courtois et Table Ronde, pp. 61-96, and in the same volume, "Amour Courtois" pp. 33-41; see also notes 17 and 21.

44 "La influencia de Ausias March, muy intensa, fue puesta de relieve por Menéndez y Pelayo, que hizo notar la estrecha afinidad espiritual entre los dos poetas, superior a la de Boscán con Petrarca, y reunió buen numero de ejemplos con débitos indudables. Sus conclusiones fueron corroboradas y ampliadas por Amédée Pages." (R. Lapesa, La trayectoria poética de Garcilaso, p. 46.)

45 I do not wish to suggest that Ausias March's poetic sensitivity was "renacentista," nor that it should be confused with the Italianate sensitivity, but rather that through his handling of cosmic and harmonic theories of melancholy, which went somewhat beyond the standard concept of amor hereos, his sensitivity prepared the way for the entrance of Italianate currents. Hence, I tacitly object to the words of R. O. Jones who sees the entrance of the Italianate fashion as something radically unknown to Spain: "This encounter took place in 1526 when Andrea Navagero, poet and classical scholar, was present, as Venetian ambassador, at Charles V's triumphal entry into Granada. Navagero's great prestige as a man of letters doubtless made his encouragement the more persuasive. Garcilaso, in his enthusiasm for the new literary experience which Italy afforded, was led to reject earlier Spanish literature root and branch... The change of feeling was relatively recent and sudden" (A Literary History of Spain, The Golden Age: Prose and Poetry, London: Ernest Benn, 1971, pp. 28-29). As

Lapesa points out (La trayectoria de Garcilaso, p. 26) Garcilaso continued to cultivate Spanish metres for some time after 1528. The implications of Jones' assumption is not merely one of metres, but one of poetic sensitivity. I would not object to Jones' general theory had he not interpreted Garcilaso's phrase, "apenas ha nadie escrito en nuestra lengua sino lo que se pudiera muy bien escusar" (in A Literary History, p. 29) as referring to all Spanish literature, but rather, as I believe it was intended, to Castilian, remembering that Ausias March was then accessible only in Catalan. I feel somewhat supported in my contention by the research of Patrick Gallagher, The Life and Works of Garci Sánchez de Badajoz, London: Tamesis, 1968, which represents a more comprehensive study of late cancionero poetry, which unfortunately differs vastly from the kind of criticism that surrounds the study of Ausias March. As Nicholas Round has correctly pointed out in his review-article of Gallagher, "Garci-Sánchez de Badajoz and the Revaluation of Cancionero Poetry," F.M.L.S. VI, 1970, pp. 178-187, "Loosely, we might call them "Platonists" -- a reminder that humanistic Neoplatonism, when it reached Spain, was to find a public already familiar with its basic doctrines of the nature of reality" (p. 181).

46 David H. Darst, Juan Boscán, Boston: Twayne, 1978, p. 68.

47 M.W. Bundy, The Theory of Imagination in Classical and Mediaeval Thought, Urbana: University of Illinois, 1927, p. 227.

CHAPTER II: NOTES ON THE BIOGRAPHY OF AUSIAS MARCH.

When evidence concerning the intimate aspects of the life of an author is lacking, critics must inevitably base their reconstruction of his biography on conjectures. Frequently the latter are founded on references to second-hand judgements made over one century after the passing of the author in question. This adds to the complex problem that a biography is always an interpretation that focuses on certain facets of the individual's personality. In instances where first-hand source material is lacking that reconstruction is consciously, or unconsciously, determined by the approach and method taken by the critic, who is also affected by prejudices and beliefs of his age. Thus, no matter how well-intentioned and rigorous a critic may wish to be, a biography is always the subjective analysis of the life of the author concerned. It is the interpretation of documentation adjusted to the critical perspective of the researcher, especially when he feels obliged to weave a character sketch on the basis of purely external pieces of information, such as legal documents. It is subordinated to the justification of a literary theory.

It seems to me that the description made of the life of Ausias March by Amedée Pagès, and subsequently by Luis Fullana and their followers, is just such a case.[1] The preliminary work done by Pagès necessarily corresponds to his fundamental thesis that Ausias March is "un troubadour attardé".[2] It is from this context that Pagès found it natural to stress the seemingly feudal aspects of Ausias March's life, since feudality underlies the "courtly" mentality. Undoubtedly, Ausias March was in many aspects of the

administration of his estates a lord, with feudal rights and privileges, and Pagès' painstaking research evinces this point. Should one approach the poetry of Ausias March only in this light inconsistencies would quickly become obvious. Hence, it is unsettling to note that many aspects of Ausias March's historical circumstance, as well as his literary production, mark a departure from the Catalan feudal tradition, as does, for instance, his use of Catalan and not Provençal as a poetic language. Recently, modern critics have been inclined to draw attention to the fact that Ausias March seems to present a way out of the existing molds of tradition, if not an alternative.[3] Consequently I would suggest, for socio-economic reasons which I will expose below, that the life of Ausias March presents certain anomalies that do not entirely correspond to the feudal circumstance presented by A. Pagès and L. Fullana, and that furthermore certain points of interpretation stressed by various critics, and not necessarily Pagès, are unwarranted and do not allow one to sustain the kind of portrait commonly drawn of Ausias March and his work. It is not my purpose to present a biography of Ausias March. What documentation is available for this purpose has already been collected by the aforementioned critics, and I have no intention of duplicating their research. My intention is to present a slightly more balanced point of view. To this end I will try to clarify five points which have drawn the attention of most readers of Ausias March, and which have often been accepted as facts, although they are not substantiated. This exercise is not simply frivolous since these five points directly affect the interpretation of this poet's work.

The method used by Pagès deserves attention. Like most

French nineteenth and early twentieth-century historical critics, Pagès' work has a definitely positivist aura about it, worthy of the tradition of Auguste Comte and Ernest Renan. Its admirable philological rigour is undermined by a tendency to interpret the life of Ausias March in implicitly naturalist terms. Thus, in Auzias March et ses prédécesseurs, Pagès subordinates the work of the Valencian poet to that of his forebearers, and thereby places it within the "courtly tradition." The determinist bias of this interpretation is patent in the concluding paragraph of the genealogy of the March family:

> Issu d'une famille de chevaliers, comptant parmi ses parents collatéraux des ecclésiastiques ou des guerriers soumis à une discipline monacale, fils, neveu et cousin de poètes soucieux de moralisation, Auzias March ne pouvait que difficilement se soustraire à toutes ses influences, et il serait étrange que de tels exemples et une hérédité aussi multiple n'aient pas laissé quelques vestiges dans l'esprit et dans l'oeuvre d'un écrivain, en qui toutes les forces vives de la race devaient s'épanouir comme dans son dernier rameau.[4] (underlining is mine)

The twin concepts of heredity and race are the governing factors of Pagès' thesis. The critic who chooses to accept Pagès' interpretation must acquiesce to this premiss of Pagès' work. This procedure can only raise questions, even though it does not seem to have done so. In the first place, any claim to the weight of so many predecessors in Ausias March's life is substantially altered when one notes that in 1948 Pagès revised the genealogy of the Marchs, leaving only one poet in direct filiation to Ausias March, and the others may never have had any contact with the Valencian poet. This however, is entirely speculative and it is best to set aside the hardly credible notion of race and heredity. Furthermore, one might accept the Pagès' claim that Ausias March was affected by the literary works and the cultural tradition of his relatives,

if the eminent French critic had substantiated this by identifying traces of their poetry in that of their successor. The two possible instances referred to by Pagès are so general that they do not validate his approach.[5] That one should therefore approach the poetry of Ausias March primarily as the work of an individual, and only after this as pertaining to a broader literary tradition, is even more evident when the chronology of his life is taken into consideration.

Ausias March was born in 1397 or 1398, long after the marriage of his father, Pere March the fifth, to his second wife, Leonor de Ripoll in 1379.[6] His father, who died in 1413, was the descendant of Catalan bourgeois who had served the crown as royal notaries, councillors and treasurers. The first of these, Pere March the first, was originally from Barcelona, and had been granted an estate in Gandía for his services to the king in 1249, ten years after the reconquest of Valencia. From then on the March family is divided into two main branches; one remains in Catalonia, and the other in Valencia. Now, although Ausias March's cousin, Pere March the third, was knighted in 1323, his own grandfather, Jacme March the second was only knighted in 1360, and is the first March to be knighted in the Valencian branch of the Ausias' family. Thus, the nobility of Ausias March's family only dates from some forty years prior to his birth. Jacme March the second inherited the Catalan estates of the March family at the Castle of Arampunyà when that branch died out in 1354, and his second son, Pere March the fifth was then given the Valencian estates. Ausias March's uncle, the elder brother of Pere March, Jacme March the third, inherited the Castle of Arampunyà from his father. In all this the first

point to note is that Ausias March's family does not form part of the ancient aristocracy that formed the real feudal nobility, but rather it belongs to the well-to-do bourgeoisie recently integrated into the ranks of the lower nobility. Contrary to Pagès' emphasis on the nobility of the March family, it would be more exact to say that it is representative of the Valencian landed gentry that financed the mercantile Mediterranean expansionism of the Aragonese kings culminating in the work of Alfonso the Magnanimous.[7]

The next point is that, as I noted above, Pere March the fifth died in 1413, shortly after the emancipation of Ausias March, which occurred in 1409, that is, at the age of twelve.[8] If as Pagès would have it, Ausias March began to write poetry in 1430, that is, some seventeen years after Pere March's death, it is doubtful that Ausias March might have been affected by his father's teachings.[9] From this perspective it must also be noted that between 1413 and 1430, many intervening incidents, not least of which is his participation in the Italian campaigns of Alfonso the Magnanimous, where he undoubtedly met poets such as Jordi de San Jordi and Andreu Febrer, would have put him in a totally different intellectual atmosphere from that of his predecessors. Another point to be considered is that although he inherited the rich library of Pere March the fifth, which must have served to develop his intellectual abilities, Ausias March may hardly have known his father. Pere March was about seventy-five years old when he died, and until his resignation in the first months of 1412, he had been since 1395 Attorney General and Bailiff for the Duke of Gandía, responsible for all the cities and castles owned by the latter.[10] This position must have required the frequent absence of Pere from his home. For these reasons, one can only treat Pagès' presupposition

that Ausias March was affected by the literary tradition of his father, with extreme caution, although one must also be wary not to reject it outright either. As the work of an individual the poetry of Ausias March cannot be interpreted as being subordinate to that of his forebearers; he was undoubtedly aware of previous traditions, but also of his contemporaries. These contribute to shape his own literary reactions which do not necessarily adhere to a single tradition.

After his participation in the campaigns of Alfonso V which took him to Corsica, Sardinia, Naples and the Isles of Djerba, Chergui and Kerkennah in the Gulf of Gabès facing the Tunisian cities of Sfax and Gabès, Ausias March returned to Valencia in 1425, having been appointed the king's grand falconer. This obliged him to reside in Valencia while his mother continued to care for his estates. In 1429 he returned to Gandía and Beniarjò after the passing of his mother, and ceased to be directly employed by the king. From then on Ausias March seems to have retired from public life, living principally at his estate in Beniarjò, as well as in Gandía and Valencia, with possible occasional voyages to Naples.[11] His life in the remaining twenty-nine years is known to us only through a series of legal documents concerning interminable lawsuits and his two marriages. From the first of these in 1437 to Isabel Martorell i Monpalau, the sister of Johannot Martorell, one of the authors of Tirant lo Blanc, Ausias March inherited more property in Rafol de Jalòn when Isabel died in 1439, childless. In 1443 he re-married to Juana Escornà y Castella, with whom he moved to Valencia in 1450 where he passed away in 1458, with no legitimate descent. Juana Escornà had preceded him in 1454. The heirs of

Ausias March then consisted mainly of his four illegitimate children, three sons and one daughter, begotten from concubines and slaves. Various critics, such as Pagès, have made a very elaborate case of this aspect of Ausias March's life, partially in order to demonstrate the lust that would seem to complement the tortured love that animates his poetry, but mainly to accentuate the credibility of the notion that Ausias March had a seigniorial mentality. Pagès sees in this a confirmation of his thesis: "Ce sont ces amours irrégulières, les faiblesses d'un grand seigneur que nous révèle le chapître secret de la biographie d'Auzias March."[12] For whoever has read Pagès these true confessions are a key to the portrait of Ausias March the belated troubadour who is constantly represented as a "seigneur justicier ou justiciable... Très attaché à ses prérogatives, il les exerce avec le sentiment le plus vif de son importance."[13] This takes Pagès directly to the equivocal notion that: "le poète ne fait qu'exposer sa manière de vivre."[14] More than a way of life, as I hope to show in successive chapters, Ausias March reveals a theory of love. These accidents of Ausias March's life should not prejudice our evaluation of his poetry, especially since they are not referred to in his work. One should remember that the problem of illegitimate children was not exclusive to the nobility; it was a fairly common factor of the Middle Ages. One need only think of the life of Petrarch and how his work avoids factual references to Laura's marriage and to his two illegitimate children and their mother.[15] It is evident that these aspects of Ausias March's intimate life do not necessarily affect the content of his poetry. Indirectly, these things do reflect an aspect of Ausias March's character, but one which is evident in his poetry without reference to these external details.

Consequently, the extra-marital activities of Ausias March have little bearing on the so-called seigniorial mentality of the Valencian poet. Once more it is necessary to return to Pagès' inclination to represent Ausias March as a feudal lord. There is no doubt that Ausias March, who lived in the first half of the fifteenth century did live in a feudal juridical system, and that he was affected by this circumstance. Furthermore, Ausias March was a proud man, who defended his rights and privileges, but pride is not a particularity of the nobility. It is misleading to represent Ausias March as a knight of the Middle Ages living in feudal conditions such as those of the twelfth-century troubadours. The circumstance is radically altered by the change of the economic system. As I mentioned above, Ausias March and his family are representatives of the landed gentry that had recently been granted titles of nobility, and as such, they manifest a very conservative mentality. The point of differentiation between them and the old aristocracy, which Pagès seems to overlook, is that the socio-economic system on which their wealth and status rests, and which, therefore, conditions their values, is radically different from the purely agrarian warring feudal aristocracy, which they imitate. That which really affects the sensibility of Ausias March is not so much the external trappings of his social condition, as the pressures and interrelations of social economy which both maintain and modify his position. This forms his real circumstance. As he states in one of his poems, Ausias March is a Valencian: "La velledat en valencians mal prova, / e no sé com yo faça obra nova" (CXII, vv. 9-10).[16] It is, then, to the Valencian context that he belongs, and that the critic must understand in order to come to a just

evaluation of his poetry. Unlike the Castilian socio-economic system of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, which is feudal and agrarian, the Valencian system is mercantile, although not quite in the same manner as the Italian city-states with which it competes. The rural agriculture system of Valencia is complemented by an important industrial base. As early as the beginning of the fourteenth century the dukes of Gandía had fomented the development of the textile industry, which grew throughout Valencia. With the textile industry there also came a different religious sensibility, characteristic of Franciscan secularization, such as one finds in Ausias March.[17]

Ausias March does not seem to have been directly involved in the non-agrarian industry of his region;[18] however, he forms part of a very productive commercial agrarian class which plays an important role in the development of the bourgeois mentality of Valencia. In the administration of his estates Ausias March was among the first men in Spain to establish a sugar mill, and therefore, to promote the industrial production of sugar and its commercialization. To this aspect of his life must be added his participation in the building of a vast irrigation canal, still known today as the "canal dels Marcs", and the building of a bridge.[19] This kind of activity is largely reponsible for the prosperity of Valencia, which enabled the full introduction of the Renaissance in the second half of the fifteenth-century. In order to understand this development one must turn to the study of Francesc Eximenis' economic theory by José A. Maravall.[20] In this work the latter shews how the Franciscan writer adopts the modes of his spirituality to the urban pre-capitalist mentality of Valencia, in the generation prior to Ausias March. The important point that Maravall makes is

that the Renaissance sensibility in Valencia was not brought about by the small industrial bourgeoisie, but by a traditionalist leisurely class which fomented work and prosperity:

> Tales juicios sobre el trabajo y la ociosidad, como ha bien puesto en claro Anderson, constituyen una manifestación de un espíritu tradicional y responden a la mentalidad de una sociedad de base agraria. Así se explica que, contra lo que parece desprenderse de lo estimado por ciertos escritores españoles del presente, la sociedad dinámica, que inicia el gran despegue capitalista en las sociedades europeas del Renacimiento, no fuera creación de pequeños artesanos y trabajadores mecánicos, sino de los "ociosos honorables" que caracterizó Max Weber.[21]

Without being a merchant or a banker, like the Medici and other prominent Italian families, Ausias March is one of these traditionalist "honourably leisured" individuals. Yet, unlike his Italian counterparts Ausias March is not a fully integrated member of the urban gentry, as documents attest his residence alternates between the country and the city. This situation represents what Max Weber describes as a transference of status connections:

> The cutting of status connections with the rural nobility was carried out in relatively pure form only in the civic corporations of Nothern Europe. In the South, chiefly in Italy, the reverse occurs when, with the mounting power of the cities, rural nobles took up urban residence.[22]

With the growing prosperity and power of Valencia in the fifteenth century, it is only natural that one should find Ausias March, who is a rural noble, drawn to the city.

José A. Maravall's point of view, referred to in the above quotation, is somewhat extreme. If the Renaissance did not arise from the industrial class, their presence was nonetheless an important catalyst. The situation is far more complex than a mere opposition between the bourgeoisie and the aristocracy. It was the constant dialectical exchange between the two productive classes in Valencia that brought about the necessary changes. Thus, one

finds in Ausias March's poetry explicit mention of his contempt for the merchant class, such as his criticism of knights who take part in mercantile activities: "los cavallers per mercaders s'espachen" (CIV, v. 220), and when he vents his indignation at the lady who has jilted him, by accusing her of having sold her body to a "merchant": "ha mercader liura·s vostre cors vill" (XLII, v. 11). It would be incorrect to interpret these verses as simply reflecting the author's contempt for the merchant class; they are of a topical nature in Spanish poetry.[23] Behind their face-value lies the more important expression of the rivalry and tension that existed between the new nobility and the upcoming merchant class, and the passive competition which their presence in an urban context entailed. Hence, although Ausias March's fortune stemmed mainly from the agricultural productivity of his estates, one notes that he spent about one half of his adult life in the urban atmosphere of Gandía and Valencia. Furthermore, these apparent criticisms of the merchant class belie Ausias March's familiarity with the urban middle class, which is obvious in his poetic exchanges with young citizens of Valencia, such as, Bernat Fenollar,[24] and Joan Moreno,[25] who serves as witness to Ausias March's first will.[26]

Consequently, without needing to say that Ausias March was a merchant, which would be inexact, one can legitimately forward the idea that his work is the product of an individual living in an urbanizing, not to use Maravall's terminology "pre-capitalist", society. Moreover, it does not seem misleading to suggest that as a member of the pre-mercantile landed gentry, recently integrated into the ranks of the petty nobility, Ausias March partakes of the secular sensibility characteristic of the traditionalist, wealthy

"ociosos honorables", who are closely associated with the urbanization of Valencia, and as such, represent a mentality which is radically distinct from that of the purely feudal nobility. Hence, just as the agrarian-based mercantile economy of Valencia is representative of an alternative to the purely feudal structure, so does the work of Ausias March present "a way out of the existing molds of tradition",[27] and can be said to be the cultural expression of that society.

Amedée Pagès' depiction of Ausias March as a feudal lord is further undermined by the recent claims made by certain critics that Ausias March might have been of Jewish origin. This speculation is based, as usual, on the family name "March", in which Américo Castro has seen a Jewish origin.[28] The "converso" background of Ausias March could also be demonstrated by a study of his religious attitude, which would have more substance than a mere theory based on a name. However, such a study has not been made.[29] Therefore, here too caution must be exercised when one considers how much a mere suspicion can be overstretched, and that furthermore, even if one has evidence of Jewishness based on religious attitudes, it must be noted that such attitudes may not be caused by "Jewishness", but by the education and values of the middle class to which many "conversos" belong.[30] As J. N. Hillgarth indicates concerning the extent of the Jewish population according to the census of 1290:

> A prudent conclusion would seem to be that the numbers of the Jewish population were very much smaller than recent estimates have suggested. They probably did not number more than 2 or 3 percent of the population of the Crown of Aragon and formed a smaller proportion still of that of Castile-Leon. Their importance was due not to their numbers but to their wealth and industry and especially to the fact that they possessed in their Hebrew-Arabic learning a culture and a tradition superior to that of the Christians among whom they lived.[31]

In view of the small proportion of the population represented by Jews in the Crown of Aragon, it is difficult to see in Ausias March a "converso" without more specific and relevant evidence. Moreover, the Jewishness of Ausias March would have to go back at least to Pere March the first, that is some one hundred and seventy-five years before he began to write. His father and grandfather were also good Christians and their links with the Jewish culture would have been tenuous. Hence, Ausias March can hardly be said to have partaken of a separate culture and tradition. What contact he may have had with the Jewish culture would have been made through the various communities present in urban centres such as Girona, and of necessity it would have been indirect. The importance of this aspect of Ausias March's biography is that those points of hetrodox sensibility which could be construed to indicate some affinity with the "conversos ", and which I will discuss in Appendix I, are common to the secular middle class sensibility in Western Europe, as studied in the work of M. D. Chenu.[32] Without denying the possibility, however remote, of a Jewish ancestry in the March family, a solid case cannot be made simply on the basis of a suspicion. Unless it is further substantiated, Ausias March's possible Jewishness has to be considered accidental to his sensibility. It has no bearing on his poetry, and certainly to this date it has not contributed to a better understanding of his verses. What does concern the particular sensibility of Ausias March is his participation in a mercantile urbanizing society, without having to be of Jewish descent.

Another major point that has called the attention of the critics, and affected their interpretation of Ausias March's poetry,

is that he was appointed tax-collector by the Prince of Viana when the latter took possession of the Duchy of Gandía. A sixteenth-century chronicler, Jerónimo Zurita, writing a century after the death of Ausias March, says of the Prince of Viana and the Valencian poet:

> entre todos los más señalados varones que hubo en España en su tiempo fue por él más estimado y preferido de su amistad y pervança Ausias March, caballero de singular ingenio y doctrina, en gran espíritu y artificio, en todo lo que compuso, con mucha gravedad en lengua limosina.[33]

This statement, which seems to echo the marqués de Santillana's praise of Ausias March in his Prohemio to Pedro, constable of Portugal, does not give any source for Zurita's information, and furthermore it commits the error of placing Ausias March in the all too general context of Spain.[34] Strictly on the basis of Zurita's claim, and Luis Fullana's impressionistic elaboration of this statement, various well-intentioned critics have propagated the idea that Ausias March and the Prince of Viana were closely associated.[35] Indeed, the existence of such a relation would favour Amedée Pagès' thesis that Ausias March was a Thomist poet, and an assiduous reader of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, the content of which pervades the discursive elements of his poetry, for the Prince of Viana was profoundly interested in Aristotle, and especially in the Nicomachean Ethics which he translated from Latin in 1457.[36] However, Zurita's statement may be only a conjecture based on this possible point of affinity. Indeed, it is entirely to Pagès' credit that such a relation is mere speculation on the part of critics: "il n'est pas certain que le jeune duc et son vassal aient eu à cette époque de véritable relations...."[37] Although such an intellectual exchange between

Ausias March and the Prince of Viana might have been historically plausible, the lack of any kind of serious documentation, or contemporary references to a meeting or epistolary exchange between the two, coupled with the additional problem that the Prince does not seem to have travelled to, or resided in, his duchy, reduces this aspect of Ausias March's biography to mere speculation. It is best left aside and not used as the basis of any theory concerning his work.

Of greater interest among the events of Ausias March's life that have excited the curiosity of critics in the last two decades is a letter which refers to Ausias March, written by María of Castile, Alfonso the Magnanimous' wife, who governed the Crown of Aragon in his absence. This letter was discovered by Jordi Rubió i Balaguer in 1960. It refers to an incident related to the life of Ausias March which has led various eminent critics, such as Rubió i Balaguer, Martín de Riquer and Rafael Ferreres, to suggest that the Valencian poet was guilty of paederasty.[38] The entire incident described in the letter of María of Castile revolves around a lad of twelve or thirteen, Johanet Carnicer, who had run away from his apprenticeship to the queen's secretary, Pere Lobet, in order to join some boys who worked for the king's new grand falconer, Ausias March. The letter which is dated June 27, 1425, states that the lad had been placed in the care of P. Lobet, in order "to learn and to profit", but that he has fled from his master and is now "on the path of damnation":

és li fugit e és se'n anat aquí ab Mossen Ausies March. E per tal com és gran carrech del dit nostre secretari que aquell tenia en comanda per aprendre e profitar, e ara en via de perdició, vós pregam e manam que tota vegada que per part del pare del dit fadrí la present vos será presentada e'n secret requerit, façats tornar e restituir lo dit fadrí al dit son pare.[39]

The key phrase here is not the "en via de perdició" but "tenia en comanda", which refers to the responsibility of the secretary. It seems to me that the formula "en via de perdició" does not necessarily, and definitely not in this case, refer to Ausias March's possible inclination to sodomy. Incidences of sodomy under the reign of the very pious María of Castile were dealt with very harshly.[40] In the face of evidence of her intransigence on these matters, if María had really suspected that Ausias March was a paederast one can only wonder why she had one lad removed and not all the others, and why she took no further action against Ausias March. Furthermore, only two years before, María had shown great confidence in Ausias March when she requested his assistance to arrange the marriage of Na Vilaraguda and Mossen Berenguer de Vilaragut, which she considered to be a very delicate matter.[41] Although it is true that in the two intervening years, during which Ausias March was with Alfonso in Naples and North Africa, María may have discovered that he was a sodomite; there is nothing that can substantiate that speculation. It is best to turn to the intelligent opinion of Joan Ferrater on this matter.[42] His theory is that as an apprentice Carnicer broke his bondage to P. Lobet, and this placed him in "via de perdició", and that the incident has no sexual implications, it is simply a case of a lad fleeing the drudgery of learning, for the joys of hunting. I would add that this placed Lobet, who was entrusted to care for the lad, in an embarrassing position, and that it was undoubtedly also a source of shame and hurt pride for Carnicer's father. For these reasons María ordered the bailiff to act with the utmost discretion ("en secret"). Again, this rather sensational contribution towards the life and character of Ausias

March adds nothing to our understanding of his work.

A further point that has interested the biographers of Ausias March is the question of his relationship to his deaf and dumb sister, Peyrona, who was entrusted to his care. As Rafael Ferreres has shewn, Ausias March does not seem to have fulfilled his duties towards his sister with complete integrity.[43] The point that interests me is not the practical aspect of Peyrona's fate, which is not referred to in the poems of Ausias March, but the interpretation that critics such as Ferreres and Fullana have imposed on the verse "D'un ventre trist exir m'ha fet natura" (LVIII, v. 29).[44] These critics construe that this is a reference to the sad childhood of Ausias March caused by the birth of Peyrona:

> Nada sabemos de la infancia de nuestro poeta, tan solo sí, porque él lo declara, que no debía haber alegría en su casa quizá por la condición sordomuda de su hermana Peirona,... Así declara el poeta: "D'un ventre trist exir m'ha fet natura."[45]

There could be no more patent distortion of the intention of Ausias March's poetry than this kind of extra-literary imposition on the text. Taken in its context this verse has nothing to do with Peyrona or the childhood of Ausias March; it concerns his predestination to love:

> Ma voluntat ab la rahó no luyta,
> cascuna fa lo més de son poder:
> ma voluntat pus d'amar no pot fer,
> son poder fa, e ma rahó la'n cuyta.
> D'un ventre trist exir m'à fet natura,
> per vós amar fon lo meu naximent;
> no ssé als fats com no·ls fon de present
> en fer que vós d'amar aguésseu cura
>
> (LVIII, vv. 25-32)

It is evident from verses 30 and 31 in the second half of this stanza that verse 29 refers to predestination. As such, these verses refer to a much more important facet of Ausias March's poetry

than one might surmise from Ferreres' interpretation. As Pere Bohigas has indicated, verse 29 proceeds from Job's damnation of his birth: "Pereat dies in quo natus sum, et nox in qua dictum est: Conceptus homo.... Quia non conclusit ostia ventris, qui portavit me, nec abstulit mala ab oculis meis" (Job III: 3 and 10). The point made by Ausias March in these verses cannot be clearly understood unless the significance of "trist" is. This sorrowful love is a predestined condition which the poet accepts, in another poem he refers to it as his ill-starred heart: "cor malastruch" (XI, v. 2). "Tristeza" is here, as in all other poems of Ausias March, synonymous with his poetic melancholy, which he inherits from the tradition of the French fourteenth-century poets such as, Guillaume de Machaut, Oton de Granson and Alain Chartier.[46] Hence, verse 29 is a reference to his melancholy temperament to which he claims to have been predestined by birth.[47] The repercussions of this statement are very important, for if Ausias March associates melancholy with a predestined condition, he evidently had to have some knowledge of microcosmic and iatromathematical theory, such as they are found in Ramon Lull and Arnau de Vilanova.[48] Biographical criticism that attempts to explain his poetry by making use of various indefinite facets of what is known to us of Ausias March's life, overlooks the actual significance of his verses. The relevance of Peyrona's role in the origin of the poet's melancholy is very marginal, and statements such as that of Rafael Ferreres quoted above are of an unreliable speculative nature. Taken in context Ausias March uses the imagery of verse 29 to describe the melancholy orientation of his love; like Job's love of God, it is pure and constant. Thus, the previous verses state that this love is guided by reason (verses 25-28), and that as such it is not a

frenetic passion. Long before Marsilio Ficino articulated his Platonic theory of Love,[49] Albert the Great in the De animalibus (libri XXVI) had pointed out that melancholy individuals: "have firm convictions and well regulated passions",[50] and Johannes Hispalensis also remarked that pure love was a trait of the melancholy lover, because honesty in love proceeds from Saturn.[51] It is in this tradition that Ausias March writes. Verse 29 is consequently in perfect harmony with the rest of Poem LVIII; its imagery, which evokes the life of Job, merely serves to reinforce March's claim to a chaste and unwavering love to which he is predestined.

Traditional criticism of the poetry of Ausias March is based on a certain interpretation of his life which is subordinated to romantic notions of feudalism, as well as to the misleading theories of race and heredity. As I have tried to show above, many of the ideas concerning Ausias March raised by this kind of biographical criticism do not contribute to our understanding of the poet's work; they only serve to support a misleading theory conceived in the light of the concept of "courtly love," which is itself a questionable premiss. In order to understand the poetry of Ausias March, one cannot rely on unsubstantiated speculation about certain possible facets of his life; it is necessary to turn to the internal evidence of his work. Significance lies in the imagery which illustrates a theory of love, and which can reveal in what literary tradition Ausias March is writing.

As verse 29 of Poem LVIII, discussed above, indicates, the basis for Ausias March's theory of love is his melancholy complexion. In the Middle Ages and the Renaissance melancholy was considered to

be a physiological and psychological problem, largely affected by the theory of perception which was understood to be a medical question affecting the role of the vital spirits.[52] Subjacent to the microcosmic medical theories which this involved, was the question of the nature of the object perceived, that is, its relation as a form or idea to universals. Melancholy was, therefore, closely associated with Imagination understood to be not only a vain raving, fancy, or the mental creation of situations and circumstances, but principally as the faculty of forming universal images of objects sensed, as well as of creating images of objects not apprehended sensorially. These different kinds of imagination were closely related to the varieties of the possible range of melancholies which could take the individual from lunacy to genius. Thus, Milà y Fontanals has said of Ausias March: "se nota que havia estudiat la ciencia medicinal, cosa poch usada per cavallers ni poetas".[53] Although Milà y Fontanals does not develop this very perspicacious remark, one has to note that this approach does not take one to the poetry of the troubadours, but to the concept of imagination as it is found in twelfth-century Chartrian poetics, and which is the basis of the theories of melancholy that play an important role in the development of the Renaissance theory of love. It is, then, to this aspect of Ausias March's poetry that I will turn in order to understand the relation that exists between Ausias March and the theory of love introduced in Italy by the admirers of the Valencian poet: Juan Boscán and Garcilaso de la Vega.

NOTES TO CHAPTER II

1 Amedée Pagès, Auzias March et ses prédécesseurs, Paris: Honoré Champion, 1912, pp. 1-121; and "Les origines paternelles d'Auzias March d'après de nouveaux documents," Bulletin Hispanique t. L, 1948, pp. 313-333; and Luis Fullana, "Los caballeros de apellido March en Cataluña y en Valencia," Boletín de la Sociedad Castellonense de Cultura, tomos XVI-XVII, 1935-1936, pp. 432-465, 107-173, 205-255, 297-322 and 364-444. See also Chapter I, note 23.

2 Auzias March et ses prédécesseurs, p. 233.

3 Arthur Terry, Ausias March: Selected Poems, introduction, Edinburgh: University Press, 1976, p. 4; and Constanzo di Girolamo, "Ausias March and the Troubadour Poetic Code," Catalan Studies in Memory of Josephine de Boer, eds. Joseph Gulsoy and Josep M. Sola-Solé, Barcelona: Hispam, 1977, pp. 223-237.

4 Auzias March et ses prédécesseurs, p. 51.

5 Amedée Pagès, Commentaire des poésies d'Auzias March, Paris: Honoré Champion, 1925, pp. 32 and 124. The first instance is a reference to the expression "folls e pechs," in Poem XXII of Ausias March. Pagès notes that it is also found in Pere March's "Al punt com naix" verse 50. Since Pagès acknowledges that it is a fairly common derogatory term, it cannot be said to proceed from Pere March's work. Ausias March's use of the term may well be accidental. The second point is that in Poem CVI Ausias March uses the word "pugès" to refer to a coin of little value. Pagès notes that it is also used in the poetry of Raimbaut d'Orange and subsequently by Pere March. As the name of a coin frequently used in the Middle Ages, its mention by Ausias March does not infer an imitation of his father's poetry.

6 Problems of genealogy concerning the March family can be a source of considerable confusion as one passes from one critic to another. In 1948 Pagès entirely revised his interpretation of Ausias March's family tree. In order to assist the reader in following genealogical references made by critics before and after 1948, I have included the two genealogical tables in Appendix III. The first table is that of Auzias March et ses prédécesseurs, 1912, and the second is the revision of "Les origines paternelles d'Auzias March," 1948. Rafael Ferreres (Ausias March, Obra poética completa I, Madrid: Castalia, 1979, p. 22) erroneously indicates that Pere March was married to Leonor de Ripoll in 1397. This is impossible since Peyrona March, Ausias' deaf and dumb sister was born before him (Auzias March et ses prédécesseurs, p. 56).

7 In order to understand why Ausias March's family is not really a feudal aristocratic family, but rather, members of the

knighted bourgeoisie, one notes that the positions traditionally held by the Marchs, including Ausias, as notaries, secretaries, tax-collectors and prosecutors, were considered to be incompatible with claims to nobility: "Giovanni da Legnano, identifying the Roman miles with the medieval knight, cites Justinian and Roman law to prove that soldiers 'ought to abstain from the cultivation of land, from the care of animals, from trade in commodities. They should not manage the business of other people; nor engage in civil duties' (Barber, 1974, p. 45). A French seventeenth-century treatise on the social estates is equally uncompromising on this point, and lists some of the posts which a nobleman should avoid: 'Les exercices derogeans à la Noblesse sont ceux de Procureur postulant, Greffier, Notaire, Sergent, Clerc, marchand et artisan de tous mestiers...' (Loyseau, 1610, p. 62)." (Roger Boase, The Troubadour Revival, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978, p. 44). One witnesses in the ascent of the March family, a radical evolution in the concept of nobility, which is characteristic of the development of the capitalist economy in Southern Europe, as I will discuss below.

8 Auzias March et ses prédécesseurs, p. 63.

9 See Chapter III, note 37.

10 See Auzias March et ses prédécesseurs, pp. 37-41 and 63.

11 See Joan Pijoan, "Auzias March, l'any 1444 era a Napols," Revista de Bibliografia Catalana vol. 3, 1908, pp. 39-44.

12 Auzias March et ses prédécesseurs, p. 94.

13 Auzias March et ses prédécesseurs, p. 85.

14 Auzias March et ses prédécesseurs, p. 96.

15 See Robert Durling ed., Petrarch's Lyric Poems, Cambridge: Harvard, 1976, p. 6. Moreover, E. H. Wilkins (Life of Petrarch, Chicago: The University of Chicago, 1961, p. 18) remarks on the banality of illegitimate children such as Petrarch's Giovanni and Francesca: "in the course of the summer of 1337... Petrarch learned that a son had been born to him in Avignon, of a mother whose identity is unknown. Such parentage, in fourteenth-century Avignon, cannot have been uncommon, and it seems not to have led Petrarch's friends and associates to have thought ill of him."

16 There was a controversy in the late thirties concerning whether Ausias March was a Valencian or a Catalan. See A. Pagès, "Les origines paternelles d'Auzias March"; "Les deux Auzias March," Bulletin Hispanique XXXVIII, 1936, pp. 5-18; S. Ferrandis Luna, "Ausias March, Valenciano," Boletín de la Sociedad Castellonense de Cultura XVI, 1935, pp. 96-104. Of special interest in this controversy because it provides a very pointed

criticism of A. Pagès' methods, is the note by Hughes Vaganay, "A propos des deux Ausias March," Bulletin Hispanique XXXVII, 1935, pp. 480-481. It may also affect several presuppositions made by Pagès in his chronology of the works of Ausias March (see Chapter III, note 38; these presuppositions are also abused by Joan Ferrater). The source of this controversy are two articles by R. Carreres Valls, "Noves notes genealògiques dels poetes Jaume, Pere, Arnau i Auziàs March, segons documents inèdits," Estudis Universitaris Catalans XVIII (1933), pp. 309-322 (registered by R. Ferreres ed., Ausias March, Obra poética completa I, p. 22), and "La personalitat d'Ausias March," La Notaria, num. 3, 14 març, 1925, pp. 45-50 (registered in P. Bohigas ed., Ausias March, Poesies I, Barcelona: Barcino, 1952, p. 179). I have not been able to consult either article.

17 See M. D. Chenu, La théologie au douzième siècle, Paris: Vrin, 1957, pp. 225-273; José Antonio Maravall, "Franciscanismo, burguesía y mentalidad precapitalista: la obra de Eximenis," VIII Congreso de la Historia de la Corona de Aragón II, 1, Valencia: Vives Mora, 1969-1973 , pp. 285-306; J. Rubió i Balaguer, "El beat fra Mateu d'Agrigento a Catalunya i a Valencia: Notes sobre la vida religiosa en una cort del Renaixement," La Cultura Catalana de Renaixement a la Decadència, Barcelona: Edicions 62, 1964, pp. 27-47.

18 A very recent work on Ausias March suggests that Ausias March did partake in mercantile activities: "Ausias March, senyor de Beniarjò, al mateix temps que donat al negoci..." (Josep Ramon Costa i Sarió, Ausias March i el seu Cant Espiritual, Gandía: Publicacions de l'Institut 'Duc Reial Alfons el Vell,' 1978, p. 101).

19 See Auzias March et ses prédécesseurs, pp. 98-100.

20 See above note 17.

21 "Franciscanismo, burguesía y mentalidad precapitalista: la obra de Eximenis," p. 302.

22 Max Weber, The City, trans. D. Martindale and G. Neuwirth, Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1958, p. 95.

23 See R. Boase, The Troubadour Revival, p. 45.

24 See Ausias March, Poesies vol. V, ed. P. Bohigas (Barcelona: Barcino, 1959), Poem CXXVI, pp. 134-136.

25 See Ausias March, Poesies vol. V, Poem CXXVI, pp. 134-136.

26 See Martín de Riquer, Historia de la literatura catalana III, Barcelona: Ariel, 1964, p. 336.

27 Arthur Terry, Ausias March: Selected Poems, p. 4.

28 This approach was initiated by Josep Palau i Fabre, "Ausias March, poète féroce," Les lettres nouvelles vol. 36, 1956, pp. 382-389. His thesis was refuted by M. de Riquer, Historia de la literatura catalana II, Barcelona: Ariel, 1964, p. 519, whose arguments are not entirely convincing. More recently, Rafael Ferreres has again taken up this thesis (Ausias March, Obra poética completa I, Madrid: Castalia, 1979, pp. 10-11), basing his arguments on those of Américo Castro (De la edad conflictiva, Madrid: Taurus, 1968), who says at page 231 of his work: "Consuena bien con todo ello la frase de Guzmán de Alfarache, "el hijo de nadie," y siglos antes la exquisita y estremecida del converso Ausias March: "D'un ventre trist, eixir m'ha fet natura." I will discuss the implications of this verse in its proper context below.

29 The article of Palau i Fabre referred to in note 28 above, probes in that direction, but without substantial evidence.

30 See Chapter III, note 24.

31 J. N. Hillgarth, The Spanish Kingdoms 1250-1516 vol. I, Oxford: Clarendon, 1976, pp. 31-32.

32 See note 17 above and Chapter IV.

33 Luis Fullana, "Los caballeros de apellido March," section V, p. 370.

34 See Chapter I on the problems caused by this kind of over-generalization. The words used by Santillana are: "Mossen Ausias March, el qual aun vive, es grand trovador, e ome de assaz elevado espíritu" (El Marqués de Santillana, Obras, ed. Augusto Cortina, Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1964, p. 36).

35 The association was quickly noted by nineteenth-century critics such as Eugène Baret, Espagne et Provence: Etudes sur la littérature du Midi de l'Europe, Genève: Slatkine reprints, 1970 (original, Paris: 1857), p. 165. Although it is doubtful, not to say apocryphal, various recent works have presented it as a "fait accompli", such as, Roger Boase, The Troubadour Revival, p. 101: "Carlos was a close friend of the brilliant Catalan love poet, Ausias March"; and Rafael Ferreres ed., Ausias March, Obra poética completa I, p. 34: "Hay entre el Príncipe letrado y el poeta unas relaciones de afinidad literaria y cordiales."

36 Auzias March et ses prédécesseurs, p. 287.

37 Auzias March et ses prédécesseurs, p. 82.

38 J. Rubió i Balaguer, La cultura catalana del Renaixement a la Decadència, p. 73; Martín de Riquer, Historia de la literatura catalana II, pp. 474-475; Rafael Ferreres ed., Ausias March, Obra poética completa I, p. 27.

39 Letter reproduced in M. de Riquer, Historia de la literatura catalana II, pp. 474-475; and R. Ferreres ed., Ausias March, Obra poética completa I, p. 27.

40 Auzias March et ses prédécesseurs, p. 383.

41 Auzias March et ses prédécesseurs, p. 67.

42 Joan Ferrater ed., Ausias March, Poesia, Barcelona: Edicions 62 (La Caixa), 1979, pp. 7-8.

43 Rafael Ferreres, "Peirona March, la hermana de Ausias," Revista de Archivos Bibliotecas y Museos vol. LXXXI, 1978, pp. 847-854.

44 Luis Fullana, "Los caballeros de apellido March," section II, p. 138; Rafael Ferreres, "Peirona March, la hermana de Ausias," p. 847; Ausias March, Obra poética completa I, p. 23.

45 Ausias March, Obra poética completa I, p. 23.

46 Raymond Klibansky, Fritz Saxl, and Erwin Panofsky, Saturn and Melancholy, London: Nelson, 1964, pp. 217-240; and see Chapter I, note 5.

47 As a peripheral matter, which I insist is of a speculative nature since I do not have all the necessary material to demonstrate it fully, I wish to raise the question of his date of birth, in the event that it may assist someone to clarify a problem of chronology. If Ausias March claims to be born with a melancholy complexion, then he must have been born under the influence of Saturn, like Ficino. This would place his birthday in January, at the beginning of the Aquarian cycle, as Ficino explains: "my melancholy temperament... Saturn gave it to me when in my horoscope he stood in the ascendant in the sign of the water bearer" (Saturn and Melancholy, p. 258). This would place his birthday between January 20 and 25.

48 Saturn and Melancholy, pp. 94-95.

49 See Chapter IV, section I.

50 Quoted in Saturn and Melancholy, p. 70.

51 Quoted in Saturn and Melancholy, p. 131 and 190: Guido Bonatti, quoting Alcabitius.

52 See Chapter III, note 104.

53 Manuel Milà i Fontanals, "Resenya histórica y crítica dels antichs poetas catalans," Obras completas tomo II: Estudios sobre historia, lengua y literatura de Cataluña, Barcelona: Librería de Álvaro Verdeguer, 1890, p. 177.

CHAPTER III: THE RHETORICAL BACKGROUND IN AUSIAS MARCH'S IMAGINATION

There exists a very close relation between the notion that the mediaeval poet has of imagination and his use of imagery. Both of these concepts determine the way in which he understands his poetical experience and gives expression to it. In his poetry Ausias March continues to be faithful to the traditional forms and genres of the troubadours. A. Pagès has extensively documented this point, as well as Ausias March's familiarity with the Leys d'Amor.[1] It is logical, therefore, that one should turn to the rhetorical theory of the mediaeval "artes poeticae" in order to shed some light on Ausias March's theory of the image and the concurrent use of the imagination, without incurring the possibility of seeming to set Ausias March outside his chronological limits.

In Ausias March's poetry the image generally dominates the poetical structure, that is, it has precedence within the logic of the poem over the discursive exposition, or "descriptio". The "descriptio" is a complement to the image, in which the poet attempts to clarify the significance of the metaphor as it applies to his circumstance.[2] There is consequently a correlation between the two, but it is not necessarily explicit. The very short Poem XXIX can serve as a model for the analysis of Ausias March's procedure. The first four verses of this poem introduce the image of a bull who flees, vanquished by his foe, before returning to destroy him:

> Sí com lo taur se'n va fuyt pel desert
> quant és sobrat per son semblant qui·l força,
> ne torna may fins ha cobrada força
> per destruir aquell qui·l ha desert, (XXIX, vv. 1-4).

This image which is drawn from a bestiary (see Appendix II J:2) has ethical connotations concerning the poet's relation to the lady. The

remaining four verses establish a correlation between this "archetypal" image, drawn from the basic mediaeval topoi,[3] and the lover's shyness before the overwhelming beauty of the lady. He must overcome this awe before returning to enjoy the lady's company. The topical nature of this image does not establish a direct parallel with the lover's situation as exposed in the "descriptio". The lover's "delight" contrasts with the destruction of the foe, because the metaphor implies a "luctamen Veneris":

tot enaxí·m covẽ lunyar de vós,
car vostre gest mon esforç ha confús;
no tornaré fins del tot haja fus
la gran pahor qui·m toll ser delitós (5-8).

There is an awkward association of the foe as being both the lady's "gest" (v. 6) and the poet's fear (v. 8). The "pahor" is the foe that must be destroyed, but not the "gest" that gave rise to this fear; a direct parallel would establish the "gest" as the enemy. The image therefore establishes a general referential context of conflict and fear which must be overcome with time. This procedure is quite straightforward: the first four verses introduce the image and its frame of reference, which the "descriptio" in the last four verses clarifies and adjusts to the poet's experience. This procedure is typically mediaeval and corresponds to the rhetoric of composition as described by Matthieu de Vendôme in the Ars versificatoria:

in poeticae facultatis exercitatio praecedit imaginatio sensus, sequitur sermo interpres intellectus, deinde ordinatio in qualitate tractatus; prior est sententiae conceptio, sequitur verborum excogitatio, subjungitur qualitas scilicet materiae, sive tractatus dispositio.[4]

Vendôme therefore presents the creative process of the image as preceding the intellectual utterance and rhetorical disposition. Kelly succinctly summarizes this process: "Imagination, verbalization, stylization and disposition: this is composition in the Middle Ages."[5]

Matthieu de Vendôme's description of poetical rhetoric quoted above points out that imagination is the source of all poetry, "imagination precedes the senses". The definition of imagination in the Middle Ages derived principally from Boethius' De Consolatione Philosophiae in which it was considered as a means of perception and apprehension of forms divorced from matter. It was therefore considered to be a limited spiritual sense, not to be confused with intelligence which was divine cognition:

> Ipsum quoque hominem aliter sensus, aliter imaginatio, aliter ratio, aliter intelligentia contuetur. Sensus enim figuram in subiecta materia constitutam, imaginatio vero solam sine materia iudicat figuram. Ratio vero hanc quoque transcendit speciemque ipsam quae singularibus inest universali consideratione perpendit. Intelligentiae vero celsior oculus exsistit; supergressa namque universitatis ambitum ipsam illam simplicem formam pura mentis acie contuetur.[6]

The intelligence perceives the Divine Form or Idea, whereas the imagination has cognition of the form of particulars, that is, the ideas as they are reflected in matter. However, in this epistemological conception of imagination, the relation which it has to matter not only limits its function but accentuates the duality of its nature. It partakes not only of the spirit, but also of the flesh. In order that it be of value to man it must be controlled by reason.[7] This aspect of the theory of imagination was rooted in the Aristotelian tradition of scholasticism. In Book III of the De Anima Aristotle distinguished imagination from either sensorial perception or discursive thinking[8] in order to stress its ambiguous nature, as being indistinguishably true or false when considered by itself.[9] Aristotle therefore considered imagination to be a movement produced by sensation:

> But since when one thing has been set in motion another thing may be moved by it, and imagination is held to be a movement and to be impossible without sensation, i.e. to occur in beings that are percipient and to have for its content what can be perceived, and since movement may be produced by actual sensation and that movement is necessarily similar in character to the sensation itself, this movement

must be (1) necessarily (a) incapable of existing apart from sensation (b) incapable of existing except when we perceive, (2) such that in virtue of its possession that in which it is found may present various phenomena both active and passive, and (3) such that it may be either true or false.[10]

Thus imagination is for Aristotle "a movement resulting from an actual exercise of a power of sense",[11] that particular sense being sight.[12] In general this mechanical interpretation of imagination was inherited by St. Thomas Aquinas in his commentary to William of Moerbeke's version of Aristotle's De Anima. Aquinas continued to stress the relativism of imagination,[13] as well as its relation to the senses.[14] However, one should note that his commentary did concede to the "spiritual" aspects of imagination:

667. Whether this movement also presupposes some potency other than the exterior senses, is a question which Aristotle leaves unanswered. Since, however, diverse acts imply diverse potencies, and diverse movements connote diverse receivers of movement (for the moving thing moves something other than itself), it seems necessary to posit an imaginative potency distinct from exterior senses.[15]

In his discussion on the relation between light and imagination (668) Aquinas, goes beyond Aristotle by stressing that sight is the most spiritual of the senses.[16] In spite of these tentative concessions this theory of imagination remained too mechanical, and even Dante, who normally follows Aristotle and Aquinas, broke away from it in order to develop the sight and imagination relationship even further towards its potential metaphysical implications.[17]

Both before and after Dante, the theory of imagination in the realm of poetic theory was mainly influenced by Chartrian and Victorine currents. For the Chartrian poets, imagination meant a reflection of cosmic order, as it was reflected in the world. Their theory of imagination was greatly influenced by "philosophical speculation going back from the twelfth century poets to Plato's Timaeus".[18] Characteristically, they established the priority of

the imagination on the basis of an entirely Platonic epistemology. The Chartrian poets, such as Alain de Lille and Bernardus Silvestris, considered imagination to be the intellection of archetypes. In the De Planctu Naturae Alain de Lille describes imagination, which he understands as the perception of an "imago", that is, as the intellection of an archetype:

> When she saw that I had returned to myself, she depicted for my mental perception the image of a real voice, and by this brought into actual being words which had been, so to speak, archetypes ideally preconceived.[19]

The emphasis in the Chartrian theory is laid primarily on what Boethius saw as the function of intellection, and the image is considered to be "the visible correlative to the permanent archetype".[20] The imagination as the image forming process is therefore conceived of in a very Platonic manner, as an illumination from without animating objects perceived. Rhetoricians such as Geoffroy de Vinsauf[21] and Matthieu de Vendôme were greatly influenced by this aspect of Chartrian thought, as can be seen in the above quotation (4)` imagination is given a role which transcends limitations placed upon it by its relation to the senses.[22]

These concepts of imagination, as propounded by the theoreticians of poetry, were mainly a matter of rhetoric. It would be misleading to gloss this subject so as to leave the impression that imagination might have been given priority over reason. The rhetoricians' concept of this theory was broad; it corresponded to the requirements of a theory of poetic creation, which saw the poet's creative activity as being similar to God's creative activity,[23] and as such it was successful.[24] In practice, however, it was considered to be a secondary form of cognition. Hughes de Saint Victor defines imagination as "sensuous memory made up of traces of corporeal

objects entering in the mind; it possesses in itself nothing certain as a source of knowledge".[25] Hughes' notion of "sensuous memory" needs some clarification. He uses the words "sensus" and "sensualitas" in a fashion particular to his own Neoplatonic philosophical system, to denote the relation between the body and the spirit. "Sensualitas" is an intermediary movement which operates through the use of the imagination. Hughes de Saint Victor's system is similar to that of Plotinus in as much as it portrays the relation of man to the One, as a continuous movement of God moving down to man and man moving up towards God,[26] that is in Christian terminology, a continuous interaction of contemplation and revelation.[27] In the De Unione Corporis et Spiritus Hughes establishes a microcosmic relation when discussing the function of the elements, and develops the concept that the relation of the body to the spirit is as that of man to God,[28] and contemplation to revelation. Like contemplation "sensualitas" is the movement whereby imagination informs reason of "the physical universe as the reflection of thought -- the thought of God".[29] By "sensualitas" the spirit moves towards the body, and the "sensus" moves towards the spirit. Therefore, imagination in its highest function informs reason of the Divine; it is the handmaid of reason:

> Imagination is not yet reason in her most exalted mood; but for this mystic, imagination, subordinated to reason, is at least a power which makes possible the interpretation of a rational universe.[30]

This interpretation is conditioned by the intermediary and dual nature of imagination. It is a deceptive relation; if through a flaw of perception the spirit moves excessively towards corporeality imagination can mislead reason, which leads to a loss of discretion.[31] However, imagination remains the perception of an ideal, which may be either true or false. The latter consideration is primarily the concern of the moralist.

The fundamentally numinous character of the concept of imagination, both in its nature and its function, as defined by the rhetoricians of the twelfth century overlooks the problem of its degree of exactitude in favour of its inherent ideality. Imagination is the means by which the poet conceives of an ideal, which he considers to be a superior reality. In mediaeval poetry imagination consequently has an ethical dimension, which precedes moral judgements. It is a means of measuring the distance that separates man from his ideal; it forces man to reflect on the state of his soul. D. Kelly has identified this particular aspect of the use of imagination:

> Froissart and Gower conclude the Joli buisson de jonece and the Confessio amantis by looking into a mirror and finding his own face. Thus they realize what separates them from the ideal in their Imagination. The distance is what much late medieval literature is about.[32]

The failure to meet that ideal then entails moral consideration as to the value of the particular "Imagination"of the ideal, as is the case of much fifteenth-century courtly poetry. Imagination is, therefore, that which is imitated in poetic imagery as the basis for a theoretical model to be used for moral and didactic exposition.[33]

In the case of Ausias March's poetry the imagery, as seen above in the discussion of Poem XXIX, is based on a theoretically ideal model against which the poet-lover measures his own predicament; he is reflected in the image. The source of this imagery is amply documented in Appendix II to demonstrate that it draws principally from the common stock of courtly images.[34] Nevertheless, the significance of this imagery cannot be understood strictly on the basis of its origin. It is necessary to take into account that the love experience described by Ausias March is essentially sorrowful, owing to the poet's moral failure to achieve this ideal.[35] The frequent inaccessibility of the courtly ideal brings its values into crisis in

the poetry of Ausias March.[36] The various references to the "imagination" in this poetry clearly reflect this crisis. A survey of the uses of "imaginar" in the vocabulary of Ausias March should demonstrate the significance and role that imagination has in his work.

In the use of certain cognates Ausias March uses alternate forms of the verb "imaginar" simply as a mental representation, generally of a metonomical or allegorical figure, such as in XCIII, 90; CXII, 125; CXVII, 200; CXXVII, 200; CXXVII, 104; CXXVIII, 210. In these cases the use of "imagination" is derivative since the figure called to mind is already integrated into the imagery. There is, however, a richer usage of "imagination" in its rhetorical function which has profound philosophical implications, in the forms of "imaginar" as a noun, and secondarily as an infinitive.

The references to imagination in Ausias March's poems naturally vary in usage over the many years in which he wrote these poems.[37] In general, one can say that in the group of poems whose theme is the rejection of amorous life, represented by the later, or "moral" poems,[38] references to imagination are indirect. In these poems imagination assumes a passive function. It is referred to as a secondary cognitive function, whose role in the poet's amorous evolution is evaluated for its moral contents. The final work, Poem CXXVIII, verse 244,[39] refers to the function of imagination only to point out that it has a dual cognitive value, which is neither necessarily good nor bad. This evaluation made in hindsight follows the mainstream of scholastic definitions, as discussed above:

> Car lo delit e la dolor
> que porten pe(r) l(o)s senys forans
> e imaginacions grans
> d'on mal e bé se'n consegueix, (CXXVIII, vv. 242-245).

This kind of reference is purely discursive; it is part of a terminology

used to explain the basic mechanisms of "innamoramento"; hence, the concept of the image-building function of imagination is overlooked. It is used similarly in Poem CXX, verse 86. The poem's context based on the renunciation of love views all functions that contributed to the "giovenile errore" negatively. The imagination is here referred to as being closely associated to the memory; it is the "sensuous memory" of the present: "O, tu, recort, no·t recorts bé algú, / e del present perda l'imaginar!" (CXX, vv. 85-86).

The process involved in the rejection of love, however, can cause the duality of imagination to assume a more important role. In Poem CXIX imagination continues to be a point of reference for the moral evaluation of love. The ambivalent character of imagination as a cognitive function allows Ausias March to dwell at length on the opposition of the spiritual ideal of love and its limitations caused by the relation that it has to the senses in order to be perceived, and this leads to the moral evaluation of love. The poet describes a situation in which he wishes to love, but not to see his love reciprocated. Reciprocation would violate the purity of his love. Although he loves the lady any reciprocation of his love would lead to physical love:

> Sens mon voler yo no·n parteix la pensa
> per un desig que no·m par amor sia,
> car no cobeig la su·amor fos mia,
> ans ve a temps que·m plau me fes offensa;
> car per s·amor la mia se'n obliga
> e mi no plau de tal preu fer-li paga
> (CXIX, vv. 21-26).

The source of this love is the "gest",[40] which is intimately related to the movement of the imagination. The problem of the "gest" is a key to the understanding of Ausias March's poetry, which has been glossed over by many critics following A. Pagès' approach. P. Bohigas reduces the significance of the "gest" to a mere physical movement;

he defines the "gest" in the following words: "Allò que enamora el poeta és el posat de la dama, la seva gràcia".[41] Similarly, A. Pagès defines the "gest" as a "graceful movement of the lady". However, in order to make some concessions to the essentially spiritual nature of the "gest", which cannot be overlooked, Pagès remarks that as all movements it has its source in the soul, which scholastics considered to be the body's motor, and, as such it is at best an expression of the soul:

> En revanche, si ces caractères sont susceptibles, suivant lui, de frapper l'attention du vulgaire, il en est un qui n'est sensible qu'aux gens "subtils" et auquel Auzias March attache la plus grande importance. C'est le geste, lo gest, que Montemayor, dont il faut toujours se défier, confond avec le visage et traduit inexactement par l'espagnol "rostro". Le geste, comme tout mouvement, a son principe, suivant les scolastiques, dans l'âme dont il est comme l'expression. Voilà pourquoi il loue le maintien, la démarche, le port impeccable de sa dame. Il va même jusqu'à dire que c'est tout ce qu'il aime en elle.[42]

A few years later Pagès redefined the term in the strictly limited physical sense implied in the above: "Gest, 'expression du corps ou du visage, geste, allure, air, mine'".[43] Although it is literally imprecise I cannot help but feel that Montemayor's translation is more rigorous. Montemayor was greatly influenced by Italian Neoplatonism; his interpretation of "gest" as "rostro" indicates that he felt it was a reflection of the lady's soul. This is confirmed by the relation that imagination has to "gest", in the medieval Neoplatonic current of the Chartrians and Victorines, as well as, Poem CXVI, verse 121, "Lo gest dels ulls", and the Petrarchan verses 49-50 in Poem LXVII (Appendix II), which seem to echo Jordi de Sant Jordi's imitation of Sonnet 5 ("Quando io movo i sospiri a chiamar voi") in "Jus sus lo front".[44] Even if one should accept that the "gest" is "a graceful movement",[45] its spiritual nature needs to be clarified. In this poem the spiritual nature of the "gest" is explicit because

it is intimately related to the imagination; it is what the imagination perceives. The "gest" is not the movement of the lady as such, but the spirit of the lady perceived, first in the imagination, which, as discussed previously, is the movement of the spirit (or soul) down to the object parallelled by an upward movement of the senses that perceive the lady as a physical object, from which, in turn, the subject's spirit recognizes the "form" (the physical object's spirit), which animates the body, and it is only then that the "gest" is also the movement of that body. All this takes place in the act of the highest spiritual sense, sight. "Gest" is, therefore, a term used to denote the perception, or reflection, of the lady's spirit, that is, it is an imagination of the lady as an "archetypal" idea.[46] As Hughes de Saint Victor had pointed out,[47] there is the danger that the subject's spirit might become excessively enamoured of the imagination, and thereby incline too much to the flesh. The duality of the object perceived increases the possibility of this risk. Hence, in his first reference to the imagination in Poem CXIX, verse 18, Ausias March plays on this theme:

> Mas què serà que reffret e qu-enflame
> e fastig port qu-ensemps hom se'n alte?
> Tant és l'escalf que pel gest m'enamora,
> que no sent res del fret que-l toch me porta,
> l'imaginar l'amarch dolç assabora,
> sí com la mar los rius la obehexen
> qu-en s-amargor lur dolçor convertexen
> (CXIX, vv. 13-20).

These verses, which begin with an elegant riddle, expound the function of imagination in the process of "innamoramento". The riddle gives us the basic clues of the duality which we must find in the solution: that which "cools" and "ignites" (verse 13), is also that which brings "sorrow" and "joy" ("fastig" and "alt"). The "gest", which is brought on by the most spiritual sense, sight, makes the poet "ardent" (verse

15), while touch, the most physical sense, is forgotten (verse 16). The images of fire, and illumination of reason (verse 17) at the sight of the lady's "gest", consequently dominate the coldness of the physical object perceived. The imagination is, therefore, that which brings both joy and sorrow; for this reason Ausias March believes that it tastes of bitter and sweet (verse 18). The physical object as corporeal matter, or flesh, is bitter, but the spirit of the lady is sweet. The ensuing image of the sea and the rivers further exemplifies the sense of these verses. Just as the rivers flow to the sea, so does the subject's spirit move towards the object in order to perceive its form, as the subject's spirit approaches that object excessively so it diminishes in spirituality[48] and becomes baser, so do the rivers lose purity; as they come to the sea they are muddied and become more saline until they are lost in the sea. The image is a metaphor for the Neoplatonic concept of emanation and its progressive degradation.

In the remainder of this poem Ausias March continues to develop this subject, as well as the intricate relation of the "gest" to the imagination. The skill of the poet in these verses lies in his ability to play on the confusion created by the spirit's movement in the perception of the "gest", that is, to play with the ambivalence of imagination in relation to the dual nature of the lady. Hence, in stanza IV, verses 31-32, Ausias March states that when he imagines the cause of his love, he is unable to perceive either the cause itself, or where it lies: "Quant ymagín d'aquest·amor la causa, / no la perceb e menys hon tē son siti" (vv. 31-32). Owing to the fact that he is enraptured in the movement of the imagination between the senses and the spirit he can perceive neither the "gest", the lady's spirit ("la causa") nor her body ("son siti"). He is describing

the conflict of the senses and the spirit, as the one moves toward the other. The remaining verses in this stanza describe the confusion that arises out of this ambivalent cognitive faculty, imagination. This confusion is furthered in the last reference to imagination in this poem in stanza VI, verse 52. In this section Ausias March exploits the confusion caused by imagination by inverting the usual function of imagination. He describes the delight of the lowest senses in the lady's "gest", as they rise to meet the subject's spirit:

> Lo toch, per si, molt no s'i adelita;
> quant pren delit, l'imaginar lo·y porta
> pel gest, que tal pensament me reporta
> que tot mi·nsemps per ella tota·m cita
> (CXIX, vv. 51-54).

Although the sense of touch in itself takes no delight in the spiritual vision of the "gest", the upward movement of the imagination that raises it to the spirit leads it to appreciate the "gest". However, this same movement that brings the vision of the "gest" which delights the sense of touch also causes the spirit to incline to sensuality, and this leads to the poet's amorous confusion. Ausias March explains the ambivalence of this process in verses 79-80: "No és en carn, e la carn mi enclina: / entra per l'ull e·n lo tot d'ella fina." This is caused by the proximity of the body to the spirit. However, although the body is inherently ugly, since it is only base matter, it is redeemed by the beauty of the spirit or "gest", which is the source of this love: "Amor pel gest cors leig amar me mana" (CXIX, v. 87).[49] The imagination which is intimately related to the "gest" is the source of idealism for Ausias March's love; it enables him to perceive an inaccessible ideal, even on the psychological level of the "innamoramento" which he describes in Poem CXIX. The moral point of view in these later poems does not condemn the ideal "per se", but

the ambivalent nature of the means of cognition man has of it, and the fall of man's spirit which it entails.

This particular aspect of the problem of love pervades the poems of the middle and late period of Ausias March's production.[50] In these, his consciousness of the contradictory function of imagination and its power over reason becomes constantly more acute, as we have seen it defined in Poem CXIX. Ausias March's love, which delves into the ideal perceived in his imagination, is determined by the ineffable nature of this goal which can find no one to match its standards. In this period of productivity, the fall of the spirit and its inclination to the flesh, or matter, becomes a stark reality for Ausias March. The value of love is jeopardized, because it is increasingly considered to be the usurpation by the senses, or the flesh, of the apparent domain of the spirit. In his desire to achieve the ideal created by imagination sorrow, which is conceived of as a lack of discretion,[51] consequently comes to become a dominant factor in the thematic background of these poems. Love is, therefore, presented as a corporeal experience, because the fall of the spirit compels the lover to sensual love. Poem CXV repudiates that love which has led the poet to sensuality, and in the final stanzas the role of imagination is alluded to. The poem's first stanza introduces the problem of the impossibility of Ausias March's ideal love to be reciprocated[52]: "la mi·amor un altr·a si no·n tira" (CXV, v. 9). As in Poem CXIX, imagination is a source of "coldness" and "ardour" for the lover, that is, of love, "amar", or its repudiation "ahirar"[53]:

> No passa res que d'ella ymagine,
> que no·m escalph o que tot no·m refrede;
> tots los mijans de mi apart o vede,
> en ahirar o amar sí pens fine.
> Cascú d'aquests té causa·n mi que·s tinga;
> no sé jutjar en mi qual se retinga
> (CXV, vv. 85-90).

The poet is caught in the contradictory movement of imagination, reason rejects this love ("ahirar"), yet the senses are enamoured by the image of the lady ("amar"). Hence, he feels both attraction and revulsion for the lady. As verse 90 indicates this contradictory situation stems from a confusion of the poet's judgement. Owing to the idealizing nature of imagination the senses have usurped the function of the spirit, this usurpation is a source of conflict, referred to in verse 89, the "ahirar" has its cause ("causa") in the spirit or reason, and the love ("amar") in the senses; because the spirit has had to lower itself excessively and, therefore, has lost in spirituality,[54] there is no possible middle point, verse 87. That this love is sensual, and either does not partake in spirituality or forces the spirit to lower itself against its will, is obvious from what the poet says in stanza XI:

No·s pot bé dir amor de home propi
lo que yo sent, car per la carn és tota;
d'açò·m delit com no·n pas una gota
en l'esperit, e si·u fa, com repropi
(CXV, vv. 101-104).

Reason is therefore powerless before this imagination dominated by the senses that usurp the function of the spirit. Ausias March then describes the disillusionment which he feels at the perversion of his ideal. It is a deceit over which he has no control. In stanza X the conflict of "Ira" and "Amor" represents the defeat of reason by the senses, and the lack of power that the lover has when he is captivated by the "sensual memory" of the lady:

L'imaginar altre bé no·m esmenta,
sinó aquest qu·é sentit per aquesta;
té·m lo cor pres, molt poca part ne resta
per allogar Ira quant se presenta;
fent mudament tan gran en ma persona,
qu·en suor vinch quant Ira·n mi comença;
ladonchs Amor no pot fer que la vença,
ans son poder del tot li abandona;
no passa molt que lur poder s'eguala
e venç Amor, entrant-me sens escala
(CXV, vv. 91-100).

As the spirit, or reason, lowers itself, the senses "Amor" lose their power (verse 98), but as the senses rise to meet the spirit their power also increases (verse 99), and overwhelms reason. The judgement that Ausias makes of imagination is negative. He is concerned with the deceitful nature of imagination, which has brought him sorrow. As explained above, sorrow proceeds from the knowledge, or desire, of virtue which is frustrated by the individual's lack of will to transcend sensuality. This poem is, therefore, a bitter condemnation of imagination which has enticed the poet to love a lady, who was perceived as a spiritual entity. Ausias March feels that he is unable to love spiritually; however, his reason is so falsely delighted by the imagination (vv. 96-100)[56] that he is unable to reject the deceitful ideal perceived in imagination. The "tornada" of this poem sums up this situation, that the ideal of Love, perceived deceptively by imagination, can only bring the poet sorrow: "Amor, Amor, yo he pres ferma tema: / que vostre bē porta dolor extrema" (CXV, vv. 121-122).

The creation of this ideal, which is considered to be deceitful in the later poems, can be traced to the early poems. The intervening poems of the middle period, preceding the "Cants de Mort", do not refer to imagination with an explicitly moral intention. In these poems imagination is only referred to as the faculty of mental figuration, and only twice is it associated to what the poet considers to be the ideal of Love. Poem LXXXIX begins with an image of a mystic nature[57] (Appendix II), by which the poet indicates that he is seeking the lady's love, not her physical possession, as verses 50-53 indicate[58]:

> mon gran voler me porta·n aquest zel;
> de vostre cors no tem lo pus prim pèl
> qu·encontra mi res fes ne·m fos altiu.
> La voluntat vull que pas tota·n mi
> (LXXXIX, vv. 50-53).

Consequently the ideal set forth by the imagination is that the poet be granted the love of the lady, that his love be recognized and returned, spiritually but not physically. His delight is to imagine that state of beatitude, which is essentially a spiritual communion:

> Si·l penssament lunyava hun sol punt
> d'imaginar haver vostre voler,
> sens aquell tot, no pusch delit haver;
> si no·s tot sa, tost porà sser defunt
> (LXXXIX, vv. 14-16).

This parallels the "mystic" imagery that introduces this theme: "Cervo ferit no desija la font / aytant com yo esser a vós present" (LXXXIX, vv. 1-2). In this desire for a love which is not physical the imagination leads the poet into perceiving the lady ideally. The veracity of that ideal is imagined, but not tested. In Poem LXXXVII the illusory character of that ideal is explained. Once again Ausias March expounds problems arising from the duality of man and the ambivalence of imagination. This time, however, the scope of the imagination is broadened to explain that what Ausias March seeks in the imagination is Love in its most ideal form:

> No conech hom qui sens amar persona,
> coneg· Amor e per déu lo confesse;
> yo són aquell que per negun temps cesse
> d'imaginar en ell, e res no·m dóna.
> Desig me fa en la sperança jaure,
> dormint tant fort que rahó no·m desperta;
> assats a mi és caussa descuberta
> que pur· amor no pot en dona caure.
> Mon delit és vida contemplativa,
> e romanch trist devallant en l'activa
> (LXXXVII, vv. 261-270).

An important point to notice in these verses is that Ausias March is not in love with Love as such, but in love with Love through a person (vv. 261-262), that is, he is in love with the spiritual essence which he perceives in that person (vv. 263-264), by means of imagination. The contradiction which is the object of these verses lies in the fact

that the perception Ausias March has of Love cannot be achieved in reality, or the practice of love, as verse 264 states. The imagination being an imperfect means of cognition, it cannot without the assistance of reason transcend the limits of the senses. Although Ausias March does desire pure love (vv. 265 and 268) his imagination is not guided by reason, and in practice it becomes sensual love. Hence, Ausias March aspires to a "contemplative" life, as seen above in Poem CXIX, which reveals to him the ideal of a virtuous love which he desires. Nevertheless, the lack of a strong will, which is the result of the absence of reason, causes the lover to fall into sensuality and sorrow. The latter is the realization of the distance that separates him from the ineffable ideal which he perceives only in imagination.

Imagination, which has the basic function of allowing the poet to perceive an ineffable ideal that he cannot match in the sensory world, causes him to sorrow. The knowledge he has of this ideal makes the poet superior to the average man. Imagination, therefore, also serves to isolate the poet, or lover, from the community of mankind. Variations on this aspect of imagination can be found in three relatively early poems of Ausias March, XIII, XXXVI, and LXVI. In the latter poem sorrow arising from imagination becomes associated with the fear of death which serves as an expression of the poet's isolation. This poem, written after a period during which Ausias March claims not to have been in love, represents a moment in which the poet relapses into his search for pure love, and the subsequent apprehensions he feels towards his new love. In the first stanza Ausias March claims that he has been compelled to love against his will, and then implores Love to grant him a pure love:

O ver·Amor! tu invoch e reclam:
puys m'as plagat, vulles-m'abandonar
aquell engüent que sol medecinar
los pacients que per tu mal passam.
No sia sols yo en ta desfavor!
(LXVI, vv. 9-13).

As the last verse points out, Ausias March fears isolation, that is, that he will be the only true lover not to find reciprocation in "ver·Amor", true or pure love. The medical references in verses 11 and 12 set the tone for some of the ensuing imagery. In stanza IV Ausias March compares his situation to that of a sick man (see Appendix II) who is certain to live because he knows the normal symptoms of his illness, but comes to fear that he will die when a new ill befalls him. This fear of death is brought on by imagination (verse 28):

Sí co·l malalt de viure té fermança
per alguns mals que familiars té,
si algun mal d'altr·accident li ve,
en por de mort l'imaginar lo lança
ne pren a mé, que·m era ja no res
lo mal d'Amor, vivint sobre aquell,
e per mal nou, a morir vinch per ell,
per no sser tal e com molt major és
(LXVI, vv. 25-32).

As verses 29-32 indicate, imagination has thrown Ausias March into a renewed consciousness of sorrow; it has renewed his love. The fear that Ausias March expresses in the subsequent stanzas is summed up in verses 31 and 32, "lo mal d'Amor" is the product of the imagination; thus, Love brings a mortal wound: "ésser menys d'ulls, ans del colp, molt hi val, / mas al ferit mort sola·s guariment" (verses 39-40). The imagination renews the poet's sorrow and leads him to acknowledge the distance that separates him from his perception of the ideal. This experience of the distance, which in rhetorical terms is known as the "laetus horror",[59] has an existential dimension. It is an affirmation of the limitations of the flesh which can only be

transcended in death,[60] which Ausias March conceives as the release from the "dark prison" of the body: "Torn a no-res yo·t suplich, lo meu ésser, / car més me val que tostemps l'escur càrcer" (CV, vv. 197-198).

The "laetus horror" felt by Ausias March at the contemplation of the distance that separates him from the ideal perceived in the lady gives way to an increased consciousness of death as a release from sentient life. The imagination is consequently a source of alienation. Poems XIII and XXXVI explicitly refer to imagination in this context. Poem XXXVI addresses both death and the lady, in stanzas I and IV respectively. Ausias March introduces the theme of this poem with an apostrophe to death on whom he calls to free him from the sorrow he feels. Stanza II develops this theme by requesting death, which is the only thing that can surpass the poet's sorrow:

> Ma dolor gran no pot ésser perida
> sinó per mal qu·en quantitat la passe;
> per altr·affany no crech mon cor se lasse
> e sia tant que·m dón pena·nfinida,
> torbant mon seny fins que dolor no senta:
> ladonchs remey yo pens aconseguesqua;
> altra dolor me plau sia fresqua,
> o prech la mort que morir me consenta
> (XXXVI, vv. 9-16).

These verses are essentially a hyperbolic praise of the lady. What Ausias March is saying in highly rhetorical language is that his vision of the lady's beauty is such that the sorrow he experiences, the "laetus horror" caused by imagination, could only be surpassed by death. The fresh sorrow referred to in verse 15 is a renewed "laetus horror",[61] which, although impossible as verses 9 to 12 stipulate, would increase the state of anguish that the poet feels, and end his present sorrow. As Bohigas interprets these verses, this new sorrow can only be found in death. In the third stanza Ausias March traces this anguish directly to the imagination, and addresses the lady in

order to beseech her to renew his pure love, beyond all contradictions:

> L'imaginar per null temps no m'esmenta
> altra dolor, e que apert no sia
> a donar plor perdent tot·alegria;
> ffuig de les gents, no·m plau que algú·m senta.
> Deman de vós que de mi·us vullau dolrre;
> açò deman que lleument pusch atènyer,
> e no és poch; ab què no·m vullau fènyer,
> gran part del mal vós me poreu dissolre
> (XXXVI, vv. 17-24).

Ausias March seeks to renew his confidence in the possibility of achieving the ideal which the imagination presents to him. The imagination presents the image which provokes the "laetus horror" (verses 17-18), and leads the poet to acknowledge his sorrow, that is, his incapacity to fulfill that desire. This alienates him from mankind who has no conception of this ideal (verse 20). This situation will lead to the subsequent moral and religious poems in which Ausias March describes the moral decadence of his age.[62] However, in his request to the lady Ausias March begs her to reciprocate his pure love, and fulfill the requirements of his ideal, that is, to renew his faith in the possibility of achieving the ideal, by not feigning pure love (verse 23). The problem of finding a being capable of truly reciprocating that love was the subject of Poem LXXXVII discussed above.

Poem XIII also examines the problem of alienation resulting from the knowledge of the existence of an ideal imparted by imagination. Ausias March expands the scope of this alienation by explicitly contrasting his imagination to that of the average man. This is the source of Ausias March's contention that his knowledge of Love is exclusive.[63] His ideal is so much beyond the reach of the living, that is, the average person who does not aspire to Ausias March's ideal, that his love makes him seem to be a dead man among the quick:

Cascú requer e vol a son semblant;
per ço no·m plau la pràtica dels vius.
D'imaginar mon estat són esquius;
sí com d'om mort, de mi prenen espant
(XIII, vv. 9-12).

In his later moral poems Ausias March specifically refers to the "pràtica dels vius" (verse 10) as the rites of lustful love;[64] his aspiration to a virtuous love sets fear in men's hearts, as does the vision of a dead man (verse 12).[65] That which Ausias March seeks in the imagination is infinite: "car ço que vull no serà may finat" (v. 15). In this early poem Ausias March fears that death would deprive him of the vision of this imagination. This tormenting situation has its origin in the impossibility of finding a living woman to reciprocate Ausias March's love. Consequently, the fourth stanza deals with the problem of death, which would deprive the lover of his imagination and, at the same time, impede any possibility of attaining pure love:

E si la mort no·m dugués tal offensa
- ffer mi absent d'una tan plasent vista -,
no li graesch que de tera no vista
lo meu cors nuu, qui de plaer no pensa
de perdre pus que lo ymaginar
los meus desigs no poder-se complir;
e si·m cové mon derrer jorn finir,
seran donats tèrmens a ben amar
(XIII, vv. 25-32).

Death, which would lead to the burial of the poet's body, would deprive him of the pleasure he draws from the sight of the lady (verse 26), and hence, of the imagination he has of her spirit (see Poem CXIX above). The greatest loss, therefore, would be the very source of his pure love, which is the imagination (verse 29).[66] This also marks the end of "ben amar" (verse 32), which is beyond the love of the living (verse 10 above). Yet, all that Ausias March seeks is that the lady acknowledge this love. However, the only test which

the poet has to certify that the lady fulfills this condition and shows mercy, is in death, by becoming a martyr of Love:

> que d'esta mort vos ha plagut plorar,
> penedint-vos com per poqua mercè
> mor l'ignoscent e per amar-vos martre
> (XIII, vv. 36-38).

In these poems the imagination is the source of an inaccessible love, which as in the above verses, creates a "religio amoris" (verse 38), and is a source of sorrow for the poet that brings about alienation and a consciousness of death. These various poetic themes are used rhetorically to magnify the value of the poet's imagination: the greater the effect of the "laetus horror" produced on the lover by the perception of the imagination, the greater the latter is. Indirectly, the manipulation of these elements becomes a consistent praise of the lady as Ausias March wishes the reader to perceive her through his suffering, as in the laudatory verses of Poem XXXVI, 9-16.

In the early poems the formation of Ausias March's consciousness of death and the inaccessibility of pure love depends largely on the role which imagination plays in the deceitful maintenance of hope. Indeed, as in the Roman de la Rose, one of the commandments of Love is that the lover should always have present in his mind, the memory of the beloved,[67] that is, the imagination which is sensuous memory. This induces the poet into renewing his belief in the possibility of an ideal love, as in Poem XXXVI, verse 15 above. Poem I uses this concept extensively. The introductory image which draws on the Boethian theme of the adversity of Fortune in the memory of happiness (Appendix II)[68] refers to the participation of the imagination. The significance of this poem is greatly increased when one realizes that Ausias March deliberately introduces the problem of the deceitfulness of imagination, as opposed to that of mere memory:

Axí com cell qui·n lo somni·s delita
e son delit de foll pensament ve,
ne pren a mi, que·l temps passat me tẽ
l'imaginar, qu· altre bẽ no·y habita,
sentint estar en aguayt ma dolor
(I, vv. 1-5).

The imagination of past times, as a mental figuration of the Golden Age, not as a cognitive faculty, which plays an important role in Ausias March's poetry,[69] is the source of much of Ausias March's idealization of love. The imagination in this early poem is the perception of an ideal past based on pure love, as all references to imagination in this poetry. Although the ideal bears a negative moral connotation, it is nevertheless an ideal characterized by its very ineffability. As verse 9-10 of this poem indicate, Ausias March refers to an ideal which is irremediably lost: "Del temps present no·m trobe amador, / mas del passat, qu· és no-res e finit" (I, vv. 9-10). This is obviously related to Ausias March's image of past lovers, as virtuous lovers, in Poem XIII, verses 5-8. This conception of the past has an inner actuality for the poet by the very nature of its idealism: "Temps de·venir en negun bẽ·m pot caure; / aquell passat en mi és lo millor" (I, vv. 7-8), (underlining is mine). By this ideal which is irretrievable the poet finds himself constantly facing the "laetus horror" which characterizes his sorrow. The imagery in this poem is consequently inverted in order to represent the ideal which is impossible to attain. Ausias March's use of the image of the condemned prisoner in stanza II provides a key for understanding the duality of this ideal and the "laetus horror":

sí com aquell qui és jutgat a mort
he de lonch temps la sab e s'aconorta,
e creure·l fan que li serà estorta
e·l fan morir sens un punt de recort
(I, vv. 13-16).

The image of hope denied to the lover, who is a "prisoner of love"

(Appendix II), acquires its full significance in this poem when it is recalled that it is originally found in the Guillaume de Lorris section of the Roman de la Rose[70]; Ausias March is frequently supposed to have known the whole work[71]:

> Mout est Esperance courtoise:
> El ne laira ja une toise
> Nul vaillant ome jusqu'au chief,
> Ne por perill ne por meschief.
> Nes au larron que l'en viaut pendre
> Fait ele ades merci atendre (vv. 2631-2636).[72]

If hope is to sustain the lover in the Roman de la Rose, this is not the case in Ausias March's Poem I. The courtly ideal proposed by Guillaume de Lorris has an opposite value within the limits of the Valencian poet's experience. The hope of retrieving the past is deceitful; by having recourse to the imagery of the Roman de la Rose Ausias March refers to a courtly ideal which is inaccessible. The subsequent imagery of Poem I describes situations in which the deceit of hope only leads to a greater consciousness of the "laetus horror", the distance that separates the individual from the ideal perceived and sought. The "imaginar" recalls the ideal which sparks hope, and, therefore, pleasure. This causes the poet to aspire to a virtuous love which is denied by his actual circumstance, and leads to sorrow, which as we have seen above is the consciousness of the individual's failure to attain virtue:

> Ffóra millor ma dolor sofferir
> que no mesclar pocha part de plaher
> entre·quells mals, qui·m giten de saber
> com del passat plaher me cové ·xir.
> Las! Mon delit dolor se converteix;
> doble's l'affany aprés d'un poc repòs,
> (I, vv. 25-30).

These verses return to the theme of the failure to realize this imagination, and the poet's constant relapse into the belief of the

possibility of attaining this ideal, as seen in Poem LXVI, verses 25-32 and LXXXVI, verses 265, which is the fruit of a vision brought about by imagination. It is a false hope that beguiles the poet and causes him to shun the "practice of the living" (Poem XIII, verse 10). The interpretation of imagination in this poem is negative. It logically can be considered to be a reflection of the definition of imagination as an imperfect means of cognition, which as verse 27 above suggests is destructive when not accompanied by the control of reason.

Yet, in the remaining two poems which refer to imagination, Poems IX and XXVII, the function of the imagination continues to be ambivalent. It is eventually a source of sorrow, but it is also the immediate source of the poet's aspiration to the highest kind of virtuous love. Poem IX refers to imagination three times, in stanzas IV and V. In all three instances imagination is the only faculty that allows the lover to perceive Love. The poet describes the state of folly into which he has been driven now that he finds himself abandoned by Love who has become weary of his unusual constancy. This allegorical representation in the first stanza is a masque of the lover's timidity. The lover's fear of revealing his love, and the unreciprocated nature of this love are the main subjects of this poem. One could infer a moral purpose in this poem by similarities with the process described in Poem CXV, verses 85-100, discussed above; however, this is a subject developed in Ausias March's later poetry. The tone of this poem is set by the reference to Pyramus and Thisbe, who proved the truth of their love in death:

> Cell qui no sent què pot fer molt amar,
> yo li perdo si de mi s va trufan;
> Piramus volch morir passat d'un bran,
> e per senblant mort Tisbe volch passar
> (IX, vv. 13-16).

The image of ideal lovers (Appendix II) whose love was proven by death is paralleled by Ausias March's own conception of ideal love which can only be warranted by death, as in Poem XXXVI, discussed previously. Love has taken away the lover's rational faculties: "que·l seny tinch pres l'arbitre y la rahó" (IX, v. 7); this impedes him from being able to communicate his love to the lady. Beyond reason, however, he is sustained in love by the rapture of imagination, which Love cannot take away from him:

> Stant a part e sol, yo m'enpeguesch,
> ymaginant ço que deuria fer;
> d'executar no dech haver esper,
> puys lo primer assaig no enseguesch;
> l'imaginar Amor me vol reprendre,
> tan larguament ab vergonya·m refrena
> (IX, vv. 25-30).

In this stanza imagination has a passive and subservient function to the problem of revealing love. As seen previously in the discussion of Poem CXIX, the contemplation of the lady's perfection operates within the Imagination, which allows the lover to perceive the ideal. In verse 26 above it is the contemplation of action that would bring about the ideal, but which timidity or shame ("vergonya") prevents him from putting into practice (verse 27). Within the faculty of Imagination his love is born, that is, the contemplation of the lady's spirit, or pure love, which Love threatens to take away from him (verse 29). In stanza V Ausias March describes the conflict between contemplation and the practice of love, or, by extension the conflict of the spirit and the flesh that torments him. It is his belief in the reality of the perception of the imagination that drives Ausias March to claim that he would die in order to prove the veracity of his love, like Pyramus and Thisbe:

> Los fets d'Amor yo no pusch ben entendre;
> de grans contrasts m·opinio és plena;

hor· à·n lo jorn que no sent ulla pena;
pensant en ço que vinch a l'arma rendre.
Si altra veu l'imaginar m'i porta,
per dar senyal que yo sia cregut,
suplich la mort qu·en tal cas me ajut;
e si no·m val, ma veritat jau morta
(IX, vv. 33-40).

As verses 35 and 36 indicate, in this great conflict between contemplative and active life, there is an hour in which the lover is free from all sorrow and feels indifferent to death.[73] This indifference to death and sorrow is characteristic of the rapture of contemplation. Indeed, verse 37, indicates that this contemplative state is brought about by imagination. Hence, the imagination again gives Ausias March access to the ineffable ideal of love; the deceit of this mode of cognition is evident in the "tornada":

Lir entre carts, fins a veure la porta
de mos delits sobirans són vengut;
no·y he toquat, ans me'n torn com a mut,
e per tornar ja trob la via torta
(IX, vv. 41-44).

The lover's imagination has led him into a one-way, no-exit, situation; now that he has seen the lady he cannot turn away (verse 44). His reason is now captured by Love (verse 7 above); it has become excessively enamoured of imagination, which, as Hughes de Saint Victor remarked, leads to man's individual fall. The great "finesse" of this poem[74] lies in the poet's ability to play on the highly ambivalent nature of imagination.

Poem XXVII also develops around the theme of the lover's shyness, and the conflict between contemplative and active life. The first stanza presents the problematic situation. The imagination of Love found in the contemplation overcomes the sorrow of the poet, however, since it subdues reason it causes a new sorrow, because love cannot be revealed to the lady without destroying the ideal perceived.

This entails a conflict for the lover concerning whether he should reveal his love or not. These problems are summed up in the first eight verses:

> Sobresdolor m'à tolt l'imaginar;
> l'enteniment no·s dol ni·s pot esbatre:
> aytant és dolç que·l ha calgut abatre,
> e mon affany, plorant, no·s pot mostrar.
> No trob remey, car ma dolor és tanta,
> que mon voler en parts ne tinch partit,
> ne·n sol un loch lo'm trobe ahunit
> sinó·n morir e viure que·s decanta
> (XXVII, vv. 1-8).

As in Poem IX the problem of the lover's shyness is intimately related to that of the loss of his rational faculty. Reason has become excessively enamoured of imagination; it has lowered itself ("abatre", verse 3), and has fallen to the power of the senses, verses 1 to 2. The sorrow that arises out of this situation is portrayed as a choice between living and dying, verse 8. This represents the constant fluctuation of the will between revealing or not the poet's love, verses 5 to 8. The choice, which is affected by reason's excessive attraction to the imagination, is one between contemplative or active life, as discussed above in Poem LXXXVII, verses 261-270. The imagination's power over reason causes the lover's will to lose the necessary guidance, verse 6, and to fluctuate constantly, verse 7, between contemplative and active life. The sorrow, verse 5, which arises from this state can therefore be said to be the product of the lover's fear to face the distance that separates him from the ideal perceived in his imagination. The "tornada" articulates this notion:

> Plena de seny, no·s pot ben soferir
> vida y dolor sens pendr· algun espay;
> lo meu desig se converteix en glay
> quant me recort que res vos haja dir
> (XXVII, vv. 41-44).

The fear of revealing the lover's feeling is tantamount to the fear of

destroying the contemplative ideal of imagination. It is therefore the fear of facing the failure of this ideal in active life. The poet is caught between the desire of having his love reciprocated and the fear that by reciprocation it will either be destroyed, or at best, rejected by the lady. In either case it is important to note that the constant factor is that the imagination has given the lover access to an ineffable ideal which cannot be put into practice without destroying it. The desire to believe in any such possibility is entirely dependent in these early poems on the fall of reason. Imagination then becomes a state of rapture that gives the lover access to a higher ideal against which he must measure himself once this ideal is put into practice. However, the very fact that it entails the loss of reason inevitably sets the imagination in an ambivalent context, and this allows for subsequent moral judgement.

In all of the above references to Ausias March's use of the theory of imagination it is evident that the spiritual vision of the "form" of the lady is considered to be quasi-divine. Yet, in all these cases the ideal is rendered inaccessible due to an inherent flaw in reason which causes its inclination to the flesh. Hughes de Saint Victor refers to this movement as the excessive enamourment of reason to the imagination. The perception of this ideal is obviously taken in context, and as stanza IV of Poem IX, it involves the problem of "imagining" actions that are fitting to the ideal circumstance; hence, the "imagining" of an ideal world within which the object moves. This context seems to be the idealization of a certain literary tradition, implicit in the references to Pyramus and Thisbe. This larger context of the imagination as related to the problem of love in the poetry of Ausias March will be the object of a subsequent chapter in this thesis.[75] In its original sense the imagination as an ideal

individually perceived is not condemned in itself. It is the imagination as a movement of the sensuous memory leading to the perversion of reason and free will, as in Poem IX, verse 7, that is open to moral reproof.

This is the very point which I consider to be the hinge of all problems present in Ausias March's poetry, whether it be moral, religious or erotic. The classification of the types of love in three parts, which is really used to define the degree of the movement of reason away from the spirit, is a subsequent evolution of this problem, excessively noted by prior critics. It represents the discursive solution to the representation of an essentially metaphysical poetic problem which has its roots in the rhetorical theory inherited from the Chartrians and Victorines, and especially, in the case of Ausias March, from the De Unione Corporis et Spiritus of Hughes of Saint Victor, a point which will be substantiated in chapter V. This naturally implies that there is present in the works of Ausias March, the influence of a mediaeval Neoplatonic current which affects both his interpretation of love and his religious sensitivity. The latter will be the subject of chapter V. There remains in this section to clarify the notion of Ausias March's experience of the perception of the individual ideal. As I pointed out above the previous examples of Ausias March's references to imagination are all concerned with its ambivalent nature. The description of the original experience emphasizing its capacity to cause "laetus horror", and, hence, consciousness of the positive aspects of the imagination, its rise to the spirit,[76] is overlooked. This, I believe, can be found in Ausias March's usage of the word "fantasia", phantasy, which although basically synonymous to imagination, had in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries certain important secondary implications.

The problem of a distinction between phantasy and imagination is a hoary one that goes back to Aristotle's criticism of Plato, and is determined by the solution given by Proclus,[77] which explicitly separated the two terms and affected subsequent definitions. Imagination and phantasy are both imperfect means of cognition, and, as the texts previously quoted point out,[78] they are frequently interchangeable. The difference is a matter of degree based on the notion of an association of imagination to reason and phantasy to intellect.[79] Proclus' explanation of the difference placed phantasy in an even more ambivalent position than imagination by associating it to truth found in fiction or dreams, hence divorcing it, more than imagination, from the senses, and equally accentuating its unreliability. For Proclus it is "the last echo... of the intellect, and is not improperly called passive intellect".[80] Furthermore, it is associated to Platonic reminiscence in which "the images of a former ideal existence are in phantasy and can be recalled".[81] Hence, through its relation to the intellect phantasy is considered to be an ambivalent form of non-sensuous memory, which could lead to a superior truth but also to great deceit, if it is considered to be a concrete representation of sensuous objects. A further determinant factor in this distinction is the Stoic definition of phantasy. It accentuated the relation of phantasy to dreams and stressed its unreliable nature by associating it to the unreality of the vision and the physiological condition of the subject. The Stoics consequently associated it to melancholy[82]:

> Thousands who are insane or melancholy have what are really phantasies in the sense that they have sources in external reality; yet, since there is no true correspondence between the phenomenon and the impression, these are to be called "phantasms".[83]

The consequences of these two basic views of phantasy on the later Middle Ages can best be gleaned from the work of Albert the Great for

whom: "Phantasia implied the loftier functions, the greater freedom, but at the same time the greater liability to error."[84]

These concepts pervade the literary tradition of pre-Renaissance Europe. Indeed, one needs only to compare Dante's various references to "l'alta fantasia"[85] in the Divina Commedia to Chaucer's almost antonymous usage of the same word as "derke fantasye"[86] in the "Franklin's Tale", where it is related to the "maladye of hereos",[87] in order to consider the varied fortunes of this term. In courtly literature the moral consequences of the negative interpretation of phantasy, as a vain imagination, is a predominant aspect of the moralists' view on love, as can be seen in the highly influential De planctu naturae. Alain de Lille's Nature describes the deceit into which mankind has fallen since the rebellion of the senses. W. Wetherbee's interpretation of the De planctu naturae[88] clearly identifies this deceit with the "maze of phantasia"[89] whose duplicity has brought "shadows of sorrow"[90] as described in the two parts of Genius' speech. In the fourteenth-century French authors, such as Jehan Le Bel,[91] found it necessary to differentiate between imagination and phantasy; to the latter Le Bel naturally attributed the faculty of inventing valid or invalid images. Hence, this aspect of phantasy is considered to be a source of sorrow, or "tristitia". In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries "tristitia" became synonymous with melancholy.[92] An important factor in determining the relation between phantasy and melancholy in the Middle Ages was undoubtedly the former's association to sleep and dreams, as found in Proclus and the Stoics. This led to the association of phantasy to sloth in the Christian tradition, and sloth was equally considered to be an attribute of the lesser kind of melancholy.[93] However, although this seems to have been the predominant interpretation of phantasy in the courtly

treatises that considered love to be an "inmoderata cogitatione",[94] one cannot overlook the equally important aspect of phantasy as a lofty intellectual faculty, which is also present in the courtly tradition. It gained importance in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and shaped the Florentine sensibility.

The various possible implications of phantasy are greater than those of imagination. This does not seem to have been ignored by Ausias March. The three references he makes to phantasy tend to associate this faculty to its loftier contemplative function. However, the implication in the two later poems suggests a relation to lesser melancholy and, as such, to idle phantasy. This is clearly a posterior moral judgement. These three references are found in Poems XVIII, CI and CXVII. It is only in the first of these that Ausias March explicitly extols phantasy's intellectual benefits; in the others this judgement is tempered.

Poem CXVII is an extensive moral poem dealing with the various kinds of love and the poet's incapacity to maintain his love pure, owing to the weakness of the will and the problem of man's dual nature. The reference to phantasy in these verses is accessory; it comes as an interjection:

> Si·n gran excés per son desig l'om puja
> tot lo compost ses potences té preses,
> car segons és e a qui és amable,
> axí ses parts de amor les carrega,
> tirant, fluixant, creixent, minvant, fent cambis,
> volent l'onest, aprés tot lo contrari
> - açò segons se porta·n fantasia - ;
> a temps volent com hom, com brut, com àngel
> (CXVII, vv. 161-168).

This description is followed by elemental imagery describing this process in the ensuing stanza[95] (Appendix II). The reference to phantasy is used to denote the mutability of the kinds of affection to which man is inclined by his dual nature. As verses 167-168 imply,

phantasy is a source of this instability. This is a reference to the breadth of possibilities inherent in the notion of phantasy, as in Jehan Le Bel it is an indiscriminate source of valid or invalid images. Ausias March is basically repeating a standard notion concerning the ambivalence of phantasy as a means of cognition, and only as such can it be associated with deceit in a general condemnation of love.

Unlike Poem CXVII, Poems XVIII and CI, are love poems; there is a good rhetorical reason for Ausias March not to formulate a condemnation of phantasy in these poems, especially in XVIII where it is the source of a fulfilling experience of love. Poem CI, which seems to be a later poem,[96] associates phantasy to the spiritual aspects of the lover's contemplation of the lady, that is, to her "seny" and "gest". This poem develops mainly around the theme of the power of the "gest", and by so doing, Ausias March is able to praise the lady, as he frequently does when referring to the imagination. The effects of the perception of the lady's "gest" serve to praise her. Ausias March introduces the subject of this poem with a medical image of possible troubadour origin (Appendix II), which alternates with a Petrarchan image in the second stanza, describing the effects of the "gest". In these verses, the "gest" as a spiritual emanation is perceived in the eyes of the lady[97] by the imagination and renders the lover powerless:

Yo viu uns ulls haver tan gran potença
de dar dolor e prometre plaher;
yo, smaginant, viu sus mí tal poder
qu· en mon castell era sclau de remença:
yo viu un gest e sentí una veu
d'un feble cos, e cuydara jurar
qu· un hom armat yo ·l fera congoxar:
sens rompre'm pel yo ·m só retut per seu
(CI, vv. 9-16).

In the first four verses of this stanza the theory of imagination,

introduced by vision, is clearly set out, and the last four verses repeat the same concept with another, but similar, metaphor in which the notion of "gest", as related to the imagination, is elaborated upon. Characteristically the function of the imagination entails a conflict between the senses and reason[98]:

> Mos ulls d'açò han feta la bugada
> e tot mos senys s'i són volguts mesclar;
> yo pena·n pas, mas no·y puch contrastar
> (CI, vv. 25-27).

From this point onwards the poet is caught in his usual dilemma, discursively presented in Poem CXVII, v. 168, of being unable to choose between contemplation and action. The "gest" of the lady keeps him in contemplation, "Lo vostre gest tots mos actes afrena" (verse 45). It is in this context that phantasy is introduced:

> Dormint, vetlant, yo tinch la fantasia
> en contemplar qui am, qui és, què val,
> e quant més trob, lavors me va pus mal,
> pel pensament, qui·m met en gran follia
> (CI, vv. 33-36).

Ausias March's conception of phantasy in the first two verses above follows the standard definition of this faculty. The two words, "dormint, vetlant" (verse 33), which mean, sleeping, lying awake or day-dreaming, give us a perfect description of phantasy as associated to dreams and sleep, hence to sloth, and therefore, to melancholy, or "amor hereos". As one can see in verse 36 the "inmoderata cogitatione" caused by phantasy (verse 33) leads the lover into folly, "gran follia" (verse 36). This folly is the product of the opposition between the contemplation of the "gest" which restrains the lover and his boundless love (will or desire) as explained in verses 45 and 46. This is a conflict between action and contemplation. The irony is that the "gest" which causes the contemplation also sparks the "voler":

Lo vostre gest tots mos actes afrena,
he mon voler res no·l pot enfrenar;
l'ivern cremant, l'estiu sens escalfar,
aquells perills me daran mala strena
(CI, vv. 45-48).

Contrary to Bohigas' judicious opinion,[99] verse 47 is a topical description of the unstable medical condition of the melancholy lover.[100] The poetic unity of the text is maintained by a return to the medical imagery used at the beginning. The concept of phantasy presented in these verses is particularly ambiguous. It has a very close relation to imagination as a contemplative faculty (verse 34), and therefore, of keeping the poet's love on a spiritual level, yet it is also "idle fantasy" which leads to the physiological unbalance characteristic of "amor hereos", in which the lover suffers the extremes of Love's folly.

In Poem XVIII phantasy is presented as a purely spiritual faculty. The context in which it is mentioned is solely concerned with the description of the intellectual bliss found in the perception of the lady's beauty. This poem is generally referred to as one of the most "Platonic" poems of Ausias March's production.[101] It describes the rise of the visual, and therefore, sensual, perception to the spirit (verses 5 to 8 below). All references to the "enamourment", or fall, of reason are deleted. Love is here strictly intellectual and blissful. Phantasy is considered a means to revealed knowledge, that is to true wisdom.[102] Although it is only mentioned once it is the introductory verb which dominates every section of this poem. Everything referred to is perceived in phantasy. The first stanza provides the reader with all the thematic elements subsequently developed:

Ffantasiant, Amor a mi descobre
los grans secrets c·als pus suptils amaga,
e mon jorn clar als hòmens és nit fosqua,

e visch de ço que persones no tasten.
Tant en Amor l'esperit meu contempla,
que par del tot fora del cors s'aparte,
car mos desigs no son trobats en home,
sinó en tal que la carn punt no·l torbe
(XVIII, vv. 1-8).

The first fundamental problem in the above verses is that of determining the subject of the verb. Out of phantasy, that is, fancy, Love might be deceiving the poet. On the basis of previous references to the imagination and to phantasy, in which the subject always performs the action I am inclined to believe that "Ffantasiant" is performed by the narrator.[103] Phantasizing on love entails three basic themes, that of revelation (verse 2), through illumination (verse 3), which is conceived of as a spiritual contemplation (verse 5), and leads to a quasi-mystic implication of the ascension of the spirit through a divorce from the flesh (verses 7-8).

Ausias March presents the subsequent images in reference to these three themes in mystic terms adequate to the contemplative life which he is describing. Phantasy has in these verses the quality of a mystic rapture which is described through an imagery of light. It portrays the divine revelation of Love, and the spirit's ascent to the spiritual vision by separation from sensuality:

Sí com los sants, sentints la lum divina,
la lum del món conegueren per ficta,
e menyspreants la glòria mundana,
puys major part de glòria sentien,
tot enaxí tinch en menyspreu e fàstig
aquells desigs qui complits, Amor minva,
prenint aquells que del esperit mouen,
(XVIII, vv. 25-31).

As verse 31 tells us, Ausias March's love is inspired by desires that proceed from the spirit. Verses subsequent to this passage better define the source of these spiritual desires by elaborating on the divine illumination alluded to in verses 25 and 26. The light imagery

introduces an extensive contrast between it and the darkness and chaos which characterizes this world and the soul's life in it. The divine light illuminates the spirit as it is informed by the sense perception, and Ausias March uses the concept of illumination to expound a basic theory of the clear spirit,[104] which is inherent to the illuminative function of phantasy. As passive intellect, phantasy recalls the images of the soul's former existence; saintly illumination is the Christian Platonic equivalent of this concept. Through this illumination the spirit, unsullied by the flesh, rises above its earthly bonds and enjoys a purely intellectual contemplation of the divine mysteries. The fifth stanza summarizes this process:

Sí com sant Pau Déu li sostragué l'arma
del cors perquè vés divinals misteris,
car és lo cors del esperit lo carçre
e tant com viu ab ell és en tenebres,
axí Amor l'esperit meu arrapa
e no·y acull la maculada pensa,
e per ço sent lo delit qui no·s canssa,
sí qué ma carn la ver· amor no·m torba
(XVIII, vv. 33-40).

There is implied in the reference to St. Paul's conversion (see Appendix II), which involves illumination, notions which are normally associated with that of the Pauline mirror.[105] Phantasy here, as in all this poem,is conceived to be the illumination of the clear spirit, which in its movement informs the rational soul. Hence, Ausias March refers to the entombment of the spirit in the body, the soul's descent into chaos, the "descensus ad inferos" in verses 35 and 36. Love, through phantasy, liberates the spirit from its captivity and purifies its perception (verse 38). Again, this process is understood to be a mystic rapture (verse 37). Consistent with the implications of mediaeval Christian Neoplatonism the revealed knowledge gained in phantasy is presented as a divine folly: "e quant ho dic, de mos dits me desmenten, / dant aparer que coses folles parle"

(verses 55 and 56). Characteristically, the clear spirit is maintained so, by the constant action of the will[106] which keeps the surface of the mirror polished so that it will best reflect divine secrets. The "tornada" of this poem, therefore, ends by referring to the important action of the will:

> Lir entre carts, lo meu voler se tempra
> en ço que null amador sap lo tempre;
> ço fay Amor, a qui plau que yo senta
> sos grans tresors; sols a mi ls manifesta
> (XVIII, vv. 57-60).

As in the case of references to the imagination, these verses imply a certain flattery of the lady's beauty since she is perceived in the light of phantasy which is vision illuminated by Love. However, an important point in this "tornada" is that Ausias March makes it clear that in this phantasy his will is tempered. He is therefore describing himself as a well-tempered lover. Leo Spitzer has noted that the word "tempered" frequently implies a reference to the notion of world harmony.[107] In his various uses of this word Ausias March frequently alludes to the temper of the microcosm,[108] a concept with which he is quite familiar[109]: "Per menor món l'om per tots se nomena" (CXII, verse 375). In subsequent problems references to the lover's temper are governed by the theory of the four humours and the difficulty of maintaining them in balance.[110] In this case, where the lover's temper is perfectly harmonious, phantasy is associated to a state of plenitude in which the lover's soul reaches a condition of cosmic harmony; this is in total agreement with the mystic rapture that accompanies the clear spirit's vision.

When referring to the concept of the clear spirit in Poem XVIII I am describing a kind of epistemology generally associated with Neoplatonists, such as Hughes de Saint Victor. There is, consequently,

the implication that Ausias March seems to have been aware of certain Neoplatonic theories, of which he made use in his poetry. In this case, as in others, it is hazardous to attribute to a poet the traits of a particular philosophical school, and, therefore, to interpret his work strictly in terms of this model. In this poem, as in all others, Ausias March describes a variation of his particular experience. The language and imagery with which he chooses to characterize these experiences is subject to his eclecticism. One can observe, strictly in the limited scope of the last three poems, the vast differences in the poet's evaluation of his experience. In Poem XVIII folly is considered to be a virtue; at the opposite extreme, in Poem CI folly has a deceptive quality, and it is perceived as a source of error. Two basic interpretations of phantasy are thus opposed to one another in the poetry of Ausias March. Poem XVIII, presented an interpretation of the lover's experience in terms of the concept of the clear spirit in which the will keeps the lover's soul from the obscuring effects of the flesh. In this situation phantasy is considered to be a beneficial and spiritual faculty. This is opposed to the concept of phantasy as "idle phantasy" or "derke fantasye", as it is found in Poems CI and CXVII. In these instances Ausias March associates phantasy with the concept of "dark" or "puddled" spirit,[111] that is, to the will's fall and reason's inclination to the flesh. Evidently, the distance that separates the two uses of this term suggests a transformation in the poet's experience of phantasy. Yet, the two interpretations of phantasy are not juxtaposed. One can note, however, that the essence of Ausias March's poetry lies in this opposition. He is primarily concerned with the experience of love as it is found in the clear spirit, and its progressive puddling through the instability of the will; to this he adds the problem of the

physiological mutability of the lover's condition. Hence, in Poem CXVII one finds a shift of emphasis from a certain definition of the nature of phantasy to the effects of the will; this, however, is perceived in the previous stanzas (see verses 141-144 in footnote 109) to be related to the temper of the humours. The double understanding of phantasy, and of man's spirit, indicates that Ausias March's concern was not so much for Love, as for melancholy and its effect on the latter. His poetry represents an effort to maintain the clear spirit; variations in this experience are affected by melancholy and its interpretation in mediaeval Neoplatonic and Aristotelian terminology.

In his interpretation of imagination and phantasy Ausias March adapts concepts that are considered to be inherent in the mediaeval Platonism of Chartres and Saint Victor. These form part of their influence on literature. As most mediaeval Christian Platonists, Ausias March is not so much concerned with the problem of the spirit's ascent to the divine vision, as with that of recovering from the immersion of the spirit in matter,[112] the "descensus ad inferos", as can be observed in verse 35, Poem XVIII, and verse 198, Poem CV, quoted above. Consequently, a large part of his poetry is concerned with the problem of the duality of man,[113] and the function of the will in maintaining the freedom of the spirit. Both the religious and erotic experiences are affected by this consciousness of the "descensus ad inferos", and the individual's need to surpass the dualist conflict. The common denominator in both kinds of experience is the "laetus horror" perceived in phantasy or imagination. Phantasy, which I use to refer to both phantasy and imagination, consequently becomes "a particular way of relating to the world",[114] which acts as a norm by which the poet judges his worldly experience

and the distance that separates him from the ideal perceived. The experience is therefore both joyful in its perception (Poem XVIII) and sorrowful in the consciousness of its inaccessibility. It is not surprising that Ausias March should interpret this personal experience as melancholy. The quality of the phantasy associated with Ausias March's love is affected by an external literary factor, referred to in my interpretation of Poem IX. Phantasy in love as a form of action is shaped by a literary tradition through which Ausias March judges his circumstance. The melancholy is therefore subject to the adequacy of a literary tradition in which Ausias March is working.

Imagination and phantasy are subjacent to three closely related concepts in the poetry of Ausias March that affect the comprehension of his work, Neoplatonism, melancholy, and courtly love. The first poses a particular problem inasmuch as the critique has tended to oppose Aristotelianism and Platonism in general terms and obscured the origins of Florentine Neoplatonism and its relation to mediaeval Neoplatonic currents. The second, melancholy, is affected by these currents, and plays an important role in fifteenth-century courtly love, as found in Ausias March.

NOTES TO CHAPTER III

1 Auzias March, Les obres d'Auzias March vol. I, ed. A. Pagès, Barcelona: Institut d'Estudis Catalans, 1912, pp. 159-160; and also, in general Auzias March et ses prédécesseurs.

2 On this point see A. Pagès, Auzias March et ses prédécesseurs, p. 252. He states: "L'image, comparaison ou métaphore, ne fait pas corps avec l'idée, elle la precède et la prépare, etc.". On this point Pagès is partially correct. However, throughout this thesis I hope to demonstrate that in many instances it is Pagès' failure to understand Ausias March's "mentalité symbolique", and therefore, the significance of the imagery, that enables him to see all of Ausias March's poetry as disjointed. It is on the problem of the relation of the image's significance to the rest of the poem that I principally disagree with Pagès. Contrary to what some modern critics believe, his interpretation of the poetry through the scholastic language used by Ausias March is for the most part exact, however, it is only one very limited level of the text. A complete understanding of Ausias March's poetry can be arrived at when one realizes that the function of the "descriptio" is complementary to the image, which reveals the authorial intention subjacent to the discursive sections.

3 On the usage of "topoi" as "archetypes", see E. R. Curtius, European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, trans. W. R. Trask, Princeton: University Press, 1973, p. 101; it is also loosely used in this sense by D. Kelly, Medieval Imagination, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978, pp. 32-33.

4 Matthieu de Vendôme, "Ars versificatoria", ed. E. Faral, Les Arts poétiques du XII^{e} et du XIII^{e} siècle, Paris: Champion, 1962, p. 180. "In the exercise of the poetic faculty a mental image of the perception comes first; utterance, which expounds the meaning follows; and finally, arrangement ensues in the nature of the treatment. The first is the conception of the meaning, next is the invention of words, and finally we have the nature of the subject matter or the disposition of the treatment". From Ernest Gallo, trans. "Matthew of Vendôme: Introductory Treatise on the Art of Poetry," Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society no. 118, 1974, p. 84; also found in D. Kelly, Medieval Imagination, p. 32.

5 D. Kelly, op. cit., p. 32.

6 Boethius, "The Consolation of Philosophy", in Tractates, De Consolatione Philosophiae, ed. and trans. S. J. Tester, London: Heinemann, 1973, p. 410: "For sense examines the shape set in the underlying matter, imagination the shape alone without matter; while reason surpasses this too, and examines with a universal consideration the specific form itself, which is present in single individuals. But the eye of intelligence is set higher still, for

passing beyond the process of going round the one whole it looks with the pure sight of the mind at the simple Form itself".

7 Within the limits of all the variations possible it is basically this twelfth-century definition of Imagination that lies behind much of the theorizing on the definition of love in the courtly love treatises written in the scholastic tradition. This leads to the elaborate discussions on Reason, as in the Roman de la Rose. Hence, Andreas Capellanus' definition of love: "Amor est passio quaedam innata procedens ex visione et inmoderata cogitatione formae alterius sexus, ob quam aliquis super omnia cupit alterius potiri amplexibus et omnia de utriusque voluntate in ipsius amoris praecepta compleri" (underlining is mine). (De Amore, ed. E. Trojel, Munchen: Eidos, 1964, p. 3), defines love as an illness necessary for generation, and focuses primarily on the "visio", "formae", that is, "imagination", uncontrolled by Reason. The Roman de la Rose repeats this definition: "Amour, se bien sui apensee, / C'est maladie de pensée / Entre deus persones annexe, / Franches entre eus, de divers sexe, / Venant aus gens par ardeur nee / De vision desordonée, / Pour acoler et pour baisier, / Pour aus charnelment aaiser" (vv. 4377-4388). (Guillaume de Lorris et Jean de Meun, Le Roman de la Rose II, ed. Ernest Langlois, Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1914). Again the moral intention of the author, possibly for humourous intentions as in the De Amore, focuses on concupiscence born from "disorderly vision" ("vision desordonée", see above, underlining mine), which is the uncontrolled imagination that does not have the guidance of reason. I am confirmed to this interpretation by the introduction to D. W. Robertson's "The Subject of the 'De Amore' of Andreas Capellanus," Modern Philology, 50, 1952-1953, pp. 145-161, in which he surveys the sources of Capellanus' definition. One of the most popular definitions is that of Ailred de Rievaulx, in which the word "vision" is explicitly replaced by "image forming", that is, imagination. Furthermore, Ailred subsequently describes the "animo captivatur", as does Hughes de Saint Victor (see notes 26 and 31 in this thesis): "Verum amicitae carnalis exordium ab affectione procedit, quae instar meretricis divaricat pedes suos omni transeunti, sequens aures et oculos suos per varia fornicantes; per quorum aditus usque ad ipsam mentem pulchrorum corporum, vel rerum voluptuosarum inferuntur imagenes: quibus ad libitum frui, putat esse beatum; sed sine socio frui, minus aestimat, esse jucundum. Tunc motu, nutu, verbis, obsequiis, animus ab animo captivatur, et accenditur unus ab altero, et conflatur in unum: ut inito foedere miserabili, quidquid sceleris, quidquid sacrilegi est, alter agat et patiatur pro altero; nihilque hac amicitia dulcius arbitrantur, nihil judicant justius: idem velle, et idem nolle, sibi existimantes amicitiae legibus imperari" (underlining mine). ("De spirituali amicitia", P. L. CXCV, p. 665; also quoted by D. W. Robertson, op. cit., p. 151). Such passages, which are evidently the source of Capellanus' definition, demonstrate fairly clearly that behind the moral dissertations of these authors there lies the twelfth-century rhetorical theory of imagination that proceeds mainly from the Chartrian and Victorine Schools.

8 "For imagination is different from either perceiving or discursive thinking, though it is not found without sensation, or

judgement without it" (Book III, 3), Aristotle, De Anima ed. J. A. Smith, The Works of Aristotle, ed. W. D. Ross, Oxford: Clarendon, 1931, p. 427b.

9 "But what we imagine is sometimes false though our contemporaneous judgement about it is true," De Anima (Book III, 3), pp. 428a-428b; "... this movement must be... such that it may be either true or false," De Anima (Book III, 3), p. 428b.

10 De Anima, p. 428b.

11 De Anima, p. 429a.

12 "As sight is the most highly developed sense, the name φαντασία (imagination) has been formed from φάος (light), because it is not possible to see without light," De Anima, p. 429a.

13 "#659, And this leads him to the conclusion that imagination is a certain movement caused by the senses in their act of sensing. It cannot exist without sensation, nor in insentient beings. If there is any movement caused by actual sensation, it must resemble sensation, and imagining is the only activity of this kind. Hence it must be the movement in question. And, being such, it can give occasion to the imagining subject for a variety of actions and passions. And it can be either true or false..." Aristotle, De Anima in the Version of William of Moerbeke and The Commentary of St. Thomas Aquinas, trans. K. Foster and Silvester Humphries, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1959, pp. 396-397.

14 "#666 ... if the foregoing remarks are true of nothing but the imagination, and are certainly true of it, then imagination must be the movement proceeding from actuated senses." Commentary of St. Thomas Aquinas, p. 398.

15 Commentary of St. Thomas Aquinas, p. 398.

16 "#668 ... He says, then, that because sight is the principal sense, being more spiritual (as we have seen already), and knowing a wider range of objects than any other, therefore imagination, which arises from actual sensation, gets its name from light." Commentary of St. Thomas Aquinas, p. 399. It should be noted that in this passage, which must be compared to the original quoted in note 12, as well as, in sections 417-418, St. Thomas expands considerably on both the original and the Moerbeke version, in order to introduce the concept of the light's and the imagination's spirituality.

17 It is generally considered that Dante, much as Aquinas, represents the great synthesis if mediaeval thought. On the subject of imagination, however, his own synthesis draws strongly on the Neoplatonic currents which were influential in mediaeval poetic theory. Therefore, in his study of imagination, M. W. Bundy

points out: "The student of Dante, the great mediaeval synthesis, naturally turns to the Summa of Thomas Aquinas, the encyclopedia of the Middle Ages, and it is true that there is much in the views just examined that aids in explaining Dante's utterances concerning the imagination; but in many ways he is closer to Augustine and the Neoplatonists. Like Aquinas, it is true, he is an Aristotelian, glorifying the master of those who know; but like Augustine and Synesius, and often after them Hugo and Richard, he has a more profound interest in a theory of vision, in notions to be derived from Plato and Plotinus of the qualities of perfect insight into spiritual realities". M. W. Bundy, The Theory of Imagination in Classical and Mediaeval Thought, p. 225. In his exposition of the theory of imagination in Dante, Bundy demonstrates the development of its Neoplatonic inclinations from the vision of Beatrice in the Vita Nuova to the Divina Commedia.

18 D. Kelly, Medieval Imagination, p. 32. R. W. Southern's strong reservations about the concept of the existence of the "School of Chartres" as a philosophical school of thought (Medieval Humanism, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1970, pp. 61-85), should be pointed out for the sake of exactitude. These reservations do not, however, invalidate the existence of a "Platonic" influence present in the works of its various members. For a more complete exposition of the Chartrian influence see W. P. Wetherbee, Platonism and Poetry in the Twelfth Century.

19 Alain de Lille, The Complaint of Nature, trans. D. M. Moffat, Hamden: Archon Books, 1972 (reprint of Yale Studies in English, v. 36, 1902), pp. 23-24.

20 D. Kelly, Medieval Imagination, pp. 30-31.

21 Geoffroy de Vinsauf specifically refers to the source of poetry as the mental archetypes perceived in a "Pauline mirror": "Si quis habet fundare domum, non currit ad actum / Impetuosa manus: intrinseca linea cordis / Praemetitur opus, seriemque subordine certo / Interior praescribit homo, totamque figurat / Ante manus cordis quam corporis; et status ejus / Est prius archetypus quam sensibilis. Ipsa poesis / Spectet in hoc speculo quae lex sit danda poetis." "Poetria nova" vv. 43-49 in Les Arts poétiques du XII^{e} et du XIII^{e} siècle, p. 198. (Trans. If anyone has to establish a house, let not an impetuous hand rush to the act: an internal thread of the heart measures out the task beforehand, and from within man prescribes the order in rigid sequence, and the hand of the heart forms the whole house, before the hand of the body, and its form is archetypal before it is tangible. Let the art of poetry look in this mirror, which is the law that must be given to the poets.) The opposition between the hand of the heart and the hand of the body, is obviously a variation on the Augustinian "eye of the mind" and the "eye of the flesh", ("that light of honesty and beauty... which the eye of the flesh cannot ken, it being only by the inner man discerned," St. Augustine, Confessions vol. I, trans. W. Watts, ed. W. H. D. Rouse, London: Heinemann, 1968, p. 327). In Geoffroi de Vinsauf's metaphor the plan for the building of "the house" must first be

perceived by the inner eye. The metaphor of "the house" proceeds from St. John 14, 2: "In domo Patris mei, mansiones multae sunt" (Biblia Sacra Latina; Vulgate, London: Bagster, 1970). The "Father's House" is the source of divine archetypes and forms the model which is found in the mirror. The latter is the inner mirror of the soul, which was the standard Mediaeval and Renaissance interpretation of I Corinthians, XIII, 12: "Videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate: tunc autem facie ad faciem" (Biblia Sacra Latina). This passage was not generally understood to mean "through a glasse" (King James Bible) but rather as in the Tyndale Bible "Now we see in a glasse even in a darke speakynge; but then we shall see face to face". Hence the world was a reflection of the "thought of God" (see note 29 below), perceived by the "inner eye", and this was obviously a confusion of the Plotinian concept of the Animate and the Pauline mirror (see also notes 104 and 105). The vision of the House of God was therefore reflected in the soul's eye, and it was this vision that should guide the craft of the poet. John Donne, in the Easter Sermon of 1628, used both metaphors, in a manner very similar to Geoffroi de Vinsauf: "For our sight of God, our Theatre, the place where we sit and see him, is the whole world, the whole house and frame of nature, and our medium, or glasse, is the Booke of Creatures, and our light by which we see him, is the light of Naturall reason... The whole frame of the world is the Theatre, and every creature of the stage, the medium, the glasse in which we may see God" (underlining mine). (Gordon Worth O'Brien, Renaissance Poetics and the Problem of Power, Chicago: Institute of Elizabethan Studies, 1956, pp. 2-3.) This metaphor is also a basic point of departure for the elaboration of Marsilio Ficino's theory of love in the Commentarium Marsili Ficini Florentini in Convivium Platonis de Amore (Marsile Ficin, Commentaire sur le Banquet de Platon, ed. et trad. Raymond Marcel, Paris: Société d'Edition, "Les Belles Lettres," 1956, pp. 187-188; see also page 147, in Chapter IV of this thesis).

22 W. Wetherbee, Platonism and Poetry, pp. 146-151.

23 D. Kelly, Medieval Imagination, p. 44: "The similarity between the artist's craft and God's creation is a medieval commonplace that appears in Hughes de St. Victor, Bernardus Silvestris, Alain de Lille, Geoffroy de Vinsauf". On this point see also note 24.

24 There is a reference to this in the prologue of the Cancionero de Baena: "la qual çiençia (poetry) e avisación e dotrina que della depende e es avida e recibida e alcançada por gracia infusa del señor Dios" (José María Azaceta, ed. Cancionero de Juan Alfonso de Baena vol I, Madrid: Consejo Superior, 1966, p. 14). Charles F. Fraker has studied this problem: ("La poesía es una gracia infusa de Dios," Studies on the Cancionero de Baena, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1966, pp. 63-90). His research is largely based on a comparison with late Provençal texts, such as the Leys d'Amor. He believes that the source of this poetic theory lies in the current of Franciscan and Joachimite spirituality, popular among "conversos" hostile to scholasticism. The poetic theory indeed has great affinity with the general evangelical current, but it is not necessarily a product of it.

Fraker concludes that: "The whole situation is in a way a paradigm of the very special genius of our enriqueño poets in general... The theory of poetic grace, a curious amalgam of Spiritual theology and Provençal poetics, is in a way a brilliant idea, but its emergence would have been practically inconceivable if its inventors had really known and understood the later Provençal tradition" (pp. 89-90). The logic of this study relies excessively on the "myth of the Thomist phalanx" (H. A. Oberman, "Fourteenth-century Religious Thought," Speculum LIII, 1978, p. 82), which tends to confuse scholasticism too readily with Aristotelianism and Thomism. Much hazardous speculation, in this otherwise very enlightening article, might have been prevented if Fraker had considered the influence of twelfth-century Latin rhetorics on medieval poetic theory. Furthermore, this is a typical embroilment resulting from excessive reliance on the dubious notion of courtly love as a continuation of the Provençal tradition. Surely, the influence to be sought in this aspect of Baena's prologue is more likely to be that of the Northern French tradition. This concept is part of an ongoing sensibility, in which Franciscan spirituality is a posterior manifestation, and Jewishness accidental. (See notes 21, 105, and M. D. Chenu, La théologie, esp. "Le Réveil Evangélique," pp. 252-273, as well as Chapter IV of this thesis.)

25 Hughes of St. Victor, Didascalicon, trans. Jerome Taylor, New York: Columbia University, 1961, p. 66.

26 Hughes de Saint Victor ("De Unione Corporis et Spiritus," Patrologiae Latinae CLXXVII, pp. 285-294) presents this relation by means of the Biblical image of Moses' ascension on Mount Sinai, which proceeds from Dionysius the Aeropagite, Mystical Theology, I (Dionysius the Aeropagite, The Mystical Theology and the Celestial Hierarchies, London: Unwin and Sons, 1949, p. 11);Hughes state "Ascendit Moyses in montem, et Deus descendit in montem. Nisi ergo Moyses ascendisset et Deus descendisset, non convenissent in unum. Magna sunt in his omnibus sacramenta. Ascendit corpus et descendit spiritus. Ascendit spiritus et descendit Deus. Quo ascendit corpus, superius est corpore. Quo descendit spiritus, inferius est spiritu. Rursum quo ascendit spiritus superius spiritu: et quo descendit Deo, inferius Deo. Corpus sensu ascendit, spiritus sensualite descendit. Item spiritus ascendit contemplatione, Deus descendit revelatione. Theophania est in revelatione, intelligentia in contemplatione, imaginatio in sensualite, in sensu instrumentum sensualitatis, et origo imaginationis" (P.L. CLXXVII, p. 285). (Underlining is mine, and translates: "The flesh (body) ascends and the spirit descends. The spirit ascends and God descends. Where the flesh ascends it is higher than flesh; where the spirit descends it is lower than spirit, and when God descends he is lower than God. The flesh ascends through the senses, and the spirit descends in a way perceptible by the senses, the spirit ascends in contemplation, and God descends in revelation"). The notion that when God moves down he becomes less than God, and, similarly, that the spirit should become less spirit reveals the essentially "emanationist" tendency underlying this aspect of the theory of imagination. Similarly, Ausias March frequently refers to the rise of

the senses and the fall of the spirit, this process is succinctly described in Poem LXXXVII (inter alia), verses 81-90: "Les voluntats se mostren per les obres, / d'on se veu clar com nostr· arma ·s baxa / e ·l nostre cors en alt munta sa raxa, / perquè ·n delit ell e l'arma són pobres. / L'arma pel cors a son delit s'enclina / lexant lo seu, sa natura·lunya; / lo cors en alt a delitar met punya, / no coneix bé sa natura mesquina. / La carn volar vol e l'arma s'aterra, / perquè algú, si toca, no s'aferra." The negative and moral aspect of these verses is the result of a loss of discretion (see note 31). The relation of this aspect of Hughes de Saint Victor's thought to that of Plotinus would seem to lie in Plotinus' theistic mysticism (see A. H. Armstrong, The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, Cambridge: University Press, 1970, p. 263), and the concept of the duality of intelligible matter in the two moments of "timeless generation," in which Intellect proceeds from the One, and then returns to the One to be informed (Ibid., p. 241). The terminology used by Plotinus is Aristotelian; this accentuates the sense of duality in the concepts of Movement and Otherness which give rise to Intelligible Matter, and depend on the light of the One to come to them in order to return: "For Otherness there exists always, which produces intelligible matter; for this is the principle of matter, this and primary Movement. For this reason Movement, too, was called Otherness, because Movement and Otherness sprang forth together. The Movement and Otherness which came from the First are undefined, and need the First to define them; and they are defined when they turn to it. But before the turning, matter, too, was undefined and the Other and not yet good, but unilluminated from the First. For if light comes from the First, then that which receives the light, before it receives it has everlastingly no light; but it has light as other than itself, since light comes to it from something else." (Plotinus, Enneads vol. II, ed. A. H. Armstrong, London: William Heinemann, 1966, p. 117) (underlining is mine). Although Plotinus' and Hughes de Saint Victor's systems differ in complexity their common denominator lies in the double movement of the Intellect (desiring) to the One (desired), and the One to the Intellect. The difficult problem of the relation between the two systems is borne out in the evolution of the concept of the Animate, which in scholastic philosophy and medicine became virtually synonymous to the term "spirit" (see note 104, and Gordon Worth O'Brien, Renaissance Poetics and the Problem of Power, pp. 1-40), and is closely associated with concept of the "Pauline mirror" (note 21). In the concept of the spirit as animate the latter has an epistemological function similar to the illumination described by Hughes de Saint Victor (see also note 31). The term animate is paraphrased in Armstrong's edition of the Enneads, I will refer to the more explicit translation of Stephen Mackenna, as revised by C. B. Page, since I will make references to the animate as follows: "And how do we possess the Divinity? In that the Divinity is poised upon the Intellectual-Principle and Authentic-Existence; and We come third in order after these two, for the We is constituted by a union of the supreme, the undivided Soul - we read - and the Soul which is divided among (living) bodies. For, note, we inevitably think of the Soul, though one and undivided in the All, as present to bodies in division: in so far as any bodies are Animates, the Soul has given itself to each of

the separate material masses; or rather it appears to be present in the bodies by the fact that it shines into them; it makes them living beings not by merging into body but by shining forth, without any change in itself, images or likenesses of itself like one face caught by many mirrors. The first of these images is (the faculty of) Sense-Perception seated in the Couplement; and from this downwards all the successive images are to be recognized as phases of the Soul in lessening succession from one another, until the series ends in the faculties of generation and growth and of all production of offspring... #9. The Soul, then, in us, will in its nature stand apart from all that can cause any of the evils which man does or suffers; for all such evil, as we have seen, belongs only to the Animate, the Couplement" (Enneads I, i, 8-9). (Plotinus, The Enneads, trans. S. MacKenna, second ed. revised C. B. Page, London: Faber and Faber, 1956, pp. 26-27). The concept of the animate is therefore an intellective principle intermediate between the soul and matter, in this Plotinus is repeating Plato's doctrine of the emanations of the lower soul (see, Armstrong, Enneads vol. I, pp. 110-111, note 3; and, Plato, Timaeus and Critias, trans. Desmond Lee, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971, pp. 46-47). This principle implies the theory of the "Anima mundi", or as it is formulated above, "undivided Soul". It was perpetuated through the Middle Ages in medical theory, and in microcosmic theories of world harmony. Consequently, Aquinas was largely opposed to the concept, because of the Averroist implications of the "world soul" (Summa Theologica question LXXVI, article 1, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, London: Burns Oates and Washbourne, 1920, pp. 22-28), and also opposed microcosmic notions (see note 107), unlike the Chartrians and Hughes de Saint Victor (see note 27 also). The somewhat ambiguous reaction of St. Thomas to microcosmic theories is not only consistent with the consequences which this notion has in heretic writers such as Amaury de Bène (see note 109), but also forms part of his reaction against Averroist monopsychism (Summa Theologica Ia, 76, 2; edition quoted above, pp. 30-31 in particular). This problem is also the object of some discussion in A. O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, Cambridge: Harvard University, 1936, p. 81: "Returning to the author of the Summa Theologica, his position with respect to the principles of plenitude and continuity may now be summed up. He employs both freely as premisses, we have seen, whenever they serve his purpose; but he evades their consequences by means of subtle but spurious or irrelevant distinctions when they are at the point of leading him into the heresy of admitting the complete correspondence between the realms of the possible and the actual with the cosmic determinism which this implies". The proximity of Hughes de Saint Victor's epistemology to the theory of the animate is self-evident, as are its repercussions in poetic rhetoric previously referred to. As I will explain Ausias March, as a poet, not only shows knowledge of Hughes de Saint Victor, but makes extensive use of medical and microcosmic theories, that imply reference to the animate, though not necessarily to the "anima mundi".

27 To define this relationship Hughes de Saint Victor, before elaborating on the microcosmic relation, uses the image of Jacob's ladder, which also acts as a gradualist metaphor of the chain of

being: "Vide scalam Jacobi, in terra stabat, et summitas ejus coelos tangebat. Terra corpus, coelum Deus. Ascendunt animi contemplatione ab infimis ad summa. A corpore ad spiritum, mediante sensu et sensualite. A spiritu ad Deum, mediante contemplatione et revelatione" ("De Unione Corporis et Spiritus" P.L. CLXXVII, p. 285). (Trans.: See Jacob's ladder, it rested on earth, and the top of it reached the heavens. The earth is the flesh, the heavens, God. Our minds ascend in contemplation from the depths to the most high. From flesh to spirit, through the mediation of the senses and sensory perception; from spirit to God through the mediation of contemplation and revelation.)

28 See note 26: "Ascendit corpus et descendit spiritus. Ascendit spiritus et descendit Deus".

29 M. W. Bundy, p. 202.

30 M. W. Bundy, p. 201.

31 This, I believe is one of the most important points towards the understanding of Ausias March's poetry, which has been overlooked by critics who follow an almost exclusively Thomist interpretation of his work, as the one and only key to his work. It affects an image which is central to his work (see Chapter V). Hughes de Saint Victor explains that imaginations are made when the form of things enters into the eyes of the beholder through the seven "tunics" and the "humours", the other senses introduce the forms by hidden canals unto the "phantasticam cellam". These "imaginations" are corporeal and are common to both animals and men. In men, however, they are spiritualized by reason, and reach, "the very substance of the rational soul" (Quae quidem imaginatio in brutis animalibus phantasticam cellam non transcendit; in rationalibus autem usque ad rationalem progreditur, ubi ipsam incorpoream animae substantiam contingit, et excitat discretionem" ("De Unione Corporis et Spiritus," P.L. CLXXVII, p. 288). The imagination, however, is like a shadow which wraps itself around reason. If these imaginations are merely contemplated in order to gather knowledge for the Intellect, then they are easily shaken off. However, if reason becomes excessively enamoured of these imaginations, then they cling to it like a second skin or garment that cannot be taken off without causing great pain. The central point concerning the role of the imagination in love, is the contentious issue raised by Andreas Capellanus in his definition, "ex visione et inmoderata cogitatione", which provides the source of the "irony" in the De Amore and related treatises (see note 7). This role is affected by the gradualist concept inherent to this theory (see note 27, and D. Kelly, "Courtly Love in Perspective: The Hierarchy of Love in Andreas Capellanus," Traditio XXIV, 1968, pp. 119-148). Due to the fact that both the image and the concept of Hughes de Saint Victor's theory play a very important role in Ausias March's poetry, I believe it is opportune to provide the reader with both a copy and translation of the passage concerned. From the passage quoted previously (Quae quidem...) the text continues: "Ergo imaginatio nihil aliud est quam similitudo corporis, per sensus quidem corporeos ex

corporum contactu concepta extrinsecus, atque per eosdem sensus introrsum ad partem puriorem corporei spiritus reducta, eique impressa. Haec autem in rationalibus purior fit, ubi ad rationalem et incorpoream animae substantiam contingendam defecatur; tamen illic quoque extra substantiam illius manens, quia similitudo corporis est et fundatur in corpore. Rationalis autem substantia corporea lux est; imaginatio vero, inquantum corporis imago est, umbra est. Et idcirco postquam imaginatio usque ad rationem ascendit, quasi umbra in lucem veniens, et luci superveniens, inquantum ad eam venit, manifestatur, et circumscribitur inquantum illi supervenit, obnubilat eam, et obumbrat, et involvit, et contegit. Et siquidem ratio ipsa sola contemplatione eam susceperit quasi vestimentum, ei est ipsa imaginatio extra eam, et circa eam quo facile exui et spoliari possit. Si ver etiam delectatione illi adhaeserit, quasi pellis ei fit ipsa imaginatio, ita ut non sine dolore exui possit, cui cum amore inhaesit. Hinc est quod animae corporibus exutae, corporalibus adhuc passionibus teneri possunt, quia videlicet a corruptione corporalium affectionum nondum mundatae sunt. Habet namque et ipse spiritus quandam in sua natura mutabilitatem, secundum quam corpori vivificando appropinquat, in qua illa spiritualis et incorporea substantia nonnihil suae puritatis deponit, et quasi quamdam grossiori proprietate corpori assumendo occurrit. Quae quidam coaptatio, si secundum solam naturam fit, mutationem habet, corruptionem non habet. Si autem vitiosa est, in hoc ipso puriorem naturam corrumpit, quod eam ad consortium ignobilioris terminos naturae transire compellit. Et hoc vitium quanto altius animae in corpore manenti inhaeserit, tanto difficilius a corpore discendentem deserit: non tollitur passio, etiam cum tollitur causa passionis" (P.L. CLXXVII, p. 288). (Translation: Indeed this imagination does not transcend the chamber of phantasy in wild animals, but in those with rational minds it proceeds to the rational part of the mind where it touches that very incorporeal substance of the anima (soul, or mind), and arouses reason (discernment or discretion). Therefore, the imagination is nothing other than a likeness of the body, conceived through the corporeal senses externally from the contact of bodies, and brought back within through those same senses to the purer part of the corporeal spirit, and impressed upon it. The imagination, therefore, becomes purified in those with rational minds, when it is cleansed with a view to attaining the rational and incorporeal substance of the anima; remaining, however, also outside its substance, because the likeness of the body is based on the body. But rational substance is corporeal light; indeed, imagination, inasmuch as it is the image of the body, is a shadow. And therefore, when imagination has ascended to reason like a shadow coming into light, and coming upon light suddenly when it reaches it, it is made manifest and is therefore circumscribed; sometimes when it comes upon it, it veils reason, obscures it, envelopes it and hides it. And if indeed, reason herself, by contemplation alone puts it on, as though it were a vestment, then imagination is outside reason and around it, so that it may be easily cast off and stripped. If indeed through delight, imagination still clings to reason, the imagination herself becomes like a skin on it to which reason clings with love, in such a way that it cannot be cast off without grief or pain. It is for this reason that souls cast off from bodies can be held by corporeal passions, because clearly they have not yet been affected by the corruption of corporeal love.

For the spirit itself has in its nature mutability, according to which it comes near to the quickening of the body and in which that spiritual and incorporeal substance places something of its purity, and as it were, counteracts the body's being usurped by a baser quality. This combination, if it comes about naturally, has variation, and not corruption. But if it is corrupted, it destroys its purer nature in the very thing which compels its nature to pass on to a partnership with a nature more obscure in its boundaries. And the deeper this vice of the soul shall have become rooted in the living body, the more painfully it will leave the body as it dies, and passion is not suffered, even when the cause of passion is tolerated".) This description of "corporeal imagination" places emphasis on the negative aspects of the imagination, and is characteristic of the moralist's interpretation of the "inmoderata cogitatione". Although Ausias March's love includes a consciousness of this aspect of imagination, the poetic theory which is also part of his craft, enables him to manipulate the opposite aspects of the concept of imagination, which one can term as, "the illumination" and "the clouding".

32 D. Kelly, Medieval Imagination, pp. 36-37.

33 "... non pas l'imitation proprement dite d'un acte ou d'une personne, qu'on prend comme modèle concret, vécu, mais celui de la reproduction d'un modèle théorique, idéal, entrevu dans sa pensée, qu'on se propose soi-même de réaliser. Le modèle qu'on veut copier ou reproduire n'existe pas au concret: il n'a pas de réalité que dans l'esprit qui le conçoit et l'effort de l'imitateur tend à le réaliser concrètement, comme un artiste tâche d'exécuter l'idéal entrevu," Jean de Ghellinck, "Imitari, imitatio," A.L.M.A. (Bulletin du Cange) XV, 1940-1941, p. 151; also quoted in D. Kelly, Medieval Imagination, p. 44.

34 Many of the topical images found in Ausias March have been traced from troubadour sources, as catalogued by N. Scarano, "Fonti Provenzale e Italiane della Lirica Petrarchesca," Studj di Filologia Romanza vol. 8, 1899, pp. 250-360.

35 In his latter poems Ausias March clearly defines the sorrow, "dolor" which plays an important part in all his poetry. In Poem CXXVII, verses 325-333, Ausias March explains that "sorrow" is the realization of the failure of the will seeking virtue to assert itself, that is, it is the personal impotence to act virtuously, even though the desire to do so is present in the individual: "Ells han propòsit de fer bé, / mas no han l'àbit, ço per què / s'ateny delit. / Los bons han lur camí complit / havent lur intent conseguit / e són contents; / los malvats son cas· impotents / d'esmenar lurs defalliments / d'on han dolor." "Dolor" or "sorrow" is, therefore, the desire to act virtuously which is denied because of the lack of a strong will; it is the realization of a moral condition. As in Poem CXXVIII, verses 219-220, it is a lack of discretion: "hon no és discreció / regeix la sola passió." This problem, especially as it is qualified in Poem CXXVII, entails in this poetry the problem of predestination, which is closely related to the evangelistic and Platonic current present in Ausias March's poetry (see note 109,

and Appendix I).

36 As di Girolamo has demonstrated in "Ausias March and the Troubadour Poetic Code" (Chap. I, note 24), although Ausias March sporadically uses what seems to be troubadour vocabulary, "he breaks with the courtly tradition" (p. 236). Naturally, this conflicts with O. H. Green's definition of courtly love which relies on Ausias March's work to demonstrate its validity ("Courtly Love in the Spanish Cancioneros". Chap. I, note 39). In the works of Ausias March and his French predecessors, such as Oton de Granson and Alain Chartier, although the terminology of the courtly tradition is apparently maintained, its significance is altered in order to reflect the internal disarray of the poet's spiritual life. By so doing, Ausias March may be seen to rejoin the first or second generation of troubadours such as Marcabru (A. Jeanroy, La poésie lyrique des troubadours II, Paris: Didier, 1934, pp. 13-60; R. Nelli, L'Erotique des troubadours, Toulouse: Privat, 1963, pp. 105-158, and p. 273), yet he departs from the essentially ludic character of the troubadour courtly love. From Ausias March's point of view, he deviates away from the troubadour tradition, for whereas he seeks spiritual ascesis in love, he considers that the troubadours revel in sensuality: "D'aquest voler los trobadors escriuen, / e, per aquest, dolor mortal los toca; / la racional part de l'arma no·ls broca; / del sensual aquests apetits viuen" (LXXXVII, vv. 41-44).

37 A. Pagès, in Auzias March et ses prédécesseurs, pp. 106-107, considers that Ausias March wrote all his poetry between 1430 and 1459. This presupposes that he began to write poetry around the age of 32, after his return from the Italian campaigns of Alfonso the Magnanimous in 1420 and 1424 and his final settling in Gandía in 1428. R. Ferreres, Ausias March: Obra poética completa I, p. 30, complies with Pagès' general theory, although he suggests that Ausias March began to write poetry around 1428. Martín de Riquer, basing his theory on the absence of Ausias March's name in the Cançoner Vegá-Aquilò, suggests that Ausias March did not write poetry before 1426 (Historia de la literatura catalana II, p. 487). Bohigas shies away from this problem. P. Ramírez i Molas, rejects Pagès' suggestion as absurd, and accepts Riquer's interpretation (La poesia d'Ausias March, p. 199). Without further definite evidence the problem of when Ausias March began to write poetry is one of Byzantine speculation subject to the preconceptions of critics. Riquer's deduction seems to me to be thus far the most perceptive. From an objective point of view, this also leaves me somewhat uneasy, because of its rigid exclusivity. All of the above theories are based on the questionable presupposition that Ausias March wrote poetry only once he had retired to his estates and had sufficient leisure to feel inspired. This does more to reveal the academic nature of criticism on Ausias March, than enlighten the reader, and culminates in Ferreres comparison of Ausias March to Hans Holbein's "Erasmus" (p. 30); for these critics only the poet, quill in hand and clouded brow, is worthy of the Muses' inspiration. In the Italian campaigns Ausias March was possibly in contact with some of the best Catalan poets of that period, such as Andreu Febrer and Jordi de Sant Jordi, the possible influence of the latter is not to be dismissed (see Appendix II). Poetry was a courtly pastime which was cultivated even on the

battlefield, one of the best examples is the "Debat entre Honor et Delit" written by Ausias March's uncle, Jacme March, in June 1365 during the siege of Morvedre opposing Pere el Cerimoniós and Pedro el Cruel (A. Pagès, ed., La "Vesió de Bernat de Só" et le "Debat entre Honor et Delit": Poèmes provençe-catalans du XIVe siècle, suivis du "Sirventes" de Joan de Castelnou, Toulouse: Privat, 1945). Moreover, parts of Jordi de Sant Jordi's own poetry seem to have been written during the Italian campaigns of Alfonso the Magnanimous (M. de Riquer, ed., Jordi de Sant Jordi, Granada: Universidad de Granada, 1955, pp. 16-17). It is therefore not entirely impossible that Ausias March may well have written poetry prior to 1426. That his name does not appear in the Cançoner Vegá-Aquilò definitely demonstrates that he was not known as a poet prior to 1426, but not necessarily that he did not write poetry. Furthermore, Pagès suggests that: "De la première de ses chansons à la quatorzième il s'écoule un intervalle de cinq ans. Il met onze autres années à écrire les soixante dix chansons qui suivent" (Auzias March et ses prédécesseurs, p. 107). Although this statement may not necessarily be exact it indicates that Ausias March's poetry was written over a very long span of time, a point that is obvious to every reader. Poem VI, "Molt he tardat en descobrir ma falta" implies that there has been a previous erotico-poetical experience which Ausias March now retracts. Hence the dating of the beginnings of Ausias March's poetical production should be placed anywhere between 1420 and 1430, until better evidence demonstrates conclusively a specific date at which Ausias March began to write poetry.

38 The problem of the chronology of Ausias March's poems is as ambiguous as that discussed in note 37. Realizing the inconsistencies in the manuscript order of the poems, early editors, such as Baltasar de Romaní, divided them into four groups: "Cántica de Amor," "Cántica Moral," "Cántica de Muerte," "Cantica Spiritual" (see A. Pagès ed., Les Obres d'Auzias March vol. I, p. 58). It was generally accepted that the last three groups belonged to a later period, since they correspond mainly to the theme of the rejection of love. A. Pagès in: "Etude sur la chronologie des poésies d'Auzias March," Romania XXXVI, 1907, pp. 203-223; and Les Obres, pp. 161-181, established a chronology on the basis of manuscripts F and N which proceed from two distinct families, and which correspond to each other in the order in which the works are presented. Furthermore, Pagès relied on historical references found in the poems, of which only one was then erroneous (see, A. Pagès, "Sur un vers d'Auzias March et un passage du Curial et Guelfa," Romania LXI, 1935, pp. 85-90; and by the same author, "La 'Table de Prusse' et l'ordre teutonique dans l'ancienne littérature catalane," Romania LXII, 1936, pp. 242-245). Bohigas feels that the best chronology is provided by manuscripts F, N, G^2, B, K, D, and turns to the historical references in support of his arguments, in general he follows Pagès' chronology (P. Bohigas, ed. Ausias March: Poesies I, pp. 166-175), although he cautions against an overly rigid acceptance of this chronology (p. 175). M. de Riquer, in view of the relative merits of Pagès' classification classifies Ausias March's poems into groups according to their "cycles", the latter are determined by the "senhals" found at the end of each poem, furthermore Riquer adopts the classification of B. Romaní (Historia de la literatura II, pp. 507-540). Riquer's

classification, based on differentiating traits in each cycle, has been extensively criticized by P. Ramírez i Molas (La poesia d'Ausias March, pp. 206-209), who rejects Riquer's method because it does not arrive at sufficiently precise conclusions. Ramírez i Molas has attempted to establish a chronology on the basis of the kinds of rhymes used in Ausias March's poetry, within the various cycles and groups previously used by M. de Riquer. P. Ramírez i Molas' method, which seems not to have been accepted by most critics, is an interesting approach; unfortunately, it presents two major drawbacks. First, it relies heavily on M. de Riquer's theory of the cycles (see La poesia d'Ausias March, pp. 209-219); second, strictly as a matter of methodology which presupposes "la sinceritat del poeta" (Ibid., p. 195), the establishing of a chronology on the basis of certain rhymes, has a certain unsatisfactory positivist simplicity. Enlightening as it is M. de Riquer's classification has some weaknesses. It allows excessive importance to the problem of the lady, when the actual subject of these poems is the poet himself; this reveals an intent on the part of the critic to see in Ausias March a "cantor de Teresa", in the stilnuovisti manner. This is warranted neither by the text nor the tradition in which Ausias March seems to be writing, although there may be points of affinity. Further objection can then be raised that if, as critics seem to agree, Ausias March and his generation in Catalonia are influenced by the French poets of Guillaume de Machaut's tradition, then the problem of the lady would be extraneous. As I will demonstrate in Chapter V, "Melancholy: The Mirror of Courtly Love", because of the importance of the theory of imagination, not only could two senyals refer to one lady, but one senyal could refer to as many ladies as the poet chose to love (see D. Kelly, Medieval Imagination, pp. 180-181). Hence, in the differentiations observed by Riquer between the two main cycles, it is dangerous to suggest that each refers to a different lady. Hypothetically, there is the extreme possibility that each poem could refer to a different lady, or at least, to a different perception of each one by the poet. In each case the reader is faced by a different reaction on the part of the poet to the vision of the lady adjusted to his imagination. Caution should be exercised in any attempt to establish a chronology of Ausias March's poetry. This is especially true as regards apparently rigorous pseudo-scientific methods which presuppose mechanical behaviourist tendencies in a poet of Ausias March's genius. This defines Ramírez i Molas' criteria, as he states himself: "... el poeta que rima els seus versos treballa gairebé sempre per un mecanisme d'associació d'imatges fonètiques. Una de les lleis inexorables d'aquest mecanisme és la de l'habit..." (La poesia d'Ausias March, p. 213). According to this kind of criteria one could, conceivably, establish a more exact chronology by tracing the development of the poet's imagery, and frequency of usage, as found in Appendix II. I feel, however, that the results might be equally dubious, since the critic cannot control the individual poet's freedom of creativity. Consequently, I believe that Pagès' approach, and in general, his results, tempered by Bohigas' just caution, still represent the most reliable ordering of Ausias March's poems. M. de Riquer's division of the love poems into cycles has produced interesting results, reinforced by Ramírez i Molas' research, and these should also be taken into account in the interpretation of Ausias March's work.

In all cases a reasonable degree of reserve and flexibility should be observed, the lack of an exact chronology should not affect our understanding of Ausias March's poetry.

After I had written this note, Joan Ferrater published, Les poesies d'Ausias March: Introducció i text revisat per Joan Ferrater, Barcelona: Edicions Quaderns Crema, 1979. The entire introduction claims to be a study towards the establishment of a "new" chronology. The rest represents a "new edition" of his poetry. Ferrater's chronology is a defense of Pagès' work complemented by the aportations of Ramírez i Molas, and it is therefore meant to represent the most up to date work on Ausias March. Ferrater does not present any arguments in favour of Ramírez i Molas' chronology, although he recognizes that it is accepted by no one but himself (p. lv). His defense of Pagès is based on an apparent collation of texts and the notion that Ausias March began to write in 1425 at a rate of 284 verses a year (p. xliii). This leads him to divide Ausias March's poetry into a dozen cycles representing the same amount of periods of composition. To go into all the reasonings of Ferrater is impossible here, and I will limit myself to a few pertinent comments, which may sound impertinent to the author and his followers. In essence, although I agree with Ferrater in his recognition of the superiority of Pagès, as I have said above, I do not agree with his theory of divisions, and find his presentation and method, rather, his lack of method, absolutely objectionable.

Joan Ferrater is an eminent critic of modern literature. As a professor of comparative literature he is very familiar with the latest critical methods of modern literature, and as is often the case with modern critics, ventures into the field of mediaeval studies simply reveal the superficiality of modern pseudo-scientific methods, and a total lack of the most elemental erudition. This gives Ferrater's chronology an air of ease and general scientific rigor, which is a poor "façade" for his shameless exploitation of the unwary reader's gullibility, and a sinister abuse of his reputation as a critic. In spite of its pretensions of "Wissenschaft", it is a scurrilous display of lack of philological scholarship, the arrogance of which deserves to be condemned in the strongest possible terms.

On the very first page of his introduction Ferrater informs the reader that he is preparing this edition because he understands Ausias March from cover to cover: "es perquè je em penso que els he entès de cap a cap" (p. xv). Such a prodigious blessing of "ciencia infusa", unclaimed by anyone to date, enables him to imply at the end of his introduction that his work is "too learned for a public of imbeciles" but that he feels obliged to present his new findings on Ausias March for the benefit of a cultivated public. The air of modesty with which this is said smacks of Tartuffian glibness: "Algú es va empescar de dir que aquest pròleg era massa savi per al públic d'imbècils que el qui ho va dir es de via pensar que per força havia de ser el de l'esmentada col-lecció, i és del tot just, doncs, que jo recuperi per al públic fet de bona gent, curiosa i si pot ser cultivada, a qui destino tot el que publico unes pàgines que contenen prou notícies força interesants..." (p. lv). Indeed, I am glad to be among the "imbeciles" who may have found nothing new, of worth, in his "interesting" work. It is only glibness that can substantiate Ferrater's chronology. In the first place, a chronology is not a matter of

hypothetical speculation. Without the painstaking examination of each poem, a chronology cannot be said to be valid. In other words, Ferrater's entire work is based on an unsubstantiated construction, and as such it is absolutely vacuous, and his arguments are poor rhetoric. In short, Ferrater begins with what should be a conclusion. His method is even less sensitive than Ramírez i Molas', it is purely mechanical: "La versemblança que les seccions que hem obtingut mitjançant l'aplicació mecànica dels nostres criteris (predominantment externs, ho repeteixo...)" (p. xxxviii) and "Els resultat obtingut amb l'execució mecànica de la nostra projecció fonamentada al seu torn en una hipòtesi cronològica" (p. xliv). These external criteria are an artificial imposition on the text, a corruption of the reading. Whatever external criteria Ferrater may use, and these are never very clear, he is building castles in the air. He avoids confronting the text by claiming that such a task would be too demanding: "No podem entrar en l'examen frontal de la successió de les poesies, com a elements funcionals de les seccions a què pertanyen, des del punt de vista del contingut, ja que això equivaldria, quasi a comentarles exhaustivament totes" (p. xxxviii). Let us come to the point; I sincerely doubt that Ferrater is capable of such a commentary, and I will demonstrate this claim immediately. He vaguely promises to grace the world with a proper study, some day: "Ja en parlarem un altre dia" (p. liii). The kind of specious rhetoric to which he has recourse is patent, when after thirty-one pages of vain ramblings he admits that his claims lack foundation: "a penes podem dir que hàgim transcendit pel seu mitjà el pla de la conjectura i passat a establir-nos en el de la documentació històrica. La plausabilitat de la nostra hipòtesi és, ho podem admetre, extrema, però la hipotesi no ens ha donat efectivament cap fet" (p. xlvi). Ferrater proceeds backwards by attempting to seek historical justification for his lack of evidence; this is inacceptable. He may tell us of the extreme plausability of his hypothesis, on the basis of his own authority, but the critical mind should never accept demagogy. The lack of facts, but the suggestion of an extreme plausability, demands an excessive faith in the critic's superior wisdom, which I, for one, am not graced with. In order to adduce "facts" in support of his "inventions", Ferrater presents a "historical" interpretation of Poem 46 which he claims cannot be read otherwise: "no podem sinò llegir com a (prestament) escrita per algù que es disposa a fer un viatge per mar en direcció oest-nord-oest" (p. xlvi). One is surprised to find that Ferrater's revealed knowledge is also very limited, as one can read in my interpretation of this poem in Chapter V of this thesis, the actual significance of this poem is medical. Ferrater's dogmatism crumbles easily. Moreover, since this is one of the rare instances in which he confronts the text one can rightly wonder what his commentary would be like. Indeed, even in his peripheral references to the text one can legitimately question whether he has read sufficient studies on Ausias March. For instance, on page xxviii he states that Poem 72 is written in praise of Alfonso the Magnanimous, a theory formulated by Pagès in 1901, which he revoked in 1907 (Romania XXXVI, pp. 210-211) and explained that it was in fact written in praise of Christ. This has been accepted by all contemporary critics, except of course, Ferrater, who gives no reason for returning to Pagès' early error. Furthermore, Ferrater's edition has no footnotes,

nor does his introduction, every statement he makes is undocumented. As such, Ferrater does not justify his editorial criteria, it is a gratuituous act of re-punctuation. A serious edition of Ausias March should present a completely annotated text, if possible without punctuation leaving such things to the discretion of the reader, since Ausias March probably did not know the rules of punctuation.

Much more could be said, but I think that Ferrater's poor excuse for scholarship speaks for itself. It is characteristic of the shoddiest kinds of academic work done principally in the field of hispanism. Of the two recent editions Rafael Ferreres', for all its drawbacks, has sufficient modesty and learning to elicit the respect, if not the agreement, of this reader. It is not a travesti of scholarship like Ferrater's work. The most regrettable aspect of Ferrater's work is that, in view of his reputation as a critic, the reach of his influence as a reader on various journals and editorial houses, it is to be feared that his work will be met with favourable reviews by those who do not wish to be considered "imbeciles". This will undoubtedly perpetuate his dubious approach to literature, and foster the proliferation of a "modern" approach to mediaeval texts devoid of a sound preparation which may be too tasking.

39 P. Ramírez i Molas (La poesia d'Ausias March, pp. 109-118) considers that Poem CXXVIII is not by Ausias March. His theory has not been met with much success among most critics. The arguments for this theory are based mainly on the suggestion that Ausias March may not necessarily have read a version of St. Bernard's Contemptus mundi, as Pagès had thought in his reading of verses 41-48 in Poem XXVI (see Commentaire des poésies d'Auzias March, Paris: Honoré Champion, 1925, pp. 39-40), since these verses are also found in the Flors del Gay Saber, vv. 5054-5071, and El Torcimany ("Torcimany" de Luis de Averçó: Tratado retórico grammatical i diccionaro de rimas. Siglos XIV-XV vol. I, ed. José M. Casas Homs, Barcelona: Consejos Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1956, p. 125), and on the metric irregularity. The subsequent arguments of P. Ramírez i Molas suggest, but do not establish, that the poem is actually by Pere Vilasaló, a priest-scribe who copied the works of Ausias March. His arguments do not transcend personal opinion. On the basis of the arguments of Pagès, Bohigas and Riquer, as well as on that of the use made of images and proverbs in poem CXXVIII, which on the whole correspond to that found in the 127 other poems of Ausias March, I am inclined to believe in the latter's authorship.

40 The problem of the "gest", although it is discussed here at some length, will be dealt with again in Chapter V: "Melancholy: The Mirror of Courtly Love."

41 Bohigas, Poesies V, p. 95; he goes on to explain: "en canvi, no se sent inflamat pel toch. D'acord amb aquests versos i amb els vv. 81-90, que els expliquen, la dama cantada així per Ausiàs March no era bella en el sentit propi d'aquesta paraula; la passió del poeta no era pas desvetllada per la bellesa d'aquella, sinó pel seu gest" (p. 95). In the introduction to Poesies, vol. I, p. 55, Bohigas defines the gest as the object of spiritual contemplation, "sols ocasionalment trobà la joia de la contemplació de

l'harmoniosa bellesa d'un cos, un gest i un intellecte superior infonent-los noblesa...," "Ausias March canta uns ulls amb poder de dar dolor e prometre plaher i el gest i la veu d'un feble cos que l'han fet esclau: "Dormint, vetlant, yo tinch la fantasia / en contemplar qui am, qui és, què val" (CI, vv. 33-34). The role of phantasy-imagination, which form parts of discussion found in this section of the thesis, is the essential source of my disagreement with Bohigas' definition of "gest", as is evident in the text. Part of the confusion which surrounds the definition of the "gest" seems to arise out of Ausias March's usage of the theory of the imagination, and the interpretation he makes concerning its validity. The examples I give indicate the "interior" significance which the "gest" has in his poems. However, the ambiguity of this term can easily be understood in its relation to "amor hereos", where imagination is frequently conceived of strictly as a source of concupiscence. Hence, in Latin "gestus" has the meaning of "bearing", such as in the Latin translation of Avicenna's Cannon of Medicine (quoted from John Livingston Lowes, "The Loveres Maladye of Hereos" Modern Philology XI, 1913-1914, p. 513): "Haec aegritudo est solicitudo melancholica similis melancholiae, in quo homo sibi iam induxit incitationem seu applicationem cogitationis suae continuam super pulchritudine ipsius quarundam formarum et gestuum seu morum quae insunt ei." As the latter half of this sentence states "amor hereos" is a vehement, or immoderate, cogitation "on the beauty of certain forms of being and gestures and character, which are in it". Hence, "gest" as used by Ausias March, if indeed Pagès' and Bohigas' interpretation is intended to reflect its mediaeval latin significance, is related to the perception of the soul (form). Ausias March's poetical usage of this concept is characteristically broader than that of the philosopher. (See also note 87 on "amor hereos".)

42 A. Pagès, Auzias March et ses prédécesseurs, pp. 212-213.

43 A. Pagès, Commentaire des poésies d'Auzias March, p. 35.

44 See notes 40 and 41 above.

45 In his edition-translation of the complete poems of Ausias March, R. Ferreres accepts the definition proposed by Pagès (Ausias March: Poesia Completa I, p. 212). Yet, in spite of his own criticism of Montemayor's translation of "gesto" by "rostro", echoing that of Pagès, Ferreres himself finds it impossible to elude the semantic implication, and translates "gesto" by "rostro", as in Poem CI, verses 13 and 45, inter alia. These inconsistencies demonstrate the difficulty which many critics experience in understanding the essentially Neoplatonic theory of imagination which underlies the notion of "gest" (see also note 49), and pervades Ausias March's erotic though.

46 In its extreme implications, "gest" understood as the vision of the form of the lady, reduces the perception that the lover has of her to the most idealized traits, as a universal aspiration. As Chapter V: "Melancholy: The Mirror of Courtly Love " will discuss, she is both reduced and heightened to the embodiment of

Sapientia. She becomes a "mental archetype", as prescribed by mediaeval rhetorical theory.

47 See note 31.

48 As Hughes de Saint Victor explains on the perception of the imagination that "when the spirit descends it is lower than spirit; and when God descends He is lower than God" ("De Unione Corporis et Spiritus", p. 285). See note 26.

49 The perception and the definition of the "gest" as understood by Pagès and Bohigas, has led to a certain amount of misinterpretation in the poetry of Ausias March, and, in particular, in stanza IX of Poem CXIX: "Axí com és bella una persona / tota ensemps, e no en parts jutjada, / e no·s veu bé perqu·és tal estimada, / puix no ha res qu·als bells natura dóna / -en àls està que·l cors li acompanya, / ço és lo gest qu·en tal cas l'ull engana-; / Amor pel gest cors leig amar me mana, / tant qu·en mi veig speriença stranya: / si·l pens en parts, la pensa d'ell aparte, / e quant la veig o toch, sens alt, no·m farte" (vv. 81-90). Verse 85 has been the subject of a little inconsistency and misinterpretation. R. Ferreres translates verses 85 and 86 as: "pues no tiene nada de lo que a los bellos da natura, en otros está en el cuerpo que les acompaña, está en la actitud que en tal caso la vista engaña". It seems to me that this interpretation, coupled by the translation of "gest" by "actitud", deforms the sense of text. In verse 85 "li" is, as always, a dative singular pronoun. I would therefore interpret this passage as either: "it is in something else which accompanies the body", or preferably, "it is in something else which is accompanied by the body"; since the basic concept in Aristotelian scholasticism is that the soul is the motor of the body, the body accompanies it, or it accompanies the body. The indefinite "it" refers to what is not well perceived ("no·s veu bé"), which is why the person is loved ("perqu·és tal estimada"), and that is the "gest". In Catalan my translation would be "que al cors que li acompanya", the beauty is in something else than the body which accompanies it; it is in the "gest" which reveals the soul which is accompanied by the body; the sense is then "it is in something other than the body which accompanies it". This is parallelled by the definition of beauty given in CXVI, verses 121-126 concerning the "gest": "Lo gest dels ulls e de aquells la forma / fet han en mi passió molt estranya / per l'apetit que tot per carn se guanya / ab altre molt que d'opinió·s forma; / e d'aquest és lo tot d'ella l'objecte, / no sols lo cors, mas tota ensemps presa". Here, as in CXIX, v. 82, the object of beauty is defined as: "tota ensemps e no en part jutjada". This is not a reference to the Stoic concept of beauty as the harmonious association of the various external parts (see Marsile Ficin, Commentaire sur le Banquet de Platon, introduction de Raymond Marcel, p. 77), but to the Neoplatonic doctrine of the body as a reflection of the soul. "Tota ensemps" refers to the union of the body and the soul. Hence beauty perceived by Ausias March in the imagination is not merely corporeal symmetry, he is drawn to the body by his perception of the soul imprisoned therein.

50 In the thematic classification of Ausias March's poems this would refer to the "Cants Morals"; like the religious poems, they seem to correspond to a period of rejection of love. (See notes 37 and 38.)

51 See note 35.

52 See below in this chapter the discussion of imagination in Poem LXXXVII.

53 "Ira can mean a whole gamut of unpleasant emotions ranging from anger to resentment and despair, while the absence of happiness leaves the field open to a fairly wide variety of types of feeling -- chagrin, sorrow (violent or resigned), hopelessness, and so on," (D. R. Sutherland, "The Love Meditation in Courtly Literature," Studies in Medieval French Presented to A. Ewert, Oxford: Clarendon, 1961, p. 74). In his interpretation of Ausias March, Pagès limits the significance of this term to "anger": "Cette irascibilité n'est d'ailleurs qu'une conséquence de l'amour, de l'inclination primitive. La colère, dit-il, tire sa puissance de l'amour..." (Auzias March et ses prédécesseurs, p. 294). Similarly, he interprets "odi" as "l'aversion ou la fuite" (Ibid., p. 296). The relation which these terms have with the movement of the imagination implies that their usage is meant to denote the movement of reason away from the object of enamourment, which is exploited by the poet as a moral source of sorrow (see note 35). As such, this concept is related to the Chartrian definition of irascibilitas as "the power to reject unwanted things" (see, D. C. Meerson, The Ground and Nature of Literary Theory in Bernard Silvester's Twelfth-Century Commentary on the Aeneid, Ph.D. thesis, Chicago: Illinois, 1967, p. 38).

54 See notes 26 and 48.

55 See note 31.

56 This is inherent to Hughes de Saint Victor's description of the movement of reason. See note 31.

57 Rafael Ferreres has challenged the notion that this image proceeds from Psalm XLII (Obra poética completa II, pp. 8-9, and "Ausias March en algunos poetas del siglo de oro," Estudios sobre literatura y arte: Dedicados al Profesor Emilio Orozco Díaz, vol. I, Granada: Universidad de Granada, 1979, p. 472). He suggests that it may also proceed from the Galician tradition. His objection is very perceptive; however, as I hope to demonstrate in the text, the usage of this image in Poem LXXXIX still implies a high degree of mystic symbolism.

58 There seems to be some discrepancy between Pagès' interpretation of these verses and that of Bohigas. Pagès sees in verses 50 to 53 of Poem LXXXIX, an expression of the poet's victory over the physical attraction he could feel towards the lady: "Il ne

craint pas de subir l'influence de la beauté physique de sa dame" (Commentaire, p. 97). Bohigas sees in these same verses an allusion to the concupiscent desires of the lady: "Semblen clara allusió a l'amor vulgar que el poeta podia esperar de la dama incapaç d'elevar-se a les altures d'un amor més pur i durador" (Poesies III, p. 168). Bohigas' interpretation is somewhat obscured by the fact that he surmises an aspect of the lovers' relation which is not explicit in the text. The problem in these verses is not the lady's concupiscence, but the poet's own inclination to the flesh. Hence it seems to me that in this instance Pagès' interpretation is correct.

59 The expression "laetus horror" is used by D. Kelly (Medieval Imagination, p. 37) in a discussion on the principle of imposition in the Roman de la rose and Troilus: "... The reader is aware of the distance separating him from his own perfection. He is a more or less faithful imago of the perfect self visible in the mirror of his soul. Whatever the idealized context the author has chosen, one finds direction to life and meaning by consideration of the goal as perfection. Imagination as Memory is thus linked to Prudence; and Prudence as we read in the Anticlaudianus, is the sole agent able to approach God and consider His perfection, his "diuinam psichen" at least in a mirror. That mirror can only show things as Prudentius does. The prudent inspector will thus experience a laetus horror, an awful and exhuberant horror before the abyss of separation. The expression laetus horror is borrowed by the Vir from Statius to express the love he conceives for the Mulier in the Epistolae duorum amantium. That love too has its diversity, its slippings into disarray and self-alienation, the flights of the soul into diversa...". It is with this sense in mind that I am using the term "laetus horror", and the reference to its "existential" implications, as they would have been known to a medieval author.

60 This aspect of Ausias March's works naturally raises some problems in relation to the traditional vision of Ausias March as a Catholic poet strongly inspired by Thomist scholasticism. P. Bohigas, following J. Rubió i Ors, denies any possibility of existentialist experience in Ausias March. Rubio i Ors states: "Sin embargo, fuerza es convenir, y en esto se distingue nuestro poeta de los modernos eróticos escépticos, que esos arranques de desesperación son como los involuntarios gritos que hace exhalar al enfermo la vehemencia del dolor, y que se encuentran, como rumores perdidos, en la atmósfera de resignación en que procura anegarse, acordándose siempre que es cristiana su alma, enamorada de otra igualmente cristiana, y que el amor que le profesa ha de sobrevivir a su cuerpo y a los deleites, como a las tristezas de este mundo...". (Ausias March y su época, p. 53). This argument is taken up by Bohigas (Poesies I, pp. 114-115, note 3): "L'angoixa d'Ausiàs March és moral. Emprant aquesta paraula, no ens referim, doncs, de cap manera a l'angoixa metafísica dels existencialistes. Ausiàs March, doctrinàriament, és trobava al pol oposat." In the broad use of the term "existential", Ausias March's problem is not the Sartrian opposition of existence and "esse", but it is metaphysical. The moral anguish in Ausias March, as a problem inherent in the "laetus horror", is rooted in

that of the metaphysical recovery of the soul from the "descensus ad inferos", in an essentially Neoplatonic harmonic vision of the universe as the macrocosm in which the moral flaws of the microcosm are a perversion of this harmony. These problems are the concern of chapter IV of this thesis which deals with the mediaeval tradition of Neoplatonism which Ausias March inherited. This, moreover, is compatible with the current of fifteenth-century scepticism in Catalonia (see M. de Riquer, "Poemes Escèptics," Commentaris critics sobre clàssics catalans, pp. 18-29; and Antoni Canals' prologue to "De Providència," pp. 85-88, in M. de Riquer (ed.), Antoni Canals: Scipió e Anibal, Barcelona: Barcino, 1935). Canals also relates the problem of love to scepticism in the prologue to "De Arra de Ànima" (Ibid., pp. 121-125). The "laetus horror" which has existentialist implications is closely related to that of Ausias March's religious position, which is the subject of Appendix I: "The Orthodoxy of Ausias March."

61 P. Bohigas' interpretation of this stanza is formally identical to mine, but, unfortunately, he does not seem to have realized that the unity of this poem lies in its development of a praise of the lady, through the manipulation of the implications of the theory of Imagination. He therefore interprets verses 11-12 as: "Cap altre afany, si no és el de la mort, no pot superar el dolor del poeta," and verses 15-16: "El poeta demana o un dolor "fresc," més viu que el que sent, o la mort..." (Poesies II, p. 124). A slightly more complex aspect of this problem in the interpretation of these verses and related to my thesis on the "laetus horror", leads me to suggest very cautiously, that I would be inclined to identify this "altra dolor ... que sia fresqua" with a renewal of the initial vision of the ideal, prior to the poet's consciousness of the distance that separates him from it. This would explain why as verses 17-18 suggest, Imagination cannot provide the same "laetus horror" again, and, moreover, this remains within what I consider to be the hyperbolic frame of reference of these verses.

62 See Poem CIV.

63 See Poem XVIII, vv. 1-2; also, the discussion of XVIII below; LXXI, vv. 1-2; LXXIII, vv. 1-4; LXXVII, vv. 325-330; LXXXVII, vv. 1-4; CII, vv. 36-40.

64 See in Chapter V: "Melancholy: The Mirror of Courtly Love," the discussion of Poem LXXV.

65 In his use of this metaphor Ausias March relies on a highly developed mediaeval tradition of the quick and the dead, in which the dead set fear in the hearts of the quick, and preach virtue, of which they have a retrospective knowledge. This theme, which is found in the Cinq poèmes des trois morts et des trois vifs (ed. S. Glixelli, Paris: Champion, 1914), has been extensively studied by A. Tenenti, La vie et la mort au XV^{e} siècle, Paris: Armand Colin, 1952; and by the same author, Il senso della morte e l'amore della vita nel Rinascimento, Torino: Einaudi, 1957.

In Spain it has been surveyed by Florence Whyte, The Dance of Death in Spain and Catalonia, Baltimore: Waverly, 1931.

66 Verses 25-30 have been the object of some contention. Pagès sees these verses as a "construction embarrassée et obscure", and his interpretation of them is: "Je ne sais aucun gré (à la Mort), si elle ne couvre point de terre mon corps nu. Dans sa joie celui-ci ne pense qu'à abandonner toute image de l'impossibilité où je suis de satisfaire mes désirs... L'idée est celle-ci: si la mort ne me privait pas du plaisir de vous voir, je ne lui saurais aucun gré de ne point me faire disparaître de cette terre où mes desirs restent sans satisfaction..." (Commentaire, p. 20). According to Bohigas: "El sentit és ben clar: si la mort no causés al poeta el mal de privar-lo de la visió plaent de la persona amada, aquell no li agrairia que no cobris (vista), ja de terra el seu cos. Al poeta no li resta altre plaer que imaginar uns desigs que no es poden complir" (Poesies II, p. 49). P. Ramírez i Molas generally agrees with Bohigas, although he suggests that verse 30 is not subordinated to "imagination" in verse 29, but to verses 31-32, and that the verse should actually be read as "los meus desigs no podent-se complir" and interprets the passage as "no pot perdre altre plaer que el de l'imaginar, per tal com el plaer dels desigs li és defès i fora del seu abast" (La poesia d'Ausias March, pp. 29-30). R. Ferreres in his translation of verses 27-30, in spite of having access to all three of the above interpretations, according to his bibliography, still manages to take his readers out on a Tolkeinian trip of his own, in which the vital concept of imagination disappears altogether: "no le agradezco que no cubra de tierra mi cuerpo desnudo, pues no piensa en el placer que pierde, sino que mis deseos no se podrán cumplir..." (Ausias March: Obra Poética Completa I, p. 179). My interpretation of these verses is based on the fact that a close inspection of Ausias March's poetry reveals that in general every "cobla" acts as a unit of thought in which the first two verses introduce a thought which is developed in the ensuing verses. Verses 25-26 introduce the thought that death would offend the poet by depriving him of the vision of the beloved. This interpretation is inclined to favour those of Bohigas and Ramírez i Molas. The concepts implied by the sight which would be lost, are developed in the ensuing verses by the explicit reference to imagination (verse 29), which combines both sight and sensual memory, thereby bridging the introduction of "body" and "delight". In verses 27-30, the poet does not thank Death for covering his naked body with earth. The body thinks that there is no greater displeasure, than that of losing the imagination (sight and sensual memory). Verse 30 should be interpreted as does Ramírez i Molas. The difficulty in these verses lies primarily in understanding the ambivalent nature of imagination. It involves the spiritualization of the flesh, and the fall of reason, and therefore, makes the movement from "contemplació" to "desigs" in these few verses understandable. (See also the discussion of this matter in Chapter V: "Melancholy: The Mirror of Courtly Love.")

67 "Douz Pensers vient a chief de pièce, / Qui l'ire e la dolor despièce, / E à l'amant en son venir / Fait de la joie sovenir /

Que Esperance li promet; / E après au devant li met / Les iauz rianz, le nés traitiz, / Qui n'est trop granz ne trop petiz, / E la boucheté colorée, / Don l'aleine est si savorée; / Si li plaist mout quant il li membre / De la biauté de chascun membre. / Encor vait cil solaz doblant / Quant d'un ris ou d'un bel semblant / Li membre ou d'une bele chière / Que fait li a s'amie chière. / Douz Pensers ensi assoage / La dolor d'amor e la rage" (vv. 2649-2666), Roman de la rose II, ed. E. Langlois, Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1920, p. 135. As this quotation indicates hope is maintained by the imagination, which in this instance is debased to being simply "sensuous memory".

68 M. S. Boethius, The Theological Tractates and The Consolation of Philosophy, trans. H. F. Stewart, E. K. Rand, and S. J. Tester, London: Heinemann, 1973, p. 191, "Consolation II, iv, prose: "But it is just that which torments me, for in all the adversities of fortune, the most unhappy kind of misfortune is to have known happiness."

69 On the development of the theme of the Golden Age in Ausias March, see Chapter V: "Melancholy: The Mirror of Courtly Love."

70 For a summary of the controversy surrounding the problem of the relation of the two parts of the Roman de la rose, see Charles Dahlberg, trans., G. de Lorris and J. de Meun, The Romance of the Rose, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971, pp. 2-4.

71 A. Pagès, Auzias March et ses prédécesseurs, p. 280; Commentaire, p. 69.

72 Op. cit., ed. E. Langlois, tome II, p. 134.

73 I follow Bohigas' interpretation of verse 36; however, for the purpose of this discussion one should note that verses 35-36 in Poem IX cause some problems of interpretation. Pagès, Commentaire, p. 14, says of verse 35: "Il y a une heure par jour ou je n'éprouve aucune peine à, etc...." Bohigas interprets verses 35-36 as "Hi ha moments del dia que no té cap pena de pensar que està a punt de morir (l'arma rendre)" (Poesies II, p. 37). Although this interpretation conveys the general idea, it seems to me that the object of verse 36 is missed by the translation "that he is on the point of dying". Ausias March seems to be implying much more in verse 36: "pensant en ço que vinch a l'arma rendre". Bohigas' version only implies "pensant que vinch a rendre l'arma". Ausias March is actually saying: "thinking of that for which I come to give up my soul". There is a "double entente" in these verses, the spiritual vision is a rapture, but it may also be a reflection on the false "religio amoris" which steals his soul, that is, to which he gives up his soul. The reference in verse 34 would indicate a conflict of spirit and flesh, "de grans contrasts m·opinió és plena", which warrants my interpretation. Also, the sense of the "tornada" (see text) heightens the viability of this interpretation.

74 D. Kelly defines "courtly love" literature as the product of "finesse" which lies behind the rhetoric of "courtly love"; "Fin'amors as used in the Middle Ages and courtly love in modern parlance are not always synonymous. The difference lies in the divergent connotations of the adjectives courtly and fin. Courtly love commonly suggests arts of love, rules and directives prescribing specific conduct and fixing sentiment within an exact mold. It is held to be essentially deductive, functioning as an elaborate etiquette covering every conceivable circumstance and action. That which is fin evinces finesse. Finesse characterizes "la puissance intuitive" as one critic puts it, "la faculté de saisir confusément la réalité profonde des objets concrets", that is, the essential and indicative elements of experience" (Medieval Imagination, p. 20; see also p. 235).

75 See Chapter V: "Melancholy: The Mirror of Courtly Love."

76 See notes 26 and 31.

77 M. W. Bundy, The Theory of Imagination in Classical and Mediaeval Thought, pp. 140-141.

78 See in particular the reference in note 31; the implications of "fantasia" naturally incline it to "inmoderata cogitatione", as in note 7. Also see, St. Thomas' elimination of the problem, Bundy, p. 217.

79 "the common contrast was between imagination and reason, phantasy and intellect" (Bundy, p. 180). These relations pose a great problem which cannot be overlooked, but which I can only glean over in this thesis. Phantasy is constantly seen as either quasi-divine, or as totally deceitful and evil. These two kinds of Phantasy were a constant source of contention in the Middle Ages, and generally, it can be said to have been viewed negatively by most mediaeval theologians. In this respect, it shares the fate of melancholy with which it is intimately associated. In literature, as I shall try to point out below it had more fortune, however, its implications can only be determined by the context in which it is presented. In this very brief exposé of the problem I am mainly interested in presenting the ambivalent implications of this term, and its relation to intuition which is important for the understanding of Poem XVIII. I am, therefore, presenting mainly the positive aspects of phantasy and their possible negative effects which seem to have been the standard mediaeval interpretation of this concept.

80 Bundy, p. 139.

81 Ibid.

82 Here, as elsewhere, phantasy shares the fate of melancholy. The Stoics considered melancholy to be a form of madness. Phantasy is then related to insanity, however, as in the case of melancholy,

"furor" was an occasional gift of the Stoic Wise Man. Hence just as there are two types of melancholy, so are there two types of phantasy (see Saturn and Melancholy, pp. 43-44).

83 Bundy, p. 89. Bundy here paraphrases an extensive and more complex passage found in Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta vol. II, ed. J. von Arnim, Leipzig, 1903, reprinted in Stuttgart: Teubner Verlag, 1964. The passage,which comes from Aetii Placita, is in Greek. Owing to my manifest and regrettable ignorance of Greek, I am forced to rely on Bundy's text.

84 M. W. Bundy, p. 266.

85 Dante's references to "fantasia" are mainly found in the Paradiso. The only one outside this context is found in a general reference to imagination (Purgatorio, Canto XVII, 25; Dante Alighieri, The Divine Comedy I-III, ed. and trans., C. S. Singleton, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973). In all other references in the Paradiso it is associated with the highest intellectual faculties of man; it assists him in the perception of the divine, especially in the final canto, verse 142: "A l'alta fantasia qui mancò possa; / ma già volgeva il mio disio e 'l velle, / sì come rota ch'igualmente è mossa, / l'amor che move il sole e l'altre stelle" (The Divine Comedy, Canto XXXIII, vv. 142-145, p. 380).

86 "Hire friendes sawe hir sorwe gan to slake, / Ande preyde hire on knees, for Goddes sake, / To come and romen hire in companye, / Away to dryve hire derke fantasye" (Op. cit., vv. 841-844) (Geoffroy Chaucer, The Works, ed. F. N. Robinson (second edition), Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961, p. 136). In this context the "derke fantasye" refers to the melancholy state into which Dorigen swoons during Averagus' absence. The description of Dorigen's actions are exactly those of a melancholy figure: "Another tyme ther wolde she sitte and thynke, / And cast her eyen downward fro the brinke" (Op. cit., vv. 856-857; Ibid., p. 137). On this point see Saturn and Melancholy, p. 405, for the iconography of Malinconia.

87 And in his geere for al the worlde he ferde, / Not only like the loveris maladye / Of Hereos, but rather lyk manye, / Engendered of humour malencolik, Biforen, in his celle fantastik" (The Works of Geoffroy Chaucer, "The Knight's Tale," vv. 1372-1376, p. 30). The "maladye of hereos" is generally considered to be melancholy love with a concupiscent intention. This subject has been extensively studied by John Livingston Lowes, "The Loveres Maladye of Hereos," Modern Philology XI, 1913-1914, pp. 491-546. The definition given by Arnau de Vilanova identifies it with the excessive meditation characteristic of melancholics: "Amor ... qui dicitur heroicus est vehemens et assidua cogitatio supra rem desideratam cum confidentia obtinendi delectabile apprehensum ex ea" (Livingston Lowes, p. 541), from Tractatus de amore qui heroycus nominatur. The title and significance of this work seems to have escaped Spanish critics, as can be seen in the introduction

to Arnau de Vilanova, Obres Catalanes, vol. II: Escrits Mèdics, pròleg de Joaquin Carreras i Artau, Barcelona: Barcino, 1947. In the catalogue to Vilanova's work Carreras i Artau lists: "De amore qui heroicus (eroticus?) nominatur" (p. 34). Arnau de Vilanova's definition does not record melancholy love "amor hereos" as a totally negative activity, it is an ardent meditation on an object with the confidence of obtaining a delightful apprehension or understanding of it; this does not necessarily imply a concupiscent intention. Arnau de Vilanova's attitude in this matter corresponds to his more advanced conception of melancholy, when compared to that of many of his contemporaries, and preludes the position taken by Marsilio Ficino (see Saturn and Melancholy, pp. 263-266). The general notion of "amor hereos" as a concupiscent, and therefore, perverted phantasy can be perceived in the definition of the Portuguese, Velascus, in his Philonium (1418), quoted in Livingston Lowes (pp. 505-506): "Est autem hereos amor inordinatus et irrationabilis quem aliquis habet erga aliquam mulierem non propter bonum finem. Est ergo hereos amor cum sollicitudine immensa propter amorem mulieris" ... "Causa hereos est corruptio imaginatione falsa representantis virtuti rationabili et opinativae. Nam imaginatio magna domina est: et imperat aliis virtutibus...." This definition explicitly refers to the destructive function of imagination, as in Chaucer it is a melancholy engendered in first of the three cells of the brain, the cell of phantasy, which,as in Hughes de Saint Victor, is the seat of the imaginative faculty (see note 31). This is closely associated with Andreas Capellanus' definition of love as an "inmoderata cogitatione" (notes 7, 31). In the second part of the first Appendix to The Origin and Meaning of Courtly Love (pp. 131-132), Roger Boase sums up the research of J. Livingston Lowes on "amor hereos" and "amor ishq", and correctly points out that this concept was known in fifteenth-century Castile. Moreover, he quotes the late fifteenth-century writer Francisco López de Villalobos, who associates "amor hereos" with the troubadours: "Amor hereos según nuestros autores / en una corrupta imaginación / por quien algún hombre se aquexa de amores, / y en éste qu'es hito de los trovadores..." (from El sumario de la medecina con un tratado de las pestíferas bubas, Salamanca, 1498, ed. María Teresa de Herrera, Cuadernos de Historia de la Medicina Española monografía 25, Salamanca, 1973, p. 38), and also refers to Alfonso de Madrigal. On the basis of these references Boase associates "amor hereos" with "courtly love". This seems to me to be a hazardous and possibly equivocal definition. Ausias March who is also familiar with the theory of "amor hereos", also rejects the love of the troubadours, in his rejection of sensual love: "D'aquest voler los trobadors escriuen, / e, per aquest, dolor mortal los toca; / la racional part de l'arma no·ls broca; / del sensual aquest apetits viuen" (LXXXVII, vv. 41-44). Villalobos' rejection of troubadour love on the basis of "hereos" is written some fifty years after Ausias March, and seems to refer to a similar understanding of troubadour love as essentially sensual. This condemnation of "amor hereos", as related to courtly love of the troubadours, cannot be considered to have the value of a testimony, since it is a broad condemnation of an indefinite previous generation. The real danger of associating "amor hereos" with "courtly love" lies in the ambiguous nature of both terms. "Amor hereos", because it is closely related to melancholy, follows the uneven

development of this concept, and should not, therefore, be conceived of as a blanket definition, even if that may be the impression left by Livingston Lowes' article. Similarly, "courtly love", which has its own evolution (Chap. I, note 17), cannot be conceived of as a monolithic term. One can see the consequences of this approach in D. W. Robertson's very exacting interpretation "The Concept of Courtly Love as an Impediment to the Understanding of Medieval Texts," in The Meaning of Courtly Love, ed. F. X. Newman, p. 17, in which the "amor hereos" of Arcite, quoted at the beginning of this note, is considered to be something absolutely distinct from the definition of courtly love. In Ausias March's circumstances it is quite probable that his attitude to melancholy may have been closer to that of his compatriot Arnau de Vilanova, than to Velascus'. That which makes his work so interesting is that it represents an ambivalent attitude to melancholy, possibly owing to the religious climate of Catalonia-Valencia, and the definite influence of Ramon Llull, which is so affined to Vilanova's (see note 109).

88 W. Wetherbee, "The Function of Poetry in the De planctu naturae of Alain de Lille," Traditio XXV, 1969, pp. 87-125, and Platonism and Poetry, pp. 188-211.

89 Platonism and Poetry, p. 206.

90 Alain de Lille, The Complaint of Nature, trans., D. M. Moffat, p. 94.

91 D. Kelly, Medieval Imagination, p. 97.

92 R. S. Kinsman, The Darker Vision of the Renaissance, pp. 14-15.

93 Ibid.; R. S. Kinsman's arguments are based on the research of S. Wenzel, "The Seven Deadly Sins: Some Problems of Research," Speculum XLIII, 1968, pp. 1-22. The latter provides some enlightening information on the relation between Ira, acedia, and tristitia (see note 53 of this chapter) for the basis of Scholastic classification: "Cassian had distributed a large number of vices among the three Platonic parts of the soul, and in the eight century had given the following relation, in which the capital vices are considered as springing from the three parts if these are corrupted:

concupiscentia:	gastrimaquia, fornication, philargyria
ira:	tristitia, acedia
ratio:	superbia, cenodoxia.

This simple model appears in later works, even in vernacular treatises..." (p. 5). This model drawn by Wenzel from Alcuin's "De animae ratione" (P.L. CI, p. 640ff), explains why Ausias March refers to "irascibilitas" and its fall (p. 20 of this text, and note 53 above), he is led into "tristitia" and perhaps "acedia", which is defined by the treatise "Quoniam ut ait sapiens" (Brit. Mus., Ms. Harley 3823, fol. 65v., quoted by Wenzel, p. 8): "Iuxta terram autem que est elementum infimum nascitur accidia et

avaritia. Accidia quia melan grece terra vel nigrum latine. Unde melancholici qui magus sunt accidiosi." In this definition melancholy persons are given to sloth.

94 See note 7.

95 This elemental imagery is directly related to melancholy, as it is in other cases which I will describe in Chapter V, and can be seen in notes 108 and 110. The reference to phantasy in verse 167 and the instability which it causes are implicitly related to the mutability of the elements in stanza XXII; an explanation for this can be found in note 100 in a medical description common to both Ficino and Ausias March. The ensuing stanza XXIII then clarifies these references to the instability of the elements in the lover by exposing it in terms of the theory of the elementatum. The elements are not found in the body in their simple form, but always mixed in combinations with their opposites, in which one trait predominates (see Richard McKeon, "Medicine and Philosophy in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries: The Problem of Elements," The Thomist XXIV, 1961, p. 236; and Theodore Silverstein, "Elementatum: Its Appearance Among Twelfth-Century Cosmogonists," Medieval Studies XVI, 1954, pp. 156-162). The reference to the elementata furthers the concept of the body as a composite, as found in verse 162; as Ausias March states of the elements: "ans és compost d'un altre son contrari" (verse 178). This refers to a medical version of the conflict of contemplation and action, between the elements of the lover's body. Phantasy in verse 167 is therefore the source of contemplation which engenders melancholy instability. The term elementatum was introduced by Guillaume de Conches from medical texts, in particular from the Pantegni of Galen translated by Constantine the African (see Silverstein, pp. 157-158). This shows a fair knowledge of medical theory on the part of Ausias March, which should, however, be taken in perspective. Silverstein notes that the term probably came to Guillaume de Conches by way of John of Spain and Dominicus Gundissalinus in the Latin version of Avicenna's Fons Vitae. These twelfth-century sources are the common background of Ramon Lull's philosophy. Lull made of the elementatum one of the cornerstones of his thought; it is found inter alia in the Arbre de Ciencia, under "De l'arbre elemental": "Per les branques entenem los quatre elements simples, ço és a saber, lo foc, l'àer, l'aigua e la terra, qui son substàncies de les coses elementades en elles sustentades, e elles son insensibles e incorompables en quant son simples" ... "Per lo fruit entenem los elementats, així com la pera e la poma, e l'home e l leò, e l peix e l'aucell e l'aur e l'argent" (Ramon Llull, Obres esencials vol. I, Barcelona: Selecta, 1957, p. 557a). In this case Lull is undoubtedly one of Ausias March's main sources, which reflects Ausias March's perfect adequacy to a current of Neoplatonism in his era. In this sense he is neither a precursor, nor a belated follower of a by-gone tradition.

96 Pagès, who follows the manuscript chronology (see Les Obres d'Auzias March I, pp. 164-165), accepts in the case of CI the chronology presented in D (see Commentaire, p. 110), and therefore, believes that it is a later poem. Bohigas follows a similar

method and arrives at the same conclusion, Poesies I, p. 175. Riquer, Historia de la literatura II, p. 491, believes that it may belong to an earlier cycle. Ramírez i Molas, La poesia d'Ausias March, p. 217, also considers that it is a youthful product. On the basis of the internal evidence, that is, the way in which Ausias March conceives of phantasy and its effects, I am in complete agreement with Pagès.

97 See notes 41 and 49.

98 Pagès misinterprets these verses. Seemingly this can only be because he overlooks the function of imagination, for he states: "Et tous les sens (de ma dame) ont voulu s'y mêler. C'est par tous ses sens qu'elle a agi sur lui" (Commentaire, p. 113).

99 Bohigas (Poesies IV, p. 82) considers that verse 47 represents an "Oposicio entre la fredor de l'amada, que tanmateix, encén el poeta, i l'ardor d'aquest, que no aconsegueix d'escalfar la dama."

100 The traditional notion of the unstable physical attributes of the melancholy lover can be seen in John Livingston Lowes' examination of Chaucer's description of Arcite ("The Loveres Maladye of Hereos," pp. 525-526). The medical description of the melancholy person as unstable originates in the pseudo-Aristotelian Problem XXX, i, in the description of the black bile which can be either very hot or very cold: "But to revert to our former discussion, that such melancholic humour is already mixed in nature; for it is a mixture of hot and cold; for nature consists of these two elements. So black bile becomes both very hot and very cold. For the same thing can be naturally affected by both these conditions, as for instance water which is cold, but if it is sufficiently heated so as to reach boiling point it is hotter than the flame itself, and stone and steel when heated in the flame become hotter than the coal, though by nature they are cold" (Aristotle, Problems II: Books XXII-XXXVII, trans. W. S. Hett and H. Rackham, London: Heinemann, 1965, p. 161). Marsilio Ficino, in his medical explanation of melancholia's effect on the wit of individuals, repeats these concepts: "Bilis enim atra ferri instar, quando multum ad frigus intenditur, friget ad summum, quando contra ad calidum valde declinat, calet ad summum" (Marsilio Ficino, Opera Omnia vol. I, intro. P. O. Kristeller, Torino: Bottega d'Erasmo, 1962, reprint of Basilea: Henric Petrina, 1576, p. 498; this passage is also found in Saturn and Melancholy, p. 31). Further in this text after explaining the theory of opposites in the atra bilis, Ficino refers to the "great power which melancholy has towards either extreme, stable by a certain unity and of a fixed nature" ("trans. of: "Tantam ad utrunque extremum melancholia uim habet, unitate quadam stabilis, atque naturae" Opera Omnia, p. 498) thereby echoing the concept of the mean used by Aristotle to solve the problem of the melancholy instability. As Klibansky, Panofsky and Saxl point out: "only the Aristotelian concept of the "mean" made it possible to conceive an effective equilibrium between the poles of this antithesis," Saturn and Melancholy, p. 40). This concept of the opposites also forms part of the Petrarchan tradition of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries,

such as it is found in Petrarch's sonnet 48, first stanza: "Se mai foco per foco non si spense / né fiume fu giamai secco per pioggia, / ma sempre l'un per l'altro simil poggia / et spesso l'un contrario l'altro accense" (Petrarch's Lyric Poems, ed. and trans. R. M. Durling, Cambridge: Harvard, 1976, p. 115). The fifteenth-century Petrarchan tradition in Catalonia prior to Ausias March is represented by Jordi de Sant Jordi's "Cançó d'opposits," (number 15 in Jordi de Sant Jordi, ed. M. de Riquer, Granada: Universidad de Granada, 1955, pp. 173-177); it is an example of the more "preciosista" current of Petrarchism typical of the fifteenth-century imitators of Petrarch, prior to the Florentine revitalization which gave back to Petrarchism its content. Ausias March, like Petrarch, uses these concepts based on the theory of melancholy as a means of psychological introspection, which in the Valencian poet reaches what seems to me to be a greater level of complexity through the manipulation of the physiological implications. Hence in many images of hot and cold Ausias March describes his own physiological and psychological instability (Appendix II under: "Heat-Cold (Medical) G:1:c, and Hot-Cold (non medical) I:1), for example: "Cascun amor vol temps sens calt ne fret: / yo crem d'ivern, e d'estiu tremolí" (LXXXIV, vv. 23-24). This image, which comes from Bernat de Ventadorn, is used in the same way as that found in Poem CI, which is at the origin of this discussion. The heat and cold are the physiological extremes of melancholy love experienced by Ausias March. As Pagès has frequently noted, Ausias March seeks the Aristotelian mean in love: "Car la virtut en lo mig loch se met / e los estrems per vicis abandona" (XXX, vv. 31-32), (see also A. Pagès, Auzias March et ses prédécesseurs, p. 375). In his physiological interpretation of melancholy Ausias March consequently echoes the theory of the mean, as did Ficino: "A temps he cor d'acer, de carn, e de fust" (CXIV, v. 87). As in Problem XXX, i, Ausias March is describing his melancholy as being extremely unstable, cold as steel, temperate as the means (the flesh is "elementata" it partakes of hot and cold), and combustible as wood, that is, hot. The significance of this verse has not been previously noted by critics; it establishes a physiological parallel with the discursive division of the three kinds of love based on the Nicomachean Ethics.

101 See note 30, Chapter I.

102 As many twelfth-century Platonists, Hughes de Saint Victor has a sapiential view of the Incarnation, that is, he conceives of the Incarnation as the restauratio of man to his original communion with Divine Wisdom (see Wetherbee, Platonism and Poetry, pp. 54-55, and M. D. Chenu, La Théologie au XII^{e} siècle, page 205, pp. 225-227: "les implications platoniciennes d'un Hughes de Saint Victor l'amèneraient à concevoir nature et grâce comme des participations de la vie divine plutôt que comme des formes distinctes," p. 225). This entails a certain concept that true Wisdom is beheld in man's mind, as can be noticed in the first book of the Didascalicon, Hughes de Saint Victor says of man: "But his immortal mind, illuminated by Wisdom, beholds its own principle and recognizes how unfitting it is for it to seek anything outside itself when what it is in itself can be enough for

it" (Hugh of St. Victor, Didascalicon, trans. Jerome Taylor, New York: Columbia University Press, 1961, p. 46). As one can note in this statement true wisdom comes through "illumination"; it is revealed knowledge.

103 The use of a present participle has enabled Spanish translators and editors to gloss over this problem. Arthur Terry, in his translation (Ausias March, Selected Poems, trans. A. Terry, Edinburgh: University Press, 1976), correctly identifies the action as pertaining to the narrator, by translating "Ffantasiant" as "in my imaginings". A certain degree of inexactitude results from the equation of phantasy with imagination, this, however, is permissible in the general limitations intended in this translation.

104 Phantasy, as it is conceived of in these verses, especially in verses 25-40, is evidently a passive intellection of "universals"; it is "l'alta fantasia" of Dante. Ausias March, who is evidently aware of, and follows, the epistemology of Hughes de Saint Victor, clearly perceives the movement of the spirit as a go-between of the body and the soul of the individual, as can be noted in verses 33-40 (see notes 26 and 31). In a reference such as this one, the spirit has a dialectical function similar to that of the Plotinian animate (see note 26). G. Worth O'Brien points out that the concept of "spirit" was understood by the Scholastics as a "tertium quid" between the body and the soul; furthermore, the Galenic concept of the "spirit" accentuated its microcosmic relation, and hence: "when Ficino undertook to expound the nature of the "third something" in man, he substituted "spirit" for Animate..." (see Renaissance Poetics and the Problem of Power, p. 26). This is obvious in Ficino's statement: "Tria profecto in nobis esse videntur, anima, spiritus atque corpus. Anima et corpus natura longe inter se diversa spiritu medio copulantur qui vapor quidam est tenuissimus et perlucidus per cordis calorem ex subtilissima parte sanguinis genitus. Inde per omnia membra diffusus anime vires accipit, et transfundit in corpus. Accidem item per organa sensuum corporum externorum imagines, que in anima propterea figi non possunt, quia incorporea substantia, que corporibus prestantior est, formari ab illis per imaginum susceptionem non potest. Sed anima ubique spiritui presens imagines corporum in eo tamquam in speculo relucentes facile inspicit perque illas corpora iudicat. Atque hec cognitio sensus a Platonis dicitur.... Huiusmodi conceptionem imaginationem phantasticamque vocamus" (Commentaire sur le Banquet de Platon, ed. Raymond Marcel, p. 207; see also Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, Paris: Société d'Edition 'Les Belles Lettres,' 1958, pp. 407 and 668, as well as Chapter IV of this thesis). The relation of this to Hughes de Saint Victor's description of imagination and his use of "sensualitas" is self-evident (see notes 26 and 31). The fundamental concept of the clear spirit is, therefore, that of the spirit which finds itself illuminated by Divine grace, that is, informed of the Divine mysteries (Ibid., pp. 39-40). A problem arises here, inasmuch as this refers to what St. Augustine considers to be "recta ratio": "with the sight of the soul we see in the eternal truth from which all temporal things have been made, the form according to which we

effect something, in ourselves or in our bodies with a true and right reason; and it is from the same source that we possess a true knowledge of things... (Ibid., p. 19, from De Trinitate, IX, 7). Ausias March is evidently very much aware of this definition of the concept of "recta ratio". In Poem CV one finds a reference to this: "ab hull de carn he fet los teus judicis: / vulles dar lum a la vista de l'arma" (vv. 95-96). Here Ausias March opposes natural reason to "recta ratio", that is, to wisdom granted to the spirit, which purifies and clears it by illumination. Although Ausias March never refers to the term "recta ratio", he uses a very close approximation: "en pur amor l'espirit meu conferme / e·n aquell punt resta ma rahó clara" (LXXXVII, vv. 213-214). In pure love, Ausias March voices the same concept as "recta ratio" when referring to "clear reason that is "clear spirit". David W. Clark, in "William of Ockham on Right Reason," Speculum XLVII, 1973, pp. 13-36, demonstrates that the term "recta ratio" in later mediaeval scholasticism came to be conceived of as "right reasoning". William of Ockham uses it in two ways. The first is: "the correct knowledge about one's obligation" (Ibid., p. 15), it is moral knowledge. The other significance he attributes to "recta ratio" pertains to the Nominalist School's approach to the problem of predestination and the moral autonomy of the individual, "recta ratio" is then: "Rather than moral knowledge or propositions, the functional meaning of recta ratio signifies a non-complex act of judgement which asserts an obligation by assenting to normative propositions" (Ibid., p. 17). A recent article on Ausias March (Mark Johnson, "Scholastic Background as a Literary Tradition in Ausias March," Romance Notes XIX, 1979, pp. 1-5) uses the general introduction of Clark's article to suggest that Ausias March uses the concept of "recta ratio" like all Schoolmen, strictly to define "right reasoning" "as practical knowledge that enables morally correct behaviour". The conclusion of this article is that: "It is paradoxical that in his approach he applied the traditional concept of right reason -- a construct intended for the definition of morally proper behaviour -- to the implicitly immoral conduct of courtly love" (Ibid., p. 5). The real paradox is in the superficiality of the critic. That Ausias March made use of scholastic logic is not to be denied, but whether every syllogism involving reason becomes an example of "recta ratio" is another matter. The arguments used in this article are inherently misleading, if not fallacious, and the woolly reference to "courtly love" only adds to this misunderstanding. The problem of Ausias March is basically that he has to rely on "natural reason" (the eye of flesh) which is misleading because it draws him to the flesh. In pure love, when Ausias March is granted "recta ratio", that is, "rahó clara" (LXXXVII, v. 214) then he perceives truly, "with the eye of the soul": "del espirit és sa presó pus ampla, / e ses virtuts e potences exampla, / sí que no veu tras paret mas per rexa" (LXXXVII, vv. 196-198). As I have repeatedly described, Ausias March is a poet, and he is primarily influenced by poetic theory, which, indirectly, is affected by later Scholasticism, but has its roots in Chartrian and Victorine philosophy. Reason fails because it is enamoured of the imagination, as Hughes de Saint Victor describes it (see notes 26 and 31). Reason in this context is that of discursive reason, the eye of flesh. "Recta ratio" which is associated with

the soul's illumination of Wisdom, faith, could not fall since it is not strictly limited to logic. Hence in the limits of what is traditionally accepted as "courtly love", in the Roman de la rose, Reason, although she is "fille de Dieu" (v. 5816), and therefore, enables men to participate in divinity, is always secondary to faith, and consequently to the will: "A sa manière, Jean de Meun indique qu'ici-bas, si la volonté n'adhère pas aux vérités établies par la raison, celle-ci reste stérile. Il ne suffit pas de savoir, il faut croire et aimer" (P. Badel, "Raison, Fille de Dieu" et le rationalisme de Jean de Meun," Mélanges à Jean Frappier, t. 1, Genève: Droz, 1970, p. 49). This literary theme is frequent in most courtly literature, and it is intimately associated with that of raising the soul out of its immersion in chaos. To perceive with "recta ratio" is to do so through the eye of the soul, that is, in clear spirit. Since Ausias March never uses the term "recta ratio," but refers to the Augustinian concept in which it is not merely "right reasoning" in a discursive manner, but aided by Divine illumination, speculation such as that of Mark Johnson, is unwarranted, it can only refer to a standard syllogistic procedure, and rather than enlighten the reading of Ausias March it spreads confusion by placing it in the context of "courtly love" as an invariably immoral behaviour.

105 See notes 21 and 104. "The Pauline mirror is a variation on the Plotinian concept of the Animate. It is the mirror of man's soul in which divine illumination is reflected, and therefore, it is the mirror of recta ratio. "It cannot be searched by discursive reason; we are, on the contrary, the passive recipients of whatever light this mirror sheds upon our minds. The mirror of right reason is hence the Deity, so that, in the awkward imagery of this epistemology, we look upon the glass of the Lord in the darkened mirror of our mind; but whatever truth that we apprehend in this exercise comes not from our attempts to disperse the darkness from the light (right reason) which shines through the glass of understanding in spite of its darkness" (Renaissance Poetics and the Problem of Power, p. 20).

106 See note 149 on the Roman de la rose, and Renaissance Poetics and the Problem of Power, p. 29: "The will, then, is the key to efficacious mirror-polishing."

107 Leo Spitzer, Classical and Christian Ideas of World Harmony, ed. A. Granville Hatcher, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963 (see Chapter III, pp. 64-80); for example: "The history of the disappearance of the one field (world harmony -- well-temperedness) is simply the history of modern civilization..." (p. 75). It is interesting to note that Leo Spitzer refers extensively to Ausias March in support of his theory (see pages 89 and 91-92, Ibid.). He is, to my knowledge, the only critic to have paid proper attention to this vital aspect of the work of Ausias March. Francisco Rico, in his survey of microcosmic theories in Spain, El pequeño mundo del hombre, Madrid: Castalia, 1970, characteristically omits any reference to Ausias March. This seems to me to be a consequence of the interpretation of the Valencian poet's work as Thomist. As it is well known St. Thomas was generally

opposed to microcosmic theories of world harmony (see note 26 above, and Spitzer, pp. 73-74). As Rudolf Allers "Microcosmus," Traditio II, 1944, p. 385, points out: "When St. Thomas repeats after Aristotle that the soul is "somehow" all things he is careful to make a distinction. The soul is actually what it actually knows; and all other things it is but potentially. The anima quoddammodo omnia lends itself, accordingly, to a microcosmistic interpretation only in a metaphorical sense. In fact when St. Thomas speaks of this, he does not refer to the notion of the mundus parvus.

108 For example: "axí Amor suptil y enfinit tempra / la finitat de la del cors y aviva: / en cert cas mor nostr· amor sensitiva / e l'espirit junt amb ell se destempra" (LXXXVII, vv. 315-318); and, "Dins lo cors d'om les humors se discorden; / de temps en temps llur poder se transmuda: / en un sols jorn regna malenconia, / n· aquell mateix còlera, sanch e fleuma" (XCIV, vv. 17-20); see note 100.

109 Menéndez-Pelayo states, in the Historia de las ideas estéticas vol. II, Madrid: Viuda e Hijos de M. Tello, 1910, p. 227: "el llamado platonismo de Ausias March muy rara vez invade los términos ontólogicos." To the contrary, I believe that Ausias March's intimate knowledge of microcosmic theories associates his work with a particular aspect of Neoplatonic thought in which the onthology plays an important, if discreet, role. His knowledge of Ramon Lull, as studied by P. Ramírez i Molas (La poesia, pp. 313-369), is supported and furthered by the present study of Ausias March's manipulation of microcosmic theory. R. Pring-Mill has pointedly remarked that Lull's thought is eclectic, it combines a primarily Neoplatonic onthology with an Aristotelian psychology; this trait is generally common to mediaeval Christian philosophers: "Cal dir tanmateix, que per cristià que fos el simbolisme de la doctrina, com anàlisi dels processos psicològics no contenia res que fos incompatible amb el neoplatonisme filosòfic i la psicofisiologia aristotèlica de gairebé tots els sistemes de pensament de l'época..." (El microcosmos lul lià, Palma de Mallorca: Moll, 1962, p. 129). As many of his predecessors, the twelfth-century philosophers, Lull relies extensively on Augustinian hylemorphism (see Chenu, La théologie au douzième siècle, p. 117; and Pring-Mill, op. cit., p. 126). Lull consequently uses and recognizes two basic ontologies, one Aristotelian and Thomist, and the other Neoplatonic-Augustinian: "... com s'han d'ajuntar la seva ànima i el seu cos? Ramon Llull reconeix dues maneres generals de fer-ho: 'dien alcuns' (per exemple: els tomistes) 'que ànima és forma del cors pus que l'enforma, lo sosté e l'aduu a la fi per què és' (XXI: 14). Però ell, encara que sense negar mai aquesta primera manera de veure llur unió, preferiex veure-la d'una altra manera, la qual era un desenvolupament de l'hilomorfisme augustinià (amb la seva unió durant la vida de dos éssers complets, cas (un dotat de forma i de materia): 'Altres dien que lo cors ha forma de la ànima, e que de la sua forma essencial e de la essencial forma de la ànima es composta la forma de l'home, en axí passada en terç nombre de forma de ànima e de cors' (XXI: 14)" (Pring-Mill, op. cit., p. 164 and p. 165). Clearly the latter refers to the "tertium quid", which I have discussed above as

Animate or clear spirit (see notes 26, 31, 104 and 105). In the use of a combination of the two ontologies Lull writes under the influence of John Scotus Erigena (see Frances Yates, "Ramon Lull and John Scotus Erigena," Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes vol. 23, London: University of London, 1960, pp. 1-44), after the discredit of Erigena's teachings caused by the Almaurician heresy (see Yates, op. cit., p. 35; and M. D. Chenu, La théologie, p. 317) which preached the doctrine of the "divinity of man". This doctrine was carried on by Amaury de Bène's disciples who were known as the "beginnis," and is found repeated in Arnau de Vilanova's "Lliçó de Narbona" (Obres catalanes, vol. I: Escrits Religiosos, Barcelona: Barcino, 1947, p. 143): "de huna materia e de huna mà foren abdós engendrats en l'ajustament de la divinitat ab natura humana." Lull is, therefore, safeguarding himself from the accusation of heterodoxy by referring to two ontologies which in the Chrisian context are rendered compatible by the doctrines of the Fall and man as "imago dei". In the wake of Lull's influence it is not surprising to find Ausias March using an Aristotelian psychology, drawn mainly from the Nicomachean Ethics, and an implicitly Neoplatonic onthology tempered with Aristotelian elements. Unlike Pagès and his successors, who interpret the work of Ausias March as Aristotelian Scholasticism, I would suggest a greater allowance for eclecticism in view of Lull's acknowledged influence.

110 In Poem CXVII, for instance, one finds a description of the lover's temper: "Sí com en l'om un humor predomina, / que no és hu que per egual les haja, / e ve per temps que·s cambia·l domini, / axí Amor pratica en nosatres" (CXVII, vv. 141-144); see also note 108.

111 The terms "dark" and "puddled" spirit are used by George Chapman and Shakespeare to refer to the spirit's inclination to matter (see G. Worth O'Brien, Renaissance Poetics and the Problem of Power, pp. 38-39). Ausias March does not use these terms, but their significance is implicit in his work, as I explain in the text.

112 Wetherbee, Platonism and Poetry, p. 7.

113 A. Pagès has made an extensive case of this point, inter alia: Auzias March et ses prédécesseurs, pp. 289, 340.

114 R. D. Laing, The Politics of Experience, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967, p. 27.

CHAPTER IV: PHILOSOPHICAL CURRENTS AFFECTING THE INTERPRETATION OF AUSIAS MARCH.

The first concern of this chapter is a partially artificial construction. As I pointed out in the introduction, there is a tendency among many literary critics to perpetuate the notion of the Middle Ages as Aristotelian and the Renaissance as Platonic, and therefore, diametrically opposed. A reductionist approach such as this one, frequently conceives of mediaeval scholastic philosophy as being strictly Aristotelian. It uses the work of St. Thomas Aquinas as its main representative, which it interprets as being purely Aristotelian.[1] This is the fruit of a desire to see in the Renaissance a complete rejection of the Middle Ages. It has led various critics to stress the originality of certain authors at the expense of the continuity out of which the work and ideas of these authors arose. Fortunately, certain recent works have contributed to the general discredit of the traditional vision of the Middle Ages as monolithically Aristotelian and Thomist.[2] As W. J. Bouwsma has suggested, the opposition between Plato and Aristotle was not a major concern of the Renaissance humanists, "more seriously, when compared with the humanists of the Renaissance Plato and Aristotle seem more to resemble than to differ from each other".[3] Like the term "courtly love", this concept is a term of convenience which can become an impediment to the proper understanding of the text,[4] if one relies excessively on such generalities. Yet one cannot elude confronting them, since they are ingrained in our critical vocabulary. This is of utmost concern in the case of the criticism of Ausias March in which problems are almost inextricably compounded by the intimate association of the terms "courtly love" and "Aristotelianism", which critics such as A. Pagès,

Torras i Bages, and P. Bohigas use to support the notion of the orthodox catholicism of Ausias March in the light of possible Thomist references.

The premiss of the logic of these critics is therefore suspect. Any understanding of the passage from the sensibility present in the works of Ausias March to a Florentine Neoplatonic sensibility based on the aforementioned reasoning is also impeachable. Consequently, in order to arrive at a reasonable understanding of this development certain fundamental questions must be answered. Undoubtedly, the first point should be to clarify the relation that exists between the works of Plato and Aristotle;[5] this, however, would constitute not only an endless thesis, but a futile exercise since neither was clearly known to the Scholastics. It is therefore far more important to understand how this relation was understood in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, in the light of the continuity of the Platonic tradition.[6]

The point of departure for this study is undoubtedly Petrarchism. The Italianate sensibility introduced into sixteenth-century Castile is the renewed Petrarchism of Pietro Bembo,[7] which is an attempt to infuse a new philosophical content and purpose into what had become a vacuous rhetorical formulation of the standard Petrarchan topoi. This content is in large part affected by the development of Florentine Neoplatonism, as it evolved out of the writings of Marsilio Ficino and his circle, with the particular importance of the influence of the Commentarium Marsilii Ficini Florentini in Convivium Platonis, de Amore.[8] The numerous commentaries on the works of Petrarch and Dante, done in the light of Florentine Platonic theory, witness the intimate relation that exists between philosophical Petrarchism and the development of Ficino's Platonism.[9] The Commentarium of Ficino is considered by many to be the source of the new sensibility which Boscán discovered and

articulated in his translation of Baldassare Castiglione's Libro del Cortegiano.[10] This work echoed Bembo's own manipulation of the Florentine theory of love which he described in Gli Asolani. These works, together with Leone Hebraeus' Dialoghi d'Amore, comprise the theoretical background for Renaissance Italianate love theory, as it was to be assimilated in sixteenth-century Spain, and everywhere in Europe. As Pagès would have it, with Ausias March:

> Nous sommes au terme des variations auxquelles donna lieu, au Moyen Age, la théorie de l'amitié vertueuse d'Aristote conçue comme l'idéal de l'amour entre deux personnes de sèxe différent. A partir de la découverte de Platon, avec Marsile Ficin et les platonisants de l'Italie, ce sentiment entrera dans une phase nouvelle.[11]

Yet, some time after this statement Pagès also remarks: "... la distinction bien connue des trois amours, et notamment, la théorie de l'amour honnête correspondant assez exactement à celle que Baldassare Castiglione avait exposée dans son Cortegiano".[12] The extent to which the novel aspect of the Florentine sensibility may have been over-stretched, strictly in comparison to the theory of love in Ausias March, is open to suspicion. It is therefore with the source and meaning of this content, that is, with the implications of this sensibility, as uttered by Marsilio Ficino, in the light of humanist Platonism initiated theoretically by Petrarch,[13] that one must come to terms, if an understanding of the poetic evolution is to be reached.

Any attempt to oppose the Aristotelianism of the Middle Ages to the Platonism of the Renaissance encounters strong resistance when one considers the maze of problems that surround the introduction of the Aristotelian Corpus in thirteenth-century Europe.[14] The novelty of Aristotelianism could not, and did not, entirely surmount the pre-eminence of St. Augustine's Latin Platonism, which is so fundamental that it remains: "le bien commun des théologiens".[15] Rather, the new Aristotelianism had to merge with the Dionysian and Erigenian currents

which predominate in all philosophical and theological thought till the end of the thirteenth century, and remain the central inspiration in the secular current, in spite of the vicissitudes of Aristotelian Scholasticism.[16] The predominance of the Dionysian-Erigenian current with strong Augustinian implications is perceptible in the works of the Franciscan Ramon Lull, who a century later was to play an important role in the development of Renaissance Platonisms, as is evident in the work of Raimundo Sabunde,[17] Nicholas de Cusa, and Pico della Mirandola[18]; not to mention Giordano Bruno.[19] St. Thomas Aquinas' own adaptation of Aristotle relied extensively on St. Augustine's theory of the soul, and the hierarchy of the pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite.[20] However, in order to understand the difference and opposition between Plato and Aristotle, one has to remember that the scepticism which was already latent in Europe,[21] was reinforced by the introduction of Averroes' commentary on Aristotle, which was the object of Albert the Great's and St. Thomas' refutals.[22] It is around this problem that a distinction, however inaccurate, developed between Platonism and Aristotelianism. St. Augustine, following the Christian dogma of immortality, had taught that the soul is one, individual, and distinct from the body, even when it acts as the motor of the body.[23] By the end of the twelfth century it had become evident to the Chartrians that neither Plato nor Aristotle was actually reconciliable with the Christian dogma;[24] either taken to their ultimate consequences led to fundamentally heretical positions.[25] The main point of divergence between the two was considered to rest on their interpretations of the nature and function of the soul. M. D. Chenu, relying on the definitions of E. Bréhier, gives a clear summary of this problem:

Platon présente ici de vraies valeurs spirituelles contre Aristote: "Aristote a pour ainsi dire rayé l'âme de son image de l'univers; les

moteurs des cieux sont des intelligences; l'âme n'apparaît que dans les corps sublunaires, à titre de forme du corps, notion tout intellectuelle d'un physiologiste qui cherche le principe des fonctions corporelles; l'âme comme siège de la destinée, a disparu" (E. Bréhier, Histoire de la philosophie I, 2, Paris, 1948, p. 458). Chez les platoniciens au contraire, partisans de l'unité substantielle du cosmos et de la sympathie de ses parties, les âmes ont une fonction cosmique, elles ont une destinée, jouant dans le détail du gouvernement des choses le même rôle que l'âme du monde dans l'ensemble; l'âme est l'intermédiaire entre le monde intelligible et le monde sensible. De fait les Pères avaient fait une critique assez sévère de la définition aristotélicienne de l'âme. Le Ps.-Grégoire de Nysse (Némésius) est le pivot de cette résistance en plein moyen-âge: cette définition est un danger mortel pour la substantialité de l'âme, et donc pour son immortalité ("De natura hominis," P.G. 40, p. 560). L'entrée de Denys, dont la Hiérarchie ne fait pas place à l'Ame du monde, ménagera avantageusement ces valeurs platoniciennes de la continuité cosmique des âmes; en les adoptant, saint Thomas rompra avec l'architecture du cosmos d'Aristote.[26]

Hence, there is a continuity of the Neoplatonic current in Saint Thomas Aquinas' assimilation of the Aristotelian Corpus. Yet, even after Aquinas' adjustment of the Aristotelian Corpus to the Christian dogma, there continued to be an important strain of Augustinian and Neoplatonic thought that maintained itself in opposition to Aquinas' Aristotelian scholasticism.[27] The scholastic system originated in Boethius' attempt at syncretism, which acknowledged the superiority of Aristotelian logic and method, but maintained a Platonic metaphysical system.[28] It is therefore not surprising to find, especially after the introduction of the Aristotelian Corpus, Christian theologians and philosophers who maintain a dual ontology, which, while giving priority to the Augustinian and Platonic definition of the soul, also accepts the Aristotelian definition in its broader re-formulation of St. Thomas. As I have pointed out in the case of Ramon Lull,[29] and is evident in the works of St. Bonaventure, one finds philosophers using scholastic Aristotelian vocabulary and logic, as defined by Boethius, in order to develop an Augustinian Neoplatonic metaphysics.[30] It is therefore quite erroneous to associate automatically the use of a certain logical means of exposition with a particular kind of sensibility, as critics have done in the case

of Ausias March.

Florentine Neoplatonism is greatly indebted to the humanism of Francesco Petrarch; it is considered to be the culmination of his aims. The common practice is to divide Petrarch's works into two groups, the vernacular poems and the Latin humanist works.[31] Yet although the latter is philological and the former an erotic "giovenile errore",[32] they are cast by the same man and reflect his sensibility. A comparison attempting to distinguish excessively between the two is equivocal, since both parts represent one man's approach to two distinct problems, and the sensibility remains the same. Petrarch's rejection of his "youthful error", concerns his experience of earthly love, which his sensibility could only lead him to reject.[33] The common concern of both parts of Petrarch's works is evident in his apocryphal dialogue with St. Augustine, the De Contemptu Mundi, Colloquiorum Liber, Quem Secretum Suum Inscripsit. In the first of three dialogues Petrarch describes what he considers to be his "disease", the "strange fluctuations", and "inward discord" which he feels:

> Ex quo fit, ut tam salutare propositum nimia mobilitate fatiscat, oriturque illa intestina discordia, de qua multa iam diximus, illasque animae sibi irascentis anxietas, dum horret sordes suas ipsa nec diluit, vias tortuosas cognoscit, nec deserit impendensque periculum metuit, nec declinat.[34]

In these few lines of the Secretum Petrarch describes not merely his own inward conflict, but that which had become the central intellectual problem of his age, and seemed to be related to the introduction of the Aristotelian Corpus: scepticism. Throughout his discussion of this subject Petrarch, whose humanism rejects the arid formulations of scholasticism,[35] does not seem to be aware of St. Thomas' and Albert the Great's commentaries against Averroes.[36] He is aware, however, of the dangers stemming from the popularity of the Aristotelian Corpus, and in particular, of the materialism implicit in the Nicomachean

Ethics.[37]

The problem of the immortality of the soul, and the problems arising from the study of Aristotle, are the subject of Petrarch's treatise De Suiipsius et Multorum Ignorantia (1367).[38] The basis for the extensive exposé of Petrarch's Augustinian position on this matter is a defense and praise of Plato. In this context, his condemnation of the "Aristotelians" is never exactly directed at Aristotle,[39] but against the Averroist interpretation of his work, which was influential in Paduan medicine, of which his interlocutor seems to have been a representative.[40] The solution presented by Petrarch to problems caused by the notion of the mortality of the soul, is drawn from St. Augustine's statements on the compatibility of Neoplatonism and Christianity.[41] Although Petrarch claimed to possess sixteen works of Plato, his knowledge of Greek was insufficient,[42] and therefore he had to rely on commentaries, praises of the Fathers and their successors, and Latin Neoplatonists,[43] to substantiate his claim about the superiority of Plato. This corresponds very much to the way in which Petrarch conceived the role to be played by Plato. His reproaches against Aristotle rested in the nefarious effects of his writings on the Christian community.[44] Plato was a means to substantiate the revelation of Christ, and as such, although superior to Aristotle, Plato remains subordinate to Christ. The basis for this hierarchical understanding of wisdom is explicitly described in Petrarch's defense of Platonic epistemology and its relation to Christianity:

"Quibus enim, inquit, oculis animi intueri potuit Plato fabricam illam tanti operis qua construi a deo atque edificari mundum facit?" Potest utcumque haec interrogatio tolerari, nisi quod iam querendo responsum est, quibus haec oculis videt Plato nempe animi, quibus invisibilia cernuntur, et quibus ipse, ut philosophus fretus acerrimus atque clarissimus, multa vidit; quamvis ad hanc visionem nostri propius accesserint, non visu quidem sed lumine clariore.[45]

In this reference to the better light of the "nostri", Petrarch harks back to the Christian philosophers and Fathers who "bettered" Plato. The statement concerning the superiority of the Christian successors of Plato is reminiscent of Bernard de Chartres' famous saying that the moderns are dwarves on the shoulders of the ancients.[46] His admiration for Plato, in this text, rests on the vision of a cosmic God, as found in Chalcidius' commentary of the Timaeus,[47] and is directed to the assertion of his faith in the immortality of the soul and the Providence of Christ. The text represents Petrarch's reaction to an Averroist materialist philosophy which scoffs at Christ and the redemptive message,[48] and is an example of his use of the secular wisdom of Plato to express a "philosophia Christi". Plato is the pagan philosopher who perceived the divine mysteries most clearly: "In divinis altius ascendit Plato ac Platonici, quamquam neuter pervenire potuerit quo tendebat. Sed ut dixi, propius venit Plato."[49] As Raymond Marcel has pointed out in his research, this attitude is indicative of Petrarch's return to the philosophical currents of the Chartrian and Victorine Schools,[50] and acts as a link between these and Florentine Neoplatonism. However, the Christocentric nature of Petrarch's defense of Plato is indicative of a sensibility which, as is evident in the former quotation, depends on a vision of the world perceived by the eyes of the soul. In this context, Petrarch remains faithful to the teachings of St. Augustine; the De Suiipse et Multorum Ignorantia, which is addressed to a secular reader, advocates the need for the cultivation of interior faith in a lay circumstance.[51] This seems to me to be a manifestation of Petrarch's own inclination to an erudite form of the secular evangelical currents[52] which developed out of the Chartrian and Victorine Schools, and are an inherent part of the Christian Platonic tradition.

The evangelical movement, which begins in the twelfth century, is a highly complex social phenomenon which is in great part a result of the crisis of feudalism[53] and the excessive growth of the Church's temporal power.[54] The twelfth century witnesses the rise of the cities and the independent evolution of a large secular society. Intimately associated with the rise of the cities is that of the universities, and consequently, the growth of the study of the arts, as opposed to the study of formal theology.[55] In order to respond to the changing values which this social evolution represents, the Church instituted a series of canonic reforms among the various orders on which its temporal power rested. The problem which it faced was that of preserving the feudal structure which is the basis of its institutions, while attempting to adjust to the spiritual needs of a growing urban laity. There arose out of this situation a division within the various religious orders affecting their approach to the sacramental practice of religion. The more traditional members of the Church maintained the fundamentally feudal forms of the "vita monastica", whereas many advocated the return of the evangelical message of the Early Church to the world, that is, "vita apostolica".[56] The latter represents the beginning of an effort by the Church to return to what it believed to be the original Evangelical message of the Early Church devoid of its temporal power and restrictions. Undoubtedly, renewed interest in the theology of the Greek Fathers played an important role in this development, as one notes in the writings of Joachim de Flore, and his influence, with that of John Scotus Erigena, on the newly founded Minor Orders,[57] incorporated into the Church within the first decade of the thirteenth century.[58] However, before being strictly limited to a return to the study of the Bible and its message, as the foundation of all theology:

La "vita apostolica" est la lumière intérieure qui suscite, avec de

nouveaux "états de vie", une conscience nouvelle des implantations de la grâce dans le sol de la nature.[59]

In his exhortation to the emulation of Plato, this is clearly what Petrarch refers to when he states: "quibus haec oculis videt Plato nempe animi, quibus invisibilia cernuntur".[60]

The "vita apostolica" and its posterior evangelical evolutions are, therefore, a spontaneous manifestation of inner Christian sensibility, to which the Church, as an institution, responded inadequately. One of the fundamental sources for the inspiration of this movement, from within the cloisters of the Church, is the work of "the twelfth-century St. Augustine". Hughes de Saint Victor, whose thought brings together the various Neoplatonic currents of St. Augustine, the pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, and John Scotus Erigena. As I indicated in the previous chapter the mystical character of Hughes de Saint Victor's thought rests on "a vision of the universe as a reflection of the thought...of God".[61] This is consistent with the Neoplatonic influence in the evangelical movement: "les implications platoniciennes d'un Hughes de Saint Victor l'améneraient à concevoir nature et grâce comme des participations de la vie divine plutôt que comme des formes distinctes".[62] This mystical sensibility, which is so characteristic of much of the evangelical movement, and its expression in Hughes de Saint Victor is intimately related to the writings of the pseudo-Dionysius, whom Hughes frequently echoes.[63] The focal point of this vision is the pseudo-Dionysius' formulation of the theory of the symbol which had a profound influence in art and literature,[64] in both the Middle Ages and the Renaissance.[65] For the pseudo-Dionysius, as St. Augustine before him,[66] the Creation is a reflection of God's attributes, which cannot be distinct from His substance[67] since God is incorruptible, and therefore, the hierarchy

of the Creation in its parts represents, however imperfectly, the ideas in God from which they proceed.[68] Hence, the universe is symbolic:

> ... the wisdom of the venerable theologists, which has power to lead us to the heights, reverently descends to the level of the unharmonious dissimilitudes, not allowing our irrational nature to remain attached to those unseemly images, but arousing the upward-turning part of the soul, and stimulating it through the ugliness of images; since it would seem neither right nor true, even to those who cling to earthly things that such low forms should resemble those supercelestial and divine contemplations. Moreover it must be borne in mind that no single existing thing is entirely deprived of participation in the Beautiful, for, as the true Word says, all things are very beautiful.
>
> Holy contemplations can therefore be derived from all things, and the above-named incongruous similitudes can be fashioned from material things to symbolize that which is intelligible and intellectual, since the intellectual has in another manner what has been attributed differently to the perceptible.[69]

The world is, then, not only good but beautiful. In this light it is natural to find that the "vita apostolica" places great emphasis on the contemplative experience, but never participating of the images, in order to stimulate the interior life. It is this desire to find the inner-significance of the Evangelical word that incited Hughes de Saint Victor to initiate a return to Biblical studies, as opposed to the speculative theology of the great Summas, which gained in importance after the twelfth century. Hughes de Saint Victor's initial impetus was perpetuated among Franciscans by the Breviloquium of St. Bonaventure.[70]

Neoplatonic theory is therefore closely associated with a transcendental end. In Petrarch's defense of Plato in the De Suiipse et Multorum Ignorantia the actual intended purpose is to demonstrate the immortality of the soul from a rational position founded on the authority of the ancients, at least equal if not superior to that of Aristotle; Platonism is again used to a transcendental end, which is considered contradictory to Aristotle's teachings.[71] It is not surprising, therefore, to find the Timaeus frequently referred to in Petrarch's treatise;[72] it was considered by the Chartrians to be a

demonstration of the Creation as "the expression of the goodness of the creator".[73] Hence, Petrarch's Platonism was closely associated with the sensibility of the evangelical movement, which was strongly affected by twelfth-century Platonisms[74] that served to articulate the Augustinian theory of illumination.[75]

The Italy of the Humanist Renaissance which inherited Petrarch's original Platonism, prepared the way for, and rendered possible, the presumed re-discovery of Plato's corpus through Ficino's translations, is above all a middle-class society[76] imitating the feudal forms of an agrarian mediaeval aristocracy. It is in its values, as in the kind of economy on which its power is founded,[77] a profoundly bourgeois society in the context of fifteenth-century social structure. The patrons of Marsilio Ficino, the Medici family, were prominent bankers who became princes; their economic power caused their virtually hereditary "election" as leaders of the Florentine Republic. The values of the Medicis were, therefore, those of an educated secular society which frequently confronted the Church's temporal power. Its religious concerns, then, reflect those of the secular society, and it is with this in mind that Cosme de Medici chose and educated Marsilio Ficino to translate and comment the Dialogues of Plato.[78] Lorenzo de Medici merely furthered his family's concerns in his mentorship of Ficino. The religious inclination of this educated bourgeoisie is a development of the evangelical current inherent in the "vita apostolica" which is so closely related to the rise of the laity.[79] The frequent opposition between the Church and the republics in Italy naturally favoured the evangelical intent to cultivate interior spirituality. This is evident in the work, and life, of Marsilio Ficino, which abounds with references that life should be led in the imitation of Christ, and therefore, interprets Plato's opus in its subservient relation to

the teachings of Christ. He too, elaborates a "philosophia Christi" through the dialectic of Plato,[80] as is evident in his letter to Lorenzo recalling the virtues of Cosme:

> And truth itself moves the heart ("animum") more effectively than that which either bears the semblance of truth or is untrue altogether. For this reason the imitation of the Socratic way of life leads more people more surely to virtue than the moral philosophy of Aristotle. And Christ alone by His example has been of greater profit to more people in leading them towards a noble and holy life than all the orators and philosophers with their words.[81]

This quotation, which is highly reminiscent of Petrarch's remarks on the value of Aristotle's Ethics,[82] urges the reader to imitate the life of Christ, that is, to take up "the Socratic way of life", which for Ficino is the contemplative life.[83] As in the evangelical current, the philosophy propounded by Ficino places faith in the centre of the individual's daily activities. It is, therefore, not surprising that Ficino found himself closely associated with the reforms of Savonarola, for whom he had the greatest admiration.[84] Indeed, this other side of Ficino, frequently forgotten by literary critics, is most important for the evaluation of the inherent significance and posterior repercussion of the Commentarium in Convivium Platonis, de Amore. It enlightens and broadens our perspective.

As Petrarch before him, Ficino turns to the authority of Plato in order to demonstrate the veracity of the Christian dogma on the soul's immortality,[85] and hence he necessarily follows Bessarion in his attempt to conciliate Aristotle and Plato.[86] In the works of Ficino this is constantly referred to as his opposition to the "peripatetics", that is, the Averroists[87] and their interpretation of Aristotle. In order to refute the latter Ficino, on the advice of St. Antonine, relies on the Summa contra gentiles of Aquinas.[88] The latter is read by Ficino in a Neoplatonic light, and serves to complement the

teachings of St. Augustine and the pseudo-Dionysius, which form the basis of Ficinian thought.[89] Hence, although Ficino has direct access to the text of Plato, Proclus and Plotinus, vast discrepancies can be found between his Christian-Dionysian interpretation of the Greek work,[90] and Plato's intended meaning. Ficino's thought, eloquently novel as it may seem to the reader, is consequently firmly rooted in the Christian-Platonic tradition. One should bear in mind that for all the freshness of the form of the Platonic dialogue:

> encore aujourd'hui ceux qui font de Ficin un novateur auraient intérêt à chercher patiemment ce qu'il a emprunté à saint Thomas et à St. Augustin, car il n'est pas douteux qu'il a vu dans ces deux maîtres de la pensée chrétienne les meilleurs intermédiaires pour réconcilier Aristote et Platon.[91]

Indeed, the sources manipulated by Ficino reveal his profound debt to the Christian Neoplatonists that precede him, and in particular to the twelfth-century philosophers of the Chartrian and Victorine Schools, intimately associated with the evangelical movement. The repugnance felt by Petrarch towards scholasticism is not entirely shared by Ficino, for whom this forms a most essential part of his academic training.[92] Ficino himself was conscious of his debt to his predecessors. In his letter to Martin Penninger, "Responsio Petenti Platonicam Instructionem et Librorum Numerum"[93]: Ficino acknowledges his debt towards those whom he considers to be his predecessors, Greek, Arabic and Latin. As Raymond Klibansky has remarked, many of these theologians whom Ficino considers to be Platonists, "would not be considered Platonists at all if judged by the standards of modern scholarship".[94] In this letter Ficino omits specific references to the Chartrians, but establishes an inevitable continuity in his final reference to Nicholas de Cusa. However this omission may have come about, Ficino, who refers to most prominent theologians of the Middle Ages, also mentions two of the foremost Chartrians, William of Conches and John of Salisbury.[95]

Throughout his writings it is evident, nonetheless, that his debt towards the Chartrians is not limited to these authors. He also makes mention of some of the more extreme developments of the Chartrian current in the evangelical movement, such as Gilbert de la Porrée, David de Dinant, and Amaury de Bène, all of whom were accused of heresy.[96] The common denominator as regards this facet of Ficino's thought is that the Chartrians and their followers all relied extensively on the writings of the pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, as the basis to formulate a theory of the dignity of man, and the reflection of God in the Creation. This point is fundamental for understanding the position of Ficino in his interpretation of Plato. Plato is the textual source, but he is interpreted in the light of the pseudo-Dionysius, who remains for Ficino the "culmen" of Platonism.[97] Hence, both his Platonism, and the evangelism on which it is based and should not be divorced from, form a continuity that sheds light on the relation that exists between Ramon Lull, Nicholas de Cusa and Ficino.[98]

Part I: The Theory of Love: Melancholy in Ficino's Commentarium in Convivium.

The Commentarium in Convivium Platonis, de Amore was written in 1468, with no major subsequent alteration which might have been caused by a spiritual crisis, as A. della Torre originally supposed.[99] It is written after a relatively less productive period in the life of Ficino during which he undertook the translation of Dante's De Monarchia, between 1467-1468. He also seems to have taken a keen interest in the commentary of the Divina Commedia written by his friend and teacher, Cristoforo Landino.[100] It is particularly important for the comprehension of the significance of the Commentarium in Convivium to realize that

it is written immediately after this period during which Ficino manifests great interest in the writings of Dante. For Ficino, Dante's Divina Commedia is a storehouse of Platonic symbols and concepts,[101] and his reading of Dante is conditioned by this perspective. This is in large part a result of his acceptance of the Mediaeval and Renaissance notion that Virgil was a Platonist, supplemented by his knowledge of the fact that Dante was imitating Virgil. Landino, in his commentary on the Divina Commedia relied extensively on the usage of the rhetorical concept of "integumentum",[102] which was originally particular to the Chartrian interpretation of classical works, especially the pagan classics such as Virgil,[103] as in the Commentary of the First Six Books of the Aeneid ascribed to Bernardus Silvestris.[104] Hence, for Ficino, Dante in particular, and his mentor Virgil, are Neoplatonic "poetic philosophers":

> Dante Alighieri per patria celeste, per abitatione florentino, di stirpe angelico, in professione philosopho poetico, benche non parlassi in lingua greca con quel sacro padre de' philosophi, interprete della verita, Platone, niente di meno in ispirito parlo in modo con lui, che di molte sententie Platonice adorno e libri suoi... Questo ordine Platonico prima segui Virgilio. Questo segui Dante, col vaso di Virgilio beendo alla Platoniche fonti....[105]

The Commentarium in Convivium, whose chronological proximity to the translation of the De Monarchia is obvious, is thus written in the wake of this interpretation of Dante. It is, therefore, quite plausible to consider that the conception of love formulated by Ficino has great affinity with Dante's concept, as in the Divina Commedia where it is associated to a Christian Neoplatonic theory of imagination. This affinity to Dante is possibly greater than one might expect in a commentary on Plato, should one maintain neat definitions of the Divina Commedia as a poetic exposition of Aquinas' "purely" Aristotelian Summa Theologica.[106]

A main point of departure towards the understanding of the Commentarium in Convivium is its contribution to the concept of the dignity of man. Although this concept is not entirely novel,[107] the Commentarium has the merit to utter a fundamental, if limited, consciousness of it, in what purports to be a secular piece of literature.[108] This concept in Ficino's thought only reaches its plenitude in the less popular Theologia Platonica.[109] In both the Commentarium and the Theologia this concept is intimately related to the focal problem of the soul's immortality,[110] since only an immortal soul could be god-like, thereby allowing for some dignity in human nature. Furthermore, this is consequently a fundamental problem in the conciliation of Plato and Aristotle, on which the subsequent problem of the power of human, or natural, reason also rests. The subjacent presupposition of Ficino's construct is the issue of faith and scepticism. It would be exceedingly erroneous to assume that Ficino's proclaimed belief in the dignity of man left him blind to the reality of his Christian earthly existence. Ficino, who like Petrarch, saw in St. Augustine his master, has left us at least one definite equivalent of the Confessions, or Secretum, in his letter to Michael Mercato, entitled "Dialogus inter Deum et animam Theologicus Here, Ficino tells the reader of his own doubts: "Hec igitur, atque similia, quum sedulo cogitarem, coepi quandoque lugere animo. Utpote qui et rationi iam diffiderem, et nondum revelationi confiderem."[111] The crux of Ficino's situation is the difficulty of bridging the gap between reason and revelation. It is consequently natural that Ficino, who dedicates an entire treatise to the illumination of St. Paul,[112] finds the solution in the evangelical and Augustinian concept of illumination[113] which resolves the fundamental problems incurred in the "descensus ad inferos"[114] evident in the dual nature of man. In

the Commentarium in Convivium, which is intended to be "une philosophie de l'amour qui transposait en quelque sorte l'Ethique d'Aristote en faisant du Souverain Bien le centre de gravité de la création toute entière",[115] the theory of illumination becomes inextricably associated with the concept of the "divine furore", which is the fruit of Ficino's medical background, and draws extensively on Aristotle's Problem XXX, i. The theory of illumination, or "furore", is an aspect of the concept of melancholy that is central to the Commentarium in Convivium, and which Ficino subsequently develops in the De Vita Triplici, the second book of which, "De vita producenda", answers and furthers Arnau de Vilanova's own theories of the De retardanda senectute.[116] The importance of the theory of melancholy in the Commentarium in Convivium seems to have been overlooked by literary critics, as well as by Klibansky, Saxl and Panofsky,[117] who, in their Saturn and Melancholy, have limited their study to the De Vita Triplici and the Epistolarium. When approaching the text of the Commentarium in Convivium, it is, therefore, essential that one bear in mind the eclectic nature of Ficino's dissertation, which comments on Plato, but diverges from his text in order to expound Dionysian and Thomist theories, and frequently, medical principles resting on the theory of "amor hereos".[118]

As it can be inferred from what I have said until now, the "dignitate hominis" in Ficino's thought is subject to the action of divine grace in relation to the individual will which is affected by the dual state of human existence. The transcendental reality which determines our comprehension of the true nature of man, that is, the divine origin of his soul which is considered to be his real nature, is cognizable strictly by his intellect, for "only the intellect enters into a real relationship with its objects".[119] The "Summum Bonum", which Ficino equates with "Beauty", becomes central to the object and

the manner in which one apprehends it in this world, as I have indicated previously (quotation 115 above). This simply repeats the essential theophanic conception of the world of the pseudo-Dionysius. It echoes again the concept of the vision of the world as a reflection of the thought of God, as articulated by Hughes de Saint Victor.[120] Consequently, it is only natural that problems of vision and perception are the most frequently discussed topics of the Commentarium; they are directed, however, towards a particular consciousness of Beauty.

Beauty, as it is perceived by the sense of vision pertaining to the eyes, is primarily a reflection of light. Real Beauty is not this reflection, but the source of this light. There results from this basic premiss that although corporeal bodies may appear to be beautiful they only serve to draw us to the real Beauty, which is God, or the inherent Goodness. This aspect of Ficinian thought is explicable only in reference to the Augustinian elaboration of the Pauline concept of the soul as a mirror,[121] and the Plotinian theory of the "animate".[122] These concepts are found in conflation with the awareness of the participation of the "Summum Bonum" in the objects perceived. As I have previously explained this is an inherent part of the pseudo-Dionysius' notion of the relationship that exists between the Beautiful and the Good, which Ficino repeats:

> Neque ab re theologi veteres bonitatem in centro, pulchritudinem in circulo posuerunt. Bonitatem quidem in centro uno, in circulis autem quatuor pulchritudinem. Centrum unum omnium deus est, circuli quatuor circa deum, mens, anima, natura, materia.[123]

This hierarchic description of the interpenetration of Beauty and Goodness, is an elaboration of the pseudo-Dionysian structure of the universe. It establishes an emanative movement from the single and immobile transcendent One out of which beauty derives in four stages which are variously apprehensible to man. Hence, the Good is the

transcendent existence of God, and Beauty, as we perceive it, is the act, or accident, making His Goodness manifest to us:

... bonum quidem ipsa supereminens dei existentia dicitur. Pulchritudo actus quidam sive radius inde per omnia penetrans; primo in angelicam mentem, secundo in animam totius et reliquos animos, tertio in naturam, quarto in materiam corporum.[124]

The terms with which Ficino chooses to describe the nature of the Beauty manifest in the hierarchical Creation is made clear in his metaphorical choice of words: "radius... penetrans". The closest approximation for the description of the divine act is our knowledge of the perception of light which he uses as a physical metaphor for a spiritual presence. Just as the sun is the source of the light which irradiates this world, so is God's Beauty made manifest to man in His Creation. The beauty of bodies, or corporeal objects, is but a shadow of His Beauty:

Amor enim fruende pulchritudinis desiderium est. Pulchritudo autem splendor quidam est, humanum ad se rapiens animum. Nempe corporis pulchritudo nihil aliud est quam splendor ipse in colorum linearumque decore. Animi quoque pulchritudo, fulgor in doctrine et morum concinnitate. Lucem illam corporis, non aures, non olfatus, non gustus, non tactus, sed oculus percipit. Si oculus solus agnoscit, solus fruitur. Solus igitur oculus corporis pulchritudine fruitur.[125]

Beauty in individual corporeal objects, therefore, can only be apprehended by the highest and most spiritual of the senses, sight.[126] A basic problem arises when one considers the nature of this beauty, as it is perceived by man. Although it is a reflection of divine Beauty, man can only perceive it imperfectly, since his perception, unlike that of the angel who contemplates God directly and is subject only to multiciplicity, is a physical apprehension of the body's beauty which is subject to plurality and mobility deriving from the Plotinian One. The beauty which we perceive is in the first instance external, and then, it is, as such, a reflection of the internal, or the soul's beauty. Its purpose is to draw us to the internal goodness. By means

of the cognitive function of the senses we are drawn to the interior Good that lies reflected therein. This beauty is perceived by the eyes and ears in the gestures, acts, and voice of the object, which reveal the soul:

> Virtus etiam animi decorem quemdam pre se ferre videtur in verbis, gestibus, operibus honestissimum. Celos quoque sublimis eorum substantia clarissimo lumine circumfundit. In his omnibus interna perfectio producit externam. Illam bonitatem, hanc pulchritudinem possumus apellare.[127]

The imperfect nature of our perception of Beauty leads us to comprehend it as a dual component of the beautiful and the good. Beauty is then a composite of the Good, which is found in the body that is perceived, and its external manifestation to which we are drawn when it is acknowledged by our higher senses. The hierarchic and emanative conception of the structure of the universe, which determines the understanding that we have of the source of this beauty which is the origin of our desires, is, then, consistent with the belief that it is a reflection of the face of God in the soul, or spirit, acting as a mirror.[128] This interpretation of the beauty perceived leads Ficino to reject the Stoic conception of beauty,[129] which defines it as a merely harmonious perception of symmetry, and therefore, reduces our comprehension of it to its physical manifestations:

> Sed spiritus in punto omnem corporis amplitudinem spiritali modo et incorporea imagine suscipit. Placet utique animo ea dumtaxat speties que ab illo suscipitur. Hec autem licet exterioris corporis simulacrum sit in eo tamen est incorporea. Ergo speties incorporea placet. Quod placet, id cuique gratum. Quod gratum, hoc denique pulchrum. Quo efficitur ut amor ad incorporeum aliquid referatur atque ipsa pulchritudo spiritale quoddam potius rei simulacrum sit quam corporea speties.
>
> Sunt autem nonulli qui certam membrorum omnium positionem sive, ut eorum verbis utamur, commensurationem et proportionem cum quadam colorum suavitate esse pulchritudinem opinentur. Quorum nos opinionem proterea non admictimus quia...[130]

Hence, love, which Ficino defines as being a "desire for Beauty",[131] arises from the individual perception of "corporeal images",[132] which

according to the text quoted above, are considered to be "incorporeal images" by virtue of their presence in sight. At this point it is obvious that the distinction between incorporeal and corporeal images is very fine, and difficult to establish. The distinction can logically be considered to be one of intention. The image perceived, if it remains at the origin of the perception, is always corporeal, inasmuch as it is representative of a body, however, it is incorporeal as long as it is considered to be the object of the spirit's intellection. This is the contentious issue that this paragraph, if not the entire "Fifth Discourse" tries to establish and clarify. Ficino's solution lies in his usage of the light metaphor in conjunction with the theory of the animate or mirror, and the scholastic division of the senses into two groups, physical and spiritual.[133] Hence, the image that is perceived by sight, which is a spiritual sense, must be incorporeal, since the representation present in the eye is not physical. The presence of an entire body in the eye being impossible, it can only be present to the eye:

Imago illa in visu et animo, cum isti sint incorporei, corpus esse non potest. Quo enim pacto caelum, ut ita loquar, totum parva oculi pupilla caperetur si modo corporali reciperet? Nullo profecto.[134]

Sight is, then, light reflected in the spirit which informs the soul. It carries a spiritual image reflecting light originally present in the object. As such it is a sensual movement, which, as in Hughes de Saint Victor's theory of the imagination,[135] informs the soul of corporeal images. In the "Sixth Discourse", which comments on Socrates' opinion and resolves the various tentative definitions of love made in the previous discourses, Ficino's position on this matter becomes clear. What he describes is the Victorine-Platonic "sensualitas", normally attributed to imagination or phantasy:

Sed anima ubique spiritui presens imagines corporum in eo tamquam in speculo relucentes facile inspicit perque illas corpora iudicat. Atque hec cognitio sensus a Platonicis dicitur. Dum eas inspicit, similes illis imagines multo etiam puriores sua vi concipit in se ipsa. Huiusmodi conceptionem imaginationem phantasiamque vocamus.[136]

This description, which is introduced by a medical reference to the function of the spirit and its effect on the elemental balance and heat of the body, is clearly parallel to the rhetorical concept of imagination-phantasy. As in the latter, the way in which the spirit's function is evaluated depends on the manner in which the object is apprehended, and its effects on the soul and the body, between which the spirit acts as a mediator. The passage quoted above goes on to examine the problem of the effects on the soul that the corporeal images perceived have, and the intrinsic limitations of their nature, especially in the intellection of the "eye of the soul" (animi acies). Ficino's interpretation of this theory is conditioned by his dependence on Proclus' definition of the more spiritual function of phantasy as a lesser manifestation of the intellect's capacity to apprehend universals in individual sense-objects:

Hic concepte memoriter servantur imagines. Per has animi acies sepenumero incitatur ad universales rerum ideas, quas in se continet, intuendas. Ideoque dum unum quemdam hominem et sensu cernit et imaginatione concipit, intellectu rationem definitionemque hominibus omnibus communem per innatam illi humanitatis ideam communiter contemplatur et que fuerit contemplata conservat. Animo igitur formosi hominis simulacrum conceptum semel apud se reformatumque memoriter conservanti satis esset amatum quandoque vidisse. Oculo tamen et spiritui que veluti specula presente corpore ipsius imagines capiunt, absente dimictunt, perpetua formosi corporis presentia opus est, ut eius illustratione continue lucescant, foveantur et oblectentur. Igitur et isti, propter indigentiam suam, presentiam corporis exigunt et animus iis ut plurimum obsecutus eamdem cogitur affectare.[137]

Perception and its implications are affected by the spirit as it informs the body and the soul. Although his initial premiss stresses the desirable intuitive virtue of phantasy to perceive universal ideas in the images, Ficino is quick to point out that this same perception

is not transcendent when it remains in its intermediary state as the object of the eye of flesh in the imagination ("Oculo...spiritui"), and not that of the "keen eye of the soul" (animi acies). The deficiency of sensorial perception is evident inasmuch as it must continually renew its vision of the corporeal object, unlike the intellectual perception which forms a universal idea of the object. Hence phantasy, which can raise the soul to divine perception, can also lead to the characteristic fall of the soul which is subject to the inclinations of the senses in what it perceives.

The role played by the rhetorical theory of imagination in the Commentarium is of capital importance. Its function duplicates that of love; it is a manifestation of love's presence. Since love is initially defined as a desire for Beauty and ultimate union with it, and Beauty is an act manifesting the transcendent Good in its objects, then love is a movement[138] of desire, determined by individual perception within the gradualist structure of the Dionysian universe. For this reason, Ficino, while still commenting on the words of Diotima, develops a cosmic theory of demonology which is basically a re-formulation of the fourth chapter of the Celestial Hierarchy[139] concerning the nature of angels. The theory of love which Ficino establishes is then strongly affected by a certain definition of the relation between the body and the soul, which as in the ambivalent implications of the rhetorical theory of imagination, also entails a dual understanding of the concept of melancholy. Hence, before embarking on a description of the significance of Ficino's quintuple division of love, and the notion of "furore", one must comprehend the importance which the position of the soul has in Ficino's system, and aspects of this condition which determine its relation to imagination and melancholy.

According to Ficino, as most Christian Neoplatonists, the soul

is essentially in a state of fallen grace. Although it is divine in its origin, it has fallen into the body, and therefore it is a prisoner of chaos. Ficino uses the myth of the androgyne to illustrate this state. It is originally a comic piece in Plato's Symposium given to Aristophanes, but here it is explained by Cristoforo Landino, who through "integumentum" uses it to describe the "descensus ad inferos". The rebellion of the androgynes is consequently interpreted by Ficino as a pagan version of the Fall of Man. As in the biblical narrative of Adam and Eve's ejection out of Eden, when the soul fell it became subject to necessity, or the vicissitudes of the body. By far the most important theme of this section is the problem of the soul's cognitive capacity. Before their fall the androgynes were fully circular, their rebellion against the gods resulted in their being split into two halves. In Ficino's interpretation of this myth the full circle of the androgynous form represents the original disposition of the soul to know reality both through its natural reason and right reason, which is infused reason, that is, divine illumination. The rebellion of the androgynes is considered to be the product of Satan's sin, pride. In other words, the fall of the soul was caused by its belief that it could surpass divine illumination by the sufficiency of its natural reason. This led to the loss of infused reason, and the immersion of human souls into matter:

> Homines, id est, hominum anime. Quondam, id est, quando a deo creantur. Integre sunt, duobus sunt exornate luminibus, ingenito et infuso. Ut ingenito equalia et inferiora, infuso superiora conspicerent. Deo equare se voluerunt. Ad unicum lumen ingenitum se reflexerunt. Hinc divise sunt. Splendorem infusum amiserunt, quando ad solum ingenitum sunt converse statimque in corpora cecidere.[140]

Hence the soul, which is trapped in the body, is basically deprived of the divine light to guide it in its operations, and it has to rely on its natural reason. What it perceives by natural reason is first

apprehended in the light of natural reason through the senses, as in the movement of imagination. This again presupposes that although it is in a fallen state, it can be redeemed, if by gaining consciousness of the weakness of natural reason it turns its contemplation towards things divine, and through contemplation is granted "recta ratio" in the Augustinian sense.[141] The soul is bound to the body, nevertheless, it remains one and immutable, and therefore, although its natural reason is informed by the senses, it is independent. Ficino establishes this point by arguing that the body is subject to temperamental fluctuations, whereas the soul is not.[142] The body is, then, considered to be an instrument, or servant, of the soul. On this point Ficino is once more simply in agreement with the Christian-Augustinian tradition,[143] according to which the body is subject to the government of the soul.[144] This naturally places the onus for the activities of the individual, both physical and spiritual, on the soul, such as in matters of sin. It is the soul that sins, not the body.[145] Ficino approaches this problem through the medical theory of the spirit, which is the instrument of cognition natural and divine. Hence his interpretation of the operations of the soul leads him directly to the complex theoretical problem of the interrelation between the physiology of the individual and his psychology:

> Quo fit ut qualitates, quia a corpore necessario substinentur, ab aliqua superiori substantia que neque corpus sit neque in corpore iaceat, fiant atque regantur. Huiusmodi anima est, que corporibus presens et insidens, ipsa se substinet et qualitatem vimque complexionis corporibus tribuit, per que tamquam instrumenta in corpore et per corpus varias operationes exercet.[146]

In this, and previous passages, Ficino conflates the Augustinian theory of the soul as a mirror with that of the medical "spiriti". It is, therefore, somewhat difficult to distinguish between the spirit and the soul, as he indicates the two are always together (above 136). It

must then be assumed that by referring to the medical theory of the spirits he consciously creates a median that logically enables him to maintain the notion of the soul's independence from the body, while still making it possible for him to explain and describe the physiological and psychological effects of the soul on the body.[147] By this means it is possible for Ficino to account for the movement of the soul as it is affected by its relation to body through its epistemological function.

Everything that the soul apprehends through the windows of the senses it judges by natural reason. The latter only enables it to see itself, and things "below" it, that is, corporeal bodies. That which is incorporeal it does not truly apprehend. In other words, it cannot perceive the hierarchic members above it by its own power, natural reason: "Ideoque per eum utpote sibi equalem se ipsam et que infra se sunt, id est, corpora omnia, anima videt quidem, deum vero et alia superiora non videt."[148] Clearly, this natural light is insufficient, and it is only through the grace of divine illumination that the soul is able to operate purely in spiritual contemplation. Without the light of the "recta ratio" the soul is basically confused. Hence, the initial use of natural reason can only turn the face of the soul towards the divine object, because it enables the soul to know itself, that is to know the majesty of its divine origin and its limitations in its present state separated from its source. Right reason can only proceed from God. Without this assistance the soul is prone to a constant state of fluctuation between contemplation and bestiality, and therefore it loses its dominion in order to follow the baser inclinations of the flesh. This fluctuation is intimately related to the ambivalent epistemological function of the imagination, which can either raise the soul to universal heights or cause it to fall to the duplicity of corporeal bodies:

Anima tamen nostra, quod summopere dolendum est, hec enim est totius nostre infelicitatis origo, anima, inquam, sola ita corporalis forme blanditiis delinitur ut propriam posthabeat spetiem, corporis vero formam, que sue umbra est, sui ipsius oblita sectetur.[149]

As in the implications of the theory of imagination, the soul's enamourment of her corporeal form results in torment. From the above quotation, Ficino goes on to describe the fall of the soul in his explanation of the myth of Narcissus. The mythological figure is used as a symbol of the soul which becomes enamoured of the image it perceives in a well, that is, the spirit, so that by lowering itself to seek union with it, it renounces its majesty. The fall of the soul is brought about by its inability to discern between the image which is a reflection, or shadow, of Beauty, and the source itself, it is a misuse of natural reason:

Sed eius umbram in aqua prosequitur et amplecti conatur, id est, pulchritudinem in fragili corpore et instar aque fluenti, que ipsius animi umbra est, ammiratur. Suam quidem figuram deserit. Umbram numquam assequitur. Quoniam animus corpus sectando se negligit et usu corporis impletur. Non enim ipsum revera appetit corpus sed sui ipsius spetiem a corporali forma, que spetiei sue imago est, illectus, quemadmodum Narcissus, affectat. Cumque id minime advertat, dum aliud quidem cupit, aliud sequitur, desiderium suum explere non potest. Ideo in lachrimas resolutus consumitur, id est, animus ita extra se positus et delapsus in corpus, pernitiosis perturbationibus cruciatur corporisque infectus sordibus quasi moritur, cum iam corpus esse potius quam animus videatur. Quam utique mortem ut Socrates devitaret, Diotima ipsum a corpore ad animum, ab hoc in angelum, ab eo reduxit in deum.[150]

Hence, the struggle of the soul is only overcome when it is reintegrated into the cosmic hierarchy of the pseudo-Dionysius. As in Hughes de Saint Victor's theory of the imagination described in the "De Unione Corporis et Spiritus",[151] the soul's enamourment for corporeal objects leads to its fall, and thereby, its loss in divinity; it moves away from its divine nature and becomes corporeal ("cum iam corpus esse potius quam animus videatur"). The love of these corporeal objects is not condemned as such,[152] since the beauty which attracts the soul to these bodies is a reflection of the face of God in them.

As the above quotation indicates, it does not desire the body, but it is enticed by its image ("Non enim revera corpus..."). The fall of the soul is, then, an abuse of the rational powers misdirected, which abdicate eventually to the rule of the flesh. This is an example of the natural reason's insufficiency. That love which turns strictly to the desire of union with corporeal beauty, beyond its necessary reproductive function,[153] deviates from its ultimate intention which is love of God, and not of objects for their sake. The abuse of natural reason, an excessive faith in its power, transforms the corporeal images, which are meant to draw us on to God's beauty, into the ultimate objects of our intentions:

> Lucem illam infusam atque divinam statim ad naturalem reflexi negleximus. Altera ergo posthabita, servavimus alteram. Ubi dimidium nostri tenemus, dimidium pretermisimus. Certo vero etatis tempore a naturali lumine ducti, divinum affectamus quidem omnes...[154]

Clearly, then, what natural reason apprehends is severed from the light of right reason. Hence, the soul turns from the one to the other, and never to both simultaneously. Therefore, since the soul has two distinct faces or means of cognition, it is unable to love God perfectly while still being enamoured of this world. Contemplation approximates divine love, because it impels natural reason upwards to the perception of that which is divine and therefore calls on, and prepares the soul for, the gift of right reason. It is not, however, a substitute for the love of God;[155] it is only a means which must be forsaken in order to attain union with God. Since the grace of God cannot be attained by natural reason, but only desired by it inasmuch as it can create that longing by making the soul conscious of the source of that beauty which it contemplates sensually, then that grace must be given by God.[156] On this matter Ficino echoes again the Augustinian and evangelical concept that it does not suffice to have knowledge of God's existence

and attributes in order to redeem the soul, one must also love Him: "Qui deum cognoscunt non dum illi placent nisi cognitum diligant."[157] Consequently, it is evident that fruition of God's love and Beauty presupposes an ascesis from this world,[158] since within the Dionysian hierarchy this grace is the movement of the soul upwards and away from the corporeal objects it perceives:

> Ipsius itaque unius lux penitus simplicissima infinita pulchritudo est, quia nec materie sordibus inquinatur, ut corporis speties neque ut animi forma temporali progressione mutatur neque ut angeli speties multitudine dissipatur.... Similiter lumen ab omni corpore liberum, infinitum, nam sine modo ac termino lucet, quod natura lucet sua, quando ab alio minime terminatur. Itaque dei lux et pulchritudo, que mera est prorsus, ab aliis omnibus absoluta, absque dubio infinita dicitur pulchritudo. Infinita pulchritudo immensum quoque requirit amorem. Quapropter te obsecro, o Socrates, ut certo quodammodo et termino cetera diligas; deum vero amore diligas infinito neque ullus divino modus assit amori.[159]

As the above passage indicates things of this world can be loved moderately, but this is only because they reflect divine Beauty. Their corporeal duplicity is rejected in favour of divine love. This translates itself in extremely tangent terms, subsequent to the above passage and terminating the sixth discourse which comments on Socrate's speech which is central to the whole work, culminating in an unmistakably evangelical jubilation:

> Nos autem, o viri clarissimi, non solum sine modo deum, ut iubere Diotima fingitur, <u>sed deum solum amabimus</u>..., Et quisquis hoc in tempore sese deo caritate devoverit, se denique recuperabit in deo.... Verus autem homo et idea hominis idem. Ideo quisque nostrum in terris a deo separatus, non verus est homo, cum a sui idea sit formaque disiunctus. Ad eam nos divinus amor pietasque perducet. Cumque hic discerpti simus et mutilati, idee tunc nostre amando coniuncti, integri homines evademus, ut deum primo in rebus coluisse videamur, quo res deinde in deo colamus, resque in deo ideo venerari, ut nos ipsos in eo pre ceteris amplectamur et amando deum, nos ipsos videamur amasse.[160] (underlining mine)

This vision of love spiritualizes the sentient apprehension of this world by acknowledging the presence of God's shadow in it. This does not eliminate, however, the necessity of an ascesis from the

multiplicity of matter and the corporeal imperfection of the world we perceive. It is a fundamental desire to overcome the corporeal condition ("discerpti simus et mutilati") of this world, by recovering the original condition of man, his soul's true nature, ("idea... formaque"), which lies in God alone. This love is, then, of things at the plenitude of their reality, that is, as they are found in God, and of God in them, not of things in themselves.

The reflection of God in this world is perfecting, but not perfect, and it must therefore be transcended. The importance of this ascesis is made obvious by Ficino's assertion that divine grace is a gift of enlightenment that lifts man out of the corporeal world into which he (his soul) has fallen. The "furore" is here clearly identified with Augustinian illumination characteristic of the evangelical movement:

> Divino autem furore super hominis naturam erigitur et in deum transit. Est autem furor divinus illustratio rationalis anime, per quam deus animam a superis delapsam ad infera, ab inferis ad superna retrahit.[161]

The distinction between natural reason and right reason, which Ficino deliberately emphasizes, leaves no doubt as to how he understands the life of the soul in its unredeemed state. As in Hughes de Saint Victor, the kind of perception that the soul has of the world below it, from its position within the body, leads to a constant rise and fall of the spirit. In view of the implications of this condition, the intermediary function of the spirit's sight in collusion with the imagination which informs both the soul and the body of corporeal objects made incorporeal by their presence in sight, necessitates that the soul incline itself to the spirit in order to recognize the objects perceived. Hence, this movement lowers the soul and raises the body thereby causing a constant fluctuation in the soul's inclinations. It is, then again, by means of images that the soul is drawn to corporeal and spiritual

objects, and is torn between the two:

> Amor, ut diximus, ab aspectu ducit originem. Aspectus inter mentem et tactum est medius, hinc semper contrarias in partes amantis distrahitur animus et sursum vicissim deorsumque iactatur. Interdum amplexus cupido suboritur, interdum vero pudicum celestis pulchritudinis desiderium et modo illa, modo istud pervincit et ducit.[162]

Hence, since all love is born of sight, and divine love can only be attained by the gift of divine grace, which distinguishes natural reason from right reason, it follows from this premiss that all human love, which depends on the intermediary function of sight and imagination, is fundamentally contemptible because it is a source of anguish.[163] A certain reservation must be made for contemplative love, for although it too depends on the sense of sight, it does so with spiritual intent and represents the upper limits of natural reason. Contemplative love, when it is maintained as such, and if it is directed to the divine, is praiseworthy since its intention is turned to the source of Beauty, not its deceptive shadow. On this matter Ficino is explicit:

> Accedit ad hec quod et ferinus et humanus amor sine indignatione esse numquam potest.... Itaque formosos odis simul et amas odis tamquam fures et homicidas, tamquam specula celesti fulgore micantia mirari cogeris et amare.[164]

Thus, although Ficino places spirituality in the secular context, by stressing the participation of the divine in objects, the love which he describes does not incline to a strict pantheism, God is not present in the object but reflected in it.[165] Similarly, he distinguishes very tangently the limits of the human dignity in relation to Divine majesty, without inclining to Manicheist dualism. All love in this world, which is subject to necessity, manifests imperfection. The reflection of Beauty in this world is but the shadow of God, and it is only by ascesis that the source of the beauty can be loved perfectly.

The ascesis required to overcome limitations imposed on the soul by its fall into the dark recesses of the body presupposes that

its recovery of its original condition will be effected within the hierarchical system of the Areopagite's gradualist universe. Similarly, the fundamental microcosmic conception of man's place in this system requires that, owing to his relation to the elements, his complexion, though not his free-will, be subject to the effects of cosmic organization and changes. As I have pointed out previously (above, notes 146 and 147), the bond between the body and the soul created by the intermediary position of the spirit suggests that there exists an intimate connection between the elemental physiological component of the individual that is, his complexion, and his psychological character and stability. The combination of medical and astrological theory in the Commentarium in Convivium provides an extensive iatromathematical explanation for the close mutual relations between physiology and psychology. In spite of the interpenetration of astrology, physiology and psychology, Ficino never seems to incline to the heretical notion of astrological determinism.[166] This is undoubtedly due to the stringent, and somewhat artificial, structure of his hierarchical division of the types of love. Ficino's understanding of Love depends on its function as a universal bond; since love is defined as a desire for union with Beauty, love is a movement between the lunar and sublunar creation, and it is therefore the means by which the soul can aspire to its integration into the Summum Bonum. The movement of love between the divine and matter naturally affects the point at which these two meet, that is, the microcosm which is man. In order to explicate the problem of the physio-psychological interpenetration of that which is spiritual and that which is elemental, or the fluctuating movements of the soul between the two, Ficino devised a quintuple classification of love which integrates the Aristotelian tripartite classification of the Nicomachean Ethics within what is in reality a

dualist vision of love. The three kinds of love to which human beings are subject by their dual composition are the bestial, human or mixed, and honest, which signifies contemplative or angelical. These, like man's nature, his soul, lie between Chaos and God. As I shall attempt to explain this construction is partially artificial inasmuch as Love's two extremes are indeterminate. This allows for a physio-psychological gradation which forms a link between the two extremes, while still maintaining a non-pantheistic division, and thereby rendering ascesis necessary.

The Ficinian structure of the amorous universe is implicitly dualist. Whilst Ficino contends that love is essentially good, since its source can only be described as good and it is a desire for Beauty, he is still obliged to account for the negative aspects of desire that are considered to be love, and which moralists use in order to associate love with evil. The manifestation of these two aspects of love is perceptible in the individual's constitution, that is, in the tension that exists between the body and the soul, in which unrestrained contrary desires incline the soul, which is the efficient agent, to one of the two basic kinds of love.[167] The cosmic explanation provided by Ficino in order to clarify this state of affairs is based on a series of dualist principles. These are, the existence of two Venuses, two demons, and two kinds of mental alienations, follies, or "furores". All of these principles, because they affect man the microcosm, are translated into a theory of complexions which has to accommodate the divine and the physical, and, as such, their presence in the Commentarium in Convivium revolves around the notion of melancholy as a temperament and an illness. Love in the individual is, then, subject to the bipolarity of melancholy as either a divine gift of frenzy or sinister insanity, thereby inclining the individual either to divine

contemplation or bestiality. Hence, throughout the Commentarium in Convivium an extensive case is made of the physiological effects of melancholy, in particular in the sixth and seventh speeches, which rely considerably on the medical explanation of Aristotle's Problem XXX, i.

The dualism implicit in this system could have entailed serious problems of orthodoxy were it not for the fact that from the outset Ficino tempered the theoretical opposition between the two Venuses by stating that the second, whose function is generation, proceeds from the first and only becomes bad when man uses its generative, or physical, nature beyond its intended purpose. The key distinction between the two is found in their different quality. Whereas the Celestial Venus is pure intelligence, and, therefore, does not partake of matter either in its origin or end, as Ficino explains: "Mens autem illa a materie corporalis consortio est aliena",[168] the Vulgar Venus is found mixed in matter. It follows from this that the first is divine and the other worldly:

> Denique ut summatim dicam, duplex est Venus. Altera sane est intelligentia illa, quam in mente angelica posuimus. Altera vis generandi anime mundi tributa. Utraque sui similem comitem habet amorem. Illa enim amore ingenito ad intelligendam dei pulchritudinem rapitur. Hec item amore suo ad eamdem in corporibus procreandam. Illa divinitatis fulgorem in se primum complectitur; deinde hunc in Venerem secundam traducit.... Cum primum humani corporis speties oculis nostris offertur, mens nostra que prima in nobis Venus est, eam tamquam divini decoris imaginem veneratur et diligit perque hanc ad illum sepenumero incitatur. Vis autem generandi, secunda Venus, formam generare huic similem concupiscit. Utrobique igitur amor est. Ibi contemplande hic generande pulchritudinis desiderium. Amor uterque honestus atque probandus. Uterque enim divinam imaginem sequitur.
>
> ... Si quis generationis avidior contemplationem deserat aut generationem preter modum cum feminis vel contra nature ordinem cum masculis prosequatur aut formam corporis pulchritudini animi preferat, is utique dignitate amoris abutitur.[169]

In the last sentence of the above quotation it becomes obvious that although Ficino claims that both Venuses have a divine origin, love of

the body preferred over love of the soul leads to an opposition. Although in this passage Ficino establishes a link between the two Venuses, it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain the validity of this bond throughout the development of the Commentarium in Convivium. In fact, the two principles which are drawn here together continue to polarize when Ficino finds it necessary to explain the movement of the soul between them. The two Venuses are, then, conceived of as two extremes, and in order to bridge the distance that separates the two Ficino has recourse to the theory of demons which serves as a subterfuge for the two Venuses.

The terms which Ficino uses to present the concept of the two demons are quite similar to those used to expose the theory of the two Venuses, as will be seen below. The variation lies in that unlike the two extremes represented by the Venuses, the demons are presented as intermediaries between the two. They are, therefore, subject to movement. It then becomes possible for Ficino to explicate the movement of these demons according to the tripartite classification of love found in the Nicomachean Ethics and its mediaeval tradition.[170] Hence, Ficino introduces the theory of the two demons by using the concept of the twin Venuses on a cosmic scale. The two Venuses affect the world soul, whereas the two demons pertain to the life of the microcosm within the macrocosm. This leads consequently to an interpenetration of the two concepts, the two Venuses, as the world soul, are also present in man: "Gemine autem Veneres iste geminique amores non solum in anima mundi, verum etiam in sperarum, siderum, demonum hominumque animis insunt."[171] Thus, the demons actually form a counterpart in the microcosm for the two Venuses, who are implicitly representative of good and evil, even though Ficino takes special care to point out that in this world, which is a reflection of the thought of God,

nothing can be inherently evil. In spite of this precaution the extremities at which the two demons are found does create a polarization which is actually tantamount to good and evil. Logically, this is evident; if the evil arises out of the soul's excessive attention for the "Cacodemon" which is the procreative urge, it is because the demon incites the soul to delve in matter. Although the onus is on the soul to exercise moderation by the use of the will, the two demons represent the poles between which it moves. Hence it is between the movement of these two demons that Ficino places the three Aristotelian classifications of love, as three basic passions of the soul. "Calodemon" is at the pole of angelical love and therefore, good, whereas "Cacodemon" is at the opposite extreme which is bestiality, and consequently, evil. Nevertheless, by referring to the two extremes of love as demons, and therefore, as intermediaries in constant movement Ficino eludes the implicit dualist view on which he relies. By positing the demons in passions they are inclinations of the soul, their intermediary stages towards one another are movements of the soul, and the soul by its divine origin is inherently good. As such the demons cannot be evil:

> In nobis autem non duo tantum sed quinque amores reperiuntur. Duo quidem extremi, demones. Medii tres, non demones solummodo, sed affectus. Profecto in hominis mente eternus est amor ad divinam pulchritudinem pervidendam, cuius gratia et philosophie studia et iustitie pietatisque officia sequimur. Est etiam in generandi potentia occultus quidam stimulus ad sobolem procreandam. Isque amor perpetuus est, quo assidue incitamur, ut superne pulchritudinis illius similitudinem in procreate prolis effigie aliquam effingamus.[172]

As two fundamental inclinations of the soul the two demons are considered to be irreproachable. Moreover, since both participate in Beauty they are inherently good. As in the case of the two Venuses the similarity ends here, for whereas one inclines us to contemplation, the other which should bring us to contemplation can also be the

source of our miseries:

Hi duo amores in nobis perpetui duo sunt demones, quos Plato nostris animis semper adesse vaticinatur, quorum alter ad superna erigat, alter deprimat ad inferna, alter Calodemon, id est, bonus demon sit, alter Cacodemon, id est, malus sit demon. Revera utrique sunt boni, quoniam tam sobolis procreatio quam indagatio veritatis necessaria et honesta censetur. Verum secundus ideo dictus est malus, quia propter abusum nostrum sepe nos turbat et animum a precipuo eius bono quod in veritatis speculatione consistit, avertit maxime et ad ministeria viliora detorquet.[173]

The phraseology used in the above passage to describe the two demons is obviously a duplicate of that used to present the theory of the two Venuses. The demons which are placed in us, that is in our soul or nature, clearly represent a medium for the interrelation between intelligible forms and matter. Given that they are originally presented as a movement they constitute the two inclinations of the soul between good and evil, theoretically without partaking of evil. It becomes unclear, however, whether their position is really intermediary when Ficino posits them at the antipodes of this movement and introduces between them the three kinds of loves or passions formulated by Aristotle. The two demons then become a finality in themselves:

Horum medium amores in nobis tres obtinent, qui cum non sint in animo eque ut isti firmissimi, sed incipiant, crescant, decrescant et desinant, rectius motus atque affectus quam demones vocabuntur. Horum unus equis intervallis ab utrisque distat extremis. Reliqui duo in partem alterutram inclinatur.[174]

These three intermediary loves are then used to describe the movement of passion in reaction to the immediate perception of objects by the spirit in the microcosm. The demons, who are originally considered to be particular manifestations of the two cosmic Venuses, are, then, conceived of as extremes and not as mere inclinations of the soul in the microcosm, but rather as two ends towards which our soul inclines; naturally, both lie beyond the limits of the Aristotelian tripartite division. The inclination of the soul referred to above is brought

about by the reception of Beauty or light from corporeal objects into the spirit which by its sight informs the soul. The effects which it has on the individual are then caused by the movement of imagination which pertains to the constant fluctuations of these three loves. Although all three of these passions are present in the individual, the predominant inclination towards one of these is determined by the individual's complexion. Thus, Ficino states that the inclination of the soul to contemplative, human, or voluptuous love is affected by the astral conditions, or sign, under which he was born. In order not to incur the suspicion of heresy on the matter of astrological determinism, Ficino adds that by his education a man is able to control his inclination to the effects of a certain kind of complexion, thereby exercising the power of his free-will on his reaction to his imaginative perception.[175] Love, which Ficino consistently defines as beginning in sight, is then a movement of the soul in accord with imagination:

> Porro cum corporis alicuius figura propter materie preparationem talis est maxime qualem in eius idea divina mens continet, oculis obvia perque oculos in spiritum penetrans, animo evestigio placet, cum illis consonet rationibus, quas veluti rei ipsius exemplaria tum nostra mens, tum generandi potentia olim divinitus accepta conservat. Hinc triplex, ut diximus subrepit amor. Aut enim ad contemplativam, aut activam, aut voluptuosam vitam prompti et proclives geniti educative sumus. Si ad contemplativam, statim a forme corporalis aspectu ad spiritalis atque divine considerationem erigimur. Si ad voluptuosam, subito a visu ad concupiscentiam tangendi descendimus.[176]

The relation of this description of the three kinds of love to the physiological theory of complexions becomes clearer when it is understood in the context of Ficino's first introduction of the concept of the demons. This is done in the previous pages of the Commentarium within a presentation of the cosmic elemental order of the universe. Within this scheme the tripartate division of love is applied to the concept of "heroes love" or "amor hereos", as a movement between divine and bestial love. Ficino undoubtedly knew the implications of

"amor hereos" from his readings of Arnau de Vilanova. Although Ficino's graphic interpretation from "hereos" to "heroes" is different this only reflects his superior knowledge of Greek. In this context the polarization between love as unformed Chaos and the intelligible forms or ideas becomes evident:

> Demon autem venereus triplex est amor. Primus in Venere celesti a Platonicis ponitur, in ipsa scilicet angelice mentis intelligentia. Secundus in vulgari Venere, in ea videlicet potentia quam habet mundi anima generandi. Qui duo propterea demones apellantur quia inter informitatem et formam sunt medii, ut et supra tetigimus et paulo post latius explicabimus. Tertius ordo demonum planetam Veneris comitantium. Horum quoque triplicem ordinem ponimus. Alii ignis, alii purissimi aeris, alii crassioris et nebulosi aeris elemento sunt assignati. Omnesque a greco vocabulo, heros, quod amorem significat, heroes, id est amatorii nominantur.[177]

Ficino's concern is then with melancholy love, "amor hereos". In the passages of the Commentarium in Convivium which describe the three intermediary passions, or loves, drawn from the divisions of the Nicomachean Ethics, Ficino is interested in describing the effects of this on the microcosm. He consequently embarks on an extensive exposé of melancholy as it is described in Aristotle's Problem XXX, i, and attempts to come to terms with the closely related ambivalence of imagination-phantasy.

The view that Ficino takes of melancholy, and hence, of "amor hereos", is basically that of his predecessors, the moralist mediaeval writers of treatises on love; that is, he considers it to be a taciturn and malevolent temper.[178] Yet, Ficino is also conscious of the bipolarity of Saturn and the beneficent aspects of melancholy; what is commonly a source of insanity, can also be a gift of divine frenzy. He makes use of this knowledge as the background for his commentary on the origin and nature of Love given by Diotima and repeated by Socrates.[179] Diotima's description of Love is interpreted by Ficino in medical terms which rely partially on the works of al Razi, one of

the Arabic commentators of Aristotle's Problem XXX.[180] The interpretation is applied to Ficino's theory of the five kinds of love which he had previously established; however, because this section of the Commentarium in Convivium focuses principally on the melancholy instability of the lover and the means by which both extremes are attained, the author is concerned above all with the three intermediary loves. These are the object of the vicissitudes of love, not the two extremes or demons, which as I have explained above are not really a movement but an end in themselves. These three intermediary loves, all of which are the product of sight, and therefore, imagination, correspond to the various manners in which the soul apprehends the object perceived; they are "Contemplativi hominis amor divinus, activi, humanus, voluptuosi ferinus cognominatur."[181] The usage of the theory of melancholy from an astro-medical point of view enables Ficino to account for the lover's fluctuations between the three kinds of love on a physiological basis, that is, it provides a rational explanation for the soul's movement to, or away from, revelation. Hence it is also an argument for the immortality of the soul. He consequently introduces this passage by pointing out that all the traits of Love as enumerated by Diotima are applicable to all five kinds of love, but in particular to the three intermediary loves. By so doing, he sustains the cosmic implications of Love's divine origin. The subject of this passage is, then, the three loves: "Hec licet omnibus insint amorum generibus, in tribus tamen mediis tamquam nobis manifestioribus clariora videntur."[182] Diotima's description is a play on the inherent contradictions of these three loves. Ficino uses the physiological implications of these contradictions in order to describe the standard medical type of the melancholic; because of this, love and melancholy become hardly distinguishable, as it will

be obvious from the rest of this study.

The point of departure for the merging of the concept of melancholy with that of love can be found in the description of the birth of love. Love is engendered by the Celestial Venus, and therefore, his real function is to bring souls back to the place of their divine origin. Love which is found in beauty is the source of the soul's recollection of its nature:

In Veneris natalibus genitus Venerem sequitur, id est, cum supernis illis spiritibus quos vocavimus Veneres, genitus, hominum animos ad superna reducit. Ac pulchri desiderio capitur, cum Venus ipsa pulcherima sit, id est animas accendit summe divineque pulchritudinis desiderio cum ipse sit in illis spiritibus ortus, qui deo proximi, dei decore summopere illustrantur atque ad eosdem nos radios erigunt.[183]

The lofty function of love to participate in divine Beauty and draw souls back to God is used by Ficino as a Saturnine trait introducing melancholy. Saturn, and the complexion associated with it, melancholy, also have this lofty function, as does phantasy, all lead mens' souls to the initial perception of the intelligible forms in the Summum Bonum.[184] Indeed, Saturn who is the father of the gods is at the origin of the divine parnassus, moreoever as a result of his overthrow and castration by Jupiter, which led to the birth of Venus, he is given to purity and contemplation. Hence, in spite of his taciturn and dark nature which associates him to death and insanity, he is also benevolent as a source of divine frenzy. Ficino, immediately after explaining the birth of Love, goes on to discuss the description of his physical features which is an analysis of the melancholy complexion, as it is based on the properties of the melancholy humour, that is, cold and dry.[185] This is applied to Diotima's portrait of Love:

Preterea cum vita omnium animantium atque arborum et terre fertilitas in humore et calore consistat, ad demonstrandum amoris inopiam utrumque deesse illi tam humorem quam calorem Diotima innuit, cum aridum et macilentum dixit et squalidum. Quis enim ignoret arida et sicca esse illa que deserit humor? Quis item pallorem dicat et squalorem aliunde

quam sanguinei caloris defectu venire?[186]

The pallor and grayness of skin is basically a standard feature of the melancholy temperament, especially when it is in proper conjunction, by adustion, with the choleric temperament.[187] This is a fairly well known method of describing the atrabilious character's capacity to be raised into the realm of loftier aspirations. Whereas melancholy, or black bile, on its own is heavy and slow, as well as, cold and dry, and is therefore associated with the element of earth which is stable; yellow bile is associated with fire and is hot and dry. Hence, when the melancholic humour is brought into proper conjunction with yellow bile by adustion in the blood, melancholy, which is contemplative, exercises its most noble functions because it is moved upwards by the heat of the yellow bile. The opposition between the melancholic and choleric tempers results in the most balanced exercise of virtue.[188]

After having introduced the problems of melancholy from this point of view, which really pertains to scholastic medicine, Ficino proceeds to the explanation of the psychological and physiological effects of melancholy adust and how it is brought about by the action of the vital spirits, which, as I have already pointed out, he equates with the Plotinian animate and the Augustinian Pauline mirror. Once again, the problem of melancholy adust converges with the Chartrian and Victorine theory of perception in imagination and phantasy, as it was expounded in the twelfth-century rhetorics.[189] Melancholy, as a nefarious characteristic, is the product of the puddling of the vital spirits resulting from immoderate cogitation on the wrong object.[190] The immoderate cogitation is a consequence of the melancholy humour which is stable and therefore leads to a constant love:

Quin etiam diuturno amore pallidi et macilenti mortales efficiuntur. Quippe ad duo simul opera vis nature ferme non sufficit. Animi amantis intentio in assidua amati cogitatione tota se versat. Illic et

naturalis complexionis vis omnis intenta est. Ideo neque cibus in stomaco perfecte conquoquitur. Quo fit ut major pars in superfluas reliquias emictatur, minor et ea quidem cruda trahatur ad iecur.[191]

The immoderate cogitation of the lover on the image of the beloved, then, affects directly the seat of passion, the liver, which is also the source of the yellow bile. The immoderate cogitation then causes the blood to concentrate itself in one place where it is not renewed, this creates an exhausted blood of poor quality, lacking in clear vital spirits. In subsequent passages Ficino proceeds to explain in some detail the effect that phantasy has on the vital spirits. The spirits which are weakened by the immoderate cogitation on the image perceived as reflected in them, cause vapours to rise to the head and lead the brain to create tetric visions, probably by clouding the "cella phantastica":

Preterea, quocumque animi assidua fertur intentio, illuc et spiritus, qui animi sive currus sive instrumenta sunt, advolant. Spiritus in corde ex subtilissima sanguinis parte creantur. In amati imaginem phantasia infixam ipsumque amatum amantis animus rapitur. Eodem trahuntur et spiritus. Illuc evolantes assidue resolvuntur. Quapropter frequentissimo puri sanguinis fomite opus est ad consumptos spiritus recreandos ubi subtiliores et lucidores partes sanguinis quotidie in reficiendis spiritibus exalantur. Propterea puro et claro sanguine resoluto, maculosus, crassus, aridus restat et ater. Hinc exsiccatur corpus et squalet, hinc et melancolici amantes evadunt. Ex sicco enim crasso atroque sanguine melancolia, id est, atra bilis efficitur, que suis caput vaporibus opplet, cerebrum siccat, animam tetris horrendisque imaginibus diu noctuque solicitare non cessat.[192]

In the above paragraph melancholy as a humour is considered to be a product of phantasy on the spirit, which by its effects on the brain will naturally affect the rational soul. Consequently, the quality of the image perceived in the spirit also plays a part in determining the nature of this effect on the soul. The physiological condition described above is limited to a basic presentation of melancholy, and Ficino limits himself to a repetition of the negative judgement on the effects of this humour.

In the ensuing paragraph, however, he points out that the nefarious effects of the melancholy humour is the product of the individual's desire to transform the contemplative virtue of melancholy into an active or sensual love: "Hec illis accidere consueverunt qui, amore abusi, quod contemplationis est ad amplexus concupiscentiam transtulerunt."[193] After having established this proviso Ficino then begins to rectify the negative inferences of melancholy, in order to introduce concepts related to "melancholia generosa". This he does by having recourse to the standard scholastic theory of melancholy adust formulated by Albert the Great. Ficino proceeds to compare the two complexions, melancholic and choleric, and point out their beneficial virtues, in particular by stressing the redeeming contemplative value of the former. Whereas the melancholic is slow to love and constant, the choleric quickly falls in love and is inconstant. However, both the melancholic and the choleric overcome their nefarious inclinations, and their tendency to carnal, or bestial, love by seeking spiritual pleasures. These are spiritual delights obtained by the more spiritual senses, hearing and sight, which make them the best disciples of Venus. The understanding in this statement is that they are lovers of the Celestial Venus, not of her counterfeit. This is reinforced by the closing statement, towards which the entire discussion of melancholy seems to have been directed, that Socrates is a melancholic:

> Quamobrem colerici et melancolici homines, tamquam unicum remedium et solamen molestissime ipsorum complexionis, cantus et forme oblectamenta sectantur. Ideoque sunt ad Veneris illecebras proniores. Et Socrates, quem Aristoteles melancolicum iudicavit, ad amandi artem ut ipsemet profitebatur erat omnium propensissimus. Idemque de Sapho melancolica, ut ipsa testatur, possumus iudicare. Nec non et Maro noster, quem colericum fuisse eius effigies indicat, quamvis pudicus, fuit tamen proclivior ad amandum.[194]

The important point, in the above paragraph on the amorous nature of both melancholics and cholerics, is that it includes both Socrates

and Vergil, both of whom Ficino considered to be models of his Platonism, as I have remarked previously.[195] In subsequent passages of the Commentarium in Convivium Ficino ceases to refer to cholerics in order to focus on the melancholy which is the complexion of Socrates, whose figure dominates the entire work. It suffices to point out that Ficino has introduced the problem of the choleric complexion in his portrait of Love in order to combine it with that of the melancholic and introduce the concept of the great man, following St. Albert the Great's definition of Aristotle's Problem XXX, i.

Melancholy, then, becomes one of the principal underlying factors in the concept of the Socratic way of life, which it is the Commentarium in Convivium's object to present. In both the Socratic way of life and melancholy the common denominator is contemplation and the effects that it has on the movements of the soul. It is a means to the divine "furore", which is Augustinian illumination, and, as such, both represent a "perfective" way of life by which man imitates "the God-loving Celestial Intelligences".[196] The exhortation which follows the passage quoted above, and concludes the "Sixth Discourse" is the evangelical message to which I have referred previously. In order to come to an accurate understanding of the implications of the theory of love set forth by Ficino in the Commentarium, it is important to note that although he insists on the contemplative love as the only real love, Ficino is conscious of the duality of love, just as he is of melancholy. Both love and melancholy have their origin in an epistemological experience set in sight, the ambivalent result of this experience then suggests that there are two means of cognition, or two "furores", one leading to the extremes of the Celestial Venus and the other to the Vulgar Venus. These two "furores" are described in the concluding discourse of the Commentarium, which is an exposé of

the applications of Ficino's theory in Guido Cavalcanti's "Dona me prega...." In this final part of the Commentarium Ficino turns to the problem of imagination's ambivalence when it is apprehended in the light of natural reason. On this matter he echoes the theory of imagination formulated by Hughes de Saint Victor, and uses the latter's metaphor of enamourment of natural reason for imagination as a burning shirt or skin which it is impossible to rid oneself of, in order to describe the earthly love of natural reason as a burning disease of the skin, in terms highly reminiscent of the "De Unione Spiritus et Corporis"[197]:

Inquietudo quoque amantium tam diu necessario perseverat quam diu infectio illa sanguinis per fascinationem iniecta visceribus permanens, gravi cor premit cura, vulnus alit venis, cecis membra flammis adurit. A corde siquidem in venas, a venis in membra fit transitus. Hac denique expurgata amantium immo vero amentium cessat inquietudo. Id longum in omnibus requirit temporis spatium; in melancolicis vero longissimum, presertim si Saturni influxu fuerint irretiti. Adde et amarissimum, si Saturno retrogrado vel Marti coniuncto vel Soli opposito mancipati sint.[198]

The disease of love described in the above quotation is directly related to Saturn and melancholy as a nefarious state. Conjunction of Saturn with Mars does not refer to melancholy adust, which depends on a proper mixture of melancholy in the choleric humour, or vice versa, but to a disproportionate combination which causes a vehement passion. The reference to Mars and the Sun indicates a firing of the stable and constant melancholy humour, and hence an incessant passion in which the nefarious aspects of melancholy are accentuated. This disease is then considered to produce insanity, as does melancholy, its origin in sight is once more the source of "immoderate cogitation", or, as it is called in the above passage, it is "an infection, or puddling, of the blood by fascination". It is then, the outcome of the second "furore", which is insanity, and which is also intimately related to "melancolia negra", the humour that causes man to fall to

the level of beasts, as does physical love.[199] On the problem of the two "furores" Ficino draws his arguments mainly from the Phaedrus, in order to provide rational evidence for the two "furores" on the basis of astral medicine and Lucretius' theory of sight which gives a physical explanation for the problem of perception in imagination and the soul's enamourment of the object it perceives reflected in the spirit. The two "furores" are, then, considered to be states of mental alienation, one as insanity since it causes the soul to lose its dignity, and the other as redemptive divine illumination:

> Plato noster furorem in Phedro, mentis alienationem definit. Alienationis autem duo genera tradit. Alteram ab humanis morbis, alteram a deo provenire existimat. Insaniam illam, hanc divinum furorem nuncupat. Insanie morbo infra hominis spetiem homo deicitur et ex homine brutum quodammodo redditur. Insanie duo sunt genera. Alterum cerebri, alterum cordis vitio nascitur. Cerebrum sepe adusta bili, sepe sanguine adusto, nonnumquam atra bili nimium occupatur... Quando enim humores illi retinentur in corde, angustiam et solicitudinem pariunt, non dementiam.[200]

The melancholy adust referred to above is not Albert the Great's "melancolia non naturalis" but a violent adustion which engenders madness. The two kinds of madness are, however, caused by melancholy, depending on its predominance in the heart, which is the source of sadness, or in the brain where it causes a demented state of alienation. Ficino approaches this problem by suggesting that there are two kinds of alienation, one which is divinely inspired, and the other which is a humoural problem of insanity in its various manifestations affecting the heart or the brain.

A superficial approach to the Commentarium in Convivium would leave the reader with the impression that Ficino, like most mediaeval moralists writing on love,[201] associates melancholy only with insanity. Close examination of the text evinces the contrary. Ficino repeatedly points out that Socrates is a melancholic. It is this particular complexion, which makes true and constant lovers, and is a contemplative

virtue, that prepares Socrates to receive the gift of divine "furore". The innate contradiction which is particular to the melancholy complexion is then transferred to Ficino's description of the nature of love. Thus, in his portrait of Socrates, Ficino turns to Diotima's description of love, and states that Socrates is the model for the portrait of Love, and that this portrait is also that of melancholy. This concept brings together "melancolia generosa" and Love:

> Numquid, o optimi viri, illud in superioribus animadvertistis, quod dum Plato ipsum fingit amorem, Socratis omnem pingit effigiem ac numinis illius figuram ex Socratis persona describit quasi verus amor ac Socrates similimi sint atque ideo ille pre ceteris verus sit legitimusque amator? Agite iam amoris picturam illam in animum revocate. Videbitis in ea Socratem figuratum. Socratis personam ante oculos ponite. Macilentum, aridum, squalidumque videbitis, hominem scilicet natura melancolicum, ut fertur atque irsutum, extenuatum inedia, incuria sordidum.[202]

This is the man whose pagan model is to be followed, and whom Diotima exhorts to Christian love. That a Christian writer, such as, Ficino should present Socrates, the melancholy philosopher, as the portrait of Love, and of "the true and legitimate lover", might seem to the inexperienced reader of Ficino to be a case of paganism, since for a Christian, Christ can be the only true lover. In fact, the portrait which Ficino draws of Socrates is the portrait of Christ. In his other writings Ficino frequently turns to the Apuleian, and early Christian, tradition which saw in Socrates a metaphor, or adumbration, of Christ.[203] As in the Confirmatio Christianorum per Socratica the explanation that Ficino provides for the portrait of Love-Socrates is a very evangelical description of the virtues of the "vita apostolica", it is a praise of poverty and charity seeking the inner light in the imitation of Christ-Socrates applied to daily life. The explanation for the description of Socrates is pushed to the extent that at certain points which lack a proper Christian explanation Ficino forces his intention onto the text of the Symposium, and as a

result, the commentary is adequate to Christ, though perhaps not to the text, as for instance: "Ad fores, in via, sub divo dormiens. Hec apertum pectus et cor patens omnibus in Socrate nostro significant."[204] This frequent metaphor of the welcoming arms of Christ clearly indicates the primarily Christian-evangelical intention of Ficino's Commentarium in Convivio, and the significance of the Socratic way of life. It is an exhortation to the contemplative and evangelical life.

It should be evident from what I have discussed until now that the theory of love formulated by Ficino is novel when compared with the love treatises written by mediaeval moralists. The latter work within the traditional ecclesiastical structure, their perception of love is a social hierarchic comment on the secular society outside the traditional institution of the Church.[205] It is therefore the point of view of the "vita monastica". Their approach reflects a distinction between religion and life; concepts such as the "dignitas hominis" do not find a place in this system. These moralists are concerned with the condemnation of love as lust, that is, of an excess pertinent to a fallen creature redeemed only within the institution of the Church. It is, therefore, open to doubt whether the point of view expressed by the moralists, who are men of the cloth, is representative of the love expressed by poets, although it may condition some poetical works it is not an "ars poetica". Unlike its mediaeval predecessors, Ficino's theory of love pertains to the well-established secular tradition of Christian Neoplatonism, which is intimately associated with "vita apostolica", or the evangelical current, beginning in the twelfth century and reaching its maturity in the sixteenth century with the growth of the merchant class, and the economic collapse of the Hundred Years war.[206] Ficino seems to be more indebted to the "ars poeticae" than to the mediaeval treatises. Hence, in his final

definition of true love in the Commentarium in Convivium Ficino does not really depart from the theoretical background known to poets writing in the preceding century: "Verus enim amor nihil est aliud quam nixus quidam ad divinam pulchritudinem evolandi, ab aspectu corporalis pulchritudinis excitatus. Adulterinus autem ab aspectu in tactum precipitatio."[207] It might be argued that the very fact that love is a desire of divine Beauty reflected in human corporeal beauty is novel, however, this is an inherent part of the pseudo-Dionysian tradition of the evangelical current also present in twelfth-century poetic rhetorics. The very fact that Ficino chose to close his Commentarium by explaining the sense of a poem by Guido Cavalcanti, Dante's friend, indicates that he made no claim to the absolute novelty of his theory of love. The principal novel aspects of Ficino's contribution to the theory of love are, his use of Plato as his authority, although without discarding Aristotle, and his extensive coordination of astral and medical theory in order to establish the positive value of melancholy with which he creates the Renaissance concept of the genius.[208] Finally, all of this is subordinate to an evangelical orientation which creates a social ideal of conduct, which is codified in the Cortegiano, but which really has its roots in the Imitation of Christ.[209]

In spite of the apparent novelty of the theory of love in the Commentarium in Convivium, and affined concepts, on this too some reservations must be held in Ficino's handling of these problems. The mediaeval moralists, such as Andreas Capellanus, seemed to condemn love because it was an immoderate cogitation born from the vision of corporeal objects, which by the action of the senses, degenerated into lust. As can be gleaned from the quotation above (207) Ficino does not entirely depart from this point of view. Differences lie in the

understanding which Ficino has of the nature of perception-imagination, which is similar to that of poetic rhetoricians following the Chartrian and Victorine school which is the object of Capellanus' irony.[210] Ficino, like Capellanus,[211] places the origin of love in sight, but unlike the latter, he stresses that the object perceived is spiritual,[212] and similarly that beauty is not external but lies within and is reflected by the corporeal object,[213] as the twelfth-century Chartrian and Victorine rhetoricians had done. Ficino gives this conception of love a new orientation by focusing on the Christian intention within a secular context, which became applicable to the idealized Renaissance court. Ficino's Commentarium in Convivium is, then, not entirely severed from tradition; it uses much of the previous philosophical theories. Hence, just as the mediaeval scholastic moralists had relied on the tripartite division of friendship in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Ficino integrated this division into a system that emphasized the interrelation of the Good and the Beautiful, by acknowledging the participation of the Good in the Beautiful, a point which was inherent to the Dionysian tradition in which he was working. Evidently, this could only lead to the increased role played by vision in this system. The theory of perception that Ficino resorted to had to be compatible to the Areopagian emanantist system, that is, it had to apprehend the Creation in a spiritual light. This aspect of Ficino's theory was also conditioned by his reaction against the Averroesian negation of the soul's transcendental nature. Just as love in this system is transcendental, so is the medium for this love, the soul. It is understood to be independent from the body and of divine origin. As it governs the body, it is the true nature of man, and from this, one understands the importance of the "dignitas hominis" in this theory of love. The subjacent implication of this theory is the Augustinian

definition of the soul, and the problem of perception is then focal to the entire work. It is a matter of how light is reflected on the mirror, or eye, of the soul, and thus, the author is confronted with the ineluctable problem of the "descensus ad inferos". In order to resolve the problem of the soul's fall Ficino resorted to the Plotinian concept of the animate, which he interpreted in the light of the scholastic medical theory of the vital spirits. Perception, or vision, is then initially based on a poetic and rhetorical conception which echoes Matthieu de Vendôme's metaphor of the architect.[214] As such, the object perceived by the soul in the mirror of the spirit is primarily an imagination or phantasy. It is not necessarily a "vain imagination".[215] The world is vanity, but it is also a reflection of the face of God, and, as such, that imagination is also a key to the divine vision. The imagination may lead to divine vision, but if the soul becomes enamoured of the object the image that is purely reflected in the mirror of the spirit becomes puddled. The problem of melancholy, entailed by the bipolarity of imagination, then needed to be explained, especially since Aristotle in Problem XXX, i had pointed out that Socrates was a melancholic, and that Ficino had set himself the latter as a model. Ficino resolved the problem of the melancholic around the notion of "amor hereos" (which relied on Arnau de Vilanova) on the basis of scholastic and astral medicine, thereby combining the notion of the genius with that of Augustinian illumination in the Platonic concept of the divine "furore". As such, the virtuous love described by Ficino is Christian love for God, and God only, in His Creatures. Like his twelfth-century predecessors Ficino was quick to point out that this love was practised by few, just as there are few melancholy great men; they are "alii Diane et Palladi consecrati".[216] Few spend their life in contemplation, and even fewer are granted the gift of

divine illumination. The key problem, however, remains that of making men conscious of the nature of the Beauty to which they feel attracted, that is, to make them acknowledge the source of that beauty as the real object of their love. The task was to incline courtiers to contemplative, or angelical, activity, and the means was to remind the soul of its divine origin in order to turn it away from the necessity of this world, and, therefore, to overcome the inclination of the soul to matter. That solution could only lie in faith, which is the love of God to which we are inclined by the Beauty of this creation, but which must be surpassed to reach its source. Behind the glib rhetoric of the Platonic dialogue, medical and astral references, the sensibility and intention of Ficino in the Commentarium in Convivium remains that of the "vita apostolica".[217]

Clearly, Ficinian Platonic love is a very complex extension of the philosophical intention present in Petrarch's works, and like the latter, it finds its origins in twelfth-century Chartrian and Victorine thought, and evangelism.[218] It is this philosophical content that Bembo integrated, somewhat superficially, in his renewed Petrarchism. The theoretical elaboration for the basis of Bembo's Petrarchism is found in his love treatise, Gli Asolani. A prominent characteristic of the various love treatises that were written in the wake of Ficino's Commentarium in Convivium, with the notable exception of Leone Hebraeus' Dialoghi d'Amore, is that they are primarily literary works, with philosophical pretensions, and not philosophical works; consequently, they do not have the breadth of their model.[219] They are nonetheless firmly indebted to Ficino's work, and the apparent superficiality in their content is due to the fact that they are intented for a vaster public. In this sense, they popularize themes and topics that are central to Ficino's Commentarium. Hence,

these works which imitate the dialogue form, are often set in a Renaissance court, and have a general air of being a trivial entertainment, like the mediaeval "cortsd'amor".[220] This contributes to giving the reader the impression that they have a more "courtly" aspect than Ficino's work. Due caution should be exercised here, however, since the more "courtly" aspect which they have is not necessarily so because they go back to "courtly love", but is also attributable to the fact that Ficino's own work is rooted in the poetic tradition preceding it, which the modern critic may, or may not, choose to associate with the amorphous term "courtly love".[221] As usual, this approach can distort our perspective, if applied dogmatically. The works on Neoplatonic love which succeeded the Commentarium in Convivium did not entirely overlook the inner tensions of the lover, which are generally understood to be conflicts inherent to human love, but they concentrated principally on the blissful effects of the rapture and the divine vision.[222] This accounts for the somewhat inexact impression propagated by literary critics that Neoplatonic love attains fulfilment on earth, in human love, and that it, thereby, justifies human love.[223] There is a certain measure of truth in this point of view, for inasmuch as it is less concerned with human excesses than mediaeval moralists it reflects a greater confidence in man's power not to abuse the dignity of love. For this reason the definition of the soul as representing the true nature of man, being of divine origin, and therefore, governing the body, becomes a central topic of these treatises. As in the Commentarium in Convivium the supremacy of the soul asserting its divine origin is a focal theme of the treatises, for this reason, and because of the public for whom these are intended, a point which was subjacent to Ficino, and to Ausias March, acquires greater prominence, that is,

the power of the lover's free-will to control his passions.[224] Owing to this, there is a tendency to shift the accent from love as a desire for Beauty to love as an affection of the will;[225] as Bembo's hermit remarks the two are not necessarily exclusive.[226] It does shift the emphasis, however, towards the realm of social conduct, which corresponds to the requirements of the public for whom these treatises were written. Bembo clearly defines his intention in Gli Asolani; he teaches now not to err in what is inevitable:

> Ma percicochè tra le molte cagioni, le quali il nostro tranquillo navicar ci turbano, ed il sentiero del bon vivere ci rendono sospetto e dubiosso; soule con le primiere essere il non saper noi le più volte, quale amore buono sia, e qual reo: ilchè non saputo fa, che noi le cose, che fuggire si devrebbono amando, e quelle che sono da seguire non amando, e tal volta o meno o più del convenevole ora schifandole e ora cercandole, travagliati e smarriti viviamo...[227]

The social orientation of these treatises reveals that they form an "artificial" literary genre, which superficially sets moral standards of conduct within the Renaissance court, and appear to elude the inherent problems of the tension between the body and the soul,[228] because they are principally concerned with the end result of Ficino's theory. This social conduct is, however, directed towards an evangelical end, which is fulfilled by at least one character. Consequently, great emphasis is placed on the origin of love in sight, and remains central to all arguments. However, the reader will seek in vain an elaborate discussion of the problems entailed by perception; they are present but not discussed, because the author's intention is to convince his readers of the superiority of contemplative life, and not to discuss the difficulties. It is then not surprising to find that, "the philosophical elements, as we shall see, soon become stereotyped; the author's main effort was to express with literary grace, in polished prose, sentiments and theories that were far from original."[229] Thus, one of the more interesting aspects of

the literary love treatises is to elude the complexity of Ficino's work by reducing the human problems entailed by perception to a matter of reason and will. In so doing they accentuate a point which Ficino attempted to escape, that of the duality of love,[230] as can be seen in the above quotation from Gli Asolani, and ironically it gives the impression that human love can be an end in itself. Yet, its principal aim remains to extol the virtues of contemplative life in order to entreat man to polish the mirror of his soul, and ultimately turn his love to God.

Part II: The Re-Formulation of Ficino's Theory in the Works of his Successors.

In seeking to distinguish excessively the Neoplatonic theory of love from its mediaeval predecessors, critics have focused their attention on the predominant role played by reason in the "trattati d'amore". This, as I have indicated previously, seems to be a source of distortion in the critical perspective. The problem of reason's function in love is of utmost importance in the Dialoghi d'Amore of Leone Hebreo, Ficino's most worthy successor. It has been contended that Hebreo's definition of love, which advocates that true love, whether it be honest or dishonest, always involves passion, torment and jealousy, is a prolongation of the "courtly love" attitudes present in the cancionero tradition were it not for the concept of, "extraordinary reason which Leon Hebreo rather shamefacedly conjures up as a last minute expedient, after his own argument has led him to deny reason, as commonly defined, any power over love."[231] This extreme position towards Hebreo can only be based on a lack of familiarity with his, and related, texts and the problems that Hebreo confronted. The Dialoghi d'Amore are greatly indebted to the

Commentarium in Convivium.[232] However, since they do not constitute a commentary their scope is far greater, and consequently, they are also much more diffuse. Although the language and method of the Dialoghi d'Amore is firmly rooted in the tradition of Aristotelian scholasticism, the content is primarily inspired by Plato's dialogues, and one must add, often perceived through Ficino's eyes. The problems with which Hebreo deals are fundamentally the same as Ficino's, and the eclecticism of both works cannot be overlooked. The Dialoghi d'Amore are primarily interested in one problem, which in Ficino is found in the conclusion, that of the two "furores." Whereas Ficino eluded the problem by stating that divine "furore" is true love, but the other is insanity, Hebreo is conscious that both furores are a kind of love, and hence, all love is "furore". His intent is to explain the relation between the two, that is, that which they have in common. He is, therefore, far more subtle and complex than Ficino. It is not my purpose to explore the relations that exist between the two authors. My concern is to clarify the significance of "extraordinary reason" in Hebreo's system, in order to demonstrate the relation that this has with melancholy and imagination, as in Ficino's system.

Although the Dialoghi d'Amore begin with the introduction of various basic Aristotelian principles in the first dialogue, they move in the second and third dialogues towards an eclectic conciliation of Aristotle and Plato, and also Moses. Hence, Hebreo opens his dialogues by repeating the Nicomachean Ethics' tripartite classification of friendship, which he, like his mediaeval predecessors, applies to love.[233] In the third dialogue he proceeds to an exposition of what he calls the Platonic tripartite division, which he conciliates with Aristotle, and demonstrates their inherent

compatibility.[234] This is a key point in Hebreo's system, unlike Ficino he does not adopt, or create, a quintuple division of the kinds of love. There results from this many of the complexities, as regards the role of reason, which may confuse the reader. By dividing love into five kinds, it was relatively easy for Ficino to explicate the movement of the soul towards divine love, and to distinguish between contemplation of the divine in the individual's vision of the world, and love of God, or divine rapture. The various stages of reason's role in the preparation of the soul to receive the light of right reason could be neatly associated with each one of these kinds of love. By remaining within the limits of a tripartite classification, Hebreo, whose logic is transcendental, is severely restricted, and he is obliged to expand the internal boundaries of his reasoning, especially as concerns honest or contemplative love. In this context the various facets of reason, which is not a monolithic faculty, become fragmented. This is the source of much of the awkwardness present in his text.[235] It is, therefore, imperative for him to explicate the relation between reason and intellect, the latter being the means to true love.[236] Should the reader seek a weighty discussion of love in the first dialogue he overlooks the actual intention of the author. This is what I believe has been the pitfall of the vast majority of critics. The central topic of this dialogue is the relation that exists between reason and intellect; although it is continuous source of discussion in the Dialoghi d'Amore it is here that it is most explicitly defined, as is its role in love. For this reason this initial dialogue is by far the shortest, and most terse of the three. Hebreo, like Ficino, begins by establishing as his point of departure the insufficiency of individual reason: "manifestamente es imposible que un hombre conozca todas las cosas

juntas, y cada una por sí distintamente...."[237] What reason knows; it can do so only through information imparted by the senses: "por ser todas materiales, se dice con verdad que no pueden estar en el entendimiento si primero no se halla en el sentido que las conoce materialmente."[238] Immediately after having defined the nature of individual reason in these terms Hebreo focuses on the closely related problem of the sensual perception of material, or corporeal, objects and how they come to be apprehended spiritually. This again repeats the basic description of the movement of imagination informing the intellect.[239] This consequently engages him onto the arduous problem of how reason informs the intellect, and how it thereby comes to recognize spiritual objects. It is the subjacent question of the insufficiency of our reason, and also of our intellect, which introduces the problem of the two intellects; that which is potential and the other actual, or agent.[240] Hebreo's explanation focuses on this point to direct his discussion to a teleological end. It is axiomatic to his philosophical position that: "es el entendimiento agente que, copulándose con nuestro entendimiento posible, ve todas las cosas en acto juntamente con la visión espiritual y clarísima."[241] Our intellect can only know its objects in their reality when it is enlightened by the actual intellect. However, Hebreo's discussion is theological, and therefore, he brings this eclectically into its religious context: "el entendimiento actual que alumbra al nuestro posible es el altísimo Dios; y... la bienaventuranza consiste en el conocimiento del entendimiento divino."[242] Hence, it is obvious that in Hebreo's system, reference to reason, and to the individual intellect, is intended to have the significance of "the eye of flesh", which cannot of its own light apprehend spiritual clarity. Hebreo then compares potential intellect, that is, human intellect with the

eye of the bat which can perceive objects in darkness but is blind to light; similarly, the individual intellect apprehends corporeal objects but needs divine light to know their spiritual, or real, nature:

> Esta doctrina sola trata de las cosas espirituales y eternas, el ser de las cuales, de parte de su naturaleza, es mucho mayor y más conocido que el ser de las cosas corpóreas y corruptibles, aunque de nosotros son menos conocidas que las incorpóreas, por no poderlas comprender nuestros sentidos como a aquéllas. De manera que nuestro entendimiento es en el conocimiento como el ojo del murciélago en la luz y las cosas visibles, que la luz del sol, que en sí es la más clara, no la puede ver, porque su ojo no es bastante a tanta claridad, y ve el lustror de la noche, que le es proporcionado.[243]

As all Neoplatonists Hebreo is, therefore, concerned with the recovery from the "descensus ad inferos"; however, owing to his interest in the problem of the "furores" he gives priority to the vision of God, which is the soul's original state of plenitude. Thus, our intellect, informed by reason, needs the assistance of the divine intellect, which is the source of all that is good, and therefore, lies at the origin of the felicity which we, our soul, seek. Given that felicity is the ultimate aim of man in the Summum Bonum, love is the means to beatitude, which can only be found in God, and Him alone. It is, therefore, to be found only in the vision and knowledge of the Divine Being. Reason, which informs the intellect can only choose the object in which one believes that felicity is found, its function is to direct an act of volition. Hence, love binds the will: "la sujección del amor liga primero la voluntad del amante".[244] Thus, love is a rapture.

On the problem of divine felicity Hebreo, unlike Ficino, maintains that the love of God must be attained intellectually. On this key matter his eclectic position compels him to satisfy two fundamentally opposite points of view: that union with God is

attained through love, or that it is gained by the knowledge one has of Him. However, since Hebreo understands love to be a rapture of the intellect, love is always knowledge; thus: "Siendo Dios el verdadero y solo objeto de nuestra felicidad, nosotros le amamos con conocimiento y le conocemos con amor."[245] This conflation of two opposite views as to how man attains Felicity, requires that since Hebreo has acknowledged the insufficiency of individual reason and intellect, he explicate the movement of divine grace. Owing to this he further develops the theory of the two intellects as two means of knowledge; the first is analytic and preparative, whereas the second, which is divine, is unitive:

> porque has de saber que de Dios todas las cosas amadas y deseadas se hallan en dos modos de conocer: el uno es antes del amor que de El se causa, el cual no es conocimiento perfectamente unitivo: el otro es después del amor, el cual conocimiento es fruición de perfecta unión.[246]

The key phrases in the above quotation are "antes del amor" and "después del amor". They indicate fairly explicitly that the first kind of knowledge is the recognition of the nature and worth of the object apprehended. It perceives the object and that which makes it desirable. The second kind of knowledge is intelligence of the desired object apprehended, which is gained by experience, that is, by the subject's experience of the object in its state of plenitude. It can then be correctly inferred that the first kind of knowledge is discursive, whereas the second is intuitive. As I have stated previously, discursive reason can only prepare the soul, or the intellect, for attaining unitive beatitude. The latter is the aim of love which Hebreo understands to be copulative union: "Y así es en toda otra cosa amada y deseada, que en todas es medio el amor y deseo que del imperfecto conocimiento nos lleva a la perfecta unión, que es

el verdadero fin del amor y del deseo...."[247] This enables Hebreo to establish, like Ficino before him, that the true end of love is union with God. On this point it may appear to the reader that Hebreo makes greater concessions than Ficino, for he sometimes seems to imply that this love can be found on earth. This is not surprising when one considers the pantheistic inclinations of his thought;[248] it is a point that distinguishes him from the Christian "trattadisti", and serves as a constant reminder that he does not work within the Dionysian-evangelical tradition of his contemporaries. Yet, even this difference must be approached with caution. Hebreo's tripartite division of love enables him to state that divine copulation, or unitive spiritual love, can be attained while the soul is still on earth. Even to this he sets considerable limitations, stating that this is an exceptional case which can only occur with great difficulty. Thus, in spite of his pantheism, Hebreo finds it necessary to contend with the problem of the union of the body and the soul. Divine copulation requires that the soul leave the body, and therefore, the problem of the soul's immersion in matter remains a prominent consideration:

> Bien es verdad que en esta vida no es muy fácil alcanzar la tal beatitud, y cuando se pudiese haber, no es muy fácil, continuar siempre en ella. Y esto porque, mientras vivimos, tiene nuestro entendimiento alguna manera de vínculo con la materia de este nuestro frágil cuerpo; y por esta causa alguno que en esta vida llegó a tal copulación no continuaba siempre en ella, por la ligadura corporeal.[249]

The exceptional nature of this union with the divine Being is explicitly described as a gift of divine grace, which involves the characteristic illumination of the soul. In Hebreo's epistemology it is the soul's individual intellective reason that is illuminated. Hebreo's terminology in the description of this process is almost too specific, for rather than refer to the illumination as the rise of

the soul, it is for him the uplifting of the rational intellect aided by the light of God:

> Este amor y deseo tan grande hace que seamos abstraídos en tanta contemplación que nuestro entendimiento viene a levantarse de tal manera que alumbrado de una gracia divina, sabe a conocer más alto que al humano poder y a la humana especulación conviene, y llega a tal unión y copulación con el Sumo Dios que nuestro entendimiento se conoce ser antes razón y parte divina que entendimiento en forma humana.[250]

It is implied in this quotation that the intellect is of divine origin, and that it is fulfilled by union with its original cause. This raises the problem of how Hebreo understands the nature and function of the soul. This can be clarified by a survey of Hebreo's various descriptions of the transition from the individual to the divine intellect.

The above quotation provides two points around which the philosophy of Hebreo develops. These are the individual intellect's limitations and its divine origin. Discursive reason informs the intellect of the nature of the objects which are apprehended by vision and imagination. It perceives these objects to be a reflection of the "shadow of God"[251] in the Creation. This can only cause the intellect to rise up towards the original light of God, or to fall and lose itself in the flesh. As I mentioned above, this role is normally attributed by other Neoplatonist writers to the soul. It is therefore, somewhat unclear how Hebreo understands the position of the intellect in relation to the soul. Should his reasoning be that the soul is inferior to the individual intellect, then it would have to be corporeal. This is not so.

Intellection in the Dialoghi d'Amore is obviously understood to be an illumination, as I have stated above. This is further substantiated by Hebreo's reference to the individual intellect as a mirror: "Porque nuestro entendimiento es un espejo y ejemplo, o por decir mejor, una imagen de las cosas reales."[252] Thus, our intellect,

that is, potential intellect, is a receptive faculty which is informed either by the senses mediated by discursive reason, or by the divine intellect which is Augustinian "right reason". The duality of the intellect, as agent and potential, can be the source of serious problems of comprehension for the reader of Hebreo. It is sometimes unclear when he refers to the intellect, whether he means the potential or actual intellect. Hence, when he defines the soul as a means between the intellect and the body: "el ánima es medio entre el entendimiento y el cuerpo",[253] the reader has to understand that Hebreo considers the soul to be a mean between the actual intellect and the corporeal world. In this respect, Hebreo repeats a fundamental Platonic point of view, as defined previously in note 26 above: "l'âme est l'intermédiare entre le monde intelligible et le monde sensible". The account which he gives subsequently of the soul's activities can only substantiate this. For Hebreo, as for Ficino, the soul has two faces, one which is inclined to the flesh which provides sensual knowledge of particulars, and the other which tends to the knowledge of universals, which is the function of the potential intellect. This description is fundamental to my purpose, because at this point Hebreo establishes that the potential intellect is the intellective reason of the soul. It is this reason which will receive divine reason, by which I understand Augustinian illumination, or "right reason".[254] It follows from this description that sensorial intellection will always be present at the origin of any love whether it be mundane or divine "furore", since particular objects perceived, which inherently reflect the shadow of God, can cause the soul to fall to their corporeal beauty, or draw them on to the divine good which is at the source of this love. Yet, when the soul soars to celestial heights only intellective reason can be present, since it is the object of divine

rapture or illumintation. Reason alone which turns only to the lower face of the soul can lead to sensual love, whereas reason which turns to the contemplation of the spiritual light that animates corporeal objects is the source of our spiritual knowledge of the latter, and when it is aided by divine reason it transcends its limits to attain knowledge of God's Beauty:

> La primera cara hacia el entendimiento es la razón intelectiva... La segunda cara que tiene hacia el cuerpo, es el sentido, que es el conocimiento particular de las cosas corporeas... Estas dos caras tienen contrarias u opuestas movimientos que, así como nuestra ánima con el primer rostro o conocimiento racional hace de lo corpóreo incorpóreo, así con el segundo rostro o conocimiento sensible, allegándose a los cuerpos sensitivos y mezclándose con ellos, abrevia lo incorpóreo en lo corpóreo. Con estas dos maneras de conocimiento son conocidas de nuestra anima las hermosuras corporales con la una y otra cara, esto es sensitivamente y corporalmente, o racionalmente e intelectivamente. Y conforme a cada uno de estos dos conocimientos de las hermosuras se causa en el ánima el amor de ellas, que es amor sensual por el conocimiento sensible y amor espiritual por el conocimiento racional.[255]

By spiritual love, Hebreo understands contemplative love at a human level. Thus, in themselves, neither sensual nor spiritual love is actually transcendental, for each is subject to the limits of human intellection. Although spiritual love is impelled by the intellectual beauty of particular objects ("hace de lo corpóreo incorpóreo"), it cannot be said to rise beyond human limits, since intellective reason needs the enlightenment of "right reason". This problem is in fact a discussion of the movement between the two forms of intellection, which is imagination or phantasy. Hence, all intellection is subject to the bipolarity of the latter. This will be the object of further discussion below, subsequent to Hebreo's treatment of "heroic love". The point to be made here is that intellective reason is a receptive faculty which lies at the centre of intellection, and the soul which is enamoured of the objects it perceives will either abandon intellective reason for the flesh, or transcend it for divine love.

Hebreo, who had previously described heroic men as: "aquellos que tuvieron alguna virtud heroica y hicieron actos semejantes a los divinos y cosas dignas de eterna memoria, como las divinas",[256] gives a fairly detailed account of "heroic love". El Inca Garcilaso refers to this passage as a description of the "género de hombres heroicos", that is, "amor hereos". It is a very positive statement on melancholy love. Like Aristotle, Hebreo classifies the life of the soul according to three kinds, the names which he uses for these kinds of lives, reveal his intentions: bestial, moral, and heroic. The definition of "heroes" which I have given above (256) is equally applicable to Hebreo's description of love that is guided by extraordinary reason. Ordinary reason tends to the moral preservation of the individual, whereas the second drives him on to do great things: "Asimismo nos manda la primera razón procurar lo útil y los placeres honestos, y la segunda nos manda fatigar y trabajar el ánimo y la persona por las cosas mas nobles y dignas de ser amadas con razón."[257] This point is particularly important, because it implies that the second form of reason, extraordinary reason, moves the individual to "heroic action", or as the previous quotation indicated, to "heroic virtue". The latter, which impels men to quasi divine acts, as does "melancholia generosa" which in Ficinian thought, is the source of the Renaissance concept of the great man. Hebreo tells us that these heroic lovers surpass sensorial cognition and use it to contemplate the spiritual forms present in material bodies, and become enamoured of the former. A love such as this is evidently spiritual and contemplative:

> Estos enderezan el conocimiento sensible al racional como a propio fin, y tanto estiman por hermosuras las sensibles con la cara inferior cuanto se sacan de ellas las hermosuras racionales con la superior, que son las verdaderas hermosuras, según te he dicho. Y aunque allegan el ánima espiritual con el rostro inferior a los cuerpos, para tener de la hermosura de ellos el conocimiento sensible, en continente levantan en movimiento contrario las especies sensibles con la cara superior

racional, sacando de ellas las formas y especies inteligibles y reconociendo ser este el verdadero conocimiento de la hermosura de ellas, dejan lo corpóreo y sensible como a feo y corteza de lo incorpóreo o sombra o imagen suya. Y de la manera que enderezan el un conocimiento al otro, así enderezan el un amor al otro, esto es, el sensible al inteligible; que tanto aman las hermosuras sensibles cuanto el conocimineto de ellas los guía a conocer y amar las espirituales insensibles cuanto el conocimiento de ellas los guía a conocer y amar las espirituales insensibles a las cuales aman solamente como a verdaderas hermosuras y se deleitan en fruición de ellas y al resto de la corporalidad y sensualidad no solamente no le han amor ni se deleitan en ella, antes la aborrecen como a fea material y huyen de ella como de dañoso contrario.[258]

This description of heroic love brings to mind Hughes de Saint Victor's detailed account of the movement of imagination. The remarkable difference is in Hebreo's readiness to accept the inherently good nature of this movement, which causes him to attribute positive spiritual qualities to "amor hereos". Various specific points can be made on the basis of the above quotation. Heroic, or spiritual, contemplation of intelligible forms in corporeal objects is considered to be directed to the proper end of man; in Hebreo's own words "propio fin". It can then be reasonably assumed that Hebreo's concept of the soul rests on the belief that it is immortal. This is confirmed in a previous discussion on this matter by Hebreo: "si el hombre no fuera verdaderamente inmortal, según el ánima intelectiva, que es el verdadero hombre, no desearan todos los hombres la inmortalidad como lo desean."[259] Thus, Hebreo echoes the fundamental Neoplatonic belief in the immortality of the soul, understood to be rational or intellective, not vegetal or animal. The intellective soul is understood to be man's true nature. In this sense Hebreo confirms the subjacent theme of the "dignitas hominis" in his work, and remains consistent with the basic tenets of Ficino's thought.

The second point to be raised concerning the aforementioned quotation 258, is that Hebreo is describing what he explicitly refers to as a movement based on perception. The particular trait of this

movement is that it enables the subject to apprehend the intelligible forms or species which animate material, or corporeal, objects. This movement is, irrefutably, imagination or phantasy informing the particular intellect of the divine reflection in corporeal objects. It is important to take a close look at Hebreo's choice of words which exposes a dialectically graduated movement. First he equates image and divine reflection: "corteza de lo incorpóreo, o sombra o imagen". That which is perceived is beauty or "hermosura", which is seen in bodies. These are the shell of that which is not corporeal, in other words, that which animates the body. This, in turn, is a shadow, which if it represents beauty is reflective of its source. This can only be God, as I have already determined concerning Hebreo's thought. Finally, as it is reflected in our potential intellect, which is a mirror, that shadow is an incorporeal image of the body perceived. Thus, the movement described is imagination or phantasy, and like "amor hereos" or melancholy, to which it is so closely related, it is considered very favourably in Hebreo's thought. Indeed, it is considered to be a spiritual cognitive virtue, as usual, subordinate to intellective reason:

> La imaginación y fantasía, que comprehende, discierne y piensa las cosas de los sentidos, conoce muchos más actos, oficios y casos particulares, graciosos y hermosos que mueven el ánima a delectación amorosa, y así se dice, una hermosa fantasía, un lindo pensamiento, una linda invención. Y mucho más conoce de lo hermoso la razón intelectiva, la cual comprehende gracias y hermosuras universales corpóreas e incorruptibles en los cuerpos particulares y corruptibles...[260]

Technically, on the definition of imagination and phantasy Hebreo is closer to the Aristotelian definition, and limits its transcendent role, which he subsequently attributes more to the intellective reason. This is a point that does not always remain clear in the course of the Dialoghi, since as we will see he does turn to the implications of Proclus' definition, when he refers to phantasy and implicitly

distinguishes it from imagination.

It is obvious from the function specifically attributed to imagination that Hebreo does not underestimate the power of corporeal sensation which informs the intellective soul. Like Ficino before him, Hebreo clearly states, after having given an ample description of the transcendent power of beauty, that the corporeal mixture of the soul is the source of its infelicity: "la mezcla de las cosas corpóreas impide la felicidad de nuestra ánima, privándola, con la luz sensual del rostro inferior, de la luz intelectual del rostro superior, que es la propia beatitud suya...."[261] His considerations on this problem rest entirely on the notion that the proper end of man, whose real nature is his intellective soul, is contemplation or union in God, which also represents a state of ascesis from the material world. Thus, Hebreo states that although God created man and woman for the propagation of the species, man's real purpose is to return to paradise. Therefore, he re-asserts his belief that although man is a composite of flesh and soul, the real nature of man is not this composite, but the soul itself which is divine in origin: "Dios hizo al hombre y a la mujer en forma que podían engendrar, pero el propio fin del hombre no es el engendrar sino el felicitarse en la contemplación y en el paraíso de Dios...."[262] Taking into account the limitations of the potential intellect, it is evident that the soul's contemplation will first be directed to the shadow of God as it is reflected on earth. This is the "luz sensual del rostro inferior" to which the soul is bound as we are told in 261 above. It must, therefore, be found in particular beauty. Hence, just as Hebreo states that love has its origin in reason, that is, in the particular intellect, so does he state that love proceeds from Beauty: "Yo no te he dicho que el amor consiste en la hermosura, sino

que procede de ella, y que el amor se halla donde esta la hermosura que lo causa."[263] Love is not beauty, but as in Ficino, it is a desire for union with the component Beauty-Good,[264] and since the source of all beauty is God, then love seeks union with God. Hebreo is then perfectly justified in his subsequent claim that the greatest love is not mundane, or perishable, but angelical love which remains in the direct contemplation of God's Beauty:

> el faltar la hermosura causa amor y deseo de ella, sino que principalmente cuando es muy conocido del amante a quien falta, y es juzgada por buena, extremada, deseable y bella, entonces la desea para gozarla, y cuanto el conocimiento de ella es muy claro en el amante tanto es más intenso el deseo y más perfecto el amor. Pues dime, ¡oh Sofía!, ¿en quién se halla este conocimiento más perfecto: en el mundo angélico o en el corruptible?[265]

Consequently, even in his treatment of Filo's intellectual reaction to Sophia's particular beauty, Hebreo is quick to point out that the beloved's image is a source of torment for the lover. Like Hughes de Saint Victor's metaphor of the shirt, the image is considered to be venemous. After an extensive description of the movements of the soul, in which he explains the similarity of the soul to the moon, thereby establishing a microcosmic elemental relation, Hebreo states that if the soul is excessively drawn to the beauty of corporeal images it loses its rational control. The result is that the individual is subject to the rapture of the flesh, which is insanity, which Hebreo equates to bestial existence:

> Cuando el ánima se inclina fuera de medida a las cosas materiales y corpóreas y se enloda en ellas; pierde la razón y la luz intelectual en todo; porque no solamente pierde la copulación divina y la contemplación intelectual, sino también su vida activa se hace en todo irracional y pura bestial, y la mente o razón no tiene lugar alguno ni aun en el uso de sus lascivias.[266]

Corporeal beauty can then be said to have a rapturous quality that causes the soul's intellective reason to become enamoured and forget

its original purpose. Since his metaphor is microcosmic Hebreo gives a medical explanation of the rapture. He repeats, although in less detail, Ficino's theory of the effect of imagination on the vital spirits, which described the intense presence of the beloved's image on the mirror of the soul, which resulted in a clouding of the cell of phantasy in the forelobe of the brain, and after having consumed all the vital clear spirits, caused a puddling of the mirror as long as the object was not present to the lover's sight. Hebreo repeats this explanation of the action of the "spiriti", which, indeed, he describes as a kind of rapture:

> Non è dunque giusta la tua querela, contra di me, che quando tu, o Sophia, m'hai veduto rapito dal pensiero senza sentimienti, era a l'hor' mia mente con tutta l'anima si ritirita a contemplare l'immagine di tua belleza,...
>
> Velenosa di tal veleno che manco se li truova remedio, che a niuno de corporali toschi, che cosi come il veleno và dritto al cuore, e di li non si parte fin' che habbi consumati tutti i spiriti, quali gli vanno dietro, et levando il polsi, et infrigidando gl'estremi, leua totalmente la vita, se qualche remedio esteriore non se gl'aprossima, cosi l'immagine tua è dentro de la mia mente, e di li mai si parte atrahendo a se tutte le virtù et spiriti, et con quelli insieme la vita totalmente leuerrebe, se non che tua persona esistente di fuora, mi recupera gli spiriti e sentimenti levandoli di mano la preda per intertenermi la vita.[267]

This is yet another instance of love understood to be immoderate cogitation on a particular object, initiated by the movement of imagination. As is characteristic of such occurrences, reason loses its dominion over the movement of the soul. It is a case of insanity brought about by a mundane rapture of the intellect, which Ficino also considered to be a kind of insanity, as I have previously indicated concerning the "Sixth Discourse" of the Commentarium in Convivium, quotation 136. The key to the above passage is that the beloved object must always be present. The eye of the soul, which for Hebreo is the potential intellect, is brought to contemplate corporeal images, and constantly requires the presence of the object in order to renew

the presence of the image on the mirror. As in Ficino, this movement of the soul is a distortion of phantasy or imagination, which should lead the lover on to divine contemplation. Hebreo, like his predecessors, makes a very important point on this matter concerning the role of reason. He explicitly states that those who have sufficient discretion do not allow phantasy to overcome reason: "No conviene que la fantasía impida a la razón en los tales como tu ¡oh Sofia!"[268] Reason is therefore overwhelmed and not present when the soul becomes enamoured of corporeal objects, but in divine love intellective reason necessarily retains its original guiding role by catching intelligible forms on its mirror and inciting the soul to seek the source of that beauty. Thus, by illumination in divine rapture the limits of potential intellect are transcended, but not absent.

It can consequently be said that reason has two qualities; it receives divine illumination, and it polishes the mirror of the soul so that it may be illuminated by strengthening volition. Thus, individual reason is always subject to rapture; should the soul incline to the flesh, it loses its dominion, but if the soul turns to its true end which is divine contemplation, reason is transcended. This transcendence is basically complementary, especially prior to illumination which is its end, because, then, intellective reason delights in objects that are proper to the soul, the individual intelligible forms. Intellective reason tends towards transcendence; it is readied for illumination if it acknowledges that the objects of its fantasy are but a reflection of the source of its love. When intellective reason acknowledges a transcendent end, even in particular objects, it becomes more than reason, much as Hughes de Saint Victor had described the ascent of the soul. Guided by the divine light, which it perceives reflected on earth, intellective reason moves the

soul to act heroically, and transforms corporeal objects into their images in God. It approximates divine Beauty by which the soul prepares to receive the gift of illumination that brings together intellective reason and right reason. Extraordinary reason is this movement towards illumination; it is reason transcending itself as it moves to the intellection of intelligible forms.

Ficino had defined both kinds of love, mundane and divine, as states of mental alienation, or folly. Hebreo repeats this, as the point of departure for the Dialoghi d'Amore, and even includes in this concept the theory of the two Venuses, which he seems to take to a much further extreme.[269] Differences between him and his immediate contemporaries seem to arise not only from his approach to the subject of love, but also from his use of language. It is principally in his definition of true love that this is evinced; here, the flaws of his terminology become acutely noticeable. True love must correspond to the true Felicity to which the soul aspires to return. As such, true love is love of God, who is also the true end of intellection. The human intellect being imperfect, it must be aided by divine grace, without this it is subject to fluctuations between sensuality and spiritual love of corporeal objects. The reality of the kinds of love that are directed to corporeal objects is not denied by Hebreo, as it was by Ficino, who implied that human love is not real but a counterfeit, even though he grudgingly acknowledged the necessity of procreation. What Hebreo states is not that love is never ruled by reason, but that human, or potential reason, acting under the guidance of its own lights is doomed to torment, which is a loss of reason's dominion, because of the soul's position in the body. On this matter, Hebreo is in agreement with Ficino and other "trattatisti". Phantasy or imagination, which are good in themselves, because they inform the soul of the

shadow of God's beauty, can, by function of their intermediate position, beguile reason and entice the soul to corporeal love. Thus, it is vital that the soul, or intellective reason, which is a potential intellect, recognize that this corporeal beauty is a reflection of intelligible Beauty. In order to do so, the potential intellect must turn by contrition to the agent intellect which will guide it. Hence, as I have stated previously, it turns to the light of "right reason" in the Augustinian sense, as it is reflected in this world. The awkwardness of Hebreo's vocabulary on this matter is evident:

> El perfecto y verdadero amor, cual es el que yo te tengo, es el padre del deseo e hijo de la razón y en mí lo produjo la derecha razón cognoscitiva, que conociendo haber en ti virtud, ingenio y gracia de no menos grande atracción, mi voluntad, deseando tu persona, que realmente fue juzgada por la razón ser en toda cosa bonísima y excelente y digna de ser amada, se aficionó; esta afición y amor hizo convertirme en ti, engendrándome deseo que tu te conviertas en mi.[270]

In this intitial definition of true love a possible source of confusion is the reference to "right reason", "la derecha razón cognoscitiva", which the Italian edition of 1535 registers as "la retta ragione conoscitiva".[271] This is not a reference to right reason as it is found in Ficino, it is not Augustinian illumination. To the contrary, Hebreo is here referring to natural reason acting alone. He is using the term "right reason" in its later scholastic sense, as it is frequently used by Ockhamists. It is intended to mean "by correct reasoning", that is, reason arrived at by a logical judgement.[272] As can be observed in the above quotation, after having stated that his love is the product of a correct reasoning, he lists his arguments. Further usage of this term in its Ockhamist sense is evident throughout the text of the Dialoghi d'Amore. A comparison of this passage with Hebreo's definition of bestial love contrasted with human or mixed love is quite enlightening:

Amore bestiale, amore humano, e amore divino, chiama bestiale l'amore escessivo de le cose corporee, non temperato dall'honesto, ne misurato della retta ragione, cosi ne le dilettationi soperchie carnali, come ne la cupidita, e avaritia dell'utile, e altre fantastiche ambitioni, pero che mancando in tutte queste la moderatione e temperamento dell' intelletto humano restano amori d'uno animale senza intelletto, et veri bestiali, et chiama amore humano quello che è circa le virtu temperatiue di tutti gl'atti sensuali, et fantastichi d'esso huomo et moderanti la lorro delettatione; Il qual' amore per havere la materia corporea, et la forma intellettuale, et honesta, il chiama amore humano per essere composto l'huomo di corpo et intelletto; Et chiama amore diuino l'amore de la sapientia, et dell' eterne cognitioni, il quale per esser tutto intellettuale, honesto, et tutto formale senza compagnia di materia alcuna corporea; il chiama Diuino, però che in questo solo gl'huomini sonno participi de la diuina belleza.[273] (underlining mine)

In this quotation divine love, which should be explicitly related to right reason in its Augustinian sense, is not. Instead, one finds that it is associated with measure and right reasoning used to restrain bestial love. In a subsequent phrase this function is attributed to "the moderation and temperance of human intellect". As in his definition of true love, Hebreo uses the term "right reason" to refer to correct reasoning which moderates or tempers the activity of the soul, and is directed to the proper preservation of the body. Hebreo confirms this in his definition of ordinary reason: "El intento de la primera es de regir y conservar al hombre en vida honesta, de donde todas las otras cosas se enderezan a este fin; y todo lo que a la buena vida humana impide, lo desvía y reprueba la razón."[274] Clearly then, this kind of "right reason" does not have a transcendental function, it only helps the individual make sound moral choices.

On the basis of these premisses the conclusions reached by Hebreo concerning reason are logical. Natural reason can shew the lover the proper object which he must love. It can discern and judge individual beauty, but more than that is needed to raise the soul to divine contemplation. This entails a logical concatenation. If love is a desire to unite with the beautiful object, and if that particular object sensorially perceived is bound in flesh, it follows that

natural reason, acting on its own light and turned to that particular object so intently that it does not recognize the source of that beauty, will lead the soul to seek union with the object, and since the object is physical, that union will be of a physical nature. This is intellective reason that turns its face strictly to the information that it receives from the senses. If it does so intellective reason ceases to tend to the right preservation of the individual, and thus, it looses its dominion over the lover's will. In this situation both the soul and its eye, which is intellective reason, fall. It is then true that love becomes a state of rapture, or alienation, beyond the control of natural reason. On the other hand, Divine love is also a state of rapture; since the agent intellect is greater than potential intellect, natural reason is raised and transcended by divine reason. Thus, Hebreo correctly states that love is a state of rapture, or alienation, beyond the control of natural reason, or the potential intellect, regardless of whether this love is virtuous or non-virtuous: "el desenfrenamiento no es propio del amor lascivo; antes tiene una misma propiedad con cualquiera eficaz y grande amor séase honesto o deshonesto."[275] The difference between honest or dishonest love lies in that all love in which natural reason, or potential intellect, is not turned towards the light of the agent intellect is a kind of insanity, as Ficino had defined it.

The key to Hebreo's reasoning is not that he condones love as a torment when it is dishonest, but that both kinds of love are affected by "furore", worldly or divine. Dishonest love is a misdirection of natural reason which does not recognize the source of the beauty it perceives. As such, both kinds of love are manifestations of melancholy. This is evident in the passages immediately following Hebreo's definition of true love. Hence, in a description of the

effects of love Hebreo explicitly refers to the source of these loves as "furor". The picture which he traces of the lover is that of a melancholic individual. In order to understand this passage correctly, that is to say, in its context, one has to realize that this description is made prior to the introduction of the concept of "extraordinary reason", and it corresponds to the portrait of melancholy as a negative quality, which is to say, an illness. To the contrary "extraordinary reason" is "melancolia generosa", which is the quality of heroes and great men,[276] as is evident from my previous discussion of "heroic love" in Hebreo (quotations 256 to 258). Thus, what this description of the melancholy lover has in common with "melancolia generosa", is that it has the potential to become a heroic virtue, and that it is a state of "furore":

el verdadero amor a la razón y a la persona hace fuerza con admirable violencia e increible furor, y más que otro impedimento humano perturba la mente donde esta el juicio, y hace perder la memoria de toda otra cosa y de sí solo la llena, y en todo hace el hombre ajeno de sí mismo.[277] (underlining mine)

Up to this point Hebreo is describing the state of folly engendered by immoderate cogitation on the beloved object, which in this case is indeterminate. The effects which he associates with this rapture are normally associated with "melancolia negra", which is the illness of sensual love. They are, however, sufficiently unspecific to be attributable to any form of intense contemplation:

Hácele enemigo de placer y de compañía, amigo de soledad, melancólico, lleno de pasiones, rodeado de penas, atormentado de afflicción, martirizado de deseo, sustentado de esperanza, instigado de desesperación, fatigado de pensamientos, congojado de crueldad, afligido de sospechas, asaetado de celos, atribulado sin descanso, trabajado sin reposo, acompañado siempre de dolor, lleno de suspiros, de respectos y desdenes, que jamás le faltan.[278]

In their context these traits of the melancholy lover are consequent to a loss of natural reason. It is at this point that Hebreo alters

the direction of his logic. This love, which overpowers the will, can be sensual; however, he immediately points out that love that is born of reason, that is, that has been chosen by correct reasoning, is not satisfied by sensual delight because its proper function is to seek its end in that which is spiritual. This leads him to describe what is essentially "heroic love". The torment which the lover endures is not caused by lust, but by the presence of the soul in the body which reflects the soul's beauty, and this situation renders complete penetration or union between the souls of the lover and the beloved impossible:

> Porque el tal amor es deseo de unión perfecta del amante con la persona amada, la cual no puede ser sino con la total penetración del uno en el otro. Esto en los ánimos que son espirituales es posible, porque los espíritus incorpóreos con los mentales y eficacísimos efectos pueden conpenetrarse... Pero en los diversos cuerpos que cada uno de ellos requiere propio lugar señalado, esta tal unión y penetración no se puede alcanzar, respecto de la que se desea, deja después de alcanzada, mas ardiente el deseo de aquella unión que perfectamente no se puede conseguir. Y procurando siempre la mente del amante la entera conversión en la persona amada, deja la propia, viviendo siempre con mayor aflicción y pena por el defecto de la unión, la cual ni la razón, ni la voluntad, ni la prudencia pueden limitar ni resistir.[279]

The perfect union which is referred to above has to be of a spiritual nature. It seems to me that Hebreo's reasoning is that the noble purpose sought in this love, with its very impossibility, endows it with a heroic dimension. It is love which seeks a spiritual end since it is drawn to the spiritual beauty of the beloved. Thus, this love which is governed by extraordinary reason seeks an end in the shadow of Beauty, and it is doomed to failure because it recognizes only imperfectly the source of its passion. Extraordinary reason is therefore not right reason, but reason moved by the light of right reason towards love of the divine through beauty which is perceived in particular objects. In this sense it is reason yearning for right reason. It predisposes the lover for divine rapture. Hebreo can

rightly say that extraordinary reason is far more worthy than ordinary reason,[280] because it is more than natural reason; it is a transcendent reason.

The two ensuing dialogues of Hebreo's work are directed to the didactic end of making the lover realize the true aim and source of his love. The concluding paragraphs of the Dialoghi d'Amore confirm this intention. Although Hebreo had previously pointed out the divine nature of beauty as it is perceived in this world, it is here that the various strands of his reasoning come together in a defense of divine love. In fairly explicit terms, Hebreo explains that the beauty of the beloved draws the lover upwards to the apprehension of the divine face or image. Even though Hebreo states that divine rapture transcends phantasy, the spiritual beauty to which he refers, and which serves as a catalyst for this love, is inevitably anchored in the perception of the "image" of the beloved. Imagination is then at the origin of Hebreo's description of love. This is rendered particularly true by the very fact that his entire construct is based on the premise that the soul is made in the image of God: "Siendo nuestra ánima imagen pintada de la suma hermosura."[281] This concept is axiomatic to the lover's experience of the beloved's beauty, since beauty is the manner in which the body reflects the soul. The beloved is, therefore, an image of divine beauty: "porque aquella persona es imagen de la divina hermosura."[282] The function of this beauty is not to be an end in itself; it serves to recall to the lover's soul that it itself proceeds from Divine Beauty: "Y la imagen de aquella persona amada en la mente del amante aviva con su hermosura la hermosura divina latente."[283] Through contemplation the lover is drawn upwards to a state of quasi-divine rapture: "Y por esto llega el amante a ser tan intenso, ardiente y eficaz que roba los sentidos,

la fantasía y toda la mente, como lo haría esa hermosura divina cuando retirase a sí en contemplación al ánima humana."[284] The problem of grace acting directly, that is to say, illuminating the lover, still remains. As in Hughes de Saint Victor, the movement of the rational soul towards God, also brings God to move downwards towards the soul. Thus, love of particular beauty is transcended:

> no puedes negar que la suma hermosura divina, que es mayor y más excelente que todas en infinito, no sea atraída del amor de una mente humana baja y finita, si ella le ama a reamarla y a retirarla en su felicísima delectación unitiva mediante el amor que aquélla le tiene.[285]

By the love that we have of His Creation, we are drawn to God, and He to us. This mystic vision has strong pantheistic overtones in Hebreo's thought, as I have noted above. Yet, this is the basis of the Dialoghi d'Amore, which presents a theory of love which is more dualist than Ficino's.

Although it is not specifically conceived of in a Christian context, Hebreo's theory of love is directed towards a predominantly Christian public, and like that of Ficino, it sets its ultimate goal in a mystical union with God. This confirms Hebreo's definition of the proper end of man which is, to seek contemplative union. This definition is also affected by a conception of the nature of the soul that is intimately associated with the "dignitas hominis", the soul is of divine origin and is the nature of man. Contemplation, in its various manifestations, is then central to Hebreo's discussion of love. As I have noted previously, love is always a "furore" in Hebreo's system. The point of departure for his description of the lover is based on the standard "mediaeval" conception of melancholy as "melancolia negra". This is altered by the introduction of the corrective principle of extraordinary reason which is the source of "melancolia generosa" and is a predominant factor in Hebreo's positive

understanding of "amor hereos" as heroic love. Now, Hebreo does not, to my knowledge, introduce all the complexities of Aristotle's Problem XXX, i in one central explicit discussion. However, this does not overrule the strong possibility that he was very conscious of all their implications. Hebreo was undoubtedly familiar with Ficino's Commentarium in Convivium, and consequently should have known the fundamental concepts of melancholy, if not their sources. A point of reference in Hebreo's Dialoghi d'Amore for understanding his vision of the two kinds of "furore" is his discussion of the cosmic influences of Saturn. He devotes an extensive passage to the bipolarity of Saturn, which he associates with melancholy, and, hence, with contemplation:

> Hace los hombres en quien domina melancólicos, tristes, pesados y tardos y de color de tierra, inclinados a la agricultura, edificios y oficios terrenos; y el planeta domina también todas estas cosas terrenas.... Demás de esta, de grande ingenio, profunda cogitación, ciencia verdadera, consejos rectos y constancia de ánimo, por la mixtura de la naturaleza, del padre celeste con la madre terrena. Y finalmente, de la parte del padre da la divinidad del ánima, y por parte de la madre la fealdad y ruina del cuerpo.[286]

This quotation sums up the spiritual evolution of the lover described in the Dialoghi d'Amore, from being an insane individual prone to jealousy and torment, to a beatific union. The contrary nature of Saturn in this passage is evident. The interesting point is that, although Saturn is not directly linked with love, one notes that after having pointed out the negative aspects of "melancolia negra", Hebreo passes directly onto the traits of "melancolia generosa" which evince the noble powers of the soul, and that the opposition between the two is immediately associated with the duality of the human form. This duality is associated with "Saturn-melancholy" and the earthly element, opposed to "Saturn-melancholy" father of the soul's divinity. Here the two aspects of Saturn are brought together; Saturn as a

generator of life is associated with the figure of the father who imparts the spirit which animates matter, and as the earthy element Saturn is the corruptible matter which receives the spirit and is also considered to be the mother figure. Similarly, the two kinds of melancholy represent these two directions which Saturn can take. Hence, just as "melancolia generosa" is the source of all noble aspirations that stem from profound cogitation, or contemplation, turned to spiritual ends, so is extraordinary reason, which is reason moving the individual soul back to its origins. It is, therefore, contemplative reason that turns the soul to the light of God. Hebreo's assimilation of Ficino's theory of the "spiriti" combined with the concept of melancholy, serves to articulate a theory of love in which imagination and phantasy play a key role in raising the soul to its place of origin. This love, "heroic love", which is guided by contemplative reason turning towards the illumination of right reason, has the same ultimate intention as that of Ficino; were it a Christian work, one would have to say that it has an evangelical intention. It seeks to turn the attention of man to God by awakening his consciousness of the presence of grace in nature.

Hebreo's Dialoghi d'Amore are, therefore, quite compatible with the spirit that animates the works of his Christian humanist contemporaries. Although his use of technical terms differs, it can be said that reason does, in fact, guide love in his Dialoghi d'Amore. The role of reason in Hebreo's work is basically not that different from that which we find in Bembo's Gli Asolani. It will suffice for the purpose of our discussion to turn to the third book of Gli Asolani, that is, to the speech of Lavinello, which has a profound influence on the Cortegiano and Garcilaso and Boscán, in order to understand just how Bembo conceived of the role of reason. However, in order to

establish a proper perspective one has to understand the positions of Perrotino and Gismondo. Before entering into the particulars it is best to sum up the three points of view, as they are traditionally understood. Perrotino discusses love as mediaeval moralists do; it is considered to be a source of sorrow, because it is lust. Gismondo articulates an Epicurean praise of love which is diametrically opposed to Perrotino's speech. Lavinello's point of view begins by conceding that both Perrotino and Gismondo are right, and turns to the tale of the hermit in order to show them that they are also wrong because they have failed to acknowledge the real source of their love.

Perrotino's speech can best be understood to be a description of love as "melancolia negra". It is love as a mundane folly, and it is treated as a kind of insanity, a point which Gismondo repeatedly turns to in order to establish that Perrotino's love is not love. This attitude basically corresponds to Ficino's description of bestial love, but it should be noted that in Lavinello's speech Bembo does not entirely condemn Perrotino. The latter's love is clearly defined in his own description of the lover's immoderate cogitation:

> Che comunque s'addormenta il corpo, corre l'animo e rientra subitamente ne suoi dolori; e con immaginazioni paurose, e con più nuove guise d'angustia tiene i sentimenti sgomentati insidiosamente e tribolati: onde o si turba il sonno e rompesi appena incomunicato, o se pure il corpo fiacco e fievole, si come di quello bisognoso, il si ritiene, sospira il vago cuore sognando; triemano gli spiriti solleciti, duolsi l'anima maninconiosa, piangono gli occhi cattivi avvivezzi a non mendormendo che vegghiando la immaginazion fiera e triste seguire.[287]

The immoderate cogitation of the lover is bent on the imagination's obsession with the corporeal image of the beloved. Perrotino's description of the lover's torment corresponds to that of "melancolia negra". Melancholy and imagination, which is the source of the former, have the negative effect of robbing the lover of his reason, or as Hughes de Saint Victor would have it, reason becomes excessively

enamoured of the image it perceives. The description of the effects of that folly does not entirely follow that of mediaeval moralists such as Andreas Capellanus, but echoes again Ficino's theory of phantasy distorted by a clouding of the vital spirits. This description also corresponds with Hebreo's portrait of the lover subjected to torment when he follows the dictates of natural reason alone. In all of these cases imagination misdirected is the source of "melancolia negra".

Gismondo's repudiation of Perrotino's definition of love as an illness, is based on the notion that love is a natural affection which is good when it is guided by reason. Imagination in this context is granted a much greater function, because it is the source of the lover's joy. In this sense, it is love that proceeds from vision, and therefore, claims to be originally contemplative. However, as in the texts of the mediaeval moralists in which irony determines the authorial intention, one has to consider what is being contemplated and to what end. As one can recall, Ficino had made an extensive case concerning the nature of beauty as an intelligible form, and gone to particular pains to contrast his definition which is based on the immortality of the soul, with the standard Stoic definition, which considered beauty to be based on the harmonious relation of parts.[288] In this sense beauty was considered to be a physical accident of the object perceived. This position is contrary to that of Ficino. Gismondo's understanding of beauty corresponds to the Stoic conception, and also to the description of beauty and imagination found in Andreas Capellanus' De Amore.[289] It is described not as imagination, which it "de facto" purports to be, but like in the De Amore, as a thought (pensieri-cogitatio):

Le quali dolcezze tuttavia quante sieno, non dirò io già: che non

farei a raccontarle più bastante, che io mi fossi a noverar le stelle del cielo; ma quali se noi vorremo in qualche parte dirittamente riguardare; quanto diletto è da credere che sia dun gentile amante il correre alla sua donna in un punto col pensiero, e mirarla, per molto che egli le sia lontano, ad una ad una tutte le sue belle parti ricercando? Quanto poi ne' costumi di lei reintrato la dolcezza considerare la cortesia, la leggiadria, il senno, la virtù, l'animo, e le sue belle parti?[290]

This interpretation of the lover's meditation on the lady is basically sensual. Although it refers to the praises of the lady's moral virtue, this is understood as pertaining to the courtly etiquette that goes with the "cortesia" and makes the lady all the more desirable. The aim of this contemplation of the lady is sensual and it ultimately requires the physical presence of the lady. Some concessions are made beyond the physical aspirations of this love, but they are subordinate to the procreative ends of the lover. The function of reason, as it is understood by Gismondo, is to restrain the excessive sensuality of the lover. Gismondo turns to the standard explanation of the two faces of the soul in order to establish the differences between lust and his sensual love guided by reason:

Sono adunque due, si come di sopra s'e detto le strade dell'animo o Donne; l'una della ragione, perlaquale ogni naturale movimento s'incammina; l'altra della perturbazioni, per cui hanno i non naturali a loro traboccamenti la via.[291]

Reason used in this way is not transcendental; it is directed strictly to the preservation of the species. This is simply natural reason. The role attributed to it in the second book of Gli Asolani is not incompatible to that which it has in Hebreo's Dialoghi d'Amore. What can be logically argued, however, is that Bembo devotes a larger section of his work to the defense of this aspect of love than does Hebreo, undoubtedly because it was a position in defense of love with which he expected his readers to be more familiar, and which, after having exposed it, he could undermine better in Lavinello's speech.

Nevertheless, this does not affect substantially the common background present in both Hebreo and Bembo.

Perrotino and Gismondo expressed two extreme points of view concerning love, the former describing it as an illness and the latter as a boon. Lavinello's point of view is intermediate; it accepts that love can be either good or evil according to the end to which man uses it.[292] Perrotino and Gismondo's statements concerning love are misleading, because for them love does not have a transcendental end. Thus, Bembo's introduction to book three of Gli Asolani sets the tone for Lavinello's speech by focusing the attention of the reader on two points, the immortality of the soul and our reason's insufficiency. Perrotino was conscious of the soul's immortality and divine nature, but love, which he understands to be physical, seems incompatible with the soul's dignity.[293] Perrotino's view is excessively dualist and he is not conscious of the presence of grace in nature, and hence misdirects his love. This is the object of Bembo's statements on the insufficiency of natural reason, which without the guidance of faith, or the light of right reason, cannot perceive properly the spiritual essence of things which lies hidden by nature in the material forms: "che ci tenga la pura midolla delle cose così riposta, e di mille menzonge, quasi di mille buccie, coperta e fasciata."[294] The problem of discerning the "pure marrow" of things, that is, their spiritual essence, is an evangelical problem (see note 59) of seeking grace in nature. The reader's attention is turned towards a different question of epistemology than that concerning Perrotino's and Gismondo's theory of love. Difficulty in perceiving the spiritual participation of bodies in grace, arises not from a flaw in these bodies, but out of the weakness of our reason or judgement:

che la debolezza de nostri giudizi è molta; ... Che se alla debolezza de nostri giudizj s'aggiugne la oscurità del vero, che naturalmente pare che sia in tutte le cose, vedranno chiaro questi cotali niuna altra differenza essere tra essi, e quelli, che di nulla cercano...."[295]

Bembo clearly understands human judgement, "giudizio", to be natural reason. In this sense, it is the equivalent of Leone Hebreo's "retta ragione", as a logical judgement whose validity is limited to the immediate, or untranscendental, circumstance. As such, it is necessary that natural reason seek the enlightenment of right reason in order to find the exact truth, which is a spiritual truth beyond the reach of the eye of flesh. Hence, natural reason turns to the immanent light that animates bodies and is perceived only with the eye of the soul. The weakness of natural reason which is referred to above is that by its intranscendental nature it remains attached to corporeal objects, and is subject to incline to the imperfection of matter. This weakness can only be overcome when reason turns entirely to the light of faith.

Lavinello's speech concerns this turning of reason, and the arguments are developed along two principal lines, that form two distinct sections of the speech. The first is a praise of human contemplative love, which Hebreo would equate with moral love. The other is an exhortation to love of God, involving an extensive apology for the love of the divine essence present in corporeal objects; in this sense it is the "heroic love" of Hebreo that turns the souls of men towards the love of God. The latter, which is the more important of the two, is the message of evangelical love. Thus, as in Hebreo, one finds that Bembo actually divides love into four kinds: sensual, mixed or human, contemplative, and divine. Contemplative love can be broken down into two kinds, corporeal contemplation, and incorporeal contemplation. One can, therefore, say that without doing so explicitly, Bembo actually follows the Ficinian divisions. Contemplative

love in the first part of Lavinello's speech depends on reason and will, and in particular on the latter. Like Hebreo, and Ficino before him, Lavinello defines love as a desire: "ogni amore, ed ogni disio sono quel medesmo e l'uno e l'altro. E questi sono in noi di due maniere solamente, o naturali, o di nostra volontà."[296] This desire is subject to choice, and the latter is controlled by natural reason. Lavinello's argument is that the quality of the desire, or love, is determined by the correct judgement that the individual makes of the object of his love, which affects his choice. Desires are of two kinds, as the quotation above indicates. Natural desires are those that are directed to the preservation of the individual. They are good as long as they are not abused. Desires of the will can incline the soul to good or evil, because they involve a choice which is based on human reason, which is inherently defective. Thus, desire may be good or bad according to the goal set by the will:

> ... perciocchè la nostra volontà può ingannarsi, e più sovente il fa, che io non vorrei, e buoni, e rei esser possono altresì, come sono i fini, a cui ella dirizza il disio.... Perchè esso, e buono, e reo esser può secondo la qualità del fine, che dalla nostra volontà gli è dato.[297]

The quality of the end determines that of the desire. It is on the basis of this premiss that Bembo recalls that man was created to fulfil a more lofty end than animals, and therefore, his end is transcendent, it must fulfil the nature of the soul.

This forms the theoretical background from which Lavinello turns to a direct criticism of Gismondo's description of beauty. Like Ficino, Lavinello stresses the importance of the first two senses, sight and hearing, which are the most spiritual ones. Thus, he embarks on a defense of the definition of love as a desire for beauty, and adopts the definition of beauty as being primarily intellectual, not

physical as Gismondo had claimed. The latter's notion of beauty is sensual, and this conforms with his conception of love. It is not like the virtuous love of Lavinello which is a tempered desire for beauty of the mind as it is reflected by the body. This is what Lavinello explains to Gismondo:

> La qual belleza che cosa è, se tu con tanta diligenza per lo addietro avessi d'intendere procacciato, con quanta ci hai le parti della tua bella donna voluto jeri dipignere sottilmente; nè come fai, ameresti ti già; nè quello, che ti cerchi amando, aresti agli altri lodato, come hai.... E adunque il buono amore desiderio di bellezza tale, quale tu vedi, e d'animo parimente, e di corpo; ed a lei siccome a suo vero obietto, bate e stende le sue ali per andare. Al qual volo egli due finestre ha; l'una che a quella dell'animo lo manda, e questa è l'udire; l'altra che a quella del corpo lo porta, e questa è il vedere.[298]

This love then partakes equally of the body and the soul, like Hebreo's moral love it is not transcendental: "Hay otros que más verdaderamente pueden llamarse hombres, porque la cara del ánima que esta hacia el entendimiento esta no menos llena de lumbre que la que esta hacia el cuerpo."[299] Lavinello's love depends extensively on sight and hearing, and is, therefore, predominantly contemplative. One has to note, however, that Bembo leaves certain aspects of this contemplation somewhat unclear, for although Lavinello's love is directed to the soul of the lady, sight remains anchored in the corporeal form of beauty. This love is therefore imperfect and not truly virtuous. Bembo awaits until the speech of the hermit in order to make the transition from the corporeal image to the incorporeal image, although the poems that are found between the two sections provide some preparation for his definite statement on the divine nature of beauty.

The theory of love presented by Lavinello lies between the two extremes possible in love; it is tempered love. As such it serves to turn the soul towards the enjoyment of beauty and is a first step in the preparation of the soul to receive illumination. It fulfils the

capacities of natural reason to their limit; beyond this, the lover must be moved by the light of right reason. For Lavinello all love that is not contemplative is evil, and he only grudgingly admits procreation:

> Perchè se il buono amore, come io dissi, è di bellezza disio, e se alla bellezza altro di noi e delle nostre sentimenta non ci scorge, che l'occhio, e l'orrechio, ed il pensiero; tutto quello, che è dagli amanti con gli altri sentimenti cercato fuori di ciò che per sostegno della vita si procaccia, non è buono amore, ma è malvagio: e tu in questa parte amatore di bellezza non sarai, o Gismondo, ma di sozze cose.[300]

Gismondo's love is considered to be love of the flesh, which is matter, and therefore, ugly. The implication, in Lavinello's speech that beauty is animated by the soul, is that love is directed strictly to that particular source of beauty. The poems that follow do much to clarify Lavinello's position and its posterior implications. In particular a passage in the third poem "Da poi ch'Amor in tanto non si stanca" articulates two basic propositions inherent to Lavinello's theory: that the soul is in a fallen state, and that the vision of the lady causes the soul to recall its former state of grace prior to its "descensus ad inferos". These are the elements that temper the lover:

> E così d'ogni parte si disgombra
> Per lo vostro apparir noja, e tormento.
> L'altro è, quando parlar madonna sento:
> Che d'ogni bassa impresa mi ritoglie;
> E quel laccio discoglie,
> Che gli animi stringendo a terra inclina
> Tal; ch'io mi fido ancora,
> Quand'io sarò di questo carcer fora,
> Far di me stesso a la morte rapina;[301]

This love aims to transcend death, and therefore, to free the soul from necessity, since matter is subject to death, but the soul is not. This is the underlying spiritual element in Lavinello's love. It rests, however, on a contradiction, because it does not clearly identify the source of this beauty, and consequently, it is subject to the

vicissitudes of natural reason. The hermit's function is to clarify this point, by fulfilling Ficino's intent to make men aware of the source of that beauty as the only true end of their love.

The hermit's speech is in keeping with the intentions of Ficino's Commentarium in Convivium, but it leaves the reader with a sense of incompletion. A most important aspect of Gli Asolani's shortcomings is that as a social treatise it fulfils the obligation of showing the reader the correct path of love, but at no time does it actually embark on an explanation of the complex problem of "furore", or divine illumination, and "melancolia generosa". The elements are there, and exemplified in the person of the hermit, but they are not explained. Thus, Bembo will go to extensive lengths to show how the lover must move towards God, but perhaps for reasons of orthodoxy he subtly omits any reference to God's movement towards man.[302] It can be argued that illumination is the ultimate aim of the hermit's description of heroic love, as it is found in Castiglione's ficticious speech of Bembo which is based on a reading of Gli Asolani. Nevertheless, illumination is discreetly reserved for the hermit whose ascesis causes him to lead an evangelical life of charity and poverty, and although his illumination is not described, he is a contemplative individual, and during his conversation with Lavinello he has moments of ecstasy. He is, then, the living example of the superior melancholic to be imitated. He is Bembo's Christian Socrates.

Lavinello's speech and his description of love had placed great emphasis on reason as a guiding factor in his human contemplative love. The hermit's speech serves to urge the reader to place his reason in the guidance of divine light, that is, to acquiesce to faith. Unlike Perrotino and Gismondo, Lavinello made no references to imagination, although his definition of love based on the two spiritual senses

implied the participation of imagination. It is on the basis of the problem of imagination that the hermit corrects Perrotino and Gismondo, and develops the spiritual aspects of Lavinello's theory. In order to do so, the hermit returns to the fundamental points raised by Bembo's introduction of the third book, the insufficiency of natural reason in comparison to God's Providence:

> Tanto è largo e cupo il pelago della divina provvidenza, o Figliuolo, che la nostra umanità in esso mettendosi nè termine alcuno vi truova, ne in mezzo può fermarsi: perciocchè vela di mortale ingegno tanto oltre non porta; e fune di nostro giudicio, per molto che ella vi si stenda, non basta a pigliar fondo: in maniera, che bene si veggono molte cose tutto di avvenire volute, ed ordinate da lei: ma come ella avvengano, o a che fine, noi non sappiamo: si come ora, in questo mio conoscerti, diche ti maravigli, è avvenuto.[303] (underlining is mine)

The hermit begins his speech by pointing out to Lavinello a very important factor in the insatisfactory nature of his contemplation of corporeal objects, that our humanity, that is, our rational soul, cannot fathom the bounds of things of its own power; nor can it rest in the middle. The latter is in fact the position advocated by Lavinello.[304] Love therefore cannot rest on the guidance of reason alone. The soul's instability, and the weakness of reason, will eventually cause this love to incline to the possession of the corporeal objects it contemplates.

Lavinello's definition of love as a desire for beauty is consequently questioned by the hermit. It is considered to be the source of corruption in his love, because desire involves a lack of the object that is coveted, and hence, a propensity to possess or unite with that object, which in this case is particular corporeal beauty. The hermit, therefore, denies the validity of this definition in order to re-assert the more orthodox definition that love is an affection of the will, and not a desire. This, of course, is not essentially contradictory to the theory of Ficino, and represents only

a temporary shift in emphasis in Gli Asolani. Lavinello's definition does not delineate clearly enough the role played by imagination or phantasy, and how the lover is to distinguish between corporeal and incorporeal beauty. As we have seen above (298), Lavinello attempted to distinguish on the basis of the senses. The distinction drawn by the hermit is made by discussing the problem of intellection and volition. As faculties of the soul both are divided into three parts, in which imagination is "the last echo of the intellect", as Proclus has defined phantasy.[305] Imagination is then again the ambivalent source of love, which can be either good or bad. In a parallel construction love is also conceived of as the last vestige of the will equivalent to imagination:

> Perciocchè v'è primieramente l'intelleto; che è la parte de lei acconcia, e presta allo 'ntendere, e può nondimeno ingannarsi: V'è per secondo lo intendere, che io dico: il quale non sempre ha luogo; che non sempre s'intendono le intelligibili cose: anzi non l'ha egli, se non tanto, quanto esso intelletto si muove, e volge con profitto d'intorno a quello, che a lui è proposto per intendersi e per sapersi: Evvi dopo queste ultimamente, e di lorno nasce, quella cosa o luce, o immaginne, o verità, che dir la vogliamo; che a noi bene intesa si dimostra, frutto e parto delle due primiere: laqual tuttavia se è male intesa, nè verità, nè immagine, nè luce dire si può; ma caligine e abbagliamento, e menzogna: Così nè più nè meno sono nella nostra voglievole parte del medesimo animo pure tre spezie per gli loro ufficj propria, e dall'altre due partita ciascuna. Conciossa cosa che v'è di prima la volontà: la qual può e volere parimente, e disvolere, fonte e capo delle due seguenti: E che v'è dopo questa il volere, di cui parlo: e ciò è il disporsi a mettere in opera essa volontà o molto o poco, o ancora contrariamente; che è disvolendo: E che v'è per ultimo quello, che di queste due si genera: il che se piace, amore è detto: se despiace, odio per lo suo contrario necessariamente si convien dire.[306]
> (underlining is mine)

This forms the keystone of the hermit's argument. It serves to explain why Lavinello's temperate love is intermediate. Simultaneously, it introduces the theme of "melancolia generosa", for if Perrotino's love was "melancolia negra" stemming from the dark imagination (see 287), the hermit's heroic love is based on a correct appreciation of the imagination. Thus, in the love of corporeal images the intellect and

the will remain uncertain concerning the veracity of the object perceived, and therefore, can come to hate the object that has captivated them. Here, as elsewhere in the works of his predecessors, Bembo is confronted with the problem of the imagination's ambivalence. His solution is found in the power of the free will to enable the individual to make a choice, which can incline the soul either upwards to the love of God, or to the love of matter. The will can orient the soul either to the life of the senses or to that of reason. The latter can then control the senses with the aid of the will, and guide the soul to the recognition of true Beauty. The hermit's argument runs full circle, and he returns to Ficino's standard definition of love as a desire for union with true Beauty:

> Perciocchè non è il buono amore disio solamente di bellezza, come tu stimi: ma è della vera bellezza disio, e la vera bellezza non è umana, e mortale, che mancar possa, ma è divina, e immortale: alla qual perraventura ci possono queste belleze innalzare, che tu lodi, dove elle da noi sieno in quella maniera, che esser debono, riguardate.[307]

The hermit's argument is basically face-saving, that is, it sets forth a more "institutional" understanding of grace, because it claims to place knowledge of God before love, since love is subordinate to reason. In spite of this, Bembo returns to the evangelical orientation of his sources to expound the basic concepts of Dionysius the Areopagite which Ficino had adopted. Particular beauty reflects Divine Beauty, and men who seek it in this life, leave this mortal life to become themselves god-like: "Perciocchè iddij sono quegli uomini, Figliuolo, che le cose mortali sprezzano, come divini, ed alle divine aspirano, come mortali."[308] This divine state, which is heroic love, as it is understood by Hebreo and Ficino, is also reason moving, or oriented, towards divine light. It is reason that becomes more than human reason, because it makes men god-like. The subsequent

parts of the hermit's speech are a defense of the two principles subjacent to this proposition. These are: the concept that the soul is divine and that it represents the true nature of man, and that God is reflected by the Creation. Owing to their divine nature the souls are immortal and seek divine Beauty in the individual objects that surround us, but since these are composite and imperfect the souls are never satisfied:

> Essi perciò che sono immortali, di cosa, che mortal sia, non si possono contentare. Ma perciocchè si come dal sole prendono tutte le stelle luce, cosi quanto è di bello oltra lei dalla divina eterna bellezza prende qualità, e stato, quando di queste alcuna ne vien loro innanzi, bene piacciono esse loro, e volentieri le mirano, in quanto di quella sono immagini, e luminicini: ma non se ne contentano, nè sene soddisfano tuttavia, pure della eterna, e divina, di cui esse sovvengono loro, e che a cercar di se medesima sempre con occulto pungimento gli stimola, disiderevoli, e vaghi.[309]

Souls evidently perceive particular beauty as a reflection of divine Beauty, that is, as an image conceived by the senses. It is, therefore, a problem of transcending this imagination. The hermit's speech culminates in an exhortation to seek a world free of the necessity that is inherent in the corporeal world. This entails a description of angelical love, and therefore, the truly contemplative love of the hermit does lead to illumination. His account of that which is apprehended by the "eyes of the soul" is explicitly given in terms of divine light emanating from the First Cause:

> Perciocchè certa cosa è tra coloro: che usati sono di mirare non meno con gli occhi dell'animo, che del corpo: oltra questo sensibile e material mondo, ... essere un' altro mondo ancora nè materiale nè sensibile, ma fuori d'ogni maniera di questo separato, e puro che intorno il sopra gira; e che è da lui cercato sempre, e sempre ritrovato parimente, diviso da esso tutto, e tutto in ciascuna sua parte dimorante, divinissimo, intendentissimo, illuminatissimo... [310]

The intelligible world is perceived first in the material world in which it is reflected, the eyes of the soul seek the source of this reflection, and it must be supposed that the enjoyment of that light

is the goal of the soul.

The contemplation of intelligibles is compatible with, and arrived at by, the guidance of natural reason, which turns the face of the soul towards the face of God reflected in the Creation. Natural reason, aided by the will, polishes the mirror of the soul, and arrives at a better intelligence of that which it contemplates and be fit to receive grace. This vision is not subject, however, to reason, any more than it is in Hebreo's Dialoghi d'Amore. It is accessible to the soul only when natural reason is transcended by right reason. Bembo clearly conforms with the request of Ficino, to exhort man to turn his affections to the real source of particular beauties that enthrall him in this world, that is, to God. Gli Asolani is concerned with making courtiers conscious of the divine nature of the soul and its true aspirations. Bembo's intention is then beyond the limits of natural reason, as he repeatedly stresses himself.

The expression of Ficinian love-concepts in Gli Asolani is severely restricted by the social orientation of the work. Further shortcomings may arise from the cautious religious intention that pervades the text, and which owing to the strained Italian religious climate at the moment Bembo was writing, is of a lesser evangelical nature, inasmuch as it places knowledge before love, at least in the hermit's theoretical presentation. Undoubtedly for this reason, Gli Asolani appealed to Counter-Reformation writers such as Gil Polo.[311] Bembo's work then becomes remarkable for what its author chose to veil, or omit, from the essential elements of Ficino's love theory. Possibly also for the latter reason Gli Asolani is considered to have been of less influence on the development of literary theory in the Renaissance, especially in the greatest period of Petrarchism in the first sixty years of the sixteenth-century, than either Ficino, Hebreo, or

Castiglione.[312] The elements which Bembo omited include the development of the theory of "melancolia generosa", and divine "furore", which although they are embodied by the hermit, are not explicitly presented since the author does not go into the complex astro-medical details which are so important in Ficino's work. Nevertheless, the main sources of inspiration for Bembo's work remains Ficino's Commentarium in Convivium; this combined with his knowledge of Petrarch, places Gli Asolani in the midst of the Christian humanist evangelical tradition.

The presentation of Neoplatonic love theory in the Libro del Cortegiano is a conscious effort to return to the ideological background formulated by Ficino in the Commentarium in Convivium. Although it is greatly indebted to Bembo's Gli Asolani as a literary genre, and like so many of the Italian love treatises it has the general superficiality, or cautiousness, of Bembo, it has the merit to turn its attention to the most important points of Ficino's theory; these are melancholy, furor, and imagination. Hence, the Cortegiano cannot be said to be a highly original work in this respect, and it does not contribute any outstanding novelty to the theory of Renaissance Neoplatonic love. It is, however, the most important vehicle for popularizing Ficinian Neoplatonism. Various aspects of the Commentarium in Convivium that were not developed by Bembo receive due attention in the Cortegiano. One of the most important facets of Castiglione's exposé of Ficino's love theory is that it presents a very explicit summary of the rhetorical theory of imagination, which Bembo had barely mentioned. As I pointed out in my discussion of the Commentarium in Convivium, this is the pivotal point of Ficino's theory, which contributes to the continuity of Chartrian thought as opposed to its manipulation by moralists such as Andreas Capellanus. That Castiglione consciously returns to this point is of particular importance for the study of

Ausias March's continuity among the Castilian Petrarquistas. It is primarily Castiglione's book that seems to have been instrumental in affecting the orientation of the Italianate current as it was introduced in Spain by Boscán and Garcilaso.

Castiglione approaches the problem of love within the broader context of the perfect courtier's virtues, and the latter's obligation to inspire the Prince to lead a virtuous life. The dialogue has a "courtly" orientation, and its overt intention is to present a code of social propriety. The philosophical elements are, therefore, subordinate to literary entertainment which focuses on the "dubbio" of what kind of love is adequate to men of different ages. The discussion of love is the culmination of the Cortegiano. It is preceded by an extensive presentation on the role of reason in the government of the soul. Reason, then, becomes the key to a virtuous love which is proper to the life of the courtier, and Castiglione repeats the essential points of Gli Asolani concerning natural desires and desires of the will. This leads to the affirmation that knowledge precedes desire, since desire can only be of that which the soul has taken cognizance, and the standard Neoplatonic definition of love as a desire to enjoy beauty. These points, which are common to Neoplatonic love treatises, with certain variations of emphasis in each, combine in Castiglione's work to formulate the notion that the proper end of man is intellectual, or angelical love, which is a volitional desire. The will, which represents the soul's real inclinations which can only be to return to its true centre of origin, is fulfilled only by angelical love. One is correct in stating that Castiglione's understanding of virtuous love is based on the proper use of reason, but it must be noticed that reason does have limitations, since its function is strictly limited to the direction of a choice:

dalla ragione nasce la elezione, che è propria dell'uomo; d'all intelletto, per lo quale l'uom può comunicar con gli Angeli, nasce la volontà. Così adunque come il senso non conosce se non cose sensibili, l'appetito le medesime solamente desidera: e così come l'intelletto non è volto ad altro, che alla contemplazion di cose intelligibili, quella voluntà solamente si nutrisce di beni spirituali.[313]

This passage succintly presents the theory of love expounded by Castiglione. Reason determines choice, and thereby guides love. Castiglione, like Bembo, focuses principally on the role of reason which is to guide the soul towards intellectual perception. One is constantly reminded of Hughes de Saint Victor's model in which imagination informs reason of intelligible forms present in images which the latter raises up to the intellect. This remains the subjacent understanding in perception. Hence, Castiglione must also contend with the problem of reason's orientation. After having defined the end of man as the pursuit of spiritual good, the question still remains concerning how man is to recognize this aim. Thus, all love in Castiglione's treatise remains subject to choice, for reason may turn the soul either to cognition wrought by the senses or the intellect, although in either direction man continues to seek beauty:

L'uomo di natura razional, posto in mezzo fra questi dui estremi, può per sua elezione inclinandosi al senso, ovvero elevandosi allo intelletto.... Di questi modi adunque si può desiderar la bellezza.[314]

The ensuing discussions in the Cortegiano further examine the definition of Beauty which is sought by the soul, and the constant fluctuations of the rational soul.

Beauty is defined by Castiglione, following Ficino, as an influx of divine goodness in the corporeal human form. This initial definition of beauty is limited principally to the perception of the physical harmony and grace of the body. This is somewhat like Lavinello's definition prior to his enlightenment by the hermit, it concentrates on the sensual manifestations of beauty. Subsequent

references to beauty develop the notion of the interpenetration of the Good and the Beautiful, by returning to Ficino's definition of the concentric concept of beauty as an accident emanating from the Good. Castiglione weaves this definition of beauty together with a theory of perception that enables him to dispatch the notion of "melancolia negra". This repeats Andreas Capellanus' standard definition of love as a passion born "ex visione et immoderata cogitatione":

> Ma parlando de la bellezza che noi intendemo, che è quella solamente che appar nei corpi, e massimamente nei volti umani, e move questo ardente desiderio che noi chiamamo amore, diremo che è un flusso della bontà divina.... onde piacevolmente tira a se gli occhi umani, e per quelli penetrando s'imprime nell'anima, e con una nuova suovità tutta la commove, e diletta, ed accendendola, de lei desiderar si fa.[315]

The beautiful object, which is primarily corporeal, comes to be desired by the soul which apprehends it sensually, that is, in vision. In other words, the rational soul becomes enamoured of the object. Part of the underlying mechanics of Castiglione's exposition of this problem rests on the precept that desires are moved indiscriminately towards any object that they conceive to be good because it is physically beautiful, and, therefore, they need the guidance of reason to distinguish the real nature of the object which is known to them sensually. Hence, in this instance, the soul is acting without the guidance of reason; it is deceived by sensual cognition and conceives of beauty as being limited to the corporeal form of the body. It seeks physical possession of, or union with, the object perceived, as a consequence of having turned to guidance of the senses. Thus, love is good only when the soul is guided by reason: "e però chi pensa, possedendo il corpo, fruir la bellezza, s'inganna; e vien mosso non da vera cognizione per elezion di ragione, ma da falsa opinion per l'appetito del senso...."[316] The implication of this statement is

evidently that beauty which is reflected by the body is not inherent in the body's corporeality, but in its spiritual form, and that any attempt to enjoy beauty through the possession of the body is deceptive. This misguided love is, therefore, a folly based on an imperfect knowledge of beauty which can only be found rationally. In order to arrive at this point, Castiglione, like Bembo and the other courtly treatise writers, simplifies the notion of the movement of the soul. He does not refer to the fall of reason as it becomes enamoured of the object sensually perceived, but rather, to the guidance of the senses. As a result of this he eludes any discussion of the position of the soul, and is able to introduce almost immediately a description of the "melancholy lover", who is a victim of the senses deceit:

perchè ancora nel principio, e nel mezzo di questo amore altro non si sente giammai, che affani, tormenti, dolori, stenti, fatiche; di modo, che l'esser pallido, afflitto, in continue lagrime, e sospiri, lo star mesto, il tacer sempre, o lamentarsi, il desiderar di morire; in somma, l'esser infelicissimo, son le condizioni che si dicono convenir agl'innamorati.[317] (underlining is mine)

Castiglione provides a standard description of the melancholy man. Without having referred to the medical causes of the affliction of "melancolia negra" into which the sensual lover falls, Castiglione arrives at a physiological description of melancholy. It is from this point that he introduces the alternative to this condition, which he considers to be rational love, and describes as that which is proper to "heroic lovers".[318]

After presenting the plight of the melancholy lover, Castiglione provides an explanation which is based on the central problem of the soul's "descensus ad inferos". The rest of the Cortegiano focuses on the problem of the soul's recovery from its fall. Hence, although his intention is to present the vision of the soul in its redeemed state, Castiglione, like mediaeval Platonists, pays special attention to the

problem of the recovery. Basic medical explanations describing problems of perception and "innamoramento" are provided once the author has established the Neoplatonic conceptions of the soul as the premiss of his work. He combines two fundamental points, the "descensus ad inferos" and the Augustinian definition of the soul which is considered to be responsible for the government of the body, in order to introduce the concept that the real aim of the soul, which is man's true nature, is contemplation, and that this is affected by the soul's position within the body: "perchè ritrovandosi essa sommersa nella prigion terrena, e per esser' applicata al ministerio di governar il corpo, priva della contemplazion spirituale, non può da se intender chiaramente la verità."[319] Reference to the "descensus ad inferos" is consequently fundamental to the theory of love in the Cortegiano. The aim of the soul is spiritual contemplation, and Castiglione's own references to the incapacity of the soul to attain this goal indicate that the goal sought is illumination. The terms he uses clearly express this: "chiaramente la verità". Reason can help the soul in its orientation, and to polish the surface of the soul's mirror, but as we shall see it is also insufficient to see the truth in its real light. The concept of truth in this context is bound to that of virtue, and both lie in the proper guidance of reason which can control the senses. Hence, spiritual contemplation is arrived at by the guidance of natural reason turning towards the light of right reason. Nevertheless, the fallen condition of the soul affects the torment which it undergoes in turning towards the light of right reason. Hence, contemplation is at the outset conditioned by vision, since the soul can only be informed of what lies beyond the body by the senses which inevitably mislead it:

onde per aver cognizione delle cose, bisogna che vada mendicandone il

principio dai sensi; e però loro crede, e loro s'inchina, e da loro guidar si lascia.... la empiono d'errori, e false opinioni: onde quasi sempre occorre che i giovani sono avvolti in questo amor sensuale, in tutto rubello dalla ragione.[320]

The soul must, therefore, be inclined to the guidance of rational choice. Castiglione draws a distinction between rational love in young men and old men, in the latter age naturally subdues the ardours of the body, their contemplative love cannot really be called virtuous because their senses are dulled. It is in young men whose love follows the guidance of reason that Castiglione finds heroic virtues. These men are divine: "adunque estimo que quei giovani che sforzan gli appetiti, ed amano con la ragione, sian divini."[321] Subsequent discussion of these problems in the Cortegiano develop the notion of "heroic love" and clarify some of the inexactitudes created by this more simplified presentation of virtuous love.

In the above passages Castiglione insists on the particular role to be played by reason in the pursuit of virtuous love. Thus, in the above quotation concerning perception he expediently equates heroic love with rational love. Yet, because natural reason is limited, this love could only be reasonable love without a transcendent end, which is the point that Hebreo chose to focus upon. This would not be adequate to the divine end of man which Castiglione argues is proper to this love. In order to shed light on the awkwardness of his statements the author returns to the problem of beauty which helps him better to determine towards what end reason is to guide man. This re-definition of beauty stresses the interpenetration of the Good and the Beautiful, which echoes Ficino's definition that derives principally from Dionysius the Areopagite: "la bellezza... che è cosa sacra... dico che da Dio nasce..., ed è come circolo senza centro, non puo esser bellezza senza centro, non può esser bellezza senza bontà...."[322]

Individual corporeal beauty is then asserted once more to be a reflection of divine intelligible beauty. In particular corporeal objects it is the soul, which animates the body, that reflects this influx of divine Goodness. The standard Neoplatonic concept of beauty being goodness illuminating the body is, therefore, repeated by Castiglione. Thus, after having determined this point he proceeds to reconcile love with reason, that is, he refutes the outright condemnation of moralists who limit love to "melancolia negra". As he states, in a way highly reminiscent of Ausias March and his Chartrian predecessors, the love he is about to describe is beyond the limitations of the average man; it is part of Love's mysteries: "E perchè mi conosco indegno di parlar dei misterj d'Amore, prego lui che muova il pensiero, e la lingua mia tanto ch'io possa mostrar' a questo eccellente Cortegiano amar fuor della consuetudine del profano vulgo."[323] Beyond this formulaic presentation of "heroic love" as the only love proper to the superior courtier of the Renaissance, and thereby heralding the concept of "melancolia generosa", Castiglione introduces the dual problem of contemplation which is based on the concept of imagination. Contemplative love is of two kinds; it is first mundane contemplative love, and then its proper corollary, divine contemplative love. In both of these imagination is the means whereby the courtier gains knowledge of universals which spurs his soul on to desire divine beauty, and thus, imagination is at the source of virtuous love.

In the first part of his exposé of the theory of image and imagination, Castiglione repeats Ficino's theory of "innamoramento", which is a combination of the Lucretian theory of sight and the medical theory of the vital spirits. This is, then, a resumé of Ficino's commentary on Guido Cavalcanti's poem "Dona me prega",[324]

from which Castiglione draws on the physiological explanations. Although Castiglione does not state it, it is implicitly understood that the spirits act as intermediates between the body and the soul, and that they are mirrors for the soul in which the image of the beloved is reflected. This enables the author to dwell upon the corporeal nature of this love since he emphasizes that love is born from the sense of sight and pays particular attention to the power of the eyes to capture the vital spirits of the lover. Yet, because he stresses the importance of reason to guide the soul to the contemplation of the spiritual nature of the image, this description is a palliative for the immoderate cogitation born out of vision previously described as the source of "melancolia negra":

> ... subito che s'accorge che gli occhi suoi rapiscano quella immagine, e la portino al cuore; e che l'anima cominci con piacer' a contemplarla, e sentir' in se quello influsso che la commove, e poco a poco la riscalda; e che quei vivi spiriti che scintillan fuor per gli occhi, tuttavia aggiungan nuova esca al fuoco, deve in questo principio provvedere di presto rimedio, e risvegliar la ragione, e di questa armar la roca del cuor suo; ... allor' il Cortegiano, sentendosi preso, deliberarsi totalmente di fuggir' ogni brutezza dell' amor vulgare; e così entrar nella divina strada amorosa con la guida della ragione: e prima considerar che'l corpo ove quella bellezza risplende, non è fonte ond' ella nasca...[325]

In this passage it is obvious to the author that love has its source in the image that captivates the vital spirits. The power of the image originates in the lover's contemplation. As Castiglione has previously demonstrated, this can degenerate into sensual inclination and melancholy love. The remedy which he proposes is that reason should prevent any fascination for a corporeal image from the outset. However, should the power of the image remain unchecked, reason serves to remind the lover that the image is but a pale reflection of the real source of its beauty, and that it is the source which he must seek to love. Hence, the role of reason is to guide the soul towards

divine love, or limit human love to the spiritual contemplation of divine light as it is reflected in particular bodies and apprehended by the two spiritual senses, hearing and sight. In this first introduction to "heroic love" Castiglione fulfills the principal obligation of the Neoplatonic "trattatisti", which is, to remind lovers of the real source of their love, and its superiority. This does not, however, complete the courtier's sentimental education. The message is primarily evangelical and it seeks to assert the presence of grace in nature, that is, in the image perceived.

Reason in the Cortegiano has a guiding and corrective function, as can be seen above. Its function is to aid the soul to recognize the real nature of what it apprehends. It helps the will to polish the mirror of the soul. This does not elude the problem of the soul's own instability concerning its movements towards the image which it contemplates. After an entertaining interlude concerning the casuistic question of the spiritual nature of the kiss, Castiglione returns to the topic of the soul's inevitable movements. He re-introduces the theory of the spirits, this time from a strictly medical and physiological point of view, thereby approximating Ficino's original explanation concerning the movement of imagination. This is the beginning of a shift in the Cortegiano away from stressing the importance of reason and towards the superiority of illumination, or "right reason" in its Augustinian sense. The reader is reminded that the contemplative love of a physical object can only degenerate into physical love, even though reason may choose the object correctly and attempt to check the senses:

> l'anima è inclinatissima ai sensi, e benchè la ragion col discorso elegga ben e conosca, quella bellezza non nascer dal corpo, e però ponga freno ai desiderii non onesti, pur' il contemplar la sempre in quel corpo, spesso preverte il vero giudicio...[326]

Hence, reason in the above passage, as in others, in the Cortegiano, refers strictly to natural reason, and as such, its function is limited to the making of proper choices and judgements, and to see to the preservation of the individual. Love is not a rational state. It is consequently natural that Castiglione repeats Ficino's medical description of the vital spirits and the clouding of phantasy which he describes as a rapture, or "furore". Hence in the contemplation of the spiritual attributes of a physical object, or body, the spirits delight in the image, and the soul is transported in phantasy, as though it had returned to its celestial origin:

> lo star assente dalla cosa amata, porta seco molta passione; perchè lo influsso di quella bellezza, quando è presente, dona mirabil diletto all'amante,... e mandano fuor per gli occhi quei spiriti che son vapori sottilisimi fatti della più pura, e lucida parte del sangue, il quali ricevono la immagine della bellezza, ... onde l'anima si diletta, e con una certa maraviglia si spaventa; e pur gode, e quasi stupefatta, insieme col piacere sente timore e riverenza; e parle d'esser nel centro della sua felicità.[327]

This rapture is deceptive because all the goodness that the soul has found is immediately lost when the object of its contemplation is absent. It is primarily a physical contemplation.

Although I have referred to phantasy in this passage out of necessity, it is important to note that Castiglione at no time actually refers to imagination or phantasy in this description of mundane "furore". The entire passage is a very poor repetition of Ficino's description of the Chartrian-Victorine theory of imagination as it is applied to the vital spirits acting as an animate.[328] Castiglione does not approach the problem of the imagination's ambivalence at this point. Rather almost immediately after the above passage, he refers to the imagination as the source of spiritual contemplation, when it is properly prepared by reason. Emphasis is placed on imagination, which in this context is attributed the capacities of phantasy as defined

by Proclus; it is the last echo of the intellect. It is imagination the enables the courtier to apprehend beauty as an intelligible form, and escape the necessity of corporeality. It creates a universal idea of beauty by removing the lover's contemplation from the necessary presence of the lady, and hence, escapes the sensuality and torments of "melancolia negra":

> Per fuggir' adunque il tormento di questa assenza, e goder la bellezza senza passione, bisogna che'l Cortegiano con l'ajuto della ragione revochi in tutto il desiderio dal corpo alla bellezza sola, e quanto più può la contempli in stessa semplice, e pura, e dentro nella immaginzaione la formi astratta da ogni materia; e così la faccia amica e cara all'anima sua, ed ivi la goda, e seco l'abbia giorno e notte, in ogni tempo e luogo, senza dubbio di perderla mai; tornandosi sempre a memoria che'l corpo è cosa diversissima dalla bellezza... Di questo modo sarà il nostro Cortegiano non giovane fuor di tutte le amaritudini, e calamità che senton quasi sempre i giovani; come le gelosie, i sospetti, li sdegni, l'ire, le disperazioni, e certi furor pieni di rabbia; dai quali spesso son'indutti a tanto errore... che chiuso nel cuore si porterà sempre seco il prezioso tesoro: e ancora per virtù della immaginazione si formerà dentro in se stesso quella bellezza molto più bella, che in effetto non sarà.[329]

This description of the imaginative faculty coincides with Hebreo's definition of heroic love. It is the remedy for "melancolia negra" and the torments, such as jealousy, which accompany it. Imagination raises corporeal images of bodies to their perception as intelligible forms contemplated by the rational soul turned towards the face of the intellect. Castiglione's reasoning is that amorous suffering is caused by a lack of the object desired by the soul. This love is free from suffering because it is not limited to the intellection of particulars. It is based on the vision of universals. Yet, this is not the real end for which the soul yearns; it merely sets the soul in the right direction, for it is as though the soul were contemplating the angels who contemplate God, and its real end is angelic love. Natural reason, which guides this human contemplative love, arrives at its limits with the information imparted to it by the imagination.

This love is, therefore, insufficient, as is natural reason, because the face of the soul is turned towards the vision of corporeal beauty which it raises, and it is essentially limited to corporeal beauty. Castiglione is, then, compelled to acknowledge that in spite of its spiritual nature this love is not an end in itself, because what it apprehends is proper to the "eye of flesh". Thus, it prepares the soul for divine illumination, but does not attain the goal itself:

> perchè per essere la immaginazione potenza organica, e non aver cognizione, se non per quei principii che le son somministrati dai sensi, non è in tutto purgata delle tenebre materiali; e però, benchè consideri quella bellezza universale astratta, in se sola, pur non discerne ben chiaramente, nè senza qualche ambiguità, per la convenienza che hanno i fantasmi col corpo.[330] (underlining is mine)

The insufficiency of imagination is thus coupled with the limitations of natural reason which it informs, and the "heroic love" which is based on these is not perfect. It must be transcended, so that the eye of the soul may come to the clear knowledge of Beauty which lies in right reason.

Castiglione's description of "heroic love", which is the highest form of human love possible in his system, is natural reason moved towards the light of right reason present in the Creation. It apprehends intelligible beauty imperfectly with the eye of the flesh. Reason in "heroic love" is, therefore, more than natural reason, because it is predominantly guided by imagination. The latter is a means through which the soul approaches the rapture of "melancolia generosa" which is a state fit for the intellect. One can say, therefore, that the evangelical light which seeks to apprehend the spiritual reality of all things in the Creation, and recognizes therein the participation of the Good in nature which is beautiful, animates this "heroic love". It is the spiritual presence of God's reflection that turns man's attention to heroic virtue. All objects of beauty that the lover

perceives are like a book that can reveal the true end of his soul's longing. Hence, what the soul contemplates in divine rapture, that is, in the divine "furore" of "melancolia generosa", as we have seen Ficino define it, requires an ascesis from worldly beauty, and a rejection of worldly love and its delights. "Heroic love" is a means to the divine "furore" in the Cortegiano, because it is associated with contemplative love of a corporeal object and contemplation is characteristic of melancholy. The contemplative man is subject to "melancolia generosa" when he uses the contemplation of physical objects to a spiritual end and, thereby, avoids "melancolia negra". He is graced with divine illumination, because his soul, which is a mirror, is polished by the action of natural reason and begins to perceive these objects in the light of right reason. The courtier who has arrived at the contemplative stage of "heroic love" is spiritually above the average man, but he must still perfect his soul by turning away from the lure and din of his earthly environment, and follow the first glimmer of divine light he has found in his imagination:

> Questo grado d'amore, benchè sia molto nobile, è tale, che pocchi vi aggiungono, non però ancor si può chiamar perfetto.... sono come i terneri augelli che cominciano a vestirsi di piume; che benchè con ale debili si levino un poco a volo, pur non osano allontanarsi molto dal nido, nè commettersi a'venti, e al ciel' aperto.[331]

Thus, because it is based on the effects of imagination, and Castiglione does not explicitly distinguish this from phantasy, all human love in his system is inevitably subject to the fallen state of mankind. It is on this point that Castiglione differs in his approach from Leone Hebreo who writes after him that heroic love is based on information given by the senses to the eye of the soul.[332]

The Cortegiano like Gli Asolani is a very diluted version of Ficinian Neoplatonism. A certain vague inconsistency characterizes

Castiglione's exposition of the Ficinian system which he adapts to the restrictions of Bembo's work. Castiglione hesitates to assimilate the vision of divine beauty with the actual presence of His grace, in spite of his statements to the contrary. Hence, the vision of Beauty in the imagination seems to be unsatisfactory for Castiglione, and this causes him to overlap certain explanations concerning the upwards movement of the soul. It is on this point that he, like Bembo, departs from some of the more essential elements of Ficino's theory of vision. Perhaps in order to maintain a consistently orthodox point of view, Castiglione distinguishes very sharply between corporeal and spiritual beauty; for him all beauty that has a corporeal source is corporeal. The image of the lady perceived by the lover remains predominantly corporeal in his system, unlike Ficino, who insisted that the image, once it was perceived in the eye, had to be spiritual.[333] Thus, according to Castiglione, the soul's ascesis from this world occurs in three stages. These can be likened to the "vía purgativa, iluminativa, y unitiva" of St. John of the Cross,[334] all of which Castiglione limits exclusively to the power of the eye of the soul. When the soul turns away from the guidance of beauty it apprehends in the imagination, it frees itself of worldly cares:

> e così in luogo d'uscir di se stesso col pensiero, come bisogna che faccia chi vol considerar la bellezza corporale, si rivolga in se stesso, per contemplar quella che si vede con gli occhi della mente; li quali allor cominciano ad esser' acuti e perspicaci, quando quelli del corpo perdono il fior della loro vaghezza: però l'anima aliena dai vizii, purgata dai studii della vera Filosofia, versata nella vita spirituale, e esercitata nelle cose dell' intelletto, rivolgendosi alla contemplazion della propria sustanza, quasi da profundissimo sonno risvegliata, apre quelli occhi che tutti hanno, e pochi adoprano, e vede in se stessa un raggio di quel lume che è la vera immagine della bellezza Angelica, a lei comunicata; della quale essa poi comunica al corpo una debil' ombra; però divinuta cieca alle cose terrene, si fa oculatisima alle celesti.[335] (underlining is mine)

Other Neoplatonic "trattatisti", such as Ficino and Hebreo, seem to

consider that "heroic love", when it is understood to be spiritual and contemplative, exercises a purgative role. It is from "heroic love" that they proceed to describe the illuminative progress of the soul. In other words, the "trattatisti" explicitly associate "heroic love" with "melancolia generosa", which is the divine "furore" that forms the basis of Ficino's system. To the contrary, Castiglione insists on the corporeal origin of contemplation in "heroic love", and his interpretation of the theory of vision gives a fundamentally different implication to this love. It remains for him a step towards the soul's awareness of its divine origin, but one to be rapidly used and left behind. In spite of Castiglione's own admission that imagination perceives universal beauty, "heroic love" remains irremediably bound to its corporeal origin. Consequently, in the love theory presented by the Cortegiano "heroic love" seems to overlap with the spiritual purgative life. It does so even perhaps in a contradictory manner since Castiglione is forced to acknowledge that imagination gives the soul access to the intelligible forms of the objects it contemplates sensually, and yet, the author also claims that Angelical beauty is perceived by the eye of the soul. A fundamental difference in the Cortegiano, compared to other Neoplatonic treatises, is that Castiglione stresses, very much like the mediaeval moralists, and in many ways like Ausias March, the human limitations of "heroic love". This he does because it is based on information received by the senses which constitutes the image perceived by the eye of flesh, whereas the truly purgative life of the soul turns inwards to contemplate the pure light which is reflected in the eye of the soul. The latter breaks with human love of any kind, and turns to a religious ascesis. As it is stated in the above quotation, the

purgative life is found in the study of the "true philosophy" which makes the soul learned in spiritual life. On this point Castiglione picks up the most vital strand of his predecessors' thought. From Petrarch to Ficino, the only true philosophy is the "philosophia Christi", which is the Christian humanists' Socratic way of life, so that in fact, the only true love proper to the courtier is love of Christ severed from earthly love, although it is found reflected in the presence of grace in nature.

The fundamental point in this matter is that Castiglione uses the idealism of the Cortegiano in order to reassert the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. Yet, by this very same condition the true life of the soul is opposed to any kind of earthly delight, such as that which is found in the imagination. In the phrase "contemplating its own substance" the author understands the contemplation of the divine essence of the fallen soul and its regained consciousness of its origin and destination after its "descensus ad inferos" into the body, which is found in the redemption of Christ. Castiglione does not escape the dualist implications of the Neoplatonic love treatises. He has to deal with the composite nature of the human form, even though he asserts that the true nature of man lies in his soul and its divine origin. The soul is still subject to fluctuations, and the purgative life is the action of natural reason and the will polishing the surface of the soul's mirror so that it becomes a clear spirit and best receives the light of right reason, which, as one can note in the aforementioned quotation, the soul is said to perceive in itself, that is, reflected on its mirror. This leads to the second, or divine, "furore", which is the illumination of the soul by right reason. Assiduous contemplation, characteristic of "melancolia generosa" is

the means by which the soul arrives at this second "furore":

e talor quando le virtù motive del corpo si trovano dalla assidua contemplazione astratte, ovverro dal sonno legate, non essendo da quele impedita, sente un certo odor nascoso della vera bellezza Angelica; e rapita dallo splendor di quella luce comincia ad infiammarsi; e tanto avidamente la seque, che quasi divina ebria, e fuor di se stessa, per desiderio d'unirsi con quella, parendole aver trovato l'orma di Dio; nella contemplazion del quale, come nel suo beato fine, cerca di riposarsi....[336] (underlining is mine)

This description of the illuminative ascent of the soul clearly points to the divine "furore", it is mystic inebriation, or folly, and constitutes a state of rapture. Here again, Castiglione duplicates the description that he has given of "heroic love", for he insists that at this point the soul moves from the perception of particular beauty to that of universal beauty. As I have noted previously, this function is proper to imagination or phantasy, and one has to presume that in this case Castiglione actually implies a movement of phantasy which pertains to the intellect and not reason. The function of the illumination is consequently to move the soul from the perception of universals considered by its particular, or potential, intellect, to the divine agent, or universal intellect:

vede la bellezza divina; ma non però ancor' in tutto le gode perfettamente, perchè la contempla solo nel suo particolar inteletto... Amore dona all'anima maggior felicità, che secondo che dalla bellezza particular del corpo la guida alla bellezza universal di tutti i corpi, così in ultimo grado di perfezione dallo intelletto particular la guida allo intelletto universale.[337]

Hence, at this point, once it enjoys intelligible beauty, the soul ceases to be subject to any fluctuations, and by assuming its angelical nature it unites with God. Like the angel it is not subject to mobility, but only to multiplicity and thus loses its bond to matter, in order to unite with its divine source. This union raises the soul to the ultimate goal of its journey; it becomes aflame with

divine love: "l'anima accessa nel santissimo fuoco del vero amor divino."[338] The illumination is then complete, since by its union with God the soul recovers its pure angelical nature, and Castiglione points out that it no longer has any need of reason: "ma più non ha bisogno del discorso della ragione".[339] It is filled with the light of right reason towards which it has been guided by natural, or discursive, reason, which has inclined it to make a correct choice. What is then abandoned is natural reason, and Castiglione's phrasing of this evolution is fairly clear, "discorso della ragione". Ambiguity arises from the fact that unlike Hebreo his references to reason seem to be limited to natural reason. This presents another aspect of the general problem of how love is conceived to be compatible with reason. In spite of being deeply indebted to the Areopagian tradition of Ficino's Platonism, the Cortegiano recognizes the existence of the reflection of God's goodness in the creation, but it never refers, as does Hughes de Saint Victor, to the movement of God towards the soul in its description of the soul's union with God. It is only in the last part of Bembo's speech that Castiglione corrects this oversight by beseeching Love, or Christ to pour himself into the hearts of his lovers:

> degnati, Signor, d'udir i nostri prieghi, infondi te stesso nei nostri cuori, e col splendor del tuo santissimo fuoco illumina le nostre tenebre... purga tu coi raggi della tua luce gli occhi nostri dalla caliginosa ignoranza, acciochè più non apprezino bellezza mortale; e conoscano che le cose che prima veder loro parea, non sono; e quelle che non vedeano, veramente sono...[340]

The point that Castiglione makes is of an evangelical nature, since, as the last part of this quotation indicates, it seeks the interior light of things, and that is supposed to be the aim of the Courtier. However, Castiglione is exceedingly careful to maintain the illuminative process within the limits of natural reason, as it moves the soul

towards the light of right reason. Again, like Bembo before him, Castiglione's inconsistencies and ambiguities are best explained as being founded on the author's desire to stay away from problems which could have serious religious repercussions at the moment at which he is writing. These ambiguities are an effort to maintain a basic orthodoxy towards the institution of the Church; they articulate problems which the Counterreformation will resolve. Yet, as the above quotation indicates, he cannot elude that it is only through right reason that man comes to "possess a true knowledge of things"[341] as St. Augustine understands it.

Part III: Conclusion.

The Cortegiano is consequently a courtly manual with a social intention, like Gli Asolani. The doctrines which it presents are based on Ficino's Commentarium in Convivium, and belong to the same current of evangelical sensibility. Neither the Cortegiano nor Gli Asolani has the breadth of their source, as does Hebreo. This contributes to convey the somewhat misleading impression that natural reason is the dominant factor in the Courtier's life. Yet, upon closer inspection of the text one can perceive the inherent contradictions, caused by the fact that the author cannot elude the mystic implications of his subject. Owing to this situation, Castiglione, like most of the Neoplatonists, and Ausias March, focuses his attention on the importance of imagination in the lover's numinous experience. Thus, one has to note that Castiglione is at least as exacting as Ausias March on the problem of the spiritual love of corporeal beauty. In this circumstance, the greatest form of human, or mundane, love is that which is based on the perception of divine beauty by the

imagination, as it is reflected in particular corporeal objects. It is this very kind of enamourment that Castiglione associates with "heroic love" or "amor hereos" in its highest form. In this respect he continues the direction taken by Ficino, for whom melancholy could be a source of virtue, unlike the ironical condemnation made of melancholy and "amor hereos" by mediaeval moralists such as Andreas Capellanus. The only state that can transcend this love requires that the lover make an ascesis from all corporeal or wordly love, which is only a means to the soul's true felicity and rest. These can only be found in God, and not in his shadow. Hence, no human love in Castiglione's system, or for that matter in any of the Neoplatonic theorists I have reviewed, is free from the implicit possibility of the soul's fall. Also, in each of these writers, reason plays an important part in the preparation of the soul to its original state of grace, but it is not strictly through reason that illumination is found, faith remains the condition "sine qua non". As a result of this, there is in each of these works an element of real necessity that plays an important subjacent part. Even in the Cortegiano, in which the problem is eluded, one finds that God is inevitably required to move towards the individual soul as it rises towards Him. Natural reason plays a guiding role, but it is explicitly limited. The return of the soul to its divine origin requires that it turn inwards to that which is perceived by its own eyes, but these things it can only know when it is granted illumination. In the lesser writers, such as Bembo and Castiglione, this aspect of the problem is eluded, although it remains present in the background.

I consider, therefore, that the contention that Neoplatonic love is strictly based on reason is not wrong, but misleading.

Neoplatonic love theory is not only compatible with, but rooted in, a mystical sensibility which orients the life of the individual towards a transcendental, or spiritual, reason based on faith. This verges on religious irrationality by placing emphasis on the numinous quality of the individual's experience of the presence of grace in the midst of the Creation, and therefore, in his daily life. It is, consequently, firmly established in the tradition of the "vita apostolica", or evangelical current, in its various manifestations and adaptations, which finds its apogee in the sixteenth century. Thus, this sensibility that governs Neoplatonic love theory, is not dominated by mere reason, but by "right reason", which in this context is a "furore". The reader witnesses in this particular situation the evolution of the concept and value of melancholy, and also simultaneously the variations in the manner in which the notions concerning "amor hereos" are approached and understood by the Neoplatonic writers.[342] In all of the works I have surveyed, all of which are considered to be the most representative, tremendous emphasis and value is placed, not so much on the role of reason which is an insufficient controlling factor, but rather on that of the imagination, as the means to attain illumination or divine "furore", which can degenerate into mundane "furore", otherwise known as "amor insanus ferinusque". In cases such as that described by Castiglione, heroical virtue is the highest kind of love prior to divine love. Subsequent variations on the spiritual nature of "heroic love", such as those of Giordano Bruno and Hebreo, who emphasize the inherently spiritual basis of imagination, are, therefore, understandable. They represent not so much a contradiction to Castiglione's position, but the logical outcome of Ficino's theory of love.

There is a tendency among literary critics to represent the Neoplatonic love theory of the Renaissance in general, as an ideal embodying a love free from all contradictions. In this framework it is understood that for the perfect Renaissance lover the control of reason is absolute and determines the pure nature of his love, in which reason can only lead the soul to maintain an intellectual love of the beloved who is seen as a reflection of divine beauty. Indeed, one can contend that Renaissance Platonisms tended to orient love away from mere sensuality, and towards a chaste experience of the lady's beauty, unlike the lesser Petrarchists who used a similar literary tradition to describe their unbridled sensual passion.[343] However, one should remember that the two literary currents tend to merge, as R. O. Jones has demonstrated in the case of Garcilaso de la Vega.[344] This schematization of the problem is but one very limited facet which corresponds to an individual inclination, and is not really representative of any particular system, since those reviewed are manifestly aware of the actual insufficiency of reason acting in its own light. Natural reason must turn to right reason, which is the real aim of the Courtier. Castiglione's own imposition of definite limits on the role to be played by imagination in the Courtier's love, states that it remains bound to its corporeal origins and perceives the divine shadow imperfectly. The close relation that exists in this case between imagination and reason, as opposed to phantasy and intellect, emphasizes the very non-transcendental limits of natural reason within this system, and argues against an excessively clear-cut explanation of the Neoplatonic theory of love.[345] An interpretation of Neoplatonic love theory in the Renaissance that would sear the lover's experience of beauty in order to focus strictly on the beatific end product is patently misleading.

This seems to me to be the principal element of a commonly accepted interpretation of the evolution of fifteenth and sixteenth-century lyric sensitivity, as it is presented mainly by the late R. O. Jones in the field of Spanish.[346] The latter probably follows the kind of interpretation set forth by P. N. Siegel in his work on Spenser.[347] There is a desire in the works of both of these eminent critics to see in the Renaissance the products of an absolutely new mentality severed from the Middle Ages. This leads them to overlook the numerous points of contact of the tradition within which the Neoplatonic writers of love treatises are working. Thus, Siegel, in "Spenser and the Calvinist View of Life",[348] attempted to demonstrate how this English poet who, like all the members of Leicester's following formed part of the new Tudor aristocracy, could be an admirer of the Libro del Cortegiano and a model courtier, as well as a staunch Calvinist, like all the members of that faction. Out of this he tries to explain the points of affinity between the Cortegiano and Calvinism. His otherwise brilliant exposé, which opposes a warped interpretation of Castiglione's masterpiece as a work which propounds a sensualist doctrine in which one attains "a beatific vision of God through the senses",[349] overlooks the fundamental point that both are actually products of the Areopagian-Erigenian humanist tradition within the broader evangelical current, and therefore, that both are subject to a similar sensibility. The entire religious movement that develops out of the twelfth-century awakening of the "vita apostolica" and the crumbling of the feudal agrarian system is founded on the doctrines of the interrelation of the Good and the Beautiful, and the divine origin of the soul. Yet, it is also profoundly conscious of the fallen state of the soul in its "descensus ad inferos", and

the terrible difficulties that besiege it in its return, including the omnipresent question of predestination. Spenser limits the description of the lover's numinous experience to the vision of Beauty which the individual can attain, up to a point, by the control he has over his reason, but which is not necessarily always present. This, in Spenser's case, is affected by a profound Calvinist faith, and the Puritan confidence of being one of the elect, as opposed to the ribald Italianizing Catholic Petrarchists. Spenser's point of view is, therefore, conditioned "a priori" by "right reason" in the Augustinian sense. In his work reason and faith, or revelation, become hardly distinguishable. Hence, this fulfills the primary intention of the Neoplatonic treatises, because it demonstrates a consciousness of the source of particular beauty, towards which the lover's soul turns. The very same problem is approached slightly differently in the work of another excellent courtier and Calvinist. Sidney's Astrophel and Stella is primarily concerned with reason's struggle to regain its control over the imagination with which it has become enamoured. This can be said to be a demonstration of the insufficiency of natural reason, which is quite compatible with Sidney's own profound religious convictions.[350] It represents the difficulty of the soul to find right reason. Consequently, whether one considers Spenser's or Sidney's interpretation of the spiritual experience that each describes, one is not confronted with antagonistic points of view, but with complementary stages of a similar experience, as Siegel himself comes to recognize.[351] The reader only needs to be aware that no spiritual experience is devoid of tension, and it is this very condition that exalts the lover.[352] The Neoplatonic lover does aim to control his senses by following his reason which

should acknowledge the presence of grace in nature, but the reader must be aware that the control of reason in itself does not constitute the goal of his love. It must be transcended by acting according to the dictates of faith which cause him to go beyond the limitations of any particular or worldly love.

The tensions that characterize Sidney's situation in Astrophel and Stella are also present in Ausias March's poetry; as we have seen in chapter III. Ausias March and Sidney do not seek to love without the guidance of reason, but in fact, seek reason to redress, or perfect, their experience of beauty, and a problem of volition underlies this predicament. Reason has recognized the proper object of their love, but it cannot be maintained owing to a flaw in the soul's volition. It is, above all, a matter of faith, and only then a matter of reason. The two are inextricably bound, however, because their love represents a move from natural to right reason, and the constant alternations between the two. Although Ausias March's erotic experience is conditioned by a desire for a spiritual love, the poet rightly says that his love can never be wholly pure, since it is always marred by the presence of some sensual inclination: "Jamés amí que no fos desijós / d'aquell desig que per fretur• avem" (LXXXV, vv. 33-34). This self-condemnation is entirely compatible with the excessive heterodox zeal characteristic of Ausias March's religious sensibility,[353] as well as, Castiglione's interpretation of imagination. As concerns the theory of love, in all of the above cases, including that of Ausias March, imagination and its ambivalence remains the dominant problem, especially if this love is meant to be contemplative, for melancholy can affect variably the orientation of the soul. In Ausias March's poetry, the importance of these elements, originating from

his approach to the rhetorical theory of imagination, as in the Neoplatonic Renaissance love treatises, and in particular that of Castiglione, make it understandable that Boscán's and Garcilaso's assimilation of the Italianate Neoplatonic sensibility, after having been influenced by Ausias March, is not a miracle. The apparent change is based on the evolution of a greater acceptance of concepts such as, "amor hereos", melancholy as a beneficial trait, and imagination, all of which form part of the tradition within which Ausias March's poetry is written.

The problem in determining the nature of Neoplatonic love theory in the Renaissance of the sixteenth century is not, strictly speaking, one of reason, but rather a question of faith reconciled with love which recognizes the presence of grace in nature, and is moved towards the source of that grace. Reason does play a role in the recognition and guidance of this love, but the real crux of the matter rests in the will which polishes the surface of the soul's mirror, that is, it acknowledges the spiritual reality of its objects, and respects them. This is the object of the Neoplatonic love treatises following in the wake of Ficino. Neoplatonic love is the culmination of a secularization of a religious sensibility, to which I have referred as the "evangelical current". When Hebreo argues that love binds the will,[354] as usual, he displaces the centre of gravity in the individual's perception of particular objects towards an extreme development of the concept of the "furores", and the will is bound either by lust or irresistable grace. Other "trattatisti" vary the emphasis of grace's presence, but even in Bembo, the will, which pertains to the intellect, transcends reason. It is, therefore, evident to me that the Neoplatonic lover does seek a harmonic

microcosmic balance that orients him towards "rational love" in which reason retains its dominion over the senses. As in Castiglione, this, however, is really reason subordinated to faith, since as all the "trattatisti" indicate that reason is an insufficient instrument of the soul and that it is always subject to the fluctuations of the soul's reactions to imagination and phantasy. The aim of the Renaissance Neoplatonic lover is not wordly love, which he is urged to turn away from, but which he can accept spiritually as a "modus vivendi". He actually seeks union with God severed from sentient life which is misleading for the soul.

To argue that the Renaissance created a kind of love which was to be guided strictly by reason is quite another matter that needs to overlook the long tradition preceding the "trattatisti", and tends to confuse the mission of Ficino with the rise of rationalism. The point never to lose sight of is the predominance of Augustinian "recta ratio" which remains inextricably bound to the problem of the question of the ambivalence of imagination, and a favourable interpretation of melancholy as the temper of the superior individual. Mediaeval poets working within the evangelical current, such as Ausias March, in whom the predominant Lullian strain of thought has been repeatedly recognized, are virtually in complete agreement with the doctrine of the Cortegiano. They, however, realize the difficulty of implementing an ideal, because they experience it. They are not writing a theoretical treatise on love, but a lyrical description of the lover's actual experience. As a result of this divergence, the aforementioned interpretation of Renaissance Neoplatonic love theory as "rational love", is too clear-cut. It creates a distinction between what is mediaeval and what is Renaissance which puts the text out of focus,

forgetting that many of the concepts handled by poets, rhetoricians and theorists are: "a large hors d'oeuvres board: some of its dishes are more popular earlier and some later, and the number and size of helpings varies continually; the choice offered is always wide; but the range of choice remains basically the same."[355] Dronke's sumptuous description of the "evolution" of the concept of melancholy as pertaining to individual inclination is perfectly adequate to the problem of love with which it is closely related. Thus, the notion that Renaissance love aims at the control of reason and love of the Middle Ages does not, overlooks and obliterates, problems of individual inclination and sensibility, as well as the historical existence of a constant and ineludable tension between moralists representing the position of the Church and the agrarian feudal nobility, and certain poets, writers and thinkers, whose orientation, while not in overt conflict with the Church, echoes an evangelical consciousness mainly pertinent to a new commercial and fundamentally bourgeois aristocracy in its ascendance. In the latter, the Areopagian-Erigenian consciousness, which crystallizes in Ficino, predominates. Thus the view that:

> It is important not to confuse the Neo-Platonic view of love with that of the Middle Ages. According to the former human love could occupy first place in the mind without wrong, provided that love was spiritual; in the central medieval view, only divine love could rightly come first [356]

is misleading because the key "caveat" in this statement is "the central medieval view". The latter is an indeterminate factor whose very ambiguity leaves the reader extremely uneasy and does little to enlighten the text. It will always be open to debate whether the institution of the Church or the laity represents the central view. Moreover, this does not seem to me to resist a close scrutiny of the works of Ficino, Hebreo, Castiglione, and Bembo. I have repeatedly

pointed out, from "in context" quotations, that because worldly love is based on the effects of imagination, all these writers ultimately reject earthly love and delights in favour of divine love. The latter always "rightly comes first"; these works are not the product of classical paganism. This is true, with the possible exception of Leone Hebreo, whose pantheism inclines him to spiritualize human love somewhat beyond the limits set by Bembo and Castiglione. However, all the "trattatisti" are concerned with the soul's ascesis from this world. The level of respectability which they attribute to "heroic love" is based on the recognition of grace reflected in nature, and on the belief of the immortality of the soul, but, indeed, human love does not "occupy first place in the mind without wrong". It is a means that rapidly becomes incompatible with its end, just as the eye of flesh is incompatible with the eye of the soul, and both cannot see simultaneously, as Ficino insists and his followers repeat. Thus, the author of the above quotation, who consistently opposes Hebreo as a virtual representative of the "courtly love tradition", is, on this point, misleading. The confusion lies in the blanket concept of "courtly love", which in this instance, in particular, has served as an impediment to the clear understanding of the texts in question. There then remains to shed some light on this point which is principally represented by institutional moralists, the prime example of whom is Andreas Capellanus, who has been the backbone of twentieth-century "courtly love" criticism, and whose vision is fundamentally opposed to that of poets affected by the evangelical current of the Victorine and Chartrian rhetoricians.

NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

1 For an extreme example of this attitude see: Jules d'Albi, Saint Bonaventure et les luttes doctrinales de 1267-1277 Paris: Arch. Franc. Hist., 1923 , pp. 12, 97, 99, 142 and 251. To a lesser extent but still stressing the predominance of Thomism as universally representative of mediaeval thought see: P. Mandonnet, Mélanges Thomistes, Kain (Belgique): Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques, 1923 ; and Maurice De Wulf, Histoire de la philosophie médiévale, vol. 2, Louvain: Presses Universitaires, 1924-1925. It is applied in this way to the history of Renaissance Platonism by Nesca A. Robb, Neoplatonism of the Italian Renaissance, New York: Octagon Books, 1968 (reprint from 1935), p. 18: "Augustine's teaching was perpetuated by a long series of followers, and it was not until the XIIIth century that Aristotelianism, as interpreted by Aquinas, became the official system of the Church and displaced its rivals, Augustinian and Avicennist..." This statement is fallacious, see F. C. Copleston, Aquinas, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975 (1955), pp. 243-248.

2 In this light one can turn to the prepatory work done by F. Van Steenberghen in La philosophie au XIII^{e} siècle Louvain: Presses Universitaires, 1966, as well as, H. A. Oberman, "Fourteenth-Century Religious Thought: A Premature Profile," Speculum LIII, 1978, pp. 80-93; and W. J. Bouwsma, "The Two Faces of Humanism," Itinerarium Italicum, eds. H. O. Oberman and Thomas A. Brady, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1975 , pp. 3-60.

3 W. J. Bouwsma, "The Two Faces of Humanism," p. 5.

4 Phrase coined by D. W. Robertson Jr. in "The Concept of Courtly Love as an Impediment to the Understanding of Medieval Texts," The Meaning of Courtly Love, ed. F. X. Newman, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1968, pp. 1-18.

5 On this point see, among others, F. Van Steenberghen, La philosophie au XIII^{e} siècle, pp. 30-40, who presents a very intelligent discussion applicable to all mediaeval studies.

6 See principally R. Klibansky, The Continuity of the Platonic Tradition during the Middle Ages, London: Warburg Institute, 1950 (reprint of 1939), as well as, the résumé of the development of mediaeval Platonic studies in Van Steenberghen (op. cit.), pp. 14-15.

7 On this point in general see Leonard Forster, The Icy Fire: Five Studies in European Petrarchism, Cambridge: University Press, 1969 , pp. 118-120, and, in particular, of more importance for the introduction and development of Petrarchism in Spain: Joseph G. Fucilla, "Pedro de Padilla and the Current of Italian Quattrocentist Preciosity in Spain," Philological Quarterly IX, 1930, p. 226, and, of course by the same author: "Two Generations of Petrarchism and Petrarchists in Spain," Modern Philology XXVII, 1930, and Estudios

sobre el Petrarquismo en España, Madrid: Revista de Filología Española (Anejo LXXII), 1960. A point to be noted here is that the popularity of Ausias March in Spain, wanes after 1565, that is, after the death of Jorge de Montemayor, although one can find sporadic references to him after this date (see: M. de Riquer, Historia de la literatura catalana II, Barcelona: Ariel, 1964, pp. 558-567, and Traducciones Castellanas de Ausias March, Barcelona: Instituto de Estudios Mediterráneos, 1946, pp. IX-XXXVII). One can infer from this situation that the shift in sensibility away from the "evangelical current" which is inherent to the Neo-platonism of Bembo's Petrarchism, affects the popularity of Ausias March because his poetry also partakes of the "evangelical current" inasmuch as it is affected by the works of Ramon Lull.

8 On this subject see Jean Festugière, La philosophie de l'amour de Marsile Ficin, Paris: Vrin, 1941; Nesca A. Robb, Neoplatonism of the Italian Renaissance, New York: Octagon Books, 1968; J. C. Nelson, Renaissance Theory of Love, New York: Columbia University Press, 1958. Of particular interest is the fact that in spite of the somewhat diluted nature of his Neo-platonism as it is found in Gli Asolani, which I will discuss below, Bembo is known to have possessed an autograph copy of the Commentarium in Convivium (Marsile Ficin, Commentaire sur le Banquet de Platon: text manuscrit autographe présenté et traduit par Raymond Marcel, Paris: Société d'Edition "Les Belles Lettres," 1956, p. 40). Throughout this thesis I will refer to this edition of the Commentarium. Moreover, because Raymond Marcel's translation is sometimes defective, inasmuch as it gleans over certain vital concepts such as melancholy, and because the English edition of Sears Reynolds Jayne (Marsilio Ficino's Commentary on Plato's Symposium, Columbia: University of Missouri, 1944) is considered to be even more defective, and it does not follow the autograph edition, I have taken the liberty to provide a literal translation of every quotation I have made in the text.

9 See N. A. Robb, Neoplatonism of the Renaissance, pp. 17-56; J. C. Nelson, Renaissance Theory of Love, pp. 15-66.

10 Margherita Morreale, Castiglione y Boscán: El Ideal Cortesano en el Renacimiento Español, Madrid: Real Academia Española (Anejo I), 1959.

11 Amédée Pagès, Auzias March et ses prédécesseurs, Paris: Honoré Champion, 1912, p. 341.

12 A. Pagès, Auzias March et ses prédécesseurs, p. 411.

13 This is the basic thesis of Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, Paris: Société d'Edition "Les Belles Lettres," 1958, pp. 50-120; and see also, P. O. Kristeller, Renaissance Thought: The Classic Scholastic and Humanist Strains, New York: Harper and Row, 1961, pp. 57-58.

14 See M. D. Chenu, "Les platonismes du douzième siècle," La théologie au douzième siècle, Paris: Vrin, 1957, pp. 108-141;

as well as, F. Van Steenberghen, "Invasion de la philosophie païenne," La philosophie au XIII^e siècle, pp. 72-117. Chenu points out the very misleading nature of any opposition between Aristotelianism and Platonism. Whatever the inadequacies of the Latin Platonism of the Fathers, the introduction of the Aristotelian corpus: "ne ruinera pas le spiritualisme platonicien, qui restera le climat spontané du chrétien, non sans échec pour son évangélisme natif, son réalisme historique, son efficacité terrestre. Elle ne disqualifiera pas non plus la grandeur et vérité du néoplatonisme du XII^e siècle, qui nous empêche de dresser dans un dyptique sommaire, 'l'aristotélisme de la scolastique' face au 'platonisme des Pères', division érronnée en histoire et équivoque en théologie" (op. cit., p. 141).

15 M. D. Chenu, La théologie au douzième siècle, p. 116, and "Malgré la crue de l'aristotélisme, l'Aréopagite commande la théologie du XIII^e siècle" (op. cit., p. 278).

16 In M. D. Chenu's analysis of the permanent themes in Augustinian thought in Christian philosophical movements, two points must be stressed since both concern the principal questions discussed in this chapter: "1/ l'homme composé d'un corps et d'une âme, est par la même entre deux mondes, mais l'âme est par elle-même, une, substantielle, raisonnable, individuelle, lors même qu'elle régit un corps; et cette définition détermine toute la philosophie médiévale, malgré la crue de l'aristotélisme. 2/ ce dualisme se répercute sur les voies et les moyens de la connaissance: l'âme a deux faces, l'une tourné vers le monde intelligible, l'autre vers le monde sensible; l'expérience chrétienne favorisera en permanence cette noétique, contre les nouveautés aristotéliciennes" (La théologie, p. 117). These two points are further developed in the Dionysian and Erigenian works which continue to form the basis of philosophical and theological speculation in the Middle Ages, as F. Van Steenberghen has shown (La philosophie au XIII^e siècle, pp. 182-185). The importance of these points in the works of Ausias March, approached from an Augustinian point of view, and not the traditional Thomist perspective taken by A. Pagès and his followers, need not be pointed out.

17 M. Menéndez y Pelayo, Historia de las ideas estéticas II, Madrid: Viuda e Hijos de M. Tello, 1910, pp. 203-220; "De las vicissitudes de la filosofía platonica en España," Obras completas t. 9, Madrid: Victoriano Suárez, 1918, pp. 80-84. It should be noted that in this last work Menéndez-Pelayo makes a brief but important note to the role played by Hughes de Saint Victor in the introduction of Florentine Platonism in Spain, as well as to the participation of Lull and Sabunde.

18 Frances A. Yates, "Ramon Lull and John Scotus Erigena," Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes vol. 23, University of London, 1960, p. 40.

19 Ibid. and F. A. Yates, Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition, London: Routledge, Kegan Paul, 1964, pp. 270-271 and 308 (inter alia); as well as J. C. Nelson, Renaissance Theory of Love, pp. 4 and 234.

20 See below, and note 26 of this chapter.

21 The presence of scepticism in the Middle Ages long before the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries (see J. Huizinga, The Waning of the Middle Ages, New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1954, p. 164) is evident in works such as Alain de Lille's Complaint of Nature (trans. D. M. Moffat, Hamden: Archon Books, 1972, reprint Yale University Press, 1908). Although the latter is principally concerned with the condemnation of lust, the Complaint is actually directed towards a condemnation of scepticism which is a manifestation of cupidity. Hence, fornicatio is the subject of the Complaint, and it represents all manner of cupidity, as it is defined by St. Augustine (see D. W. Robertson Jr., "The Doctrine of Charity in Mediaeval Literary Gardens," Speculum v. 26, 1951, p. 28; see also Chapter V "Melancholy: The Mirror of Courtly Love."). Although Alain de Lille presents an eloquent defense of Reason as the means to attain divine Wisdom, he also condemns it when it is abused as deceitful logic: "He is too fond of logic, with whom a simple conversion causes the rights of Nature to perish" (p. 4). In subsequent passages reason is considered to be "the eye of flesh" (p. 68), and Alain de Lille emphasizes that it is by a misuse of the latter that man has forsaken God and His divine order.

22 Although this attitude may well be based on a misunderstanding of Averroes' theory of the intellect, Albert the Great did write his "De unitate intellectus contra Averroem" in 1254, which was followed by St. Thomas' "De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas," in reaction to the teachings of Siger de Brabant. Specifically against Siger, Albert the Great also wrote the Problemata contra Averroista, XV questiones. These works can, therefore, serve as a justification for this attitude. For a very explicit exposé of this problem see Fernand Van Steenberghen, Maître Siger de Brabant, Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1977, pp. 57-70; 121-129; 347-363, and for the Franciscan point of view on Averroism pp. 33-46.

23 See above note 16, which is supported by St. Augustine's statement: "quae diversa per eos ago unus ego animus" (Confessions vol. II, ed. W. H. D. Rouse, London: William Heineman, 1967, re-1912, p. 93). For a complete discussion of this subject by St. Augustine see City of God, trans. H. Bettenson, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976, pp. 550-556 (Book XIII, 3-5).

24 See M. D. Chenu, La théologie, p. 116.

25 M. D. Chenu, La théologie, pp. 274-322. The focal point of attention in these chapters of Chenu's work is the rising problem of the theories of cosmic determinism and predestination, which is prompted by the entrance of the thought of the Greek Fathers into popular devotion through Joachim de Flore (see also Harold Lee, "Scrutamini Scripturas: Joachimist Themes and Figurae in the Early Religious Writing of Arnold of Vilanova," Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes vol. 37, 1974, pp. 33-56), and Franciscanism. Of note in Chenu's work is his reference to

contacts between Catalans and Greeks (op. cit., p. 285). Charles Fraker has made it clear that this influence was strongly felt in the Iberian peninsula in his work on the Cancionero de Baena (Studies on the "Cancionero de Baena," Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1966; "The Dejados and the Cancionero de Baena," H.R. XXXIII, 1965, pp. 97-117; "Gonçalo Martínez de Medina," H.R. XXXIV, pp. 197-217; "The Theme of Predestination in the Cancionero de Baena," B.H.S. LII, 1974, pp. 228-243). Wyclifism, as it is understood by Fraker, is preceded by the influence of Scotus Erigena on the Franciscan Order (Chenu, pp. 287-288), and by the translation of the Greek Fathers who presented a well co-ordinated theory of cosmic determinism: "... la théologie d'un Gregoire de Nazianze, d'un Denys, d'un Maxime, les trois grands "grecs" envisage l'économie chrétienne dans son unité suprême, où les vicissitudes de l'histoire, y compris celles de l'histoire sainte, y compris l'évenement central de l'incarnation, s'inscrivent, telles les libertés humaines, dans les déterminismes cosmiques" (op. cit., p. 290). This along with the key notion of "cause" culminates in the pantheistic teachings of Amaury de Bène and David de Dinant (Chenu, pp. 314-318), as well as Gilbert de la Porrée, all of which represent extreme developments of Erigena's system. In this context it is worthy of note that Ausias March refers to the problem of "cause", and, therefore, of determinism within the context of predestination: "Ajuda'm Déu, car ma força és flaca; / desig saber què de mi predestines: / a Tu·s present y a mi causa venible" (CV, vv. 150-152). See Appendix I.

26 M. D. Chenu, La théologie, p. 122. For the sake of exactitude, I must repeat again that distinctions made between Plato and Aristotle are a matter of convenience. Therefore, for a total reversal of the position I am taking, which is that of most literary historians, see Jaako Hintika, Time and Necessity: Studies in Aristotle's Theory of Modality, Oxford: Clarendon, 1973. It will be noted that what Bréhier and Chenu are referring to is A. O. Lovejoy's "principle of plenitude" (The Great Chain of Being, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936, p. 52). Hintika notes that "Lovejoy claims that Plato adopted and used the principle while Aristotle did not. The truth, it seems to me, is precisely the opposite: ..." (p. 95). Hence, once again documented caution should be used in the opposition between Aristotle and Plato in order to avoid over generalizing and losing the proper focus.

27 See H. A. Oberman, "Fourteenth-Century Religious Thought: A Premature Profile," Speculum LIII, 1978, pp. 82-84.

28 See M. D. Chenu, La théologie, p. 125 (inter alia), and H. A. Oberman, "Fourteenth-Century Religious Thought," pp. 82-84 and 86-89.

29 See Chapter III, note 109.

30 Etienne Gilson remarks on the philosophy of Saint Bonaventure: "D'inspiration essentiellement théologique elle utilise, sans fausse honte, la terminologie ou même la doctrine d'Aristote, mais

sans la condition expresse que jamais aucun de ses principes constitutifs ne viendra se substituer à l'augustinisme dans l'édifice légué par la tradition", La philosophie de Saint Bonaventure, Paris: Vrin, 1953, p. 392. See also F. A. Yates, "The Art of Ramon Lull: An Approach to it Through Lull's Theory of the Elements," Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes vol. XVII, London: The Warburg Institute, 1954, p. 165, which refers to the relation between Saint Bonaventure and Ramon Lull.

31 See Hans Baron, "Petrarch: His Struggles and the Humanistic discovery of Man's Nature," Florilegium Historiale: Essays Presented to Wallace K. Ferguson, eds. J. G. Rowe and W. H. Stockdale, Toronto: University Press, 1972, pp. 19-20; and Pierre de Nolhac, Pétrarque et l'humanisme t. II, Paris: Honoré Champion, 1965, reprint of 1907, pp. 232-233.

32 Sonnet I, v. 3, R. M. Durling ed. and trans., Petrarch's Lyric Poems, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976, p. 37.

33 The spiritual sensibility of his work is particularly evident in certain instances such as Poem 72, vv. 16-21: "Io penso: se là suso, / onde'l motor eterno de le stelle / degnò mostrar del suo lavoro in terra, / son altr'opre sì belle, / aprasi la pregione ov'io son chiuso / et che'l camino a tal vita mi serra" (ed. Durling, Petrarch's Lyric Poems, p. 163). It is obvious that in such verses the source of love is not considered to be the lady, but God the Prime Mover, to whom Dante refers as "l'amor che move il sole e l'altre stelle" (The Divine Comedy, ed. and trans. C. S. Singleton, "Paradiso" Canto XXXIII: 145, Princeton: University Press, 1975, p. 380). Petrarch's love is, therefore, directed to a spiritual end which must reject sensuality.

34 Francisci Petrarchae, Operum t. I, Basilae: Henrichus Petri, 1554, republished Ridgewood, New Jersey, U.S.A.: Gregg Press, 1965, p. 382. This is translated as: "And then the work that promised so well and seemed so good, flags and grows unsteady; and there comes to pass that inward discord of which we have said so much, and that worrying torment of a mind angry with itself; when it loathes its own defilements, yet cleanses them not away; sees the crooked paths, yet does not forsake them; dreads the impending danger yet stirs not a step to avoid it" (Petrarch's Secret, trans. William H. Draper, London: Chatto and Windus, 1911, pp. 45-46).

35 Pierre de Nolhac, Pétrarque et l'humanisme t. II, pp. 223-225; and P. O. Kristeller, Renaissance Thought, p. 78.

36 Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, p. 76.

37 This is evident in various passages of the "De suiipsius et multorum ignorantia," Operum t. II, Basilae 1554, p. 1149, for instance: "Credo, hercle, nec dubito illum non in rebus tantum parvis, quarum parvus et minime periculosus est error, sed in maximis et spectantibus, ad salutis summa aberrasse, tota ut

aiunt vita. et licet multa Ethicorum in principio, et in fine de foelicitate tractaverit, audebo dicere, clament ut libuerint censores mei veram illum foelicitatem, sic penitus ignorasse, ut in eius cogitatione non dico subtilior, sed foelicior fuerit, vel quaelibet anus pia, vel piscator, pastorue fidelis vel agricola. quo magis miror quodam nostrorum, tractatum illum Aristotelicum sic miratos quasi ineptias censuerint, idque scriptis quoque testati sint, de foelicitate aliquid post illum loqui." This attitude is consistent with the effects produced by the introduction of the Nicomachean Ethics in Europe as studied by F. Van Steenberghen, La philosophie au XIII^e siècle, in particular pp. 125-130 ("nous avons ici le point de départ des tendances rationalistes et naturalistes qui seront condamnées en 1277..." p. 130).

38 This work has been studied in detail, from the point of view of the circumstances in which it was written, by Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, pp. 63-76.

39 See Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, p. 64.

40 Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, pp. 62-63.

41 See, St. Augustine, Confessions Book VII: 9 (ed. W. H. D. Rouse, pp. 365-371), and City of God Book XIV: 5 (ed. David Knowles, trans. H. Bettenson, pp. 554-555).

42 "... at Platonem, prorsum illis et incognitum nil scripsisse asserunt, praeter unum atque alterum libellum; quod non dicerent, si tam docti essent, quam me predicant indoctum. Nec literas ego, nec Graecus, sexdecim vel eò amplius Platonis libros domi habeo; quorum nescio an ullum isti nomen audierint..." ("De suiipsius et multorum ignorantia," p. 1162). See also, Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, pp. 54-55; Pierre de Nolhac, Pétrarque et l'humanisme II, pp. 133-152.

43 See Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, p. 69; and "De multorum et suiipsius ignorantia," p. 1160.

44 Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, p. 66.

45 "De suiipsius et multorum ignorantia," p. 1157.

46 See Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, p. 81; Winthrop Wetherbee, Platonism and Poetry in the Twelfth Century, Princeton: University Press, 1972, p. 229: "The image is usually attributed to Bernard de Chartres on the authority of John of Salisbury, Metalogicon 3: 4" (ed. C. C. J. Webb, Oxford: Clarendon, 1929, p. 136).

47 See the Chartrian interpretation of the Timaeus following Chalcidius' commentary, in M. D. Chenu, La théologie, pp. 118-122, as well as, W. Wetherbee, Twelfth-Century Platonism, pp. 28-36, and R. Klibansky, "Plato's Parmenides in the Middle Ages,"

Medieval and Renaissance Studies vol. I, 1941-1943, pp. 281-330. Similarly one finds in the "De suiipsius et multorum ignorantia" specific references to the importance of Chalcidius' commentary: "Sed nec non legisse hoc, sed tantos aliorum iudices fas est suspicari, que si tamen forsitan non legerunt, legant, si quis est pudor, apud Calcidium in Timeum Platonis secundo commentario" (op. cit., p. 1156).

48 See Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, pp. 65-71.

49 "De suiipsius et multorum ignorantia," p. 1161.

50 Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, p. 81.

51 The Augustinian tradition with its emphasis on interior faith and illumination lies behind the sensibility of the "devotio moderna": "En signification chrétienne, par conséquent, l'intériorité, et d'abord la foi, seront premières: sans la foi, plus d'intelligence de la parole de Dieu; sans la foi, plus de sens spirituel de l'histoire sainte; plus de sacrement efficace. A cette fonction spirituelle de la signification, répond une mystique de l'intériorité, celle dont le De magistro pose le principe méthodologique; les éléments extérieurs, même les plus autorisés, ne seront que des excitants et des adjuvants; la philosophie augustinienne de l'illumination est ici prégnante, et, dès avant l'Imitation de Jésus-Christ, une certaine attitude individualiste menace la pratique sacramentaire" (M. D. Chenu, La théologie, p. 176).

52 The evangelical renewal of spirituality took on many forms, but it always originated within a secular circumstance: "les laïcs furent ainsi les plus efficaces promoteurs de la vita apostolica dont la réforme canoniale était loin d'épuiser l'idéal et les exigences... Si le réveil évangélique se produit non par une révision institutionelles des formes existantes, mais par un retour à l'Evangile par-delà ces formes, il est a prévoir que les principes de son effervescence: témoignage de la foi, amour fraternel, pauvreté, béatitudes, joueront plus spontanément et plus promptement chez les laics que chez les clercs, tenus dans le réseau des institutions. Le risque peut être grand -- de voir le laïc abuser de sa liberté évangélique..." (M. D. Chenu, La théologie, p. 237). Among humanists the evangelical current, which has its origins in the works of the Chartrian and Victorine masters, could take on an erudite aspect which, while partaking of the general sensibility, might not descend to the extremes of unorthodoxy that could lead to an "abuse of evangelical liberty". This religious sensitivity which returns to the devotion of the Early Church has been called "la religion des temps nouveaux" (Ibid., p. 239). It is only natural that Petrarch, "le premier homme moderne" (P. de Nolhac, Pétrarque et l'humanisme t. I, p. 2) partake of this sensitivity that accounts for similarities between his work and that of Ausias March on which numerous critics have commented (see Appendix II, L: 8; and in particular, Mario Casellà, "A. Pagès, Auzias March et ses prédécesseurs,"

Bulletino della Società Dantescha Italiana, Rassegna critica degli studi danteschi no. 20, 1913, pp. 205-210; Bernardo Sanvisenti, I primi influssi di Dante, del Petrarca e del Boccaccio sulla letteratura spagnuola, Milano: U. Hoepli, 1902, pp. 372-377; A. Farinelli, Italia e Spagna t. I, Tori: Fratelli Bocca, 1929, pp. 67-72; José Amador de los Ríos, Historia crítica de la literatura española VI, Madrid: Gredos, 1969, reprint of 1865, pp. 489-526).

53 See Chapter I, note 1, as well as M. D. Chenu, La théologie, pp. 239-245 in which he sums up the "déclassement féodale".

54 On the development of the Church's temporal power and problems of conscience that this caused for its members see M. D. Chenu, La théologie, pp. 252-273, he documents the reactions of individuals faced with this situation.

55 In the twelfth century the arts acquired a high degree of respectability in their own right and they ceased to be subordinated to theological studies. Thus, philosophy came to be studied for its own sake, and not merely as a preparation for theological studies. See F. Van Steenberghen, La philosophie au XIIIe siècle, pp. 48-71.

56 M. D. Chenu, La théologie, pp. 226-227.

57 M. D. Chenu, La théologie, pp. 284-288.

58 "Pierre Valdo et François d'Assise sont des laïcs... La cléricalisation des fraternités franciscaines qui incorpore leurs membres a la hiérarchie écclésiastique (1210) ne se fait pas sans resistance, ni sans scrupules pour frère François... En 1207, des Vaudois, sous la conduite de Durand de Huesca, convaincus par Dominique qu'ils pourraient poursuivre à l'intérieur de l'Eglise leur ancienne manière de vivre, puis en 1210, un autre groupe de clercs et de laïcs, avec Bernard Prim, reconciliés à leur tour, bénéficient d'un régime analogue..." (M. D. Chenu, La théologie, pp. 266-267). An important facet of the spread of the evangelical movement, which is characterized by a fervent desire to return to the fold of the original Church, is that it spreads among the class of weavers and merchants, as in the case of St. Francis Assisi and Peter Valdo. It shares this fundamental trait with Catharism. Denis de Rougemont has noted the affinity that exists between Catharism and St. Francis and the bequines (L'Amour et l'Occident, Paris: Plon, 1972, edition définitive, révisée de 1956 et 1939, pp. 365-367). Of considerable importance for this study and the understanding of Ausias March's works is the fact that the evangelical movement shares a certain number of texts with Catharism, such as the writings of John Scotus Erigena (F. Yates, "Ramon Lull and John Scotus Erigena," pp. 34-42), the novel, Le Roman de Barlaam et Josafat, referred to by M. D. Chenu (La théologie, p. 284) as being very influential on Alain de Lille, and which R. Nelli (Ecritures Cathares, Paris: Denoel, 1959, p. 7) places as one of the key texts of Catharism. Other works

listed by Nelli include, Le poème de Boèce, Voyage au Purgatoire de Saint Patrice, and Vision de Tindal et Saint Paul. The last two works, at least, were translated into Catalan. This enables us to support the theory of a continuing strain of Catharism in Catalonia, as suggested by Jorge Ventura Subirats ("El catarismo en Cataluña," B.R.A.B.L.B. t. 28, 1960, pp. 75-168). These texts are available in the editions of, A. Pacheco (ed.), Viatges al altre món, Barcelona: 62, 1973; and R. Miquel i Planas (ed.) Histories d'altres temps: Viatge al Purgatori de Sant Patrici, Visions de Túndal i Trictelm, Viatge d'en Pere Portes a l'Infern, Barcelona: Fidel Giró, 1917. Steven Runciman (The Medieval Manichee: A Study of the Christian Dualist Heresy, Cambridge: University Press, 1960) has pointed out that the Catharism found in those writings which have survived the destruction of the Inquisition, such as the Cathar Catechism (ed. René Nelli, "Le Rituel Latin" and "Le Rituel Occitan," in Ecritures Cathares, pp. 228-252, and L. Clédat, Le Nouveau Testament traduit au XIII^{e} siècle en langue provençale suivi d'un rituel cathare, Genève: Slatkine, 1968, reprint of Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1887), are very reminiscent of the writings of the Early Church (p. 154). Hence, it is important to remember that "when a sect is persecuted it is because the State is convinced that the sect is undesirable... The arguments thus become not so much theological as social" (Runciman, op. cit., pp. 3-4). In this one is reminded of the circumstances surrounding the massacre of the Vaudois in 1554 (see G. de Felice, History of the Protestants of France, trans. P. Barnes, London: Routledge, 1853, pp. 46-51). This consideration is of particular importance for understanding the religious inclination of Ausias March's poetry. Although my first concern in this thesis is the theory of imagination, this leads inevitably to religious considerations which I will try to clarify in Appendix I. For the moment it should suffice to point out that in Poem CV, "Cant Espiritual," verses 209-212 echo a passage of the Cathar Catechism (Nelli, Ecritures Cathares, p. 213), which has drawn the attention of critics such as, R. Nelli, S. Runciman, and J. Ventura-Subirats. This, of course, flies in the face of certain "courtly love" critics who derisively refer to de Rougemont's theories as "crypto-cathar" (R. Boase, The Origin and Meaning of Courtly Love, Manchester: University Press, pp. 77-80). I do not suggest that Ausias March was a belated Cathar, but rather that if Lull was affected by the historical presence of Catharism in his cultural medium, as F. Yates suggests, then Ausias March, who is a Lullian poet (P. Ramírez i Molas, La poesia d'Ausias March, Basle: University Publication, 1970, pp. 313-387), does indeed echo certain spiritual concepts that pertain to the evangelical current, which has many points of affinity with Catharism. The point to be stressed is that there is nothing "cryptic" about this situation. It is a social reality experienced by Ausias March, which plays a historical role that shapes individual and collective sensibility. "Courtly love" is a nineteenth-century invention which must adjust itself to the existence of certain realities, not obliterate them to justify its convenience. One has to recognize that until recently, the individual's life has always been directly affected by religious tensions. The notion that: "courtly love is inherently ambiguous. Its aesthetic principles were inspired not by theology but by Graeco-Arabic physiology" (R. Boase, The Origin, p. 129), is patently misleading. As I hope

to have shewn in the text, with the help of research done by Klibansky, Saxl, Panofsky, Wetherbee, and Chenu, the two are inextricably bound in the lover's experience of melancholy imagination.

59 M. D. Chenu, La théologie, p. 226.

60 See above note 45.

61 M. W. Bundy, The Theory of Imagination in Classical and Mediaeval Thought, Urbana: University of Illinois, 1927, p. 202.

62 M. D. Chenu, La théologie, p. 225.

63 See Chapter III, note 26.

64 See M. D. Chenu, La théologie, pp. 159-209, and W. Wetherbee, Platonism and Poetry, pp. 220-226, and D. Kelly, The Medieval Imagination, Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1978, for a survey of the continuation of this "mentalité symbolique" in secular literature.

65 It is out of this consciousness of the symbolic nature of the universe that the Chartrian developed the theory of involucrum, "et le succès de l'opération... soutint et étendit le genre jusqu'à la Renaissance et au-delà" (La théologie, p. 165). Thus we find Erasmus still defending the value of this method in the Enchiridion Militis Christiani: "Uti divina scriptura non multum habet fructus, si in littera persistas haeresque, ita non parum utilis est Homerica Virgilianaque poesis, si memineris eam tota esse allegoricam" (quoted in La théologie, p. 166).

66 In a paragraph that could serve to sum up the theory of love developed by Ficino and his followers, St. Augustine states that love of created objects is not forbidden provided that God be loved in them, because He is in them and they in Him: "Si placent corpora, deum ex illis lauda, et in artificem eorum retorque amorem, ne in his, quae tibi placent, tu displiceas. si placent animae, in deo amentur, quia et ipsae mutabiles sunt et illo fixae stabiliuntur: alioquin irent et perirent. in illo ergo amentur, et rape ad eum tecum quas potes, et dic eis "hunc amemus: ipse fecit haec et non est longe" non enim fecit atque abiit, sed ex illo in illo sunt. ecce ubi est, ubi sapit veritas: intimus cordi est, sed cor erravit ab eo" (Confessions I, p. 178 and 180). See also on this subject M. D. Chenu, La théologie, p. 182. As I will shew in Chapter V, this is the doctrine of Charity of St. Augustine, which affects the evangelical sensibility and was well known in the Middle Ages.

67 See City of God Book XI, Chapter 10 (p. 440 ff.), inter alia: "The Trinity is one God; the fact that it is a Trinity does not mean that it is not simple... What is meant by "simple" is that

its being is identical with its attributes.... Accordingly, the epithet "simple" applies to things which are in the fullest and truest sense divine because in them there is no difference between substance and quality, and their divinity, wisdom and blessedness is not acquired by participation in that of others... Then it is evident that God created knowingly, he created things which he already knew... this world could not be known to us, if it did not exist, whereas it could not have existed if it had not been known to God." It is evident then that here too the Creation merely reflects the thought of God.

This is the appropriate place to note that Ausias March uses the word simple in the Augustinian sense. His love which originates in imagination yearns for the contemplation of the lady's soul, that is, her form in its divine attributes. Thus Ausias March states "son espirit yo volguí amar simple" (XCIV, v. 116). However, at a moment of disillusion he admits that this contemplation must be transcended for it will always partake of the flesh "Tot element elementat no·s simple" (CXVII, v. 177).

68 See above 67. It should also be noted that by placing the forms in the objects, and thereby denying them a transcendental function, "Aristotelianism" is opposed to a symbolic interpretation of the Creation: "Avec Aristote les idées sont dans les choses. La valeur de représentation des choses, si le transcendent existe, sera à chercher dans les choses, selon leur nature sensible. Le "naturalisme" est la condition élémentaire du symbolisme. Le pur experimentalisme aristotélien élimine le symbolisme, sans profit, pour une science de définition..." (M. D. Chenu, La théologie, p. 182).

69 Dionysius the Areopagite, The Mystical Theology and the Celestial Hierarchies, Surrey: The Shrine of Wisdom, 1949, pp. 33-34; quotation from The Celestial Hierarchies.

70 "A un siècle de distance, Saint Bonaventure renouvellera la même entreprise, son Breviloquium est... un résumé doctrinale très concis, devant servir d'instrument à la lecture organique et approfondie de l'Ecriture.... La lettre demeure comme pour Hughes la base de cette intelligence.... Mais, en 1250, le temps a marché, l'équivalence Sacra Scriptura - theologia est débordée et les "Sommes" longues ou brèves ont pris consistance et autonomie; l'exégèse s'est fixée dans un cours textuel, tandis que la construction doctrinale s'élabore décidément selon la méthode toute différente et la dialectique des quaestiones définitivement détachées des commentaires" (M. D. Chenu, La théologie, p. 204). It is, however, to Hughes de Saint-Victor that the credit for the evangelical return to the reading of the Bible as the source goes: "Hughes ... a énoncé un principe qui va soutenir techniquement dans les écoles le renouveau évangélique populaire qui ramenera bientôt dans l'Eglise, avec une réforme institutionelle, le goût de la lecture directe de l'Ecriture" (La théologie, p. 205).

71 See above note 68.

72 See above note 47.

73 W. Wetherbee, Platonism and Poetry, p. 30.

74 M. D. Chenu, La théologie, pp. 108-158. This is one point which I have chosen not to elaborate, because of the nature of this thesis. Nevertheless, one has to take into account all the variations of Neo-platonism that co-exist within the evangelical current.

75 See above note 51.

76 See Leonard Forster, The Icy Fire, Cambridge: University Press, 1969, pp. 104-105.

77 The Renaissance represents principally a shift of values, in which the mercantile bourgeois socio-economical standards come to predominate. Although this segment of the society is assimilated by the aristocracy, they form a new class which develops its own system of mimetic protection. Ausias March, like many writers of his age witnesses the rise of this new economical system, and criticizes it bitterly in Poem CIV: "los cavallers per mercaders s'espachen" (verse 220), in spite of his own assimilation of the mercantile economy (see Chapter II).

78 Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, p. 276. Raymond Marcel's interpretation clearly goes against the theory of Burckhardt concerning the "paganism" of Cosme de Medici and his circle. (Jacob Burckhardt, The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy, trans. S. G. C. Middlemore, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1921 (eighth ed.), p. 499).

79 See notes 53 and 58 above. Moreover, within the class of mercatores and the laity affected by the "réveil évangélique", there is also a strong inclination towards anti-clericalism from the thirteenth century onwards: "C'est dans ce contexte surtout, plus que dans quelques pointes de scepticisme doctrinal, qu'il faut observer, assez violentes parfois, et s'affirmant au XIII^{e} siècle, les poussées d'un anticléricalisme tantôt réformiste (utilisé parfois publiquement par l'Eglise), tantôt antiécclésiastique dans sa critique des appesantissements sociologiques de l'Eglise" (M. D. Chenu, La théologie, p. 268).

80 Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, p. 413.

81 Marsilio Ficino, The Letters of Marsilio Ficino, trans. members of the London School of Economic Science, preface P. O. Kristeller, London: Shepheard-Walwyn, 1975, pp. 135-136. I take the liberty to indicate that the word translated by "heart" in this passage is "animum" which I feel would be best translated by "soul" if one is to maintain the physiological term of reference, not the idiomatic expression, which is not intended by Ficino.

82 See Petrarch's comment in note 37 above.

83 "Hence all the arts which relate to outer things, to the body, to the senses and to action, should be subject, and give place to contemplation as their queen. This is God's own activity.... If life is a kind of activity and the finer the activity the finer the life, then surely contemplation, being the most excellent of all activity, both because of its worth and its permanence, is also the greatest and most distinguished life..." (The Letters of Marsilio Ficino, pp. 188-189). See also Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, p. 263.

84 See Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, pp. 543-565.

85 As Ficino writes in the introduction to the Theologia Platonica, his intention is to show the divine essence of the soul which reflects the work of the Creator. His intention, as the full title of the work indicates, to demonstrate the immortal condition of the soul: "Ego vero cum iam pridem Aureliana authoritate fretus summaque in genus humanum charitate adductus, Platonis ipsius simulacrum quoddam Christianae veritati simillimum exprimere statuissem ad illa quae dixi, duo prae ceteris diligenter incubui, ideoque universum opus Platonicam Theologiam de immortalitate animorum inscribendum esse censui. In quo quidem componendo id praecipue consilium fuit, ut in ipsa creatae mentis divinitate, ceu speculo rerum omnium medio, creatoris ipsius tum opera speculemur, tum mentem contemplemur atque colamus" (M. Ficino, Opera Omnia I, Basilae: Henric Petrina, 1576, p. 78). See also Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, pp. 180, 407, 489, 587, and especially pp. 649-650, as well as note 86.

86 "il ne pouvait pas entreprendre d'écrire une théologie platonicienne avant d'avoir compris et résolu tous les problèmes que pose la présence de cette âme divine et immortelle dans le corps, et ces problèmes étaient pour lui d'autant plus redoutables que sur la question de l'immortalité, qui était la clef de voute de son système, on déclarait à l'envi que Platon et Aristote n'étaient pas d'accord. Or, cela il ne voulait pas et il ne pouvait pas l'admettre..." (Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, p. 351). As Marcel goes on to explain, the answer to this dilemma was provided by Bessarion's In Calumniatorem Platonis (see Marcel, op. cit., pp. 351-370, in particular, p. 368).

87 See Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, pp. 419-420, and 594.

88 See Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, pp. 210-211; P. O. Kristeller, introduction to the Letters of Marsilio Ficino vol. I, p. 21; Ardis B. Collins, The Secular is Sacred, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974; "Ficino is more indebted to Christian theology than to Platonism, for he develops a position which follows the spirit and letter of Thomas Aquinas' Summa contra Gentiles (op. cit., p. 4).

89 Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, pp. 519 and 601-602.

90 One must always remember that for Ficino the text of the Symposium is read with a specifically Christian intention, that is, in the light of St. Augustine, St. Thomas and the pseudo-Dionysius. Thus, Raymond Marcel can rightly say that in his commentary Ficino "a réduit la lettre à la plus simple expression" (Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 116). This is consistent with the approach taken by Thomas Gould on the historical problem of love: "In the history of the idea of love, at least, the Renaissance does not appear to have been a crucial turning point. After all, there is not really much more Plato in Spenser or Ficino than there is in Dante" (Platonic Love, New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963, pp. 9-10).

91 Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, p. 647.

92 P. O. Kristeller, "The Scholastic Background of Marsilio Ficino," Traditio II, 1944, pp. 257-318; The Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino, trans. V. Conant, New York: Columbia University Press, 1943, pp. 14-19; Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, p. 87 and 638.

93 The text is reproduced in: Raymond Klibansky, The Continuity of the Platonic Tradition, London: Warburg Institute, 1950, reprint of 1937, pp. 45-47.

94 R. Klibansky, The Continuity of the Platonic Tradition, p. 42.

95 R. Klibansky, The Continuity of the Platonic Tradition, p. 36.

96 See Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, p. 645, and M. D. Chenu, La théologie, pp. 316-319. Unlike Amaury de Bène and David de Dinant, Gilbert de la Porée was never excommunicated, however, he and his followers who professed a strong admiration for the Greek Fathers (Chenu, p. 276), were held in disfavour until they ceased to be of any importance after the fourth Lateran Council (1215).

97 On the influence of Dionysius the Areopagite on the Chartrians see M. D. Chenu, La théologie, pp. 174-178; W. Wetherbee, Platonism and Poetry, pp. 57-60. For his importance concerning the development of the thought of Ficino, as acknowledged by the latter, see R. Klibansky, The Continuity, p. 42; Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, pp. 743-744.

98 See notes 17-19 above.

99 Arnaldo della Torre (Storia dell'Academia Platonica, Firenze: Carnesecchi e Figli, 1902) following the interpretation of Burckhardt (see note 78), believed that the Commentarium in Convivium was originally written in 1467, but that it had been rewritten for Lorenzo il Magnifico in 1475, and that the text known to contemporary scholars was the latter, since the former

had been destroyed (see della Torre, op. cit., pp. 587-609). In support of his theory della Torre interpreted a phrase used by Corsi in his life of Marsilio Ficino, "ex pagano miles Christi factus", as meaning that between 1459 and 1469 Ficino had undergone a spiritual crisis, first realizing the errors of Cosme de Medici's paganism and then becoming a faithful Christian, and a priest. These arguments are summed up by Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, pp. 348-355, and in greater detail in Commentaire sur le Banquet de Platon, pp. 11-41. Raymond Marcel in the pages quoted above goes to great lengths to shew that the Commentarium was first written in 1469, by basing his theory on the research of M. J. Hak (Commentaire, p. 37), and then by showing that "paganus" in Renaissance latin was frequently used to refer to secular individuals, who could be excellent Christians, and not to pagans as della Torre and Burckhardt thought (Marsile Ficin, p. 355). The conclusion of Raymond Marcel, which I accept, is that: "le de Amore, qui est bien de 1469, et qui n'a jamais été revu ni corrigé, non seulement n'est pas l'oeuvre d'un paien, mais témoigne d'un christianisme éclairé et d'une piété d'autant moins douteuse qu'elle se manifeste jusque dans les termes" (Marsile Ficin, p. 354).

100 Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, pp. 326-327.

101 Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, p. 327.

102 Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, pp. 329-330.

103 See W. Wetherbee, Platonism and Poetry, pp. 36-48; M. D. Chenu, La théologie, p. 165; and Douglas Kelly, The Medieval Imagination, Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1978, pp. 22-23.

104 See Daniel Carl Meerson, The Ground and Nature of Literary Theory in Bernardus Silvester's Twelfth-Century Commentary on the Aeneid, Ph.D. Thesis: Chicago, 1967, p. 84. On the authorship of the Commentary, see The Commentary on the First Six Books of the Aeneid of Vergil Commonly Attributed to Bernardus Silvestris, eds. J. W. Jones and E. F. Jones, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1977, pp. IX-XI.

105 From the Prohemio di Marsilio Ficino sopra la Monarchia di Dante, quoted in footnote pp. 327-328 of Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin.

106 As Raymond Marcel points out in the introduction to the Commentarium: "C'est encore pour prouver la nature spirituelle de la Beauté, qu'il a tant insisté sur le rôle des yeux dans la naissance de l'amour. Cela est d'ailleurs si vrai que l'image en est vieille comme le monde. Mais ce que Dante, et Pétrarque en particulier, avait dit avant lui de la fascination, Ficin a voulu le démontrer pour ainsi dire scientifiquement, et l'on doit avouer que sur ce point ses arguments demeurent problématiques et n'ont guère plus de valeur que ses inférences astrologiques" (Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 113). This statement is exact in what concerns the relation of Ficino's theory of love and that of

Dante and Petrarch; however, I believe that the latter part of Marcel's affirmation is inexact. The medical and astrological references are a iatromathematical description of melancholy, of the highest importance, as I hope to show below by basing my analysis on the work of R. Klibansky, E. Panofsky and F. Saxl, Saturn and Melancholy, London: Nelson, 1964, which, it must be pointed out in order to do justice to Marcel's excellent work, was not available to him at the time he prepared his study of the Commentarium.

107 See Charles Trinkaus, "The Dignity of Man in the Patristic and Medieval Traditions and Petrarch," in In Our Image and Likeness: Humanity and Divinity in Italian Humanist Thought vol. I, London: Constable, 1970, pp. 179-199; and Note 109 in Chapter III of this thesis.

108 It is worthy of note that although it was not met with success, Ficino made an Italian version of his Commentarium in order to increase its circulation (Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 114). This work, which has important theological implications, was then intended to be read by a large secular audience.

109 See Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, pp. 649 and 653; Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 113.

110 See Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, p. 407.

111 M. Ficini, Opera Omnia vol. I, p. 609.

112 "In Epistolas D. Pauli, ascensus ad tertium coelum, ad Paulum intelligendum," Opera Omnia vol. I, pp. 425-472.

113 See M. D. Chenu, La théologie, p. 173; Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, pp. 321 and 434.

114 Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, p. 664.

115 Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 107.

116 See Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, p. 495; R. Klibansky, E. Panofsky and F. Saxl, Saturn and Melancholy, p. 263 ("Arnaldus de Vilanova, who somewhat resembled Ficino in his many-sidedness, and whose work De Conservanda iuventute was to some extent the pre-humanist forerunner of the De vita triplici..."), and p. 266.

117 Op. cit. above 116.

118 On "amor hereos" see Chapter III notes 86, 87 and 100.

119 P. O. Kristeller, The Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino, p. 109.

120 See M. W. Bundy, The Theory of Imagination, p. 202. Of greater concern for the purpose of this thesis, and because I will talk of the influence of Hughes de Saint-Victor on Ausias March in the next, is the contribution of the former in the development of the concept of the dignity of man, as it can be traced in authors such as Pico della Mirandola. Thus, in On The Dignity of Man, trans. C. Glenn, New York: Bobbs-Merill, 1965, original 1940, p. 10, we find a key passage which draws on the ladder image of the pseudo-Dionysius (Mystical Theology and The Celestial Hierarchies, pp. 40-41); Pico states: "But if we want to be companions of the angels moving up and down Jacob's ladder..." (op. cit., p. 10). The Areopagite does not refer to "Jacob's ladder", it is a point introduced by Hughes de Saint-Victor in the "De Unione Corporis et Spiritus" (P. L. CLXXVIII, p. 285; see notes 26 and 31 in Chapter III): "Vide scalam Jacob, in terra stabat, et sumitas ejus coelos tangebat... Si non sumus angeli volantes, tamen sumus homines ambulantes. Angeli scala non indigent qui volant divina contemplatione; sed homines qui repunt, vel, si amplius, ambulant humana ratione." By drawing a comparison between man's rational soul and angels, Hughes de Saint-Victor is referring to a fundamental concept of the evangelical movement, the divine origin of man, and, therefore, to his capacity to recollect the vision of his origin by means of the imagination.

121 See for example, St. Augustine, Confessions II: "et certe videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate, nondum facie ad faciem..." (p. 84), and "ubi fulget animae meae" (p. 87). Clearly in these passages the soul, illuminated by the grace of God, shines imperfectly like the Pauline mirror. As St. Augustine explains, the soul is not of the same substance as God, as the Manicheans believed ("nor is the soul the same as its wisdom," City of God, p. 441). It is illuminated, and in this way, it partakes of the divine attributes. Thus, it is a passive receptor of divine Wisdom, or light: "the soul itself, even though it may be always wise through participation in the changeless Wisdom, which is other than itself... there is a certain similarity between the two... which makes it quite appropriate to speak of the illumination of the immaterial soul by the immaterial light of the simple Wisdom of God" (p. 442). As a Platonist, St. Augustine considers the soul to be an intermediary between the intelligible and material worlds, and as such, it is a mirror reflecting the intelligibles (see M. D. Chenu, La théologie, p. 117).

122 See Chapter III, note 21. Furthermore, Ficino is explicit on this point: "Animus autem eo potissimum ad illam est natura sua accomodatus quod et spiritus est et quasi speculum deo proximum, in quo quemadmodum in superioribus diximus divini vultus elucet imago" (Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 190, see also pp. 158, 183, 190 and 207).

123 Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 147. Compare this quotation with note 69 in the text. The predominant influence of the pseudo-Dionysius becomes evident. (Trans.: "Nor is it without reason that the ancient theologians place Goodness in the centre

and beauty on the outer ring. Indeed, the Good is a single centre, but beauty, on the contrary is in four circles. God is the single centre of everything, and the four circles are around God: these are intelligence, soul, nature and matter.") (See also, Celestial Hierarchies, p. 37).

124 Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 152. "The Good is said to be that very outstanding essence of God. Beauty is a sort of impulse (force), or beam penetrating everything, first in the angelic mind, then into the soul of the entirety and the other souls, thirdly into nature, and fourthly into corporeal matter".

125 Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 159. "For love is a desire to enjoy beauty. But beauty is a certain light which attracts the human spirit to itself. Surely the beauty of the body is nothing other than the brilliance itself, which is derived from the grace of colours and lines. In the same way the beauty of the soul is a radiance of learning and the harmony of morals. It is not the ears, nor the sense of smell, nor taste nor touch, that can perceive that corporeal light, but only the eye. If the eye alone can recognize beauty,. then only the eye can enjoy it. Therefore, the eye alone enjoys the beauty of the body".

126 On sight see note 125 above, and Chapter III, notes 12 and 16.

127 Commentaire sur le Banquet, pp. 178-179. "The virtue of the soul also seems to manifest itself in a certain refinement of words, gestures, and deeds. Its sublime substance encompasses even the heavens with a clear light. In all these matters the internal perfection produces one which is external. We can call the former Goodness and the latter beauty."

128 "Unus igitur dei vultus tribus deinceps per ordinem positis lucem in speculis: angelo, animo, corpore mundi" (Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 185). This is the basis for the theory of the Animate (see Chapter III, note 26). It is also to be noted that although Ficino creates the theory of the "spiritus" to act as the animate in the microcosm, he does not abandon the "mirror" function of the soul itself. Although he distinguishes between the two, they are always present together (Commentaire, p. 207).

129 See note 49, Chapter III. The Stoic concept of beauty is first enunciated in the Commentarium, p. 142, and see notes 125 and 130.

130 Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 183. "But the spirit receives in a single point the whole amplitude of a body in a spiritual manner, and in the guise of an incorporeal image. It is precisely this image or shape (speties, vision, or beauty, or splendour) received by the soul, which alone is pleasing to it, and although this image may be the semblance of an external body, yet in the soul it is incorporeal. Hence, it is an incorporeal image (speties) that is pleasing (that delights). And that which delights (the soul) is pleasant to everyone, and that which is pleasant is in

the end that which is beautiful. Hence it is brought about that love is attracted to something incorporeal, and beauty itself is a certain spiritual semblance of the object, rather than a corporeal image. / / There are some, however, who are of the opinion that beauty lies in a certain disposition of the limbs, or, to use their words, a symmetry and proportion together with a certain sweetness (smoothness) of colour. We do not accept their opinion...."

131 "Amor enim fruende pulchritudinis desiderium est" (Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 159).

132 That the image is actually corporeal is evident when we take into account Ficino's theory of sensation-phantasy (Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 207). In the quotation referred to above (note 130), Ficino wishes to stress the spiritual nature of beauty, although the source of the image apprehended by the senses must be corporeal. The distinction drawn by Ficino enables him to go beyond the limitations of imagination understood as "sensuous memory", as in Hughes de Saint-Victor. It is, however, a very fine distinction that is not always maintained by Ficino.

133 See note 125 above.

134 Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 183. "That image which is apprehended in the sight and in the soul cannot be a body, since those two (sight and soul) are incorporeal. For by what means can the whole heavens, so to speak, be embraced by the tiny pupil of the eye, if the pupil should receive it physically? This is impossible".

135 See notes 26 and 31, Chapter III. It should also be pointed out that Ficino repeats, almost word for word, Geoffroy de Vinsauf's metaphor of the architect and poetic imagination (see Chapter III, note 21). Thus, he states in the Commentarium: "Quo si quis quesiverit quo nam pacto corporis forma animi mentisque forme et rationi similis esse queat is, oro, consideret edificium architecti. Principio architectus edificii rationem et quasi ideam animo concipit. Deinde qualem excogitavit domum, talem pro viribus fabricat. Quis neget domum corpus exsistere eamque idee artificis incorporee, ad cuius similitudinem effecta est, esse persimilem? Porro propter incorporalem ordinem quemdam potius quam propter materiam est architecto similis iudicanda. Age igitur materiam subtrahe si potes, potes autem cogitatione subtrahere, ordinem vero relinque. Nihil tibi restabit corporis, nihil materie. Immo vero idem erit penitus qui ab opifice provenit ordo et qui remanet in opifice. Idem in quovis hominis corpore facias. Reperies illius formam, animi rationi quadrantem, simplicem esse materiesque expertem" (Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 188).

136 Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 207. "But the soul which is present everywhere the spirit is, easily examines the corporeal images reflected in the latter as in a mirror, and through the

perception of these images it judges the bodies. And this means of cognition is called sensation, or sense perception, by the Platonists. While the soul examines these images, it conceives in itself, by its own power, images similar to them, but which are much more pure. We call such conception imagination and phantasy."

137 Commentaire sur le Banquet, pp. 207-208. "Images thus conceived are preserved in the memory. Through these the keen eye of the soul is aroused again and again to contemplate the universal form of things, which it contains within itself. Therefore, while it perceives a certain man by the sense of sight and conceives him in imagination, it contemplates him in the intellect and by the definition common to all men through the idea of humanity innate in it, and finally, it preserves what it has contemplated. Therefore, it would be enough for the soul, which preserves in its memory the image of a handsome man once it has conceived and reformed it, to have seen the beloved only once. However, for the eye and the spirit, which catch images of corporeal object only when it is present, and lose them when the corporeal object is absent, the continual presence of the body is necessary, so that they may continually receive light from its radiance and remain charmed and delighted. Therefore, they too, because of their own need, require the presence of the body. The soul, being most indulgent to them is compelled to desire the same presence."

138 In the Sixth Discourse Ficino defines love as an affection between that which is beautiful and that which is not: "Atque ita amorem ex huiusmodi mixtione medium quemdam affectum esse volumus inter pulchrum et non pulchrum utriusque participem" (Commentaire, p. 201). This affection involves "movement", since what Ficino goes on to describe is phantasy (see note 136 above). Thus, Raymond Marcel explains concerning this passage: "Or si l'Amour désire la Beauté qui lui manque, mais qu'il n'ignore pas, c'est qu'un mouvement s'est établi entre Dieu et l'homme, mouvement qui, comme celui de la pierre magnétique ou celui du feu, affecte l'homme en respectant sa nature sans cesser d'être lui-même fidèle à son principe. Ce mouvement ... est l'Amour lui-même..." (Commentaire, p. 85).

139 Ficino himself states: "Bonos autem nostri custodes proprio nomine angelos inferioris mundi gubernatores Dionysius Areopagita, quod a Platonis mente minime discrepat, vocare solet..." (Commentaire, p. 203).

140 Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 169. "Men, that is, the souls of men. Once, that is, when they were created by God. Are whole, are endowed with two lights, one inborn and the other infused. By the inborn, that they might contemplate things equal and inferior to them, and by the infused one that they might contemplate things superior. They wished to make themselves equal to God. They turned themselves towards the inborn light only. Hence, they are divided. They have lost the infused light, when they turned solely to their own inborn light, and

have immediately fallen into their bodies."

141 See Chapter III, note 104.

142 "Corpus iugiter fluit crescendo, descrescendo, resolutione continua, liquefactione calore vicissim et frigore permutatum. Anima semper eadem permanet" (Commentaire, p. 171).

143 The problem of the omnipresent tension between natural and right reason is essentially that of the body and the soul, as explained by St. Augustine (Confessions II, p. 379): "nam et nos, qui secundum animam creatura spiritalis sumus, aversi a te, nostro lumine, in ea vita fuimus aliquando tenebrae; et in reliquis obscuritatis nostrae laboramus, donec simus iustitia tua in unico tuo sicut montes dei." On the question of St. Augustine's dualism, see M. D. Chenu, La théologie, p. 117.

144 St. Augustine, Confessions II (p. 93): "... yet I the soul being but one, do actuate and govern."

145 "... those who imagine that all the ills of the soul derive from the body are mistaken... it was not the corruptible flesh that made the soul sinful; it was the sinful soul that made the flesh corruptible" (City of God, p. 551, Book XIV: 3).

146 Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 170. "From this it comes about that qualities, because they are necessarily sustained by the body, come into being and are controlled by some superior substance which is neither a body, nor lies in the body. Such is the soul, which present and firmly fixed in the body, sustains itself and imparts to bodies the quality and strength of its temper (complexion). By these instruments it exercises various functions in the body and through the body."

147 See Chapter III, notes 104 and 105 on the medical use of the theory of the animate.

148 Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 172. "That is why, thanks to this light which truly belongs to it, the soul can see itself and all that is below it, in other words, the corporeal objects, but it cannot see God or the other superior beings."

149 Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 235. "However, our soul, and this is profoundly deplorable, for it is at the origin of all our misfortunes, the soul, I say, is alone so captivated by the charms of the corporeal form that it neglects its own image (speties), and indeed, forgetful of its own self, it pursues the form of a body which is its own shadow."

150 Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 235. "But he pursues its shadow in water and tries to embrace it, that is, he is enamoured

of beauty in the fragile body and its semblance of flowing water which is the shadow of the soul itself. He abandons his very own image, and never attains his shadow, since by following the body the soul neglects itself, and is not content with the use of the body. For it does not really long for the body itself, but like Narcissus it is allured by the corporeal form which is but the shadow of its own beauty. What it really yearns for is the latter, but since it is unaware of this and seeks the one while desiring the other, it can fulfil its yearning. Hence, bursting into tears he is consumed, that is, the soul placed outside itself and having slipped into the body, is tortured by destructive passions, and infected by the pollution of the body, as it were, dies, since it seems now more a body then a soul. And so that Socrates might avoid such a death, Diotima brought him from the body to the soul, from this to the angel and from there to God."

151 See notes 26 and 31, Chapter III.

152 "Ibi contemplande hic generande pulchritudinis desiderium. Amor uterque honestus atque probandus. Uterque enim divinam imaginem sequitur" (Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 155).

153 "Si quis generationis avidior contemplationem deserat aut generationem, preter modum cum feminis vel contra nature ordinem masculis prosequatur aut formam corporis pulchritudini animi preferat, is utique dignitate amoris abutitur" (Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 155).

154 Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 175. "We have immediately neglected that infused divine light, having turned aside towards the natural one. So the one having been neglected, the other we have preserved. While we have kept one half of ourselves, we have let the other go. But led at a certain moment of our existence by natural light, we all desire the divine light, in fact...."

155 "Verus enim amor nihil est aliud quam nixus ad divinam pulchritudinem evolandi, ab aspectu corporalis pulchritudinis excitatus. Adulterinus autem ab aspectu in tactum precipitatio" (Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 260). As this quotation indicates, contemplative love is only a means, not and end in itself. Here as in Hughes de Saint-Victor's "De Unione Corporis et Spiritus" (see Chapter III, notes 26 and 31), the soul that remains bound to the contemplation of beauty found in particular objects will inevitably incline to the flesh, because it remains in a constant state of fluctuation (see above note 149).

156 "... sed a Diotima fatidica muliere, divino afflata spiritu, se accepisse dicebat, mea quidem sententia, ut ostenderet sola divinitatis inspiratione quid vera pulchritudo sit, quid legitimus amor, qua ratione amandum, homines intelligere posse" (Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 199).

157 Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 176. "Those who know God do not please him unless they also love the knowledge" (that is, "love the object known to them").

158 "Ainsi le message de Diotime nous révèle en fait une ascèse qui, à partir de la Beauté nous conduit à Dieu..." (Commentaire sur le Banquet, introduction de Raymond Marcel, p. 97).

159 Commentaire sur le Banquet, pp. 238-239. "Thus the light of the One, itself entirely and utterly simple, constitutes infinite beauty because it is neither stained by the pollution of that which is material, nor changed by the advance of time, as is the form of the soul, nor scattered by multiplicity, as is the image or beauty (speties) of the angel.... Similarly, the infinite light is free from all corporeality, for it shines without moderation or end because it does so (shine) through its own nature, when it is not limited in the least by any other thing. Thus the light and the beauty of God, which is absolutely pure and unrestricted by all other things, is said to be, without doubt, infinite beauty. Infinite beauty also demands boundless love. Wherefore I beg of you, Socrates, to love all other things in a fixed and limited manner; but to love God with infinite love and not let there be any moderation in divine love."

160 Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 239. "We, however, my illustrious friends, shall not only love God immeasurably, as Diotima is represented as having ordered, but love Him alone.... And whosoever in this time will have devoted himself to God out of love, he will finally, in the end regain himself in God.... A true man and the idea of man are one and the same. Hence, each of us, separated from God on this earth, is not a true man, since he is separated from his idea and his form. Divine love and piety will lead us back to it, and since we are torn asunder and mutilated, then we are joined again with our ideas through love, and we will become whole men, in such a way that we seem to have worshipped God first among all things, that we may then worship things in God, and that we may seem to revere all things in God, so that we may find ourselves in Him before all other things, and by having loved God perfectly we may have loved ourselves."

161 Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 257. "But by divine "furor" (ecstasy), he (man) is elevated above the nature of man and is transformed into God. Indeed, this divine "furor" is the illumination of the rational soul, through which God recovers that soul which has slipped down from above to the region below, and brings it from those regions below to those above."

162 "Love, as we have said, takes it origin from sight. Sight lies between thought and touch; hence, the soul of the lover is always torn in opposing directions and is cast up and down, to and fro, alternately. At one time the desire to embrace is born, at another that chaste desire for celestial beauty, and now that one, now this one, conquers and leads the way" (Commentaire sur

le Banquet, p. 218).

163 "Dès les premières pages du Commentaire, nous l'avons (Ficin) vu souligner pour montrer la transcendence de la Beauté, l'inquiétude et l'angoisse que tout amour humain porte avec lui..." (Raymond Marcel, ed., Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 111).

164 Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 222. "In addition, bestial love and human love can never be said to exist without causing indignation (displeasure)... And so you come to hate, and at the same time, to love the beautiful; you hate them like thieves and murderers, but are forced to admire them and love them like mirrors that reflect celestial splendour."

165 God is not substantially present, but they participate in His Beauty, and, therefore, are not wholly distinct from His substance. On this point Ficino is consistent with the orthodoxy of St. Thomas and the pseudo-Dionysius, see notes 66-69.

166 Like most Neo-platonists, Ficino is affected by the doctrine of the four temperaments, but he is careful never to let the astrological influence of the elements affect the free-will of the individual (see Saturn and Melancholy, pp. 273-274). Thus, although there is in his system an implicit element of predestination concerning the temper of the individual, Ficino cannot be said to incline to judicial astrology which would lead to a denial of free-will, and entail "astrological fatalism" of the kind found in the Cancionero de Baena (see C. F. Fraker, "The Theme of Predestination in the Cancionero de Baena," B.H.S. LII, 1974, pp. 230-240). Ficino follows orthodoxy as defined by St. Augustine (City of God, pp. 184-185, Book V: 5), and St. Thomas Aquinas (The Summa Theologica, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, London: Burns Oates and Washbourne, 1941, pp. 157-162, Book I, Q. 115, art. 3-4). The direction taken by Ficino is anteceded by Arnau de Vilanova and Ramon Lull (Saturn and Melancholy, p. 95; Arnau de Vilanova, Obres Catalanes vol. II: Escrits medics, ed. M. Batllori, Barcelona: Barcino, 1947, p. 70; and Ramon Lull, "Arbre de Ciencia," Obres Essencials vol. I, eds. Tomas i Joaquim Carreras i Artau, Barcelona: Selecta, 1957, p. 715 and 1043 note 92).

167 See Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 218: "... hinc semper contrarias in partes amantis distrahitur animus et sursum vicissim deorsumque iactatur."

168 Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 154. "The Angelic Mind is absolutely free from any commerce with corporeal matter."

169 Commentaire sur le Banquet, pp. 154-155. "Finally, to summarize, Venus is twofold. The one is, of course, that intelligence which we have placed in the Angelic Mind. The other is the power of generation attributed to the world soul. Each

one has a companion love which is like it. For the former is carried by inborn love towards understanding the Beauty of God. The latter is likewise carried by its love towards procreating the same beauty in corporeal bodies. The former first embraces within itself divine splendour, then she transfers this ecstasy to the second Venus.... When first the image (speties) of the human body is brought before our eyes, our mind, which is in us the first Venus, reveres it like an image of divine grace (and loves it), and through it the soul is frequently drawn towards that image. However, the power of generation, the second Venus desires to reproduce a form similar to its own. Therefore, love is present in both. In the former by contemplation, and in the latter by reproducing it (the desire for beauty). Each love is honourable. / / If anyone who is too eager for reproduction abandons contemplation, or pursues this act with women beyond normal means or beyond natural order with men, or prefers the form of the body to the beauty of the soul, then he, in particular, abuses the dignity of love."

170 The terminology I am using in this instance clearly reflects the inadequacies of the Platonic-Aristotelian opposition within the context of Christian literature. Plato implies in the Symposium that there are three kinds of love: physical procreation, spiritual procreation and love of Wisdom (The Symposium, trans. W. Hamilton, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976, pp. 23-25 and 84-95). In the Phaedrus these are more explicitly presented as: "the purely sensual, those who are called in the Phaedrus 'lovers of honour', and the lovers of Wisdom" (Ibid., p. 25). In this system it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between the last two, because the "lovers of Wisdom" attempt to, but do not quite, transcend physical love. It is around this point that Ficino develops a multiple series of divisions based on the Aristotelian theory of friendship, which is elaborated in Book VII of the Nicomachean Ethics. The latter divides the good into three classes, friendship is sought for three purposes: utility, pleasure, or goodness (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. J. A. K. Thomson, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976, pp. 260-269). This classification is based on the three kinds of lives described in Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics, as pleasurable, political and contemplative (Ibid., p. 68). In mediaeval or renaissance Aristotelianism, these are labelled "provechoso, deleitable, y honesto" (Leone Hebreo, Diálogos de Amor, en Obras Completas del Inca Garcilaso de la Vega, B.A.E. CXXXII, ed. P. Carmelo Saenz de Santa María, Madrid: Atlas, 1960, p. 17). Mediaeval translators of the Nicomachean Ethics interpret these three lives as sensual or bestial, human or mixt (that is, love controlled by reason), and contemplative, as one finds in Guillem de Copons' Catalan translation of Brunetto Latini's Livre dou tresor: "A comtar fan tres vides: la una és de concupiscència e de cobejanca; la II és vida ciutadana, ço és de seny, de proesa e d'onor; la terça és contemplativa. E los de més viuen segons la vida de les bèsties, que és apellada vida de concupiscència" (B. Latini, Llibre del Tresor vol. II, ed. C. J. Wittlin, Barcelona: Barcino, 1976, pp. 111-112). It is on the basis of such divisions that Hebreo attributes to Plato, undoubtedly following Ficino's handling of these three divisions, the latter classification.

The evolution of this tripartite division is conditioned by two factors. The Augustinian Neo-platonic conception of the position of the soul as an intermediary between God and matter favoured this kind of classification, and moreover, it is an inherent part of the Biblical exegetical tradition, such as in Guillaume de Saint Thierry's commentary on the Song of Songs which classifies life as "animal, rational, and spiritual" (see M. D. Chenu, La théologie au douzième siècle, pp. 298-299). This broader context is unfortunately overlooked in most exposés of the mediaeval tradition of this tripartite classification such as, A. Pagès, Auzias March et ses prédécesseurs, Paris: Honoré Champion, 1912, pp. 298-323; and René Nelli, L'Erotique des troubadours, Toulouse: Privat, 1963, pp. 247-264). When Ficino came to use this tripartite division he was less concerned with Aristotle or Plato than with an essentially Christian tradition, and he expanded the limits of this division, which is present in the Symposium, in order to deal with the various manifestations of human activity from a physiological basis rooted in Aristotelian theory, as found in Problem XXX (see note 176).

171 Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 211. "Now these twin Venuses and twin loves are not only present in the World Soul, but also in the souls of the spheres, of the stars, of demons and of men."

172 Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 211. "In us, however, one finds not only two but five loves. The two extremes are, of course, demons. The three intermediaries are not demons at all, but passions. Certainly, in the mind of man, love leading to the contemplation of divine beauty is eternal, by reason of which love we pursue the study of philosophy and the duties of justice and piety. There is even in the power of generation a certain hidden stimulus to procreate offsprings, and that love by which we are constantly incited to recreate in the figure of the procreated infant some similitude of celestial beauty, is eternal."

173 Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 211. "These two eternal loves within us are the two demons which Plato foretells will always be present in our souls, of which one elevates us to the regions above, the other drags us down to the regions below, the one being Calodemon, that is, the good demon, the other Cacodemon, that is, the evil demon. In truth both are good, because the procreation of a child, as well as, the search for truth are thought to be essential and honourable. The second to some extent is called evil, since because we abuse it, it often throws us into confusion and greatly turns the soul away from its principal good, which consists of the contemplation of the truth, and it twists us towards quite worthless occupations."

174 Commentaire sur le Banquet, pp. 211-212. "Between these two are within us three loves which, since they are not so stable as the others, but have beginnings, increase and decrease, and cease to exist, they are more correctly called impulses and passions than demons. Of these, one lies at an equal distance from both extremes. The remaining two incline in either direction."

175 See note 166 above. In the "De Vita Coelitus Comparanda" (Opera Omnia I, Basel: Henric Petrina, 1576 (Torino: Bottega d'Erasmo, 1962), p. 534), Ficino points out that one can come under the beneficial influence of melancholy-Saturn by the exercise of free-will, and thereby become a superior man. As R. Klibansky, E. Panofsky, and F. Saxl indicate: "Ficino is convinced that not only are children of Saturn qualified for intellectual work but that, vice versa, intellectual work reacts on men and places them under the dominion of Saturn, creating a sort of selective affinity between them" (Saturn and Melancholy, p. 261).

176 Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 212. "Furthermore when the image of someone's body, which comes before the eyes and through the eyes penetrates to the spirit, it pleases the soul instantly, because the composition of matter is of such a sort that the divine mind contains it in its idea, and since it agrees with the seminal reasons which both our mind and the power of generation once received from divinity and preserve as models of the thing itself. From this the tripartite love we have spoken about springs. For we are either born or educated to be eager and inclined towards a life of contemplation, or one of action, or one of sensual pleasure. If it be the life of contemplation then immediately we are elevated from the sight of a corporeal form to the contemplation of the spiritual and the divine. But if it be the life of sensual pleasure, we suddenly descend from seeing to the desire to touch." Furthermore Ficino goes on to classify these three loves as I indicated in note 170: "Contemplavi hominis amor divinus, activi, humanus, voluptuosi ferinus cognominatur" (p. 212). (See note 181.)

177 Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 205. "The Venereal demon is in fact a threefold love. The first is placed by the Platonists in the Celestial Venus, that is to say, in the very intelligence of the Angelic Mind. The second is placed in the Vulgar Venus, namely in that power of generation which the World Soul possesses. These two are also called demons because they lie between Chaos and Beauty, as we have mentioned above and will explain a little later on. The third is the order of demons who accompany the planet Venus. In these two we place a threefold order. Some are assigned to the element of fire, some to pure air, and some to denser and misty air. All are called "heroes", that is, lovers, from the Greek word, "heros" which means love."

178 See Saturn and Melancholy, pp. 255-274. Peter Dronke points out in his review of Saturn and Melancholy (Notes and Queries vol. 12, 1965, p. 356), that the main drawback of this point is that it artificially establishes a distinction between the mediaeval and the renaissance concepts of melancholy, when in fact both views are consistently present.

179 The Symposium, pp. 81-82.

180 Reference to Al-Razi is made in the ninth chapter of the Sixth Discourse of the Commentarium (Commentaire, p. 214): "Eumque Rasis medicus cohitu, ieunio ebrietate deambulatione curari precepit." It is also possible that Ficino relied on Saint Albert the Great's Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, which introduces the concept of melancholy adust. The latter plays an important part in Ficino's theory of love, as I will shew below. See Saturn and Melancholy, pp. 69-72.

181 Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 212. "The love of the contemplative is divine, that of the active man is human, and that of the voluptuous man is bestial."

182 Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 213. "Although all these traits are found in all kinds of love, they are seen most clearly in the three intermediary loves which are best known to us."

183 Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 213. "Born on the birthday of Venus he follows Venus, that is, born with those spirits from above which we call venereal, he brings the souls of men back to the regions above. But he is seized by a desire for beauty, since Venus herself is most beautiful, that is, he fires souls with the desire for the highest, divine beauty, since he himself was born among the spirits, who being close to God are illuminated magnificently by the grace of God and raise us towards those same rays."

184 "It is Saturn who leads the mind to contemplation of higher and hidden matters, and he himself, as Ficino says in more than one place, signifies "divine contemplation" (Saturn and Melancholy, p. 260). See also, ibid., pp. 271-273, and in particular, pp. 337-338, which specifically refers to Raymond Lull's treatment of the lofty functions of Saturn in the Tractatus novus de astronomia, which, as all of Ramon Lull's works, may have influenced Ausias March's thought, as we will see in Chapter V. Furthermore, see Chapter III, notes 79-85.

185 See Saturn and Melancholy, pp. 10, 17, 103, 145.

186 Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 213. "Besides, since the life of all living things and trees as well as the fertility of the earth lies in humidity and heat, Diotima, in order to demonstrate the poverty of Love, inferred that both humidity and heat were lacking in him, when she said that he was dry, thin and a dirty grey-green. For who would not know that the things which moisture abandons are arid and dry? Likewise, who can say that pallor and greyness (squalor) come from any other source than the lack of warm blood."

187 "The Saturnine man is the worst of all men... His skin is dark, brown, yellowish or almost greenish" (Saturn and Melancholy, p. 191, paraphrasing Michael Scott, Liber introductorius, Oxford: MS. Bodley 266, fols. 150v sqq.).

188 "If that melancholy be not violently affected by "adustio", it will generate vital spirits which are abundant, constant and strong. For this reason, such people have firm convictions and very well regulated passions, and they will be industrious and possess the highest virtues" (Albertus Magnus, De animalibus libri vol. II, quoted from Saturn and Melancholy, p. 70). I do not refer specifically to Albertus' theory but to the medical tradition following Avicenna (Saturn and Melancholy, pp. 86-89).

189 See note 135 above.

190 See Chapter III, notes 87, 95, and 100.

191 Commentaire sur le Banquet, pp. 213-214. "Indeed, by a lengthy love mortals become pale and thin, inasmuch as the power of nature is hardly adequate for two tasks at once. The attention of the lover's soul is absorbed by perpetual thoughts of the beloved, and to this end the power of his entire temperament is directed. Hence, no longer is the food in his stomach completely digested, and as a result of this the major part is released as superfluous residues, while the lesser part is carried to the liver in a raw state."

192 Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 214. "Moreover, wherever the attention of the soul is drawn, there too fly the spirits which are the vehicles or instruments of the soul. The spirits are created in the heart from the thinnest part of the blood. The soul of the lover is dragged down towards the image of the beloved, fixed there by imagination (phantasy), and into the beloved himself. And the spirits are dragged in the same direction. Perpetually flying thither they are weakened. Wherefore it is necessary that a continuous recharging of pure blood take place in order to recreate burnt out spirits, where the clearer parts of the blood are each day exhausted in the refurbishing of spirits. On account of this, when the pure clear blood has been weakened, there remains blood that is impure, thick, dry and black. From this the body becomes dry and squalid (dirty grey-green), and lovers become melancholic. For from the dry, thick, black blood emerges melancholy, that is, black bile, which completely fills the head with its vapours, dries the brain, and does not cease to trouble the soul day and night with hideous and horrifying images."

193 Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 214. "These things usually happen in the case of those who, abusing love, have transformed what belongs to contemplation into a desire for physical love."

194 Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 215. "For this reason choleric and melancholic men seek music and the pleasures derived from the visual enjoyment of corporeal forms, as the sole cure and solace for their most troublesome temperament. Hence, they are more inclined to the charms of Venus. Socrates, whom Aristotle considered to be melancholic had the greatest propensity of all towards the arts of loving, as he himself confessed. In the same way we can consider Sappho a melancholic, as she herself witnesses. Even our master Vergil, whose portrait indicates him to have been

a choleric, was somewhat inclined to love."

195 See note 105.

196 Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, The Mystical Theology and the Celestial Hierarchies, p. 39.

197 See Chapter III, note 31.

198 Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 255. "Out of necessity the restlessness of lovers perseveres as long as that infection of the blood, remaining fixed in the entrails as a result of fascination, oppresses the heart with deep anxiety, nurtures the wound in the veins, and burns the members (limbs) with invisible flames, passing from the heart it goes on to the veins and from these to the members (limbs). Only when this has finally been purged, does restlessness in lovers, or rather, in madmen, cease. In all instances, indeed, this requires a long period of time; the longest in the case of melancholy men, especially if they have been ensnared under the influence of Saturn. In addition, it is an interminable period of time if they were seized when Saturn was in decline or in conjunction with Mars, or opposite the Sun."

199 See note 176.

200 Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 245. "In the Phaedrus our Plato defines "furor" as an alienation of the mind and he teaches that there are two sorts of alienation. One he believes comes from human illness, the other from God. The former he calls insanity, the latter divine frenzy. Smitten by insanity a man is act beneath the form of man, and somehow returns to being an animal. There are two types of insanity. One arises from a vice of the brain and the other from a vice of the heart. Often the brain is excessively occupied by scorched bile, often by scorched blood, sometimes by black bile.... For when these humours are held within the heart, they engender anxiety and restlessness, not madness..."

201 For example, in the many references to melancholy found in Alfonso Martínez de Toledo's Arcipreste de Talavera, it is always seen as a sign of madness with no redeeming value, as in: "Más que más quando son onbres colóricos, que son prestos a las manos e reyna súbyto la malenconía en ellos, e fazen en un punto e en una (hora) cosa de que se arrepienten por todo el año, o quiçá toda su vida; o le matan súbyto e va a las penas ynfernales condepnado" (ed. J. González Muela, Madrid: Castalia, 1970, p. 195). See also Saturn and Melancholy, pp. 75-97 and 109.

202 Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 242. "Surely, my friends, you have noticed in what was said above that while Plato depicts Love itself, it is entirely the portrait of Socrates that he paints, and he describes the image of that god from the persona of Socrates,

as though true love and Socrates were the same, and as if he, before all others, were the true and legitimate lover. Come, recall to mind that picture of love. You will see in it the figure of Socrates. Place before your eyes the figure of Socrates. You will see a man, thin, dry, and pale grey-green (squalidus), doubtless, melancholic by nature, as they say, and rough, unkempt, underfed, dirty through lack of attention."

203 Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, p. 626.

204 Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 243. "Sleeping out of doors, in the street under the sky. These words mean the open breast and heart of our Socrates, open to all."

205 I am thinking here of moralists such as Andreas Capellanus in particular. As I hope to show in Chapter V, and as D. W. Robertson ("The Subject of the De Amore of Andreas Capellanus," M.P. vol. 50, 1952-1953, pp. 145-161) has partially demonstrated secular love for Capellanus can only signify fornicatio, and as such it can only be a condemnable activity. Therefore, Capellanus distinguishes very clearly between the experience of love in the "saeculum" and the Church. For a contrary, but intelligent, point of view see D. Kelly, "Courtly Love in Perspective: The Hierarchy of Love in Andreas Capellanus," Traditio XXIV, 1968, pp. 119-148.

206 As M. D. Chenu has shown the growth of the evangelical movement is intimately associated with the evolution of the laity, and in particular, the commercial laity, as is evident in the case of the "devotio moderna" in Deventer. The Hundred Years War, which undermined the agrarian economy of France and England, lead to the growth in power of the Italian middle class families such as the Medici who financed the French war effort (see Maurice Keen, The Pelican History of Medieval Europe, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968, pp. 238-239). This led not only to the growth of the mercantile class, but also to the involvement of the aristocracy in commercial transactions of a mercantile nature (Ibid., pp. 241-243), which eventually contributed to the dissolution of the feudal social structure. The alteration of the cornerstones of the mediaeval economy directly affected the religious outlook of that society.

207 Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 260. "For true love is nothing other than a certain struggle roused by the sight of corporeal beauty attempting to fly up to divine beauty; false love on the other hand is the descent from sight to touch."

208 Saturn and Melancholy, p. 247.

209 This phrase is a matter of convenience. I am not suggesting that the Cortegiano is "influenced" by Thomas à Kempis' Imitation of Christ, but that as a "rifasciamento" of the Commentarium in Convivium, it is indebted to the evangelism of Ficino which runs also in Erasmus' Enchiridion (see A. H. T. Levi, "The Neoplatonist

Calculus," Humanism in France at the End of the Middle Ages and in the Early Renaissance, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1970, p. 231). The ideas which it expresses are basically a development of those pertaining to the "devotio moderna", that is, they represent the ideology of a new nobility arising out of the commercial middle class. I am therefore referring to the Imitation as the principle representative of the evangelical current prior to Florentine Neoplatonism. By creating the perfect courtier, Castiglione creates a kind of secular saint, much as St. François de Sales does in the Introduction à la vie dévote.

210 See Chapter V.

211 For Capellanus' definition of love see note 7 Chapter III.

212 See notes 130-134 above.

213 See notes 123-125 above.

214 See note 135 above.

215 Jean Festugière (La philosophie de l'amour de Marsile Ficin, Paris: Vrin, 1941, p. 34) confuses the issue by suggesting that beauty perceived by the lover is always a "vain imagination": "La Beauté extérieure est éparse, composée, imparfaite, ... et qui l'aime n'aime qu'un songe, une vaine imagination." This use of the word "imagination" is not wrong; it is, however, misleading, since Ficino uses imagination as a cognitive faculty which serves to identify true beauty which is interior.

216 Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 199. This follows in the tradition of Alain de Lille's Complaint of Nature and the mediaeval poetic tradition of the mythological Metamorphosis Goliae (see W. Wetherbee, Platonism and Poetry, pp. 134-136, and P. Dronke, Medieval Latin and the Rise of European Love-Lyric vol. II, Oxford: Clarendon, 1968, pp. 367-369), which Ausias March follows in his mythological Poem LXXV, which I will briefly examine in Chapter V.

217 See note 209.

218 With no wish to belittle the contributions of N. A. Robb (Neoplatonism of the Italian Renaissance) and J. C. Nelson (Renaissance Theory of Love), two things should be pointed out which affect my interpretation. First, they both tend to follow the Burckhardt-della Torre approach to Renaissance Neoplatonism, and, therefore, present Florentine Neoplatonism as a novelty, somewhat divorced from anything happening outside Italy. In the second place, this kind of isolationism is further carried to the point of showing Neoplatonism as something devoid of passion, as an experience of an ethereal nature. By following the direction taken by Raymond Marcel, and exploring the text of the Commentarium

in the light of Klibansky, Panofsky and Saxl's Saturn and Melancholy, as well as, Chenu's and Wetherbee's studies on medieval Platonisms, I have attempted to re-adjust this point of view into what I believe to be the proper perspective. Naturally, my interpretation of the Commentarium, concerning certain passages, has considerable particular affinity with those of Robb and Nelson, but I diverge from them by considering Ficino to be primarily a Christian Platonist, rather than a disciple of Plato. As A. H. T. Levi has suggested: "the Neoplatonist vogue in sixteenth-century France is certainly not unconnected with the central concerns of evangelical humanism..." ("The Neoplatonist Calculus," p. 232). It is this direction which I am following, but with the difference that, on the basis of Chenu's research, I am applying the concept of evangelism prior to the Reformation.

219 Again A. H. T. Levi notes that one has to take into account the tensions involved in Ficino's theory of love which attempts to reconcile both earthly and spiritual love: "It seems important to insist on this point, because a good deal of work on sixteenth-century authors still assumes that the love for which Ficino himself coined the term "Platonic" is a spiritual aspiration which remains emphatically insulated from passion and instinct... At its highest point, and at its nearest to Ficino, sixteenth-century Neoplatonism was the vehicle for a daring investigation precisely into the connection between the love which is instinctively based and that which was spiritually perfective... Significantly, neither Pico della Mirandola, nor Bembo, nor Castiglione dares to go so far as Ficino" ("The Neoplatonist Calculus," pp. 237-238). Yet, as we have seen in Chapter III, this is precisely what Ausias March does, with an intensity that certainly surpasses that of Ficino, and makes him so important for the proper understanding of Spanish Golden Age poets. Levi's point of view naturally flies in the face of that of Paul N. Siegel ("The Petrarchan Sonneteers and Neo-Platonic Love," Studies in Philology vol. 42, 1945, pp. 164-182), who presents Platonic love as an inclination of the soul guided entirely by reason, and therefore, dispassionate: "Whereas chivalric love has as its very centre sexual intercourse outside marriage and is an overwhelming passion which ignores the dictates of reason, ... neo-Platonic love is governed by reason and is in one of its many aspects an idealization of marriage (p. 164)... The neo-Platonic sonnet-cycles... emphasize that the love of which they speak is a "chaste" love, and there is no conflict between reason and passion (182)." Siegel's approach is also that taken by R. O. Jones ("Ariosto and Garcilaso," B.H.S. XXXIX, 1962, pp. 153-164; "The Idea of Love in Garcilaso's Second Eclogue," M.L.R. XLVI, 1951, pp. 388-395; and "Bembo, Gil Polo, Garcilaso: Three Accounts of Love," Revue de littérature comparée XL, 1966, pp. 526-540), and followed by A. Solé-Leris ("The Theory of Love in the Two Dianas," B.H.S. XXXVI, 1959, pp. 65-79, and "Psychological Realism in the Pastoral Novel: Gil Polo's Diana Enamorada," B.H.S. XXXIX, 1962, pp. 43-47).

220 See Gaston Paris, "Le conte de la charette," Romania XII,

1883, p. 529, and Amy Kelly, "Eleanor of Aquitaine and Her Courts of Love," Speculum vol. 12, 1937, pp. 3-19, and J. Festugière, La philosophie d'amour de Marsile Ficin, p. 3.

221 See J. Festugière, La philosophie d'amour de Marsile Ficin pp. 3 and 20. This author sees Ficinian Platonism as a prolongation of "courtly love", whereas, as I pointed out before in note 219, Jones and Siegel who understand "courtly love" to be oriented towards sexual love, distinguish sharply between the two. Once more confusion here originates in the amorphous term "courtly love".

222 See note 219, and J. C. Nelson, The Renaissance Theory of Love, p. 119, and P. Floriani, Bembo e Castiglione (Roma: Bulzoni, 1976), p. 172.

223 See note 219.

224 J. C. Nelson (The Renaissance Theory of Love, p. 107) remarks that in Gli Asolani: "will is the source of love and hate." This point is also made by Ficino, see notes 166-176. It follows the basic Augustinian notion that sin originates in the will (Confessions vol. I, pp. 341-342, Book VII: 3), that is, in the soul (see note 145). This is also expressed by Ausias March (see Chapter III, note 35) when he defines sorrow as a lack of discretion, it is understood that this is a defect of the will.

225 See above note 224, and P. Bembo, Gli Asolani, Opere tome II, Roma: Francesco Hertzhause, 1729, reprint, Ridgewood, New Jersey: Gregg, 1965, p. 58: "Conciossa cosa che v'è di prima la volontà: la qual può e volere parimente, e disvolere, fonte e capo delle due seguenti:...."

226 Gli Asolani, p. 58: "E sia per me, se così a te piace, amore e disiderio quello stesso."

227 Gli Asolani, p. 4.

228 This, of course, is consequent with the impression projected by P. N. Siegel and R. O. Jones (see note 219). As J. C. Nelson remarks on Ficino's followers: "The trattatisti overlook the existence of emotional, psychological and esthetic factors in sensual love" (The Renaissance Theory of Love, p. 70). This also seems to me to be true of the way these writers deal with the problem of love as a whole, since by oversimplifying the participation of the body, they focus principally on the ascension of the soul, and on the nature of the beauty which it contemplates. As a result, they seem to overlook the tension that really concerned Ficino in his handling of the theory of melancholy. As I hope to shew, however, this is the first impression which the reader receives, a closer look shews that the basic problems are assumed to be known by the reader.

229 J. C. Nelson, The Renaissance Theory of Love, p. 73.

230 See above, the quotation concerning note 227: "quale amore buono sia, e qual reo."

231 A. Solé-Leris, "The Theory of Love in the Two Dianas," p. 77. This interpretation of Leone Hebreo is taken up by R. O. Jones in Ariosto and Garcilaso (p. 162), and developed in "Bembo, Gil Polo and Garcilaso," in which Jones forwards the idea that Leone Hebreo's theory of love favours jealousy, as does "courtly love": "Montemayor quoted Leone Hebreo in support of a view of love which in its lachrimosity, its acceptance of jealousy and suffering as the true lover's lot, is recognisably courtly love... in a new setting" (p. 531). Although Jones expresses some reservations as to Montemayor's usage of Leone Hebreo, it seems to me that his interpretation of Hebreo, and of the indeterminate term "courtly love," is misleading. In the first place, jealousy as it is used by the trattatisti such as Hebreo and Giordano Bruno, does not only signify a destructive passion, "it is pain suffered through the deprivation of the beloved object" (P. E. Memmo, Giordano Bruno's "The Heroic Frenzies," Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1964, p. 29). As such it is not condoned by Hebreo, who like Ficino (see note 137 above) sees in it a misguided physiological effect of a sensual inclination to love. As I will show in the text Hebreo repudiates this kind of love, which does not acknowledge the real object of the soul's yearning. In second place, if we take "courtly love" to mean love as it is practised by the troubadours, then one has to note that according to them, jealousy was a vice, and they certainly did not base their conception of love on it, as Erich Köhler ("Les troubadours et la jalousie," Mélanges de langue et de littérature du moyen âge et de la renaissance offerts à Jean Frappier tome I, Genève: Droz, 1970, pp. 543-559) has demonstrated. Yet, it is true that in the parody of "courtly love" found in the Spanish cancioneros, jealousy does play an important role, thereby imitating the ironical rules of love set down by Andreas Capellanus. However, the intention of the latter work is unclear (see Chapter V). Therefore, R. O. Jones' theory is based on a series of uncertain premisses which invalidate his otherwise very sensitive study.

232 N. A. Robb, Neoplatonism of the Italian Renaissance, pp. 197-198.

233 The edition of Leone Hebreo's Dialoghi d'Amore throughout this thesis, except in exceptional circumstances, is the Castilian translation of El Inca Garcilaso de la Vega, Diálogos de Amor de León Hebreo, Obras Completas I (B.A.E. CXXXII), ed. Carmelo Saenz de Santa María, Madrid: Atlas, 1960. Reference to the point just made in the text is to be found on page 17.

234 Diálogos de Amor, p. 213.

235 On this matter I tend to disagree, for reasons which will be obvious in the course of analysis, with J. C. Nelson. It is not so much the classification of love that affects Leone's text, but his various uses of "reason", "right reason" and "extraordinary reason" (see J. C. Nelson, The Renaissance Theory of Love, p. 88).

236 See Diálogos de Amor, p. 42: "El perfecto y verdadero amor... es padre del deseo e hijo de la razón," see note 270 for the complete passage in the text.

237 Diálogos de Amor, p. 34.

238 Diálogos de Amor, p. 35.

239 "las cosas espirituales se conocen por los efectos vistos o sentidos como ves por el continuo movimiento del cielo se conoce que el movedor no es el cuerpo ni virtud corpórea, sino entendimiento espiritual apartado de materia, de manera que si el efecto de su movimiento no fuera primero en el sentido, no fuera conocido el movedor. A este conocimiento sucede otro más perfecto de las cosas espirituales, que se hac entendiendo nuestro entendimiento la ciencia intelectual en sí misma, hallándose en acto, por la identidad de la naturaleza y unión sensual que tiene con las cosas espirituales" (Diálogos de Amor, p. 35).

240 "Y es entendimiento posible, es todas las cosas en potencia, que su propia esencia no es otra que entenderlas todas en potencia. Y si es entendimiento en acto, puro ser y pura forma, contiene en si todos los grados del ser, de las formas y de los actos del universo, todos juntamente en ser, en unidad y en pura simplicidad" (Diálogos de Amor, p. 36).

241 Diálogos de Amor, p. 37.

242 Diálogos de Amor, p. 37.

243 Diálogos de Amor, p. 36.

244 Diálogos de Amor, p. 44.

245 Diálogos de Amor, p. 37.

246 Diálogos de Amor, p. 38.

247 Diálogos de Amor, p. 38.

248 See N. A. Robb, Neoplatonism of the Italian Renaissance, p. 201; and Suzanne Damiens, Amour et Intellect chez Léon l'Hebreu,

Paris: Edouard Privat, 1971, in particular, pp. 178-181.

249 Diálogos de Amor, p. 39.

250 Diálogos de Amor, p. 39.

251 La hermosura corporal, que es sombra de la espiritual" (Dialogos de Amor, p. 185).

252 Diálogos de Amor, p. 18.

253 Diálogos de Amor, p. 193.

254 See note 104, Chapter III.

255 Diálogos de Amor, pp. 193-194.

256 Diálogos de Amor, p. 71.

257 Diálogos de Amor, p. 45.

258 Diálogos de Amor, pp. 193-194.

259 Diálogos de Amor, p. 164.

260 Diálogos de Amor, p. 135.

261 Diálogos de Amor, p. 194.

262 Diálogos de Amor, p. 174.

263 Diálogos de Amor, p. 153.

264 See above, note 207.

265 Diálogos de Amor, p. 153.

266 Diálogos de Amor, p. 117.

267 The typesetting of the B.A.E. edition is defective at this passage, and renders the text incomprehensible. I have, therefore, turned to the original 1535 edition (reprinted in Leone Ebreo: Dialoghi d'Amore, Hebraische Gedichte, ed. Carl Gebhardt, Heidelberg: Societatis Spinozanae, 1929, p. 19, Dialogo terzo).

268 Diálogos de Amor, p. 157.

269 See, Diálogos de Amor, p. 169.

270 Diálogos de Amor, p. 42.

271 Again the B.A.E. edition is defective, see Leone Ebreo: Dialoghi d'Amore, p. 33, Dialogo primo.

272 See note 104, Chapter III.

273 Again the Spanish text is defective, Leone Ebreo: Dialoghi d'Amore, p. 137, Dialogo terzo.

274 Diálogos de Amor, p. 45.

275 Diálogos de Amor, p. 43.

276 See R. Klibansky, F. Saxl and E. Panofsky, Saturn and Melancholy, pp. 271-273 in particular.

277 Diálogos de Amor, pp. 43-44.

278 Diálogos de Amor, p. 44.

279 Diálogos de Amor, p. 45.

280 "La segunda (razon) es mas digna y de mas eminente grado..." (Dialogos de Amor, p. 45).

281 Diálogos de Amor, p. 226.

282 Diálogos de Amor, p. 226.

283 Diálogos de Amor, p. 226.

284 Diálogos de Amor, p. 226.

285 Diálogos de Amor, p. 226.

286 Diálogos de Amor, p. 78.

287 Gli Asolani, p. 22 (for edition see note 225).

288 See note 129 above.

289 Andreae Capellani, De Amore, ed. E. Trojel (Munchen: Eidos, 1964), p. 5; and see note 7, Chapter III, and note 40, Chapter V.

290 Gli Asolani, p. 42.

291 Gli Asolani, p. 33.

292 This repeats Ficino's point of view, see note 207 in the text.

293 "... che cosa amore si sia, e quanto danosa e grave: ilquale incontro la maestà della natura scellerato divenuto noi uomini cotanto allei cari, e da essa de l'intelletto, che divina parte è, per ispeziale grazia donati, acciò che così più pura menando la nostra vita al cielo con esso s'aviaciassimo di salire; di lui perraventura miseramente spogliandoci ci tiene col piè attussati nelle brutture terrene in maniera, che spesse volte disavventurosamente v'offoghiamo" (Gli Asolani, p. 22).

294 Gli Asolani, p. 49.

295 Gli Asolani, pp. 49-50.

296 Gli Asolani, p. 52.

297 Gli Asolani, p. 52.

298 Gli Asolani, p. 53.

299 Diálogos de Amor, p. 193.

300 Gli Asolani, p. 53.

301 Gli Asolani, p. 56.

302 Gli Asolani was written between 1495 and 1505. It seems to me that for the reader who does not take into account the situation in which Bembo found himself, Bembo's intention concerning the problem of illumination remains unclear. Indeed, for a man who possessed Ficino's Commentarium in Convivium it does seem strange that he should have omitted such an important part of the master's theory. Yet, when one recalls that Bembo was writing at a moment when the revolt of Savanarola shook Florence and led to a violent confrontation with the Church of Rome, and that furthermore, Savanarola was considered by Ficino to be a model of divine "furore", it is not so surprising that Bembo purged his work of references to divine love. Gli Asolani is then strictly concerned with the kinds of human love, and thereby avoids violating the bounds of strict orthodoxy.

303 Gli Asolani, p. 57.

304 Gli Asolani, p. 62: "E in fine sappi che buono amore non è il tuo. Il quale posto che non sia malvagio in ciò, che con le bestievoli voglie non si mescola, si è egli non buono in questo, che esso ad immortale obietto non ti tira: ma tienti nel mezzo dell'una e dell'altra qualità di disio; dove il dimorare tuttavia non è sano...."

305 See Chapter III, note 80.

306 Gli Asolani, p. 58.

307 Gli Asolani, p. 61.

308 Gli Asolani, p. 61.

309 Gli Asolani, p. 61.

310 Gli Asolani, p. 63.

311 See R. O. Jones, "Bembo, Gil Polo and Garcilaso," pp. 526-533.

312 See Pietro Bembo, Gli Asolani, intro. R. B. Gottfried, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1954, p. XVII; and J. Festugière, La philosophie de l'amour de Marsile Ficin, p. 43.

313 Baldessar Castiglione, Il libro del Cortegiano, Opere Volgare e Latine, ed. Cornelio Bentivoglio, Padova: Giuseppe Comino, 1733, pp. 226-227.

314 Il libro del Cortegiano, p. 227.

315 Il libro del Cortegiano, p. 227.

316 Il libro del Cortegiano, p. 227.

317 Il libro del Cortegiano, p. 228.

318 These are the words used in the translation-edition of George Bull (Baldesar Castiglione, The Book of the Courtier, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967, p. 328). Yet, the Italian editions (Corneglio Bentivoglio, p. 238; and B. Castiglione, Il libro del Cortegiano, ed. Vittorio Cian, Firenze: G. C. Sansone, 1947, Book 4, liv. 15) use the word "divine" instead of "heroic." The implication remains, nonetheless, the same. By "heroic" Castiglione refers to the divine, or god-like, nature of man in the context of the concept of the "dignity of man" (Saturn and

Melancholy, p. 246). Hence, in a previous passage on which all versions concur Castiglione uses the word "heroic" in this sense (Cian, 4: xxii: 18-20; Bentivoglio, p. 207; and Bull, p. 299): "In somma sara glorosissimo, e carissimo agli uomini, e a Dio; per la cui grazia acquisterà quella virtù eroica che lo farà ecedere i termini della umanità..." (Bentivoglio). This is also the reading followed by Juan Boscán (Margherita Morreale, Castiglione y Boscán: El Ideal Cortesano en el Renacimiento Español tomo II, Madrid: Real Academia Española, 1959 (Anejo I), p. 16). The significance, as I will show in the text, corresponds to Ficino's use of "heroic" or "heroes".

319 Il libro del Cortegiano, p. 228.

320 Il libro del Cortegiano, pp. 228-229.

321 Il libro del Cortegiano, p. 229.

322 Il libro del Cortegiano, p. 231.

323 Il libro del Cortegiano, p. 234. One is immediately reminded of similar claims by Ausias March in Poem XVIII, studied in Chapter III.

324 Commentaire sur le Banquet, Discourse VII, chapters IV and V, pp. 246-250 in particular.

325 Il libro del Cortegiano, p. 234.

326 Il libro del Cortegiano, p. 237.

327 Il libro del Cortegiano, p. 237.

328 See Chapter III, notes 26, 31 and 104, and in the text of Chapter IV between notes 188 and 192.

329 Il libro del Cortegiano, pp. 237-238.

330 Il libro del Cortegiano, p. 238.

331 Il libro del Cortegiano, pp. 238-239; see also quotation 258 in text.

332 One notes that the difference in attitude lies in the fact that Leone Hebreo understands "heroic love" as the perception of the form of corporeal objects raised upwards so that they may be apprehended by the eye of the soul (see note 331).

333 See in the text, quotation 130, and the subsequent discussion.

334 San Juan de la Cruz, El Cántico Espiritual, ed. M. Martinez Burgos, Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1969, p. 18.

335 Il libro del Cortegiano, p. 239.

336 Il libro del Cortegiano, p. 239. Again it is interesting to note that the "rest" sought in contemplation, referred to in the above quotation, lies at the source of Ausias March's problems. Indeed, the frustration experienced by Ausias March is that although he apprehends the first glimmer of divine beauty in the "gest" of the lady, he, like the Courtier, must transcend this initial vision in order to find "rest" in the source of that beauty. Thus, in XCIX, his delight in the lady's beauty, which first seems to be the delight of his soul, becomes a source of torment: "Lo meu repòs treball és convertit, / e lo meu goig en tristor sens remey" (vv. 21-22). In Poem LXXIX, he realizes that this corporeal beauty is not the real source of delight: "O foll Amor, qui vostre delit vol, / sobre loch fals ha son contentament; / per ço repòs no te·n l'enteniment, / car si no·l ver l'enteniment no col" (vv. 41-44). This reaches a purely religious expression in the "Cant Espiritual", Poem CV: "Axí la fi de tot en tot humana / no da repòs al apetit o terme, / mas tan poch l'om sens ella no ha l'altra: / sent Johan fon senyalant lo Messies" (vv. 125-128). Here Ausias March is referring to the fact that the perception of beauty by imagination can lead to divine love, but that it is not an end in itself. This is furthered in the ensuing verses: "No té repòs qui null altra fi guarda, / car en res àls lo voler no reposa; / ço sent cascú, e no·y cal suptilesa, / car fora Tu lo voler no·s atura" (vv. 129-132). In other words Ausias March explicitly recognizes, like the "trattatisti", that there is no rest for the will, except in the cause of Beauty, which as he indicates, is God.

337 Il libro del Cortegiano, pp. 239-240.

338 Il libro del Cortegiano, p. 240.

339 Il libro del Cortegiano, p. 240.

340 Il libro del Cortegiano, p. 242.

341 See Chapter III, note 104.

342 As in the question of "courtly love" the attitude taken is largely a matter of personal choice. One should note, however, that for moralists "amor hereos" is rarely met with favour. Thus, Robert Burton (The Anatomy of Melancholy, New York: Farrar and Rinehardt, 1927, pp. 650-659, Part 3, Member 1, subsection 2), collects most things said on melancholy, and continues to view it as "melancholia negra", still considers "heroical love" to be, "this mad and beastly passion... named by our Physicians Heroical

Love, and a more honourable title put on it, Noble Love, as Savanarola styles it, because Noble men and women make a common practice of it..." (pp. 657-658). Melancholy heroical love in these terms stands at the opposite pole of the heroical love referred to by Castiglione and the other trattatisti. It is what René Nelli calls "amour de chevalier", which he believes was condemned by the troubadours (R. Nelli, L'Erotique des troubadours, Toulouse: Edouard Privat, 1963, pp. 64-65).

343 See note 219. For Siegel, Petrarchism, which he equates with "courtly love", is basically disguised sensuality: "It was not without reason that contemporary satirists and reformers denounced the sonneteers as "lascivious". The exaggerated laudation of the mistress and the complete humility of the lover in the Petrarchan sonnet do not represent an idealization of womanhood. Rather do they represent a degradation of women, for the literary and social convention which gave them this purious elevation sprang from a point of view in which they were so many conquests to be gained" (pp. 169-170). The Neoplatonic lover stands at the opposite pole: "The veneration and awe with which he regards his mistress is not the mere rhetoric of the Petrarchists; it is the expression in literary terms of the genuinely idealistic sentiments of the Platonist who sees in the beauty of his mistress a manifestation of God" (p. 177). On this last point, I would agree with Siegel. Many critics have complained that Ausias March has never described his lady, as Petrarch does, and that, therefore, he does not express a Platonic point of view. Yet, as Siegel indicates, this is the most important point for understanding the so-called "non-courtly" intention of an author such as Ausias March. As I hope to demonstrate in Chapter V, Ausias March's beloved takes on a purely sapiential character, and he conceives of her beauty as "a manifestation of God".

344 This seems to me to be evident, in particular, in R. O. Jones, "Ariosto and Garcilaso," B.H.S., XXXIX, 1962, pp. 153-164, in which he studies Garcilaso's use of the two conceptions of love. The merging of the two literary conventions is the object of the study of Sharon Ghertman, Petrarch and Garcilaso: A Linguistic Approach to Style, London: Tamesis, 1975; and, of course, Rafael Lapesa, La trayectoria poética de Garcilaso, Madrid: Revista de Occidente, 1968, re-edition of 1948, pp. 73-124.

345 Thus, Siegel himself has to note in "The Petrarchan Sonneteers and Neo-Platonic Love," pp. 180-181, that in Sidney's Astrophel and Stella, reason eventually wins out over the senses, and the situation remains one in which the lover has to choose between love of God or love of the lady: "Sidney's Astrophel and Stella is the dramatic representation of the conflict within a man who passionately desires a married woman -- a conflict which is finally resolved by his mastering his passion and turning his mind from earthly love to the love of God. The Platonism with which the sonnets are infused gives philosophic significance to the inner conflict of Astrophel. Astrophel's love for Stella is

not a purely physical one of the Petrarchan sonneteers. He loves the beauty of her mind even more than that of her outward appearance, and finds in her "all vices overthrow, Not by rude force, but sweetest soveraignitie Of reason." However, the teachings of virtue cannot still in him the desire to win her fully in a love consummated by bodily union" (p. 180). I would argue that this situation, which quite appropriately belongs to the tradition of the Neo-platonic trattatisti, is also that faced by Ausias March, as I have shown in Chapter III, and will illustrate in Chapter V. Clearly then, this runs against the rather too clear-cut distinction made by R. O. Jones in his "Bembo, Gil Polo, Garcilaso" (pp. 536-537) in which he assimilates Pagès' interpretation and attempts to place Ausias March in the all too neat classification of "courtly lovers": "The idea that love is a sort of madness because it is hostile to reason is present throughout the courtly love tradition, but it was one of the things courtly lovers willingly accepted. The moralist's loco amor is an expression of repugnance. Ausias March provides a relevant illustration. His poetry describes the anguish of being torn between carnal and spiritual love, and his despairing renunciation of all human love at last in favour of love of God... For Ausias all love between man and woman is madness, because man's true end is elsewhere, and in search of it Ausias renounces the world... The remoteness of this form Garcilaso need not be underlined" (pp. 536-537). The inexactitude of these last four sentences should be obvious from what I hope to have indicated in the body of this thesis. If Garcilaso imitates Bembo's theory of love, it is patent that Bembo preaches the renunciation of wordly love. Furthermore, as Chapter III has shewn, and V will illustrate, spiritual love between man and woman is possible in certain instances in Ausias March's poetry. For him, as for the trattatisti, an excessive inclination to the love of corporeal objects leads to mundane "furore".

346 R. O. Jones, "The Idea of Love in Garcilaso's Second Eclogue," M.L.R. XLVI, 1951, pp. 388-395; "Ariosto and Garcilaso," B.H.S. XXXIX, 1962, pp. 153-164; "Bembo, Gil Polo and Garcilaso," Revue de littérature comparée v. 40, 1966, pp. 526-540; as well as, "Garcilaso, poeta del humanismo," Clavileño, no. 28, 1954, to which Jones constantly refers but which I have been unfortunately unable to consult. I wish to point out that I agree with what Jones has to say about on the content of Garcilaso's poems; where I beg to differ is on the perspective with which he approaches Neo-platonic theory.

In his desire to present Renaissance love theory as something radically different from the mediaeval "courtly love" Jones ("Bembo, Gil Polo and Garcilaso," pp. 534-540) has rejected E. L. Rivers' interpretation of the identity of Severo in Garcilaso's second eclogue ("Las Eclogas de Garcilaso: Ensayo de una trayectoria espiritual," Actas del Primer Congreso Internacional de Hispanistas, ed. Frank Pierce and Cyril A. Jones, Oxford: Dolphin, 1964, pp. 420-425). Rivers' main argument is that: "El amor del pastor Albanio es el mismo loco amor de la tradición medieval, una sensualidad desenfrenada que rompe tanto con el código del amor cortés como con la moralidad cristiana" (p. 421)... "El mejor remedio para este amor, en la experiencia de Nemoroso,

es la eficaz doctrina de cierto Severo, trasunto poético de un fraile cisterciense bien histórico. Esta doctrina por Nemoroso, parece ser combinación ya tradicional de filosofía estoica y ascetismo cristiano; no hay aquí ninguna escala de sublimación neoplatónica, porque el pecaminoso deseo sensual tiene que destruirse radicalmente; no se lo mira como primer escalón que pueda conducir eventualmente al amor espiritual, sino camino del infierno" (p. 422). Various objections should be raised against Rivers' claims. First, concerning his interpretation of Neo-platonic love, it is obvious that Rivers does not take into account the problem of imagination, which lies at the origin of all amorous experience and can turn love either into a transcendental confrontation with Beauty, or debase it by dragging it down to mere lust. This takes one directly to the second major objection. Rivers' partial approach to the problem is a result of his excessive reliance on the notion of "courtly love". In all fairness it must be said that in spite of his exacting criticism R. O. Jones does not approach the problem of Albanio's folly properly either, because he too is excessively concerned with distinguishi Garcilaso's individual sensibility from that ubiquitous notion "courtly love". This concept is in great part an invention of modern critics, and in this case it is a source of error. Thus Jones is correct in saying of Rivers' analysis that: "Hardly anything can be based on this in the way of interpretation unless we fall back on the notion that the soul was in harmony so long as reason maintained its supremacy" (op. cit., p. 537), this, of course, merely repeats the opinion of A. A. Parker ("Theme and Imagery in Garcilaso's First Eclogue," B.H.S. vol. 25, 1948, pp. 222-227). Although correct, Jones' statement overlooks that in Bembo, as in other trattatisti, the will precedes reason, if Garcilaso is following Bembo, then surely it would be more exact to refer to the will's efficacious mirror-polishing as the source of the soul's harmony. Moreover, Jones also remains oblivious to the underlying problem of the imagination as the actual source of Albanio's madness. Indeed, a closer scrutiny of Garcilaso's text reveals that Albanio's madness is caused by the absence of Camila, and as such, it represents the kind of sensual heroic love studied by Ficino in the Commentarium in Convivium VI, 6 (Commentaire, pp. 206-208; see in this chapter note 191-8). Although in the first part of the eclogue Albanio's love seems pure, it is, as always, based on sensual perception of Camila's corporeal form. It is in this that his spirit takes delight, and which is the origin of Albanio's misfortune, as he states: "El placer de miralla con terrible / y fiero desear sentí mesclarse, / que siempre me llevaba a lo imposible; / la pena de su ausencia vi mudarse, / no en pena, no en congoja, en cruda muerte / y en un infierno el alma atormentarse" (vv. 320-325; Garcilaso de la Vega, Poesías Castellanas Completas, ed. E. L. Rivers, Madrid: Castalia, 1972). Prior to Albanio's description of the nature of his illness, references to the "Clear Spirit" abound. In typical Macrobian terminology, the soul is considered to be the "clear fountain" which reflects the "música divina": "Convida a dulce sueño / aquel manso rüido / del aqua que la clara fuente envía, / y las aves sin dueño, / con canto no aprendido / hinchen el aire de dulce armonía" (vv. 64-69). In this way Albanio describes his distempered love: "En medio del invierno está templada / el agua desta clara fuente, / y en el verano mas que nieve helada" (vv.

1-3). The comparison with Bembo's Gli Asolani presented by Jones must be put in its proper perspective. The madness of Albanio's love in its lowest moments is the same as the love of Perrotino in the first part of Gli Asolani, and when Albanio describes the blissful life which he found with Camila, before his fall, his love is that of Lavinello, prior to the hermit's sermon which reveals to Lavinello that the source of beauty is not the corporeal object, but the Goodness of God reflected in that object, and that it is to this that he must turn his attention. Thus, as Ficino and his successors repeatedly stress, any love that fixes its attention in a corporeal object will ultimately incline either to the flesh, or to its real source. Albanio, who is unaware of the divine source of his love, has been enthralled by the imagination of the lady's form, and by immoderate cogitation on this particular object, his reason has been dragged downwards by the flesh. Indeed, in verses highly reminiscent of Ausias March and Hughes de Saint-Victor, such as for instance: "Amor, Amor, un àbit m'é tallat / de vostre drap, vestint-me l'espirit; en lo vestir, ample molt l'é sentit / e fort estret, quant sobre mi.s posat" (LXXVII, vv. 25-28), and "Solen pensar de fer-hi aparell / per a jaquir tan singular amich; / si creu no sab que li sia·nemich / puix gran delit li és vengut per ell" (CXXI, 33-36, and for an analysis of this imagery in Ausias March see Chapter V). Albanio describes his plight as the shirt of imagination which has penetrated the flesh and rooted itself into the very marrow of the lover where new spirits are recreated: "En amigo tal, verdad es eso / cuando el mal sufre cura, mi Salicio, / mas éste ha penetrado hasta el hueso" (vv. 143-145; in order to avert any confusion, the similarity between these verses and those of Ausias March lies in verse 145, amigo here refers to Salicio, not to Love as it does in March's Poem CXXI). Verse 145 is a reference to Ausias March's shirt of Nessus, also used by Garcilaso in Sonnet XXVII. From these clues, Severo's identity and the remedy for Albanio's illness can be found. The remedy alluded to by Salicio is clearly outlined in the first part of the eclogue, and various references are made to it in subsequent passages. Salicio identifies Albanio's madness with "fortuna": "qu'el que, viviendo acá, de vida ufana / y d'estado gozoso, noble y alto / es derrocado de fortuna" (vv. 104-106). Fortune is worldly, as is Albanio's madness, and his distempered love is not to be confused with the action of Providence. It can only be redressed by following the counsel of Wisdom, as Boethius has taught countless generations of Christians. Thus, against these worldly vicissitudes, Salicio suggests that the remedy lies in sleep. In his description, this sleep renews the soul. This is no ordinary sleep, it is a voyage to the Bowl of Liber (Macrobius, Commentary on the Dream of Scipio, trans. William Harris Stahl, New York: Columbia University Press, 1952, Book I: XII: 7-12, pp. 135-136). This voyage represents the rise of the soul above the dross and din of Chaos, by which it regains some consciousness of its divine origin, and once refreshed can renew its "descensus ad inferos", or rather, as Macrobius would have it, it is the soul turning back to its own waters (Commentary on the Dream of Scipio, II: XVI: 22-25, pp. 242-243). Therefore, Salicio says: "y al que de pensamiento fatigado / el sueño baña con licor piadoso, / curando el corazón despedazado, / aquel breve descanso, aquel reposo / basta para cobrar de nuevo aliento / con que se pase el curso trabajoso"

(vv. 89-94). Severo's role is to give Albanio consciousness of his soul's divine origin and destiny, as well as, the true source of beauty, like Bembo's hermit he awakens "heroic virtue" in the lover. As a consequence, the eclogue functions as an organic unit. The description of the history of the house of Alba, and in particular, of Fernando, is a portrait of heroic virtue set entirely at the service of God. Unlike Albanio, Fernando follows Christian Sapientia, not fortune (vv. 1419-1432), that is, not merely reason, but right reason in the Augustinian sense, and thereby becomes a model of Christian virtue. The proper understanding of this eclogue does not lie in whether the intention is mediaeval or not, but rather in its evangelical humanist context. As a result Rivers is partially correct in saying that Severo is a Cistercian friar preaching a "combinación ya tradicional de filosofía estoica y ascetismo cristiano" (op. cit., p. 422), as is Jones in seeing love as a return to harmony by following the dictates of reason, if one bears in mind that it is not mere reason that the trattatisti tell lovers to follow, but "right reason," or evangelical reason, which is faith as the fundamental way to a virtuous life. Severo's teaching is concerned with turning "melancolia negra" into "melancolia generosa", of which Albanio and Fernando are models. Thus, to all ends and purposes, Albanio's madness is mundane fury, or "loco amor".

347 See note 219 above.

348 P. N. Siegel, "Spenser and the Calvinist View of Life," Studies in Philology vol. 41, 1944, pp. 201-222.

349 "Spenser and the Calvinist View of Life," p. 218.

350 See note 345 above; "for religious piety is the most important element of the character of Sir Philip Sidney, who, as De Sélincourt has pointed out, represented Spenser's ideal... etc." ("Spenser and the Calvinist View of Life," pp. 201-202).

351 "No other sonnet-cycle gives this effect, for the mind of no other writer -- except Sidney, whose Astrophel and Stella, as we shall see, expresses its author's neo-Platonism in a different way -- was so completely permeated with the spirit of Renaissance Platonism" ("The Petrarchan Sonneteers and Neo-Platonic Love," p. 178).

352 Again, see A. H. T. Levi, "The Neoplatonist Calculus," pp. 237-241. It should be noted that this tension exists irregardless of whether this love is sensual or not. As a physical desire, love in the cancioneros has frequently been described as a love of non-attainment leading to a situation of have and have not (see Otis H. Green, "Courtly Love in the Spanish Cancioneros," P.M.L.A. LXIV, 1949, pp. 247-301). This situation is repeated in the Neo-platonic love theories, when it obviously leads to a situation of "laetus horror" (see Chapter III, note 59).

353 See Appendix I.

354 See note 244.

355 P. Dronke, "Saturn and Melancholy," Notes and Queries CCX (vol. 12, new series), 1965, p. 356.

356 R. O. Jones, "The Idea of Love in Garcilaso's Second Eclogue," p. 391.

Chapter V Melancholy: The Mirror of Courtly Love

Ambiguities inherent in the concept of melancholy, and related terms such as imagination and reason, which allow for a broad range of variations in determining the nature of the lover's experience, can serve as a point of departure towards understanding the level of irony used by mediaeval writers, when discussing the subject of love. As I remarked in the third chapter of this thesis, the dual nature of melancholy and imagination is reflected by the discursive gradation of love into three different kinds, which generally follows Aristotle's tripartite division of friendship, as it is commonly found in the Nicomachean Ethics.[1] The use of this division, which is not particular to Ausias March, is found in most writers and poets from the thirteenth century onwards. The varying degrees of emphasis in the use of this division depend largely on the authorial intention. Thus, one can suggest that the significance which this division assumes in an individual work depends on the understanding that each particular author has of beauty. This will inevitably condition the value which he attributes to each kind of love. The extent to which the use of this division reflects the author's realization that love is an essentially spiritual experience, depends on the individual's acknowledgement of the presence of grace reflected in the heart of nature. This division is, then, subordinate to the definition of beauty handled by the author, for the latter. This definition reveals the actual orientation that the author gives to his treatment of love; the tripartite classification only does so subsequently. Thus, one notices that Andreas Capellanus implicitly divides love into three kinds.[2] His division, like that of his

contemporaries and successors, is based on the heritage of Aristotelian terminology, but the intention is radically different from the Stagirite.

The most remarkable facet of Andreas Capellanus' system is that he deliberately confuses the problem of love by suggesting that "amor purus" is merely a kind of sexual titilation. As a consequence, love in his work does not have a transcendental function; it remains the state of a fallen creature.[3] As I hope to shew, this is intimately related to his denial of the presence of grace in nature. His "courtly lover", like Bembo's Perrotino, is therefore subject to "melancolia negra", that is, mundane folly in its basest form.

Melancholy in its various aspects reflects all kinds of love possible within the "courtly experience", because it is intimately related to a problem of perception of beauty. It seems to me that mediaeval moralists single out a certain negative aspect of that experience in order to demonstrate the incompatibility of secular life with religious sanctity, which, in their view, can only be found within the institution of the Church. This creates an impression of a dual standard of values or "sic et non",[4] which is actually a negation of secular spirituality. Thus, one point predominates in my mind concerning the importance of melancholy for the interpretation of the somewhat inconsistent concept, "courtly love". Melancholy cannot be dismissed outright as being only a state of mental alienation, such as mediaeval moralists present it. It is also a state of interior meditation and consciousness which is characteristic of the spiritual orientation present in the general current of evangelical thought which is

closely associated with secular spirituality. As Klibansky, Saxl and Panofsky have demonstrated, the historical development of the notion of melancholy goes together with that of Italian humanism and the northern Reformation.[5] The overall re-assessment of the notion of melancholy is part of the growing unrest that eventually gives rise to the twin movements of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, inasmuch as humanism and Reformation:

> both aimed at making this "personality" as far as possible independent from the lashings of tradition and hierarchy, by which it had been supported as well as restrained; at enabling it to seek unaided its individual approach to God and the world [6] (underlining is mine).

Although it is not exclusive to the evangelical current, the evolution of melancholy is closely related to it, as I have attempted to shew in previous chapters. Similarly, as I have remarked until now, melancholy is associated with problems concerning reason and imagination, both of which affect the nature of the lover's experience, numinous and otherwise.

A distressing point in the standard concept of Renaissance love theory which I discussed in the previous chapter, is that it conveys the impression that while the Renaissance Neoplatonic lover follows his reason, his mediaeval counterpart, the courtly lover, does not. Indeed, mediaeval moralists, such as Andreas Capellanus, and Alfonso Martínez de Toledo,[7] represent the lover as an individual subject to the torments of "melancolia negra", which is considered to be irrational folly, or "loco amor". This seems to imply that the lover does not follow the dictates of his reason. In this way, they reduce any possible understanding of love to a state of madness, or "amor hereos" as it is commonly understood.[8] For modern critics, one of the main sources of

problems in this instance is undoubtedly, Gaston Paris' definition of "courtly love" as regards his interpretation of the theory of love in the Chevalier a la Charrette. This, he believed corresponded to the social innovations of Marie de Champagne's court, codified by Andreas Capellanus in his De Amore.[9]

In order to clarify the evolution of sensibility that differentiates Ausias March's particular approach to the question of love from that of Andreas Capellanus, I will proceed to a comparative analysis of the essential content of the De Amore and then of the poetry of Ausias March. Reasons for singling out Andreas Capellanus' work in order to understand the moralists' point of view should be obvious since it is "not only one of the few long documents in the tradition of "courtly love" literature, it is also the only statement of theory which we have concerning this literary convention",[10] and any understanding of Ausias March requires that one come to terms with the problem of "courtly love". Furthermore, although I do not pretent to provide a complete interpretation of the De Amore, this approach is justified by the fact that A. Pagès has frequently pointed out that Ausias March must have known the De Amore. He repeatedly attempted to establish parallels with the Valencian poet's work in order to demonstrate Ausias March's relation to "courtly love".[11]

A. Pagès' interpretation of "courtly love" is based on the commonly accepted theory of Gaston Paris that close relations must have existed between the court of Champagne and that of Provence, because of the presence at Troyes of Marie de Champagne whose mother Alienor d'Aquitaine was originally from southern France. The basis of Paris' theory is that the De Amore is an

accurate description of the court of Marie, and that it was written at her request in order to codify love as it was practiced by the members of her suite. It should be noted that what Gaston Paris suggested in a very convincing theory, which was quickly accepted as fact by subsequent generations of critics, such as J.J. Parry,[12] is a matter of conjecture. Indeed, in a very solidly documented study, "The Court of Champagne as a Literary Circle", J.F. Benton has demonstrated the lack of evidence for many of the relations that Gaston Paris assumed existed, including that of Marie and Alienor. Above all, Benton has been able to question, on the basis of historical evidence adduced for his documentation of the court of Champagne, the reality of Paris' belief in the existence of an immoral behaviour, such as "courtly love", which might necessitate a codification.[13] As regards historical evidence, Paris' theory seems to be based on the acceptance at face-value of statements made by Andreas Capellanus, and a series of rash presuppositions.

It may seem to many critics that on the basis of Benton's research one might be inclined to liquidate the problem of the existence of a code of love which is known to contemporary criticism as "courtly love". I believe, however, that caution should be exercised in this matter. When a moralist codifies a system, as Andreas Capellanus does with an ironical intention, he does not portray social reality as it actually exists, as Gaston Paris thought, but he selects an aspect that directly concerns his intention. It is social criticism from an extremely partial point of view. As satire, it does reflect, at least, the social etiquette of his time, and thus, the essential elements of courtship, many

of which are perennial.[14] The moralist creates a "caricature" grossly distorting an aspect of the society of his time, which he brings into relief in order to meet his didactic ends.

The source of problems present in courtly literature is the question of social relations within a highly hierarchical feudal structure.[15] In such a structure social positions and roles are rigidly determined, so that transgression of these limits is subject to strictures. The interpretation of the nature and value of social relations between classes is not subject to a single monolithic blanket term, but to an individual point of view which is conditioned by well-established moral and social prejudices of which the author may, or may not, be conscious. Courtly love is not a single global term determining these variable attitudes, but the general articulation of this problem. Should one choose to replace the term "courtly love" by one which is more frequently used in the Middle Ages, such as "fin' amor", the problem of the individual authorial intention cannot be evaded, since "fin' amor" can refer to sexual love, as well as spiritual love depending on the sense that the author gives it, and the degree of irony he is using.[16] However, even when it is used derisively "fin' amor" denotes an intellectual refinement, that is, a matter of wit, which is not present in "courtly love". I return to the definition of D. Kelly in order to clarify the question of the different orientations that can be given to the subject of love in a feudal context, since not all love can be limited to a problem of social forms as moralists treat it:

> Fin' amors as used in the Middle Ages and courtly love in modern parlance, are not always synonymous. The difference lies in the divergent connotations of the adjectives courtly and fin. Courtly love commonly suggests the arts of love, rules and directives,

prescribing specific conduct and fixing sentiment within an exact mold. It is held to be essentially deductive, functioning on an elaborate etiquette covering every conceivable circumstance and action. That which is fin evinces finesse. Finesse characterizes "la puissance intuitive", as one critic puts it, "la faculté de saisir confusément la réalité profonde des objets concrets", that is, the essential and indicative elements of experience.[17]

Beyond the articulation of the problems of social relations in a class system, which presents "courtly love" as the "rules and directives" subjacent in the interaction of the members of this society, there is the individual concern with the interior elements of the personal experience of love. This dual approach to the overall problem of "courtly love" is characteristic of two divergent spiritual attitudes present in individual poets. Both attitudes are directly affected by the treatment of imagination as a means of perception and knowledge, determining whether individual spiritual experience is interior or not. It is precisely this element of interior preoccupation, finesse as the need to seek out the innermost reality of corporeal objects, which ultimately leads to "tristesse" as a kind of poetic melancholy,[18] resulting from the individual experience of "laetus horror" at the realization of the distance that separates the subject from his ideal, that differentiates Ausias March from Andreas Capellanus.

In this instance the heart of the question is not, as traditional criticism understands it, whether there exists or not a definite code of love that would characterize "courtly love", but a matter of individual sensibility within the Christian European cultural tradition. Both "courtly love" and "fin' amor", as they are defined by D. Kelly, are conceived under the aegis of a Christian feudal circumstance. They share that similarity, because they are the product of the individual's experience of that circumstance.

Thus, "fin' amor" and "courtly love" can overlap, although they do not necessarily do so. They are divergent expressions of a common experience. The more an individual shifts his interest towards the problems surrounding intelligible reality, the more his expression of love moves away from concern with the exterior practice of "courtly love". His interest in the formal aspects of the secular experience wanes, even though the interior experience is a spiritualization of the secular.[19]

"Fin' amor" as I understand it, following Kelly, is a posterior development of, or a divergent attitude from, "courtly love" which is principally a ludic occupation, and therefore, what Huizinga understands to be an exterior regulatory activity of a social group.[20] It is ingrained in society and determines ways in which members of that society interact; as such it is not a fully conscious activity, but an inherited mode of understanding one's function within a culture. In a feudal society there is a profound consciousness of hierarchical distinctions between classes. This is so important that it forms the basis of Andreas Capellanus' De Amore.[21] The problem of "courtly love" in Andreas Capellanus' perspective can then be said to evolve out of this question. A ludic activity such as "courtly love" characterizes the manner in which a class, or group of classes, understand the nature of their hierarchical relation within the broader context of society. Ludic activity of this sort is not simply frivolous. It serves to distinguish this group, and therefore, it acts as an inbred ritual of self-preservation preventing social usurpation, much as manners and etiquette can limit the intrusion of "outsiders" within a particular group and tend to produce a conformist attitude. Since

it maintains social stratification "courtly love" can be said to have an inner codification which inevitably transpires into any product of the feudal culture, as in the case of literature, inasmuch as this product tends to reflect the vital context of the society within which, and for which, it is written.

Two points raised by Benton in "The Court of Champagne as a Literary Centre" are of considerable importance for what I have just said. Following Paris and Parry, many critics have accepted as fact the tentative identification of Andreas Capellanus as the chaplain of Marie de Champagne. Without denying the possibility of Paris' hypothesis, this identification has been brought into doubt by Benton's research which underlines the flimsy nature of Paris' evidence. For Benton, although Andreas may have been a chaplain to the king of France, as Capellanus himself points out in the De Amore, he may never have held that position at Marie's court.[22] This takes me to the second point raised by Benton, which concerns the audience for whom the De Amore was written. It is evident that Marie is never referred to as a libertine social innovator who might have promulgated the doctrine of adultery as a way of life. Nor is there any documentation referring to the existence of her "corts d'amor", in any writings of her contemporaries. To the contrary, reports of her extreme devoutness and piety abound. Although this might simply be a matter of flattery, we have no evidence that might disprove contemporary statements, and it is surprising that Paris' description of a departure from traditional morality within a rigidly structured feudal society should have gone unnoticed. This raises the following problem. The many translations and commentaries of

Latin Biblical works that Marie requested to be made for her use evince that she had little or no knowledge of Latin; thus, the De Amore could hardly have been written her:

> The question of Marie's Latinity bears on the intended audience of Andreas' De Amore, for if Marie could not understand De Amore without the help of a translation, there is little reason to think that it was written for her delectation. The obvious audience for a Latin treatise would be clerics and a few well-educated laymen, who might have found the first two books of De Amore amusing rather than instructing. [23]

This last point gives a new dimension to the reading of the De Amore in the light of modern scholarship, such as that of M.D. Chenu, concerning the evolution of religious sensibility within feudal society.[24] The De Amore is not intended to serve as an immoral code of behaviour for a vast courtly public, as I will shew, but as a delightful piece of entertainment for a literate élite, that is for the clergy and the higher aristocracy, such as Marie's husband, Henri Comte de Champagne, and his immediate entourage. Hence, one can reasonably, if still tentatively, advance the suggestion that this work ironically purports a point of view concerning love as a general subject, which is compatible with the religious sensibility of the agrarian feudal system, that is, the point of view of the "vita monastica", reacting against the social implications of the "vita apostolica".[25]

Here again one cannot come to a clear understanding of the significance of these currents by treating them as units pitched against one another. As in the case of "courtly love" - "fin' amor", the "vita apostolica" and the "vita monastica" are both Christian ideals, and as such, they share a common background of aspirations and traditions, in spite of the eventual conflicts which are linked to socio-economic factors in the sixteenth century.

They are divergent, not opposite, means of understanding the redemptive message which is based on Charity. As D.W. Robertson has remarked, the doctrine of Charity lies at the heart of mediaeval Christianity, and it is constantly contrasted with cupidity:

> we may use the classic formulation included in the De doctrina Christiana (III, 16:10) of St. Augustine: "Charitatem voco motum animi ad fruendum Deo propter ipsum, et se atque proximo propter Deum: cupiditatem autem, motum animi ad fruendum se et proximo et quolibet corpore non propter Deum". The opposite of Charity, as St. Augustine describes it, is cupidity, the love of any creature, including one's self, for its sake. These two loves, Charity and cupidity, are the two poles of the mediaeval Christian scale of values.[26]

As it should be obvious from what I have said until now in all preceding chapters, it is not only a question of "mediaeval scale", but simply of Christian values, since the Renaissance "trattatisti" explicitly preached that the lover should abandon all forms of cupidity and turn his attention to the ultimate goal of his soul, which is Charity. Consequently, Charity in the Augustinian definition is the aim of both the "vita apostolica" and the "vita monastica". The key difference between the two is to be sought in the implications of their approach. This divergence is based on a fundamental contradiction in their conception of beauty. The evangelical current has its roots in the "orientale lumen",[27] and the teachings of the pseudo-Dionysius and Erigena, who understand the beauty of sensible forms as a reflection of divine Goodness. It is out of this context that the basic notion of the dignity of man is developed.[28] The evangelical sensitivity acknowledges the presen œ of grace in wordly goodness, within a secular context, and therefore, it aspires to the enrichment of secular spirituality. The "vita monastica" stresses the incompatibility of secular life with religious spirituality, for although it recognizes that the

creation as the work of God must partake of His grace, it is also the seat of corruption. This excludes individual beauty as a source of spiritual plenitude, since it is viewed primarily as a source of deceit to be shunned. Just as it relegates melancholy to a state of madness, so does it reduce imagination to deceitful corporeal vision devoid of a transcendental function. Thus, the "vita monastica" separates sharply the divine from the wordly, as it does the institution of religion which is represented by the Church, from secular life which it views as a source of cupidity.

The De Amore is an extensive treatise, presented as a series of dialogues, describing secular cupidity, and written from a monastic point of view.[29] The condemnation of cupidity in the De Amore depends on the interaction of two points: the author's treatment of the concept of beauty, and his continuous references to reason with an ironical intention. The distance that separates Charity from cupidity in mediaeval works is paralleled by that which differentiates mere knowledge from wisdom, that is, scientia from sapientia.[30] In other words, sin, which St. Augustine defines as originating in a misdirection of the rational soul, is governed by the role played by natural reason (scientia) which is blinded by its own light and does not recognize its source, right reason (sapientia). These two triplical sets of concepts commonly grouped under "reason" ("knowledge-scientia-natural reason" vs. "wisdom-sapientia-right reason") are the source of ambiguity manipulated by the author of the De Amore with an ironical intention, as D.W. Robertson has shewn in his "The Subject of the De Amore".[31] They represent his conscious use of reason in the form of rational, or reasonable, arguments, with the veiled exclusion of the individual

lover's awareness of the existence of grace. This results in the consistently "foolish" action of the lover who acts without the guidance of right reason. Humour arises from the fine line that separates the lover's action from sin, since he does not really have knowledge of grace the foolish lover is not really sinning, but his actions can be viewed as sinful by the reader, because out of pride the lover allows his natural reason to assume the role of right reason. He purposefully disobeys the commonly known will of God which is repeatedly shewn to him in the course of the dialogues.[32] The lovers in the De Amore, therefore, always follow their reason,[33] that is, their scientia, but the absurdity of their actions to which Capellanus consistently refers as "foolish"[34] is evident when one notes that the author has removed from his characters any possibility of seeing their actions in the light of sapientia. Hence the De Amore is an amusing story of cupidity. It is an ironical portrayal of sin, because all sin arises out of cupidity, and in the De Amore reason guides sin. The author uses reason in relation with love as a source of cupidity which has its seat in the "saeculum" because natural reason cannot of its own power transcend that context. As a result the lover moves in a direction opposite to Charity. Reason then directs love towards the preservation of the species, and as such, love is bent on the concern of the object for its own sake. From this point of view, Capellanus treats love in the secular context as cupidity, or fornicatio, and plays with the inherent contradiction of love as signifying either Charity or cupidity:

> The fact that the word love (amor) could be used for either Charity or cupidity opened enormous possibility for word-play. It is also, I believe, responsible for the manifest preoccupation with "love" in mediaeval literature... St. Augustine interpreted the word

fornicatio in the Scriptures to mean not only illicit conjunction of the sexes, but also idolatry as any aspect of love of the world as opposed to the love of God. When luxuria or fornicatio is used symbolically either one well describes the sin of Adam and Eve and may justly be placed as the crowning fruit of the Tree of Babylon. The evil tree suggests idolatrous sexual love, an extreme form of cupidity and a reflection of the Fall.[35]

This clearly explains what so many critics have considered to be the idolatrous nature of "courtly love" viewed by moralists. There remains to understand the ironical significance of Capellanus' handling of the sin of pride, which is principally affected by the point of view he takes regarding the place of Charity in this world.

When the word-play surrounding the doctrine of Charity and cupidity is taken to its ultimate consequences, it is evident that love based on Charity, or guided by the light of right reason, would naturally have to take on a sapiential character. In a secular context such a love would naturally have to be founded on a reflection of the divine attributes in nature, as it is understood in the pseudo-Dionysian-Erigenian tradition. This is patently not the case in the De Amore. A survey of the introduction of this work can reveal the basic premisses set down by Andreas Capellanus before developing ironically the problems that these imply. As I said above, the concept of beauty voiced by the author is a fundamental factor determining his intention. It constitutes the basis of the "double lesson"[36] on love which Andreas gives to his young friend "Gualteri", or "Gauthier". Thus, in his introduction of the subject matter to Gauthier, after giving his classic definition of love as a "passio quaedam innata procedens ex visione et immoderata cogitatione",[37] which I have shewn in Chapter III to mean that it is basically a movement of imagination,

Capellanus goes on to describe what he calls the lover's "meditation". The latter is particularly important since it reveals the way in which Capellanus interprets the innermost intention of all the lovers' actions in the De Amore. He views this to be fornicatio because when he defines love as a "passio" Andreas does not merely wish to indicate that it is a "suffering", but rather he refers to its broader context in which "passio implies an act contrary to reason".[38] This does not mean an act free from reason, which is always present in man by virtue of the nature of his soul which is the source of sin,[39] but an act of misguided reason that departs from the light of right reason or sapientia towards which natural reason should be turned. It is a foolish act of the rational soul which is guided by the light of natural reason and can, therefore, only be oriented towards the flesh. The definition of the lover's meditation used by Capellanus then acquires its proper significance. Beauty perceived by the lover is characterized by the very absence of any spiritual reality. It is, at best, the relation of harmonious parts following the Stoic definition of beauty that the Renaissance "trattatisti" took care to deny, as I have pointed out in the previous chapter. Imagination in this circumstance is limited to the apprehension of physical attributes, and therefore, it is a vain, or deceitful, imagination that can only cause the rational soul of the lover to be drawn to the flesh. Capellanus ironically, if not cynically, labels this process as the lover's "complete meditation":

> Postmodum mulieris incipit cogitare facturas et eius distinguere membra suosque actus imaginari eiusque corporis secreta rimari ac cuiusque membri officio desiderat perpotiri. Postquam vero ad hanc cogitationem plenariam devenerit, sua frena nescit continere amor, sed statim procedit ad actum.[40] (underlining is mine).

This meditation is not contemplative, although it claims to be so. It is lust that leads immediately to uncontrolled action. The intended point of reference in this instance is that Capellanus, who undoubtedly knew the works of his contemporaries, the Chartrian and Victorine thinkers,[41] denies any spiritual function to imagination and at the same stroke he refutes their definition of beauty. As a consequence of this, it seems to me that Capellanus' description of the lover's "complete meditation" as concupiscence directed towards an earthly object is a tongue-in-cheek reference to Chartrian and Victorine epistemology, because it uses its terms in order to deny any spiritual value to the secular object, and thereby sets grace outside of the limits of the lay context. Subsequent references to melancholy also serve to deny the merit of interior meditation, since these reduce melancholy to a state of madness: "Qua quidem cessante illico melancolia ex adverso consurgit, in eo suum sibi locum vindicat ira...".[42] Here ira is not the Chartrian "power to reject unwanted things"[43] as it is used by Bernardus Silvestris, but outright madness. In view of the definition chosen by Capellanus to characterize the object of love in the De Amore, it is obvious that the lover can only be moved in a direction away from the fundamental teachings of the "vita apostolica". Like imagination and melancholy, beauty in Capellanus' work is a source of deceit, and not a reflection of divine goodness.[44] The interesting point raised by the subject of the De Amore is not simply that its intention is to illustrate the doctrine of Charity after the Fall, as D.W. Robertson has shewn,[45] but that it parodies a certain concept of Charity in order to refute it and replace it by another.

In a work of vast ambiguity, as is the De Amore, it can be argued that by denying the lover the capacity of knowing the real source of beauty, and stressing his foolishness, the author is actually supporting the evangelical point of view. This is always a possibility. However, the problem of acknowledging grace is central to the doctrine of Charity, and the author's explicit denial of the spiritual function of imagination indicates the important fact that he does not consider grace to be present in the secular context. This can be further elucidated when we approach the text as a problem of social hierarchy, which as I repeatedly stressed, with M.D. Chenu,[46] is fundamental to the development of the "vita apostolica". The De Amore is concerned with cupidity, the basis of which is pride. In a rigidly structured feudal society, social mobility is considered to be usurpation, that is, a form of pride much like Satan's. This can be shewn to be one of the principal themes of the De Amore.

The acts of the lovers illustrated in Capellanus' work constitute the norm of conduct and aspirations prescribed for Gauthier.[47] The latter is introduced as an innocent, if not simply gullible, young man who has recently fallen in love. The conduct taught by Capellanus is a parody of courtly social etiquette viewed and judged by a clerical moralist, and as such it provides entertainment for the reader. That this conduct is not set forth as a model, as Paris thought, is obvious from the moral implications that underlie Andreas' narration. Each case of love represents foolish action, as I have noted. In other words each lover is a fool. The classical definition of the fool is provided by the first verse in Psalms XIV and LIII: "Dixit insipiens in corde suo:

non est deus".[48] This is, of course, absolutely consistent with the concept of beauty presented by Andreas, as well as D.W. Robertson's interpretation of the De Amore. The fool is so intently enthralled by the delights of this world for their sake that he fails to recognize the existence of the source of all goodness. Similarly, the lover does not acknowledge true beauty, or the existence of grace, and like the biblical fool he moves away from Charity and sapientia. It is not surprising that at the very end of the De Amore Andreas concludes his presentation to Walter by asking him why he wishes to act like a fool and lose the grace of God:

> cur stulte quaeris amare...? ... quam si iuxta volueris praesetem exercere doctrinam, et sicut huius libelli assidua tibi lectio demonstrabit, omnes corporis voluptates pleno effectu, Dei tamen gratia, bonorum consortio atque virorum laudabilium amictia iusta manebis ratione privatus..." [49] (underlining is mine).

As Psalms XIV and LIII suggest the fool not only fails to recognize the pre-eminence of God and, therefore, moves away from any possible redemption, but he subverts the divinely ordained social order. He is a symbol of cupidity, and the love of the fool reflects his pride as he rises against the commandments of God; it repeats the cause of the Fall. The fool is then not only a trickster, he is a Godless man who wilfully spreads confusion.[50] This traditional aspect of his character is confirmed by his folkloric relation with Seth-Typhon, but more specifically in the literary tradition, as in the fifteenth-century French dialogue entitled, Fatrasie de Coquars,[51] which is one of the finest documents on the mediaeval definition of the fool. Here the fool is overtly described as a social usurper:

> Coquart mignot qui descognoit la gache,
> Ja soit venu de basse et humble place,
> Qui aux plus grans se veult comparer (verses 13-15).

In the first book of the De Amore Andreas specifically establishes a series of social comparisons for Gauthier's benefit. In all but one of these dialogues, which is concerned only with lovers of the same class, it can be shewn that there are specific references to the social confusion spread by the love of the fool.[52]

The concern for "nobility" is, above all, a worldly matter, and Andreas uses the ambiguous definition of nobility as excellence of character in order to present the subject of nobility as a kind of vanity, or pride. There is no character in the De Amore who does not eventually claim to have an excellent character, and therefore, nobility. In the De Reprobatione Capellanus explicitly states that all these claims are mere vainglory:

Sed et nulla mulier invenitur ex tam infimo genere nata, quae se non asserat egregios habere parentes et a magnatum stipite derivari, et quae se omni iactantia non extollat. Et haec sunt, quae vana gloria tamquam propria quaerit. [53]

Indeed, in the first book of the De Amore each lover begins his courtship by either praising the nobility, or excellence of character, of the lady, or staking his own claims to nobility. In each of these attempts to seduce the lady he tries to persuade her to return his love by using rational, "reasonable" arguments.[54] The lover attempts to gain the lady's confidence through the deceit of flattery, by appealing to her pride which is the source of cupidity. As a consequence one can say that each one of these brief dialogues is a representation of the Fall, as D.W. Robertson has shewn in the case of the garden reference in the De Amore.[55] Andreas Capellanus treats the subject of love in the secular context as a non-transcendental activity. For this moralist, it is a libidinous activity subject to worldly fortunes, and therefore, an earthly delight contrary to the fruition of the Lord. The courtly

love which he teaches Gauthier is fornicatio which he considers to be "damnabile crimen"[56] through which "homines coelesti hereditate privari";[57] in brief, a sin that entails the eternal damnation of the soul.

The irremediably sinful nature of courtly love as it is conceived by Andreas Capellanus evinces that this writer does not allow for a spiritual experience deriving from the secular context. The intention underlying his irony is evident. As a manifestation of pride and cupidity "courtly love", which Andreas describes by parodying an aspect of the social customs of his time, is worldly vanity that keeps man from attaining the grace of God. Indeed, in the Reprobatione this love that Gauthier pursues is classified as the work of Satan against the Charity of God:

> Praeterea ipsum Deum sine omni dubitatione castitatis et pudicitiae caput esse scimus atque principium; diabolum vero amoris et luxuriae auctorem esse, scriptura referente cognovimus. Et ideo auctoris quoque ratione tenemur in perpetuum pudicitiam conservare et castitatem, luxuriam penitus evitare, quia, quod diabolo auctore constat esse perfectum, nihil posset hominibus parare salubre nec aliquid conferre laudandum. [58]

There is an important authorial slip in the first book of the De Amore which reveals that this attitude towards secular love is not merely part of the Reprobatione, but that it pervades all aspects of Capellanus' thought. The author's intention is to distinguish sharply between the secular and the spiritual life, the earthly and the divine. The women in the first part of Capellanus' treatise are representative of Eve before the Fall; they defend themselves from the cunning of cupidity presented in reasonable arguments, until they are eventually tempted. They serve as the mouthpiece for Capellanus' actual point of view. A notable point is that the good sense, or wisdom in a loose sense, of the women increases as

their social standing increases. Andreas' point of view is most clearly articulated by the woman of the higher nobility, and it is in her speech that he reveals his presence when he forgets himself and writes: "let us turn our pen"[59] thereby making it clear to the careful reader that it is he, Capellanus, rebuking the lover, not the lady:

> Vanam quidem mundi gloriam non affecto nec sine re verbis propriis quaero ditare amicos, sed ad melioris vitae merita vos invitare nitebar, non quasi amoris volens damnare ministeria, sed mundanis rebus superiores causas esse praelatas cupiens demonstrare. Sed divinarum rerum ad praesens disputatione omissa, stilum ad amoris vertamus iudicium. Gauderem igitur plurimum, si vestra lingua tacente propria solummodo vos facta laudarent, quia Salomone testante omnis laus in proprio ore vanescit. Praeterea quid exspectavit tam magna et effusa largitas vestra? Quam diu tardavit haec, quae video, interpola et attrita vestimenta donare? Numquid divitiis abundant milites universi, et nullus reperitur egenus?[60] (underlining is mine).

This is, in a nutshell, the essential content of the De Amore. Capellanus pitches the vanity of this world against the message of Divine Charity. The former is embodied by the claims and desires of the courtly lover whose personal vanity and pride find their expression in his intent on all manner of fornicatio, which pervades secular life. For the author, Charity is only possible in a religious ascesis from this world. Capellanus consequently preaches monastic Charity, not evangelical piety, as the only way to salvation. It is for this reason that he states that he does not intend to condemn Love's service, which is founded on the feudal order of society, but to shew the lover that there is a greater love above, which has nothing to do with wordly tribulations.

Clericalism plays a major part in the De Amore, and although Capellanus does indulge in some tongue-in-cheek anti-clericalism, he also stresses that the real nobility is that of the clergy. This is entirely in keeping with general tone of his

work. If nobility is a matter of excellence of character, as Capellanus repeats throughout his text, then it is evident that the most virtuous persons should be those who devote their life to the service of God. Nobility of the cloth is not secular, and therefore, should not be stained by corruption and cupidity. This is how he describes the life of the clergy:

> Clericus ergo nobilissimus iudicatur ordinis praerogativa sacrati, quam nobilitatem ex Dei constat gremio processisse et divina clericis voluntate fuisse largitam... Sed quo ad hanc nobilitatem ad amorem clericus spectare non potest; hac enim nobilitate inspecta clericus non debet amoris operibus deservire, sed omnem carnis delectationem tenetur penitus declinare et ab omni corporis inquinamento immaculatum se Domino custodire, cuius creditur gestare militiam. Clerico igitur nobilitatem non sanguinis propinat origo, nec saecularis valet removere potestas, sed ex Dei gratia tantum concessa probatur et eo ministrante largita, et a Deo solo huiusmodi possunt nobilitatis pro sui tantum excessibus privilegia denegari. [61]

This statement is entirely consistent with what Andreas says in the Reprobatione. Excellence of character, and hence, a virtuous life, is chastity. This is what Capellanus recommends to Gauthier in the conclusion of his work. It follows that a chaste life in the author's system can only be found in the clergy, because true nobility is clerical and non-secular. Much of the irony of the De Amore lies in the opposition between the secular and the sacred whose terms of reference overlap, as does for instance the concept of nobility, but Andreas is careful never to let the two worlds mingle. Charity, in the Augustinian sense, is possible only in a monastic context.[62] When Capellanus talks of the love of the clergy he does so with the intent to ridicule and to chastise. After having explicitly stated that clerics should never engage in amorous activities, Andreas does give a description of how the cleric can indulge in love. Again, his concession is ironical, for if the cleric takes to courting, he loses his nobility, which is

entitles him to "courtly love". In Capellanus' own words, the cleric who falls in love must: "subire certamina, iuxta sui sanguinis ordinem sive gradum".[63] Our common parents are Adam and Eve who lost the state of grace. Thus, the cleric falls from grace, because when Capellanus states that the cleric in love must return to the rank of his parents, he adds that he understands this to mean, what he has already explained concerning the ranks of different men: "sicut superius edocet plenarie gradibus hominum insinuata doctrina, suo sermone utatur et amoris studeat applicari militiae".[64] This doctrine is clearly laid out in the introduction and subsequently repeated, the ranks of men all originate from our first parents: "Nam quum omnes homines uno sumus ab initio stipite derivati unamque secundum naturam originem traximus omnes".[65] With this statement it is also evident that Capellanus insists on the fallen state of mankind, and is not concerned with the theme of the dignity of man. He views courtly love as a wordly delight which is fundamentally incompatible with divine love since it is a perpetuation of the original sin: "... qui Domino contendunt perfecte servire, eius prorsus debent obsequio mancipari et iuxta Pauli sententiam nullo saeculari debent adimpleri negotio".[66] This statement, uttered by the foolish lover, is merely reasonable in the context of Capellanus' intention. The perfect life is then the monastic ideal to which Andreas adheres.

As I have tried to shew, Andreas Capellanus' religious point of view is in keeping with the definition of beauty that introduces the subject of the De Amore. In a subsequent passage Capellanus provides the reader with further indications of how he conceives of the nature of "courtly love". He associates it with

the Augustinian notion of the eye of flesh, which is natural reason. As such, imagination does not assume a transcendental function in his system. It is reduced to corporeal vision, and therefore, to deceitful imaginings which lead to "melancolia negra". The noble lover articulates these concepts in the fifth dialogue:

> Quando vero vos non possum corporali visum aspicere nec super vos constitutum aërem deprehendere, undique contra me cuncta incipiunt elementa consurgere, et varia me poenarum incipiunt allidere genera, nullo possum gaudere solatio, nisi quantum falsa mihi demonstratione dormienti somni sopor adducit. [67]

The references to melancholy found in this passage, and further developed in the course of the text, include elemental imbalance and sadness which afflict the melancholy lover. These are, by extension, signs of mental alienation. They constitute the norm of "courtly love" set by Andreas Capellanus, and are predominantly determined by his concept of beauty. As I have repeatedly noted, love in the De Amore is, in fact, a desire for this wordly beauty which the lover seeks to fulfill actively. Owing to the fact that this beauty remains untranscendental, love that pursues it is opposed to any spiritual experience. Furthermore, because this beauty belongs to the "saeculum", secular experience is viewed as cupidity, and love in that context can only be concupiscent. By denying a truly transcendental function to love,[68] Capellanus reduces it to a parody of the rules and directives that cover every aspect of social interaction within the feudal context. This is not the "fin' amor" defined by Kelly, but his "courtly love".

By referring only to what I have tried to shew in Chapter III, the "courtly love" of Andreas Capellanus stands at the opposite pole from the experience described by Ausias March

who, through his readings of Ramon Lull, is affected by the sensibility of the evangelical current initiated by Hughes de Saint Victor, as are the Renaissance Neo-platonic "trattatisti". The distance that separates Andreas Capellanus is evident inasmuch as both authors ultimately reject earthly delights as a kind of cupidity, but it is a much more complex problem in Ausias March, because he is conscious of the presence of grace as it is found reflected in mundane beauty. Thus, unlike Capellanus, who rejects, from the outset, the Erigenian concept of concentric beauty interpenetrated with Goodness, Ausias March attempts to adjust to the spiritual realities of mundane beauty and ultimately transcend it, much as the Renaissance "trattatisti" did. Whereas Capellanus' De Amore is based on an outright rejection of wordly goodness, Ausias March views the beauty which he finds in this world as a means to divine perfection:

> Alguna fi en aquest món se troba;
> no és vera fi, puys no fa l'om fèlix:
> és lo commenç per on altra s'acaba,
> segons lo cors qu• entendre pot un home
> (CV, vv. 113-116).

The beloved in the poetry of Ausias March must, then, take on a sapiential character which she does not have in Capellanus' theory of love.

The contrast between Andreas Capellanus' De Amore and Ausias March's poetry inevitably begins with the manner in which the Valencian poet apprehends the beloved. Capellanus denies any function to right reason to worldly love. The latter is considered to be lust resulting from the misguided activity of natural reason, and therefore, the beloved is perceived strictly in terms of physical beauty. As I pointed out above, this is

expressed in terms of proportional symmetry which is not transcendental. Ausias March's aesthetic appreciation has diametrically opposite consequences. His vision of the lady is based on a blissful intellectual experience. As I noted in my analysis of Poem XVIII in Chapter III, phantasy in Ausias March's poetry becomes a means to the enjoyment of true Wisdom beheld in the contemplation of a particular corporeal object. Phantasy in this context is understood to be the intellectual abstraction of the particular form to its universal idea, and as such, it is also the illumination of the clear spirit, or the enlightenment of right reason. Poem XVIII presents a description of love primarily in sapiential terms, but only by extension does it imply that the beauty of the lady has sapiential connotations. Indeed, this poses a basic problem concerning Ausias March's conception of the lady's beauty and the manner in which he describes it. It is through the proper understanding of the significance and usage of the imagery that one can come to terms with the significance of the lady in Ausias March's love.

One has to remember that within the canons of the poetry of Ausias March's French predecessors one can find justifications for describing the lady as Sapientia. Oton de Granson, following Guillaume de Machaut, had suggested in the "Complainte de Saint Valentin" that since the lover was enamoured of the ideal image of the lady, that image was transferrable to another lady.[69] The first result of this proposition is that although there might be a variation in the number of ladies loved, their fundamental qualities remain the same. Hence one notes the similarities that exist between all the loves of Oton de Granson. This characteristic

has also been noted in the poetry of Ausias March, who does not delve into the physical description of his various ladies, but does present a consistent spiritual portrait.[70] In his request to Amours Oton de Granson, who has lost his loved one, asks to be granted the love of another lady. In his description of this new lady as he would like to find her, the image which Oton de Granson draws focuses on her archetypal quality; she is a reflection of the beauty of Paradise:

> Je feray vers vous mon devoir
> D'aler par tout a mon pouior
> Vers celle dont faictes devis,
> Qu'a plain on peult apparcevoir
> De beaulté le droit paradis (vv. 188-192).[71]

Characteristically, on the basis of this criterion Oton de Granson notes, after having been granted his request, that this new lady is in every way similar to the last:

> J'entray en trop forte pensee,
> Car aucunement ressembloit
> A la belle qu'avoye amee,
> Pour qui mon coeur tant se douloit (vv. 205-208).[72]

The elevation of the lady to the embodiment of the beauty of Paradise implies that she is not merely "the imitation of an idea",[73] but of all ideas in God. She is the worldly reflection of God's Wisdom, or Sapientia Dei. At this point one notes that this situation can lead to the merging of religious considerations with the general problem of worldly love, as I hope to shew in Ausias March's use of this kind of imagery. It is a secularization of the sacred, for Sapientia is a reflection of the divine Logos, and therefore, of Christ.[74] When the question of earthly love is set in this context, that love is divine love. The love of the poet for the lady is a means towards his love for God, as Poem CV quoted above indicates. Thus, as Marie-Louise von Franz explains,

Sapientia is divine Wisdom:

> In patristic literature she was mostly interpreted as Christ, the pre-existent Logos, or as the sum of rationes Aeternae (eternal forms), of the "self-knowing primordial causes", exemplars, ideas, and prototypes in the mind of God. She was also considered the archetypus mundus "that archetypal world after whose likeness this sensible world was made," and through which God becomes conscious of himself. Sapientia Dei is thus the sum of archetypal images in the mind of God.[75]

In view of the range of implications inherent in Sapientia it is not surprising that in Poem XVIII, in which the vision of the beloved takes on sapiential characteristics, the lover's rapture leads to his "well-tempered" condition. This also implies that in Ausias March the lover's meditation on the sapiential nature of the lady leads to "melancolia generosa", which, as I hope to demonstrate in the course of this exposé, is counterbalanced by the presence of "melancolia negra" caused by laetus horror experienced at the material existence of the lady. The sapiential characteristic of Ausias March's love is, then, based on the experience of melancholy imagination.

Although Ausias March never really develops the physical description of his beloved, the sapiential nature of the lady which is evident in Poem XVIII, touches on the question of her identity. However, as in Oton de Granson, the poet's love is not oriented towards the physical reality of a definite individual, but with the image which she embodies. Yet, Ausias March takes the implications of Oton de Granson's proposition beyond the limits of the French poet's intention, to the limits of the image's spiritual reality. This consideration leads me to believe that the proper interpretation of the poetry of Ausias March depends on a re-assessment of the question of the lady's identity through the analysis of the imagery by which she is known to us.

In Poem XXIII the reader is told that her name is "dona Teresa". As a result of this various scholars have considered Ausias March to be "el cantor de Teresa",[76] in the Petrarchan fashion. Evidence for this identification is based on a note by Luis Carroz de Vilaragut, written in the sixteenth-century in the prologue of his manuscript of Ausias March's works. This note states that:

> Fonch lo dit cavaller mossen Ausias March... molt affectat servidor de dona Teresa Bou, dama valentiana, tan gentil com virtuosa, honesta y savia, com les obres fetes en son servey e lahor mostren, en servici de la qual en vida e apres mort de aquella escrigue la major part del present libre, per les obres del qual veuran les mes acabades e perfectes amors honestes que may ningun enamorat cavaller ha sentit ni escrit.[77]

Vilaragut's information seems to proceed from the conflation of references to the lady in Poem XXIII as "dona Teresa", and in the maldit, Poem XLII, as "Na Monbohí".[78] According to Pagès, "Bou" is a common last name in the area of Valencia, and this theory, which seems to be based on the merging of two antithetical poems that do not warrant the identification of "Teresa" with "Na Monbohí", is absolutely hypothetical.[79] Yet, it must be noted that the disparity between these two poems does not make them absolutely exclusive. They represent the two extremes of Ausias March's reaction to the image of the beloved. Poem XXIII is representative of his elation at the contemplation of the sapiential qualities of her image, whereas Poem XLII voices his frustration at the limitations of spiritual image imposed by her physical reality. It seems however, that even when these two poems are understood in this frame of reference Pagès' objection can be sustained on the grounds that these two names are accidental references to the lady that do not necessarily betray her identity.

Indeed, critics do not seem to have noticed that "Monbohí" is a reference to a rustic location in Catalonia.[80] In the maldit Ausias March culminates his imprecations by calling the lady "Na Montbohí", that is, "Lady Montbohí" which has derogatory implications consistent with all of Poem XLII. To the contrary, in Poem XVIII "dona Teresa" has Biblical implications, as I hope to shew below. Hence, Ausias March's abstract treatment of the lady, primarily as a figura for his love, invalidates any attempt to identify her beyond the limits of the text. However, internal evidence based on Ausias March's use of sapiential language in the "Cants d'Amor" can reveal the nature of the reference to "dona Teresa".

Peter Dronke divides the language of love into three types: mystical, noetic, and sapiential.[81] The description of the lady is primarily based on the use of sapiential language, inspired by the Salomonic Books of Wisdom. Although these three languages concur in the expression of the poet's love, one can distinguish between the mystical language as a profane definition of his erotic aspiration resulting from the idealization of the lady, and the noetic language, which is the philosophical expression of this love in its metaphysical context. The description of the lady consequently depends on the poet's understanding of love in its mystical and noetic expressions.

The identity of "Teresa" is, therefore, a basic problem of perception immediately subordinated to the nature of the poet's love. One of the most striking images used by Ausias March to describe the nature of his love is that of the fire that burns without smoke. This alchemical image of love is related to the

notion of pure substances which burn without creating a residue, and derives from the mystic imagery of Hughes de Saint Victor. In his Commentary on the Ecclesiastes, Hughes de Saint Victor explains that the perception of divine love begins imperfectly in carnal desire, but that the contemplation of God's Beauty perfects this love so that it burns in a pure fire: "The fire, then, appeared first in flame and smoke, then in flame without smoke, and lastly as a pure fire, without flame or smoke".[82] This image is found in an early poem of Ausias March. It is part of a medical description of the lover's suffering in which the poet states that his ills proceed from an everlasting pure fire which he bears within himself:

> Alt e amor, d'on gran desig s'engendra,
> sper, vinent per tots aquests graons,
> me són delits, mas dóna'm passions
> la por del mal, qui•m fa magrir carn tendra;
> e port al cor sens fum contínuu foch,
> e la calor no•m surt a part de fora (III, vv. 1-6).

The medical description is evidently one of melancholy adust as a condition for pure love.[83] The combination of choler and melancholy is clear inasmuch as the description of the lover's condition is that of a cold and dry person, that is one who is thin (verse 4), who is affected by the fire of choler and therefore burns inside (verse 5), but yet is cold outside (verses 6), and hence is predominantly melancholic. In the context of this poem the image of the smokeless fire has a twofold meaning. For the poet's particular circumstance it is a metaphor of the hidden love that cannot be revealed. On a metaphysical level, it combines with the medical metaphor to express the poet's pure love. None of these implications is contradictory.[84] The very secrecy of this love implies purity, since as an interior love it is a contemplative

delight, which, as I have shewn in Chapter III, relies on the idealizing function of imagination and phantasy. The latter can cause contemplation to degenerate into "melancolia negra" if it seeks the active realization of this love. Yet, at the outset this contemplation is based on a mystical precept and seeks divinity through love. In one of his last "Cants d'Amor", Poem LXXXVII, Ausias March sums up this problem:

> assats a mi és caussa descuberta
> que pur· amor no pot en dona caure.
> Mon delit és vida contemplativa,
> e romanch trist devallant en l'activa
> (LXXXVII, vv. 267-270).

The true, or "honest" love often referred to by Ausias March is this contemplative life which is proper to melancholy imagination, and conflicts with the act of loving.

Consistent with the Erigenian aesthetic of the evangelical current, contemplation leads Ausias March to express his love as a purified ideal in which he perceives divinity. The "figura" of the lady is taken as a medium for this contemplation. The first stanza of Poem L clearly expresses the numinous character of this experience:

> Sí com aquell qui per sa·nfinitat
> no pot esser de res finit content,
> sí que res fet, ab algun element,
> en son delit no·l haurà contentat
> - per inperfet lo delit mundà posa
> e sinó·n Déu sa penssa no ss'atura -,
> axí Amor, vós amant, m'assegura;
> tot lo restant del món li fa gran nosa (L, vv. 1-8).

In this stanza the poet's love of the lady is equated to that of God, who is true infinity. The beloved is, therefore, contemplated as a reflection of the Divine Being, that causes the lover to transcend "worldly delight".

Ausias March places particular emphasis on two aspects

of the object contemplated. Although he never describes her physical attributes, two features of her spiritual, or inner, beauty are reiterated throughout his poetry: "gest" and "seny".[85] Apart from the general philosophical implications of the latter in Catalan, it implies wisdom, intelligence, and personal control over the self. It is dominion of the self through wisdom, and as such, it is an expression of potential power. Consequently, in his use of "seny" Ausias March applies it to the figure that best embodies wisdom and power in the mediaeval mind, Solomon: "e si hagués tant seny com Salamó" (IX, v. 10). The contemplation of the idea of the beloved leads the lover to love her "seny": "ço que yo am de vós és vostre seny" (XXXIII, v. 5). This trait is closely associated with the topos of the lady as Sapientia. Through the power of her "seny" the lady dominates the lover. He stands powerless before her as he does before Divine intelligence:

> mon pensament, minvant, m'à ja vencut;
> só presoner, pahoruch, per vostre seny.
> Lo vostre gest tots mos actes afrena,
> e mon voler res no·l pot enfrenar (CI, vv. 43-46).

As one can observe in this quotation, the power of the lady which is basically contained in the "seny", finds its expression in the "gest". "Gest", which Ausias March uses more often than "seny",[86] is the physical manifestation of the "wisdom", or the lady as "agens intellectus".

In his description of the innamoramento Ausias March explicitly states that his love originates in the contemplation of the lady's soul, or spirit, which precedes physical contemplation. Again in Poem L, Ausias March sums up this notion in the tornada:

> Lir entre carts, ço que·m fa vós amar:
> no m'entra pas solament per la vista;
> vostr·esperit és aquell qui·m conquista,
> e com de mi no·us mostrau desaltar (L, vv. 41-44).

Love of the lady as "esperit" is only possible through the perception of the beloved object as she is revealed by her "gest". "Gest" is not only the graceful movement, or bearing, of the lady[87] which would be primarily physical beauty, it is also the beauty of the face.[88] That is, the expression of the face through which the eyes communicate the beauty of the soul. Poem XXIII defines the nature of this particular intellectual perception, as a beauty that lies beyond proportion and colour:

> Quant és del cors menys de participar
> ab l'esperit, coneix bé lo grosser:
> vostra color y ell tall pot bé saber,
> mas ga del gest no porà bé parlar (XXIII, vv. 13-16).

Hence, like Ficino and the Florentine Neoplatonists Ausias March rejects the Stoic concept of beauty.[89] Indeed, in the preceding verses Ausias March stresses that this beauty, which he perceives in the gest, is not external but incorporeal and interior:

> Tot mon parlar als qui no•us hauran vista
> res no valrrà, car fe no•y donaran,
> e los vehents que dins vós no veuran,
> en creur•a mi, llur arma serà trista
> (XXIII, vv. 5-8, underlining is mine).

The melancholy that ensues from the lady's beauty, as Ausias March intends to describe it, is caused by the "laetus horror" (verse 8). Thus, in verses 13 to 16 quoted above the poet claims that the uncouth man is unable to perceive the "esperit" of the lady and knows only her physical beauty, he is, therefore, oblivious to her "gest". In this context "gest" is equated with "esperit", and as we have seen in Poem CI, it is closely bound to the "seny". Through the "gest" Ausias March perceives the soul or "esperit" of the lady which finds its expression in her "seny". One can, therefore, advance that in a Neoplatonic context the lady is a

reflection of the divine Intellect, and hence, her beauty reflects divine Goodness.

As the "dona angelicata", the lady embodies Sapientia, and is characterized by the irradiating power of her intellect. Ausias March equates the illumination that he receives from the lady with that of God. In Poem LVI, which is addressed to Lir entre carts, this illuminative process is described as a mystical extasis received through the contemplation of the lady's grace which is preceded by the light of God:

> Tot simplament e sens dolor alguna
> visch en delit ab ma voluntat solta,
> que lo cor fosch qui la tenia •nbolta,
> clar posseech, fent-me lum sol e luna;
> e no•y veig àls que pur• amor entrega
> sí transportant en la person• amada;
> res no•m defall a vida contentada,
> la mà de Déu a mi res no denega (LVI, vv. 25-32).

The pure love of God is found in the beloved, that is, as verse 30 states, it is transported in the beloved person. Hence, the beloved's illuminative power is the combined light of the sun and the moon. This is God's pure love, the sun, reflected in the lady, the moon. This is an image of plenitude in which matter (moon) and spirit (sun) complement one another, which symbolizes the union of opposites, and the temperance of elements, much as we have seen in Poem XVIII.[90] Thus, since God's love is in the beloved, the beauty of Lir entre carts is compared to that of the sun and the moon. The use of this metaphor to describe the lady's beauty ultimately proceeds from the Song of Songs: "Quae est ista, quae progreditur quasi aurora consurgens, pulchra ut luna, electa ut sol".[91] Thus, in his use of the noetic language the poet ultimately returns to the concepts of the mystical language, because both are rooted in the perception of the lady as Sapientia.

The senyals used to refer to the lady can also be considered to contribute to the description of the lady. These may refer to various ladies and form cycles in Ausias March's poetry, although this point may be irrelevant, as I have argued above.[92] The two main senyals will concern us, Plena de seny and Lir entre carts. Both have religious implications stressing the sapiential context of Ausias March's love. Plena de seny echoes the liturgical phrase "Maria plena de gracia", and reflects the concept of Mary "as mediatrix, and Sapientia as a divine telos".[93] In the Song of Songs, Lir entre carts is a simile describing the beloved: "Sicut lilium inter spinas, sic amica mea inter filias".[94] Consistent with the western exegetical tradition of the Song of Songs, when Ausias March refers to Lir entre carts he conceives of the archetypal image of the lady as the soul and as Mary, that is, as serving the double function of mediatrix and Sapientia.[95]

Given the implications of the image of the lady in the senyals of Ausias March's poetry, it is logical that one should first seek a sapiential relation in the name "Teresa", as the lady seems to be called in Poem XXIII. Furthermore, since this poem belongs to the Lir entre carts cycle,references to the Song of Songs are consequent. This poem is a description of the lady on a purely spiritual level. As quotes I have made above from this poem indicate, Ausias March attempts to speak of the "gest" of the lady in order to reveal the beauty of her "espirit" (XXIII, vv. 13-16). Hence, the contents of Poem XXIII justify this analysis.

In Poem XXIII one of the salient characteristics is that Ausias March compares Lir entre carts to a city, Venice. In lyric

poetry this kind of imagery is very infrequent. The converse comparison is much more common: a city can be compared to a woman, as in the romance "Abenámar, Abenámar". In this poem Granada is personified as a lady. This is a formula which Menéndez-Pidal considers to be particular to Arabic literature:[96] "En el romance Abenámar se utiliza una imagen propia de la literatura árabe, considerando a una ciudad como novia pretendida: Granada diáloga con el rey Juan II".[97] Menéndez-Pidal goes on to note that in Arabic literature the lord of the country is referred to as the bridegroom of the land. Thus, the king is definitely seen as the lord who offers to wed the city, and therefore, to possess physically Granada. In the romance the king tries to convince Granada by offering her a dowry that would place her above the other "ladies", Córdoba and Sevilla. This situation is reversed in Ausias March's poem. As I have indicated above, he does not seek physical possession. As a result, the nature of his relation to the lady is also inverted; Lir entre carts rules over him, and she is already considered to be above all other women.

Consequently, one notes that Ausias March moves in a different tradition. Indeed, Ausias March's use of the city simile can be shewn to stem from the Judeo-Christian tradition of the Song of Songs. In the Vulgate version of the biblical poem the lover gives the following description of the beloved:

Pulchra es, amica mea, suavis, et decora sicut Jerusalem: terribilis ut castrorum acies ordinata.
Averte oculos tuos a me, quia ipsi me avolare fecerunt... (VI: 3-4).

In these verses the beloved is described as beautiful and "fitting", "elegant" or "decorous"[98] as Jerusalem. This comparison is followed in verse 3 by another simile reiterating the idea that the beauty

of Jerusalem is awesome. Thus, the beauty of the beloved is terrible as well-ordered regiments of a "fortified place", "castle" or "military camp".[99] Finally, her power is such that her eyes can set the lover in flight, or simply, reduce him to her dominion.

Stanzas four and five of Poem XXIII use a variation of the biblical metaphor. After praising Lir entre carts, who seems to be referred to as "dona Teresa", Ausias March compares her to Venice. Her beauty is the product of her well-ordered and decorous bearing which overwhelms lust. I quote the two stanzas in question:

> Sol per a vós basta la bona pasta
> que Déu retench per fer singulars dones:
> ffetes n'à ·ssats molt sàvies e bones,
> mas compliment dona Teresa·l tasta;
> havent en si tan gran coneximent
> que res no·l fall que tota no·s conega:
> al hom devot sa bellesa encega;
> past d'entenents es· son enteniment.
>
> Venecians no han lo regiment
> tan pasciffich com vostre seny regeix
> suptilitats, que·l entendre·us nodreix,
> e del cors bell sens colpa·l moviment.
> Tan gran delit tot hom entenent ha
> e occupat se troba ·n vós entendre,
> que lo desig del cors no·s pot estendre
> a leig voler, ans com a mort està (XXIII, vv. 25-40).

The image in these verses serves to illustrate that the power of the lady's "seny" is such that the peaceful order she generates is greater than the government of Venice. In this comparison with Venice, the concept of "seny" implies that the lady's capacity to create order and to dominate "subtleties", such as passions, is an expression of her interior beauty (verses 34-35). The implications of the word "pasciffich" is important in the interpretation of the Song of Songs: it expresses dominion and power, as does "seny". Thus, in his first sermon on the Song of Songs Bernard de Clairvaux

explains that:

Simulque adverto huiuscemodi principiis solas hanc intelligendam scripturam mentes invitari pacificas, quae sese jam a vitiorum perturbationibus et curarum tumultibus praevalent. [100]

Etienne Gilson translates this text as:

Comme aussi vous devez prendre garde, que par ce genre d'exorde, il n'y a que les âmes pacifiques qui savent dominer absolument toutes leurs passions et s'exempter de tous les soins importuns de cette vie, lesquelles soient invitées a l'intelligence de ces sacrés écrits. [101]

The sense of the adjective "pasciffich" in Ausias March's Poem XXIII is similar to that of St. Bernard's text. In both instances it implies dominion over the self and order from which divine intelligence proceeds. This concept is developed from verses 37 to 40 in which the contemplative delight of the intellect dominates the lover's carnal passions. The beloved in the Song of Songs is decorous as Jerusalem, which is equated with well-ordered regiments, and overwhelms the lover. Similarly, Ausias March's beloved is more orderly than the Venetian government, and the power of her beauty dominates the lover.

The identity of "dona Teresa" may, therefore, be closely related to the comparison of the beloved in the Song of Songs to Jerusalem. Close inspection of the poem's fourth stanza reveals that although it begins with a reference to the lady in the first person the rest of the stanza is in the third person: "sol per a vós" definitely refers to Lir entre carts, but "dona Teresa·l tasta" and the ensuing descriptions are all in the third person. Although there is an implicit association between "vós" and "dona Teresa", the distance created by a change of person suggests that this is a comparison between "dona Teresa" and Lir entre carts, and not necessarily an equivalence as many critics seem to believe. In

the modern Catholic Bible one finds that the description of the beloved in the Song of Songs is slightly different from that of the Vulgate. Two words are added to the verse comparing the lady with Jerusalem: "Tu est belle, mon amie, comme Thirsa, charmante comme Jerusalem" (underlining is mine).[102] The 1590 Latin translation of the Hebraic version has the same references and adjectives as the Vulgate, only the reference to Thirsa is added: "Pulchra es, amica mea, ut Thirtza: decora ut Jerusalem".[103] The standard Latin spelling for Thirsa is Thersa.[104] Officially, Thersa refers to the ancient capital of Israel,[105] but it can also be used as the name of a woman, as in Numbers 26:33, 27:1, and 36:11.

Given the context of Ausias March's metaphor, one can suggest that the reference in Poem XXIII to "dona Teresa" derives from this passage of the Song of Songs as a textual collation. Her prime identity is closely related to the figure of Sapientia Dei which predominates in Ausias March's vision of the beloved's beauty. Stanza four has some important parallels with the biblical passage. The inner beauty of "dona Teresa" is interpreted in terms of her knowledge (verses 29 and 32). Illumination, which results from the interior light of right reason found in that beauty, is such that it blinds the lover, "sa belleza encega" (verse 31). In the Song of Songs Thersa is described only in terms of beauty. Metaphorically, this beauty is so radiant and overwhelming that it blinds the lover. He begs her to turn away her eyes which perturb him, that is, which blind him metaphorically. In the fourth stanza Ausias March stresses the beauty associated with "Thersa" : "dona Teresa", and in the fifth stanza the decorum of Jerusalem : Venice is emphasized. Parallelism with the descriptive passage of the

Song of Songs is as complete as it can reasonably be suggested, without being a word for word plagiarism.

From this comparative reading of the two texts I would suggest that "dona Teresa" is probably a homonymous reference to "Thersa" in the Song of Songs. As such, it is a name with which Ausias March refers to his lady Lir entre carts as a sapiential figure. I do not deny the vague possibility that Ausias March may have known a lady of that name, although this fact cannot be substantiated. If it were so, the nature and use of the city metaphor would merely reinforce the claim that the name "Teresa" inspired him to base his description on the "Thersa" of the Song of Songs.[106]

The principal objection to this theory of the significance of "dona Teresa" will undoubtedly be that the reference to "Thersa" in the Song of Songs is not present in St. Jerome's Vulgate. Above all I want to make it very clear that it is very possible that Ausias March might well have known this reference through a textual collation between the Hebraic version and St. Jerome's Vulgate. As I hope to demonstrate below this practice was fairly frequent in the later Middle Ages.

In order to understand this possibility, one has to take into account the textual tradition of this passage of the Song of Songs and its commentaries.[107] The biblical reference to "Thersa" in the Song of Songs was lost in the Greek translation which interprets this word as "εὐδοκία".[108] Nevertheless, this name as a reference to a city remained in the Latin tradition through St. Jerome's translation of Eusebius' Onomastica Sacra. In this text one finds three references to this name:

Thersa complacens sibi, quod graece melius dicitur εὐδοκοσα.
Thersa complacitio, quae significatus graece dicitur εὐδοκία.
Thersa placens.[109]

It is then evident that the Latin tradition knew the name of "Thersa", but that it was only through a Hebraic version of the Song of Songs that one could come to know the reference to "Thersa" which I have discussed above.

It is not necessary to invoke the theory of Ausias March's possible Jewish origins in order to explain the presence of this metaphor in his poetry.[110] Ausias March could have known these references to "Thersa" by three other means: an annotated Bible which would have included this reference, a commentary on the Song of Songs based on the Hebraic text, or a version of the Song of Songs prepared by a converso. The validity of these three possibilities is evinced by the fact that long before Nicholas of Lyra mediaeval scholars across Europe made extensive use of the Hebraic text. The commentary of the Psalter prepared by Herbert of Bosham, which is based on the Hebraica,[111] and relies heavily on the commentary of Rashi,[112] was written in the late twelfth century and provides an excellent example of the Latin glossing of the Hebraic tradition prior to Lyra. As Beryl Smalley has shewn in The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages, there was a constant intellectual exchange between Jewish and Christian scholars, so much so that one can rightly say that hebrew was very well known by Christian commentators of the Bible.[113] Furthermore, in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries conversos played a very important role in the translation of Hebraic texts, and as teachers of Hebrew, especially in Dominican circles.[114]

The presence of these translators had a tremendous effect

on the European manuscript tradition of the Vulgate. Bibles based on the text of the Vulgate, but which included passages of the Hebraica to fill St. Jerome's lacuna's, were circulated throughout Europe. An example of this practice is the Bible of the Paris masters, which was the basic text of the Schools:

> The Paris masters had proposed a particularly bad text as their standard. This was being circulated by stationers, and would soon spread over Christendom... Quite alien readings were being inserted from biblical quotations in the commentaries of the Fathers, from liturgy, and from the Hebrew.[115]

The particular situation of Biblical scholarship in Catalonia presents certain even more interesting aspects. It is a well-known fact that Peter the Ceremonious and his son John I boasted that they possessed copies of the Bible, "en català, francés i fins en hebraic".[116] It is, then, not extraneous to suggest that the king and the humanists of his court had close contacts with Jewish scholars who could expose the meaning of the Hebraic text. Indeed, Gerona was a flourishing centre of Jewish Biblical studies, before the fatal persecution of 1391.[117] It is in Gerona that two of the ten remaining fourteenth-century Hebrew commentaries of the Song of Songs were written. The first by Azriel Ben Menachem, or Ezra de Gerona, does not interest us here since it does not comment on the passage referring to "Thersa". The second is a key work, and it is considered as one of the most important in rabbinical schools. The commentary of Rabbi Abraham ben Isaac ha - Levi TaMakh does refer to "Thersa".[118] It is also important to note that ben Isaac had close contacts with the royal court.[119] Consequently, there is good ground to ask ourselves whether he may not have discussed his commentary of the Song of Songs with Christians. Moreover, given the vast circulation that

his work had between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries, and the fact that Alfonso the Magnanimous especially fostered Greek and Hebrew biblical studies,[120] one can legitimately suppose that his work must have been known by Christians in the fifteenth century.

Finally, it is impossible to discard the possibility that of a translation of a fragment of the Song of Songs, or of the Hebraic commentary. As one knows Ausias March possessed at least a commentary of the Psalms.[121] There exists also a Hebraic commentary which Ausias March might have known. The commentary of the Song of Songs attributed to St. Bonaventure is actually a translation of Moses Ibn Tibbon's work.[122] Consequently, there is no reason to doubt that Ausias March could have known the Hebraic version of the Song of Songs. The popularity of the commentary of the Song of Songs by the Valencian bishop, Jaime Pérez, or Jaime de Valencia, written within Ausias March's lifetime, in 1437, and printed in Valencia in 1486, indicates the great interest that existed in the Catalan-speaking regions for the Song of Songs. This interest is not foreign to Ausias March, and one can legitimately suppose that he must have known the passage of the Hebraic version referring to "Thersa".[123]

For reasons to which I have alluded above, the question of whether or not the name of Ausias March's beloved is "Teresa", cannot be answered conclusively, without imposing one's reading on the text and, thereby, violating the basic principle of academic integrity. Furthermore, were this question to be answered inequivocally, the answer would contribute little to our understanding of Ausias March's poetry. Her importance lies in her symbolic

function. Hence, what does matter is that the lady, or the ideal *figura* of the ladies, is consistently viewed as the embodiment of Sapientia. From this point of view her "identity" lies at the opposite pole of that which is characteristic of poets writing in the tradition of Andreas Capellanus. The *tornada* of Poem XXIII provides additional evidence of the link that exists between "dona Teresa" - "Thersa" and *Sapientia Dei*:

> Lir entre carts, lo meu poder no fa
> tant que pogués fer corona ·nvisible;
> meriu-la vós, car la qui és visible
> no·s deu posar lla on miracl· està (XXIII, vv. 41-42).

The crowning of *Lir entre carts* mentioned in verse 42 is a definite symbol of her sapiential character. As I pointed out above, Ausias March follows the Western exegetical tradition of the *Song of Songs* which interprets the beloved as the soul or as Mary assuming the dual function of Mediatrix and Sapientia. The topos of the crowning of the Virgin[124] is a reference to her function as Sapientia, since the image of the non-material crown is a symbol of wisdom.[125] Thus, in Alain de Lille's *Complaint of Nature*, the wisdom of the goddess is symbolized by her crown which shines not in "false light", but of its own pure light:

> The sparkling crown of a royal diadem, shining with dances of gems, brightened high on her head. No base alloy of gold, derogate from high worth, and deceptive to the eye with false light, supplied its substance, but the pure nobility of gold itself.[126]

The crown is, then, a symbol of wisdom and chastity, which serves to establish Ausias March's description of the lady in its sapiential context. As such, the lady is a source of illumination, or of "melancolia generosa" for the poet's love, as is evident in verses 5-8 and 31 of Poem XXIII quoted above.

Characteristically, this illumination which Ausias March

further describes in Poem XVIII, but which is present in Ausias March's description of the lady's beauty in Poem XXIII, proceeds from his imagination of the lady's interior beauty. Hence, Ausias March claims that this beauty cannot be appreciated by the ignorant man, which as I will shew below in an analysis of Poems LXXV and LXXIX, signifies the majority of mortals. For this reason, Ausias March insists on the veracity of his description of the lady in the first stanza of Poem XXIII:

> Lexant a part l'estil dels trobadors
> qui, per escalf, trespassen veritat,
> e sostrahent mon voler affectat
> perquè no•m torb, diré •l que trob en vós (XXIII, vv. 1-4).

The "style of the troubadours", which Ausias March describes in verse 1, is defined in Poem LXXXVII. It is the description of concupiscent love:

> D'aquest voler los trobadors escriuen,
> e, per aquest, dolor mortal los toca;
> la racional part de l'arma no•ls broca;
> del sensual aquests apetits viuen (LXXXVII, vv. 41-44).

The sensual love that Ausias March attributes to the troubadours corresponds to Andreas Capellanus' description of physical beauty and its fulfilment. What Ausias March seeks is contrary to this love. As verses 4 and 7 of Poem XXIII indicate, it lies in the lady. The rejection of the poetic fiction of the troubadours rests on a topos,[127] also used by Jorge Manrique,[128] which is found defined in the Complaint of Nature:

> Can it be that thou dost not know how poets expose naked falsehood to their hearers with no protective clothing... or how they cloak the same falsehood with a pretense of credibility that, by means of images of objective things, they mold the souls of men on the anvil of dishonourable assent; or that in the shallow exterior of literature the poetic lyre sounds a false note, but within speaks to its hearers of the mystery of loftier understanding, so that, the waste of outer falsity cast aside, the reader finds, in secret within, the sweeter kernel of truth.[129]

Ausias March's reproach to the troubadours is to have limited their understanding of love to the contemplation of the cortex of the image of the lady, without perceiving that the source of this beauty lies reflected in the beauty of the soul. Indeed, his reproach that they have "exceeded the truth" (verse 2) is based on the fact that they have acted out of passion, which is how all commentators interpret "per escalf" (verse 2). Passion arises out of cupidity. Following the definition of Andreas Capellanus, it is the result of "immoderate meditation upon the beauty of the opposite sex, which causes one to wish above all things the embraces of the other".[130] As I have tried to shew in Chapter III this is corporeal imagination. Passion, therefore, occurs when natural reason becomes excessively enthralled with exterior beauty contemplated in imagination.[131] To the contrary Ausias March describes the spiritual beauty perceived in the lady, which tempers his love (verses 4, 21-22 and 39-40). As a result Ausias March's love can be said to focus on the nucleus of beauty which is Sapientia Dei, that "sweeter kernel of truth" which Ausias March invites the reader to seek, as the real source of the lady's beauty.

Ausias March's love is, therefore, rooted in the sapiential notion of beauty, which, as I have shewn in Chapter III, is compatible with the Dionysian-Erigenian definition of beauty. His love must consequently be based on Charity which is contrary to the cupidity of Andreas Capellanus' description of "courtly love". Although the rejection of cupidity, in the broad sense, is evident in Ausias March's "cants Morals", inasmuch as these condemn the vices of his age, it reaches particular importance in Poems LXXV and LXXIX.

Poem LXXV is a little understood allegory of the pagan gods.[132] As such, it is very reminiscent of the Metamorphosis Goliae Episcopi,[133] with the remarkable difference that unlike the latter it does not begin with a description of the concordia rerum of the gods' pantheon, and does not explicitly lead to a condemnation of the "cucullatus populus",[134] although it is an allegory of hypocrisy. Rather, it follows the direction of the short Latin lyric "Dant ad veris honorem / arida florem",[135] since it also presents the theme of the conflict between Love and Reason. Ausias March's poem is divided into three sections. The first two stanzas present the personal problem of the poet, which takes on a universal character from stanzas III to XI, and in the tornada Ausias March returns to the topic of the poem. This sums up the problems articulated in Poem LXXV:

> Senyal de bé en tota dona cessa,
> com dins son cor vergonya no s'ajusta;
> y al savi hom és vici qui·l asusta:
> la rahó pert, qui és en ell princessa (LXXV, vv. 89-92).

As verse 92 indicates the crux of this poem is the loss of reason as the guiding factor in man's love. This entails two kinds of love, foolish love and pure love. In Poem LXXV, Ausias March expresses the opposition between the two kinds of love by returning to the tradition of the two Venuses. Diana, as the representative of Sapientia or Pallas, is the Celestial Venus, while Venus represents worldly love. This opposition is used not only to describe the discord of the macrocosm, but also that of the microcosm. Just as the gods and the planets were used in the Middle Ages to represent elemental configurations,[136] so do their movements serve to illustrate the tension that exists between the flesh and the spirit.[137] Ausias March uses this to define the

tension of his own love, which, although rooted in a corporeal vision, seeks a spiritual end. Thus, in the first stanza he presents himself as a unique case of the man who knows the extremes of love:[138]

> ¿ Qui és aquell qui en Amor contemple
> com yo, qui sent sos delits on abasten?
> ¿ Qui són aquells qui dolç·amargor tasten,
> e, juntes mans, l'adoren fora temple?
> Yo só tot sol a qui natura streny
> a no poder àls fer ne pus entendre
> sinó amar, e, volent-me'n defendre,
> no·m vol seguir a res àls fer null seny (LXXV, vv. 1-8).

When Ausias March asks the rhetorical question in verses 3-4 concerning who experiences the bitter-sweetness of love, he is referring to his contradictory experience of love in the search of the melancholy mean, as in Problem XXX, i.[139] The answer to this question is given in verses 5 to 8. The bitter-sweetness of Ausias March's love arises from the composite nature of the beauty which he contemplates, and the limitations of his own duality. It is an expression of laetus horror.[140] Verse 4 uses an image which clearly defines the nature of his love. It is described as the love of the devout man who adores Love outside of the temple. The image of the devout man is consistently used in Ausias March's poetry as a symbol of the contemplative life (see Appendix II, E: 3), just as we have seen it used in Poem XXIII, verse 31 quoted above. The image of the temple in Ausias March's poetry can be considered to be a variation on the "hostal de Venus" (see Appendix II, A: 13),[141] as the place in which the act of love is performed, and it is used in this sense in verse 71 of this poem. The particularity of Ausias March's usage of this image in this instance is that he notes that the devotion to which he aspires is performed out of the "temple" (verse 4). The use of "temple" as a symbol recalls

St. Paul's metaphor, that the body is the temple of the Holy Spirit.[142] This is consistent with the pseudo-Dionysian-Erigenian aesthetic of beauty conceived of as the reflection of divine Goodness in particular corporeal objects, which we have seen used by Ausias March in Poem XXIII, as the premiss for his love of interior beauty as a reflection of the divine telos in Sapientia.

From verses 5-8 Ausias March applies this to his own situation. His nature, which one can understand to signify his complexion,[143] inclines him to the constant contemplation of this beauty. As a result, verse 8 points out that even his senses are turned towards contemplation, his love is tempered.[144] A fundamental question is raised by verse 7: Ausias March loves, and yet defends himself from love. This refers to the problem enunciated by Hughes de Saint Victor's "De Unione Corporis et Spiritus" concerning the role of imagination in the fall of reason to the attractions of the flesh.[145]The tempered condition referred to in verse 8, indicates that the action of the will maintains the supremacy of reason rising towards intellectual contemplation. Hence, the entire poem is consistent with the final verse which proclaims that Reason is the "princess" in man, and that its supremacy must be maintained.

Stanzas III to XI illustrate the development of these ideas. The poet contrasts his love with the carnal yearnings of most men and women, which he calls "la pràtica dels vius" in Poem XIII, verse 10. As he remarked in verse 5, Ausias March attributes the chaste quality of his love to his complexion, or nature. This theme is picked up in verses 11 and 12 in which he claims that the powers of the Heavens have made his love, or will, capture his

"seny", which is understood as "intelligence" in verse 12.[146] Thus, Ausias March claims celestial influence on his nature (verses 11-12).[147]

> Si·m dón solaç, creeu ferm que yo·l feny,
> si no·y acull Amor al delit pendre;
> les potestats del Cel han volgut vendre
> e fer catiu de mon voler, lo seny.
> No·m rept algú, car tots veig solacar,
> segons cascú sa qualitat requer;
> qui·n aquest món honor vol he diner,
> tinga's esment, ja té causa d'errar (LXXV, vv. 9-16).

The capture of "intelligence" by love returns to the theme of the "wise folly", as in Poem XVIII, verses 53-56, because Ausias March's chaste love which is bent on intelligence of beauty, seems foolish to other men. Thus, in verse 13 he declares that none should challenge his statement, since every man seeks solace according to his quality. This quality refers to the tripartite division of the kinds of love, and the corresponding three kinds of lives that men can lead, which form an integral part of this poem, as we will see below. All of Ausias March's delight is bent on Love (verses 9-10), and this is contrasted with the fornicatio of mankind. Hence, in verses 13-16 he introduces the theme of cupidity, which is the general folly of mankind, that passes for wisdom in this world. This is reduced to manifestations of pride and avarice (verse 15), which Ausias March rejects (verse 16).

Stanzas III to XI develop the theme of wordly cupidity as opposed to Ausias March's Charity, by means of an allegorical discordia rerum which originates in man's fornicatio. It is, like the Complaint of Nature, a description of the world in discord: "En gran discort està lo món possat" (LXXV, v. 41). The central figure of this allegory is the worldly Venus that lies at the origin of fornicatio, and against which Ausias March opposes

Pallas, the goddess of Wisdom. This leads to an opposition between the flesh and the spirit. Ausias March's allegory then becomes a description of the various vices cultivated by man. In order to stress St. Augustine's definition of cupidity as the love of a creature for its own sake, and not for God's, Ausias March states that each of these vices is a god worshipped by the individual:

> Lo temps dels déus se vol ara mostrar,
> car dintre si un déu cascú vol fer,
> e dels desigs on corre lo voler,
> solempnes déus a tots veig adorar;
> e sobre tots Venus és mils servida,
> car nostra carn no coneix altre déu.
> Bacus, en part, sa favor no l'és greu;
> Ceres, muller, no n'és enfellonida (LXXV, vv. 17-24).

The gods are then used as symbols of the seven sins to which man becomes a slave. Venus is, naturally, the symbol of lechery. The mention of Bacchus and Ceres is based on a popular proverb which is found in Bernardus Silvestris' Commentary on the First Six Books of the Aeneid. Bacchus and Ceres are not only the gods of harvest and wine;[148] they are by extension symbols of gastrimargia which Cassian subordinates to concupiscentia.[149] Consequently, Silvestris points out that heat and moisture produced by the digestion of food in the body excites lust, and thereby justifies the saying, "without Ceres and Bacchus, Venus becomes cold": "Hec autem in corpore per cibos acta libidinem movent. Ideo dictum est: 'sine Cerere et Bacco friget Venus".[150] Venus' other accomplice is Juno, the goddess of wealth,[151] with whom she shares her influence. Juno combines with Venus in order to hold sway over Mars and Saturn:

> Juno del món té una gran partida;
> diu que deu ser pus colt·, al juhí seu.
> Saturn e Mars no torben sa gran veu;
> a llur poder Juno y Venus dan mida (LXXV, vv. 25-28).

Thus, the power of Saturn and Mars is subordinated to the pursuit

of wealth and carnal love, which are two fundamental aspects of cupidity. As verse 15 quoted above states, they represent those who seek the worldly fruits of "honor" and "diner". The combination of Saturn and Mars is also representative of "melancolia negra", or black bile,[152] thereby fulfilling the warning issued in verses 15 and 16: "qui·n aquest món honor vol e diner, / tinga's esment, ja té causa d'errar" (LXXV, vv. 15-16). Saturn and Mars represent the capital sins of ira and acedia which Casian associates with "tristitia", or melancholy.[153] At the origin of this tradition, as it was inherited by the Middle Ages, lies Servius' Commentary of Vergil's Aeneid:[154]

unde etiam mathematici fingunt, quod singulorum numinum potestatibus corpus et animus nostra connexa sunt ea ratione, quia cum descendunt animae trahunt secum torporem Saturni, Martis iracundiam, libidinem Veneris, Mercurii lucri cupiditatem, Iovis regni desiderium: quae res faciunt perturbationem animabus, ne possint uti vigore suo et viribus propriis.[155]

Their function in the development of the poetry of Ausias March is to describe the effects of melancholy on the perturbation of the soul. Thus, stanza VIII refers to the instability of Mars and Saturn and how they are subordinated to Juno and Venus:

> Saturn e Mars per si no han potença,
> mas per dos déus són estrem favorits:
> guardant honor a Venus són servits,
> e per haver a Juno·n reverença.
> Mars a Saturn humilment hobeeix,
> e l'obehir entr· ells molt se cambia (LXXV, vv. 57-62).

"Melancolia negra" as a nefarious force that arises out of the instability of Mars and Saturn, or out of ira and acedia, affects those men who seek the benefits of Venus and Juno. Since most men seek these things, Ausias March can rightly contend that the world is pervaded by cupidity.

The full significance of these gods, within the entire

framework of Ausias March's poetry, becomes clear when they are contrasted with Pallas. They represent the two fundamental aspects of fornicatio as defined by St. Augustine. As stanza VI points out, Venus attracts the majority of men, and Juno's following, though lesser than Venus', is divided into two groups:

> Venus del món se trau la fina lesta;
> tot home bo en son ostal se resta,
> e val-se poch qui no·y és albergat.
> Juno té gent en dues parts gitada:
> prop de la mort, cobejosa de viure;
> altres, que veig, de baix estat delliure,
> ffam· atenyents ab leig vici guanyada (LXXV, vv. 42-48).

As verse 48 indicates, Venus and Juno are obviously associated with vice. Venus naturally represents concupiscentia, of which every man is guilty. Juno, on the other hand, is associated with the pursuit of "fama" (verse 48), which is never free from the pursuit of money. Thus, Juno and Venus represent two kinds of worldly love, or lives, the life of bestiality or voluptuousness, and that of mixed or active delights. This is confirmed by the introduction of a comparison to Pallas whose estate Ausias March pities (verse 63). This contrast is rendered particularly interesting by the fact that the significance of Pallas in relation to the other two goddesses is not developed. She becomes a foil for Diana, the goddess of Chastity. Thus, Ausias March draws on another symbolic tradition, which is also described in Bernardus Silvestris' Commentary on the First Six Books of the Aeneid. In his integumentum of the Judgement of Paris Silvestris associates the three goddesses to the three kinds of lives:[156] "Per Pallada theoricam vitam accipimus, per Iunonem activam, per Venerem voluptatem".[157] The significance of Ausias March's allegory then becomes clear. It is a highly elegant version of the three kinds of love that are so often described in

his poetry.[158] Hence, his claim to exceptionality in love, like that of Ficino and his followers,[159] is based on the contention that contemplative love, the love of Pallas, is practised by the exceptional few.

The description of the dominion of Pallas is consequently based on Ausias March's pessimistic vision of the fate of Wisdom in the saeculum. Pallas' following consists of Mercury and Diana. Reference to Mercury is not based on his association to the seven capital sins quoted above, but to a development of the traditional representation of the soul's planetary journey, in which she receives wit from Mercury.[160] Subsequently, Mercury becomes associated with eloquence in Martianus Capella's The Marriage of Philology and Mercury, which remained one of the most influential works in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. Thus, Bernardus Silvestris goes to great lengths to define the etymology of Mercury with all its contradictions, but stresses that Mercury is, above all else, eloquence.[161] It is, however, in the Ovide Moralisé that a more distinct picture of his symbolic function can be found. In his Christian context Mercury is eloquence as the voice of the prophets, who despised covetousness and rose to the soaring heights of contemplation. Furthermore, he is closely associated with Pallas, or Sapientia Dei:

> Par Mercure est entendue eloquence, qui doit estre en chacun bon predicateur ainsi comme elle le fut es predicateurs anciens qui du monde deguerpirent et mepriserent la convoitise e se prindrent à voller en hault par contemplacion devote aux grans joyes de paradis... Et au regard de Pallas, qui signifie sapience, parce qu'elle hurta a l'uys de la maison d'Envie... Mais elle peut assez sonner et preschier aux oreilles des envieux, car à grant paine se veullent ilz jamais abstenir et repentir du desplaisir qu'il prennent des biens d'autruy ne de la joye qu'ilz recoivent de son dommaige, qui est contre le bien de charité, d'amour et de begnivolence.[162]
>
> (underlining is mine).

The thematic affinity between this passage of the Ovide Moralisé and Ausias March's poem is obvious. In both, Mercury and Pallas serve as the downtrodden representatives of Charity fighting the cupidity of man.[163] Thus, in relation to fornicatio, understood in the restricted sense, Diana, who is the traditional representative of chastity, or in the words of the Ovide Moralisé: "la lune clere en purté et netteté de vie",[164] also constitutes a desirable virtue. Yet, Ausias March notes that although she is praised, nobody cares to respect her in practice:

> Mercuriús e Pal·las veu no·ls cal,
> desfalagant l'orella del hoent;
> Diana és de favor menys potent;
> mas en lo món Déu los ha dat cabal:
> ver, llur gran nom pel món és preÿcat,
> e totes gens d'aquestes manen festa:
> colta no és, car de cascú no·ls resta
> sinó hun troç de carn dins dens tancat (LXXV, vv. 31-40).

Thus, Mercury and Pallas, as Wisdom and the eloquence of the prophets, are gods that protect Chastity, or "vergonya" (verses 75 and 90), which represents a fundamental aspect of the Christian ideal of Charity.

From this premiss, Ausias March inveighs against the hypocrisy of his fellow Christians. Although men voice praises of these Christian virtues and preach their necessity (verses 37-38), Diana, or the pure and honest Christian life is not practiced (verse 39). This hypocrisy is vividly depicted in verse 40, the sense of which has eluded critics.[165] It is seemingly a proverbial phrase, and recalls in another context, Bertran de Born's introduction to his accusation of the lady's infidelity: "Je dois porter la langue là où la dent me fait mal".[166] The sense of verse 40 in Poem LXXV is that the double standard of men who praise, and yet do not emulate these virtues, leaves a sore point in their

conscience; thus, the tongue, or flesh, places itself on the tooth that hurts, as a palliative. Another possible, and simpler, explanation is that as man speaks through his teeth uttering praises of Diana, there remains locked in the teeth the carnal intention which determines the real effects, or practice, of these statements. Both of these explanations convey the idea that men do not try to lead virtuous lives. In verses 69 and 70, Ausias March states that prayers are addressed to Diana, but the will is directed to Venus. This seems to repeat the metaphorical implications of verse 40:

> Los públichs prechs s'endrecen a Diana,
> la voluntat és de Venus entrega (LXXV, vv. 69-70).

In the following stanza Ausias March brings together the various strands of his allegory by returning specifically to the theme of the conflict between Love and Reason, or cupidity and Charity. Venus, or the voluptuous life, is seen as the victor, since, by submitting to her, men relinquish their reason. Ausias March is careful to point out that the lovers voluntarily give their reason to Venus, and not that Venus takes it. Hence, Ausias March's statement does not involve astrological determinism, but a misguided act of free-will on the part of the lovers who chose to follow Venus:

> Aquelles gents ab la pensa molt vana
> que ab rahó jamés han pau ne brega,
> per llur cor flach, de vergonya fan plega,
> qui·lls met un fre donant-los vida sana;
> e si lo giny de Venus romp tal fre,
> saben-li grat com axí ·s vehen soltes,
> qu·en son servir no·s mostren ser enboltes,
> fent li present del millor de llur bé (LXXV, vv. 73-80).

The loss of the best in them is the loss of reason. It is also the loss of pudency which results from the fall of reason to the flesh,

much as Hughes de Saint Victor's "De Unione Corporis et Spiritus" has shewn[167] and the imagery of which is subsequently used by Ausias March, as I will demonstrate below.

In the last stanza Ausias March turns to an image that is also found in Alain de Lille's Complaint of Nature. Diana, who represents the virtues of Charity, is trampled by Venus and her followers, the vices of lechery, that lead to "melancolia negra" which wavers between acedia and ira:

> En lo començ, por e Diana·ls té,
> mas si lo vel d'ignorants les ha toltes,
> Venus colents, Març e Saturn a voltes,
> entre llurs peus Diana va e ve (LXXV, vv. 81-84).

In the Complaint of Nature Reason is also trampled by Vice, and Alain de Lille's image bears strong reminiscences of Hughes de Saint Victor's epistemology:

> Thus the reason of man, trampled by covetousness, serves the flesh, and like a handmaid is compelled to wait upon it. Thus the eye of the heart sickens blind from mist, and suffers its eclipse, to lead an inactive life in solitude. Thus the shadow of the flesh basely covers the splendour of human riches and the glory of the mind is made most unglorious.[168]

The effects of the "fleshly mist", to which Ausias March refers in Poem XCII, verse 38, as "hull ab gota serena", is the concern of this poem. It is the "fleshly mist" that covers man's natural reason and causes him to be subject to "melancolia negra" because it inclines him to all manner of cupidity.

Poem LXXV is a condemnation of the two kinds of wordly love, bestial and mixed, which are governed by the wordly Venus. Hence, it denies the merit of any love that leads to "melancolia negra". It must be noted, however, that melancholy arising from the loss of reason and the pursuit of fornicatio, which Andreas Capellanus presents as the only forms of love found in the secular

context, is considerably different from melancholy that arises out of the experience of laetus horror. The evangelical sensibility which pervades Poem LXXV represents a fundamental point of divergence from Capellanus' monastic sensibility. Ausias March, like Ficino, also condemns that love which leads to "melancolia negra", but not that love which is guided by reason and seeks in the contemplation of beauty the light of right reason, or Sapientia Dei.[169] As long as reason maintains the reins of the soul's flights, the melancholy that results from the laetus horror experienced by Ausias March is an incentive to contemplative love which derives from the pseudo-Dionysian-Erigenian concept of secular beauty. This clearly differs from the condemnation of secular love formulated by Andreas Capellanus, which presupposes the loss of reason. Ausias March, who still practices worldly love in contemplation, or as he states "fora temple", sees a reflection of divine goodness in the secular beauty which he seeks to transcend. Hence, Ausias March aspires to use reason to control his senses. This entails tension between the desire to love and the effort to keep the rational soul from being drawn excessively towards the corruption of the flesh in the movement of imagination. This problem, which Ausias March recognizes as a reality which he experiences, is perennial in all the Neoplatonizing writers from Hughes de Saint Victor onwards and Ficino and his followers. This is what Castiglione, Hebreo and Ficino refer to as the "heroic love" of the few which can only be attained by the rational control of imagination.[170] As we shall se below, the cult of contemplative love leads to "melancolia generosa", as in Poem LXVI, and in turn entails illumination as in Poem XVIII.

The love of Ausias March is, therefore, based on the premiss that it is essentially elitist. The introspective individual is made outstanding by his melancholy. It is, as in Castiglione, love that is based on virtue and the control of reason, which is cultivated by able-bodied men, not hypocritically by "L'inperfet hom" (LXXV, v. 65), or the old men from whom "la vida·s devia" (LXXV, v. 66). It is "angelical" or "heroic" love. Hence, it is concerned with the tension that exists in the movement of imagination between the body and the soul, as we have seen in Chapter III. Such a love, although it is based on a previous cultural tradition, is evidently not the "courtly love" of Andreas Capellanus, nor is it, as Ausias March notes, the love of the troubadours. It is a love that transcends "la pràtica dels vius" (XIII, v. 10). The "heroic" implications of this conception of love is evident. It is implicitly based on the idealization of past lovers, which, as I noted in the analysis of Poem IX in Chapter III, includes the literary imagination of mythological figures such as, Pyramus and Thisbe.[171]

The "heroic" conception that underlies Ausias March's theory of love is evinced in Poem LXXIX. Ausias March appeals to the memory of those true lovers of bygone days who died of chaste love which is symbolized by a golden arrow:

> O vós, mesquins, qui sots terra jaheu
> del colp d'Amor ab lo cors sangonent,
> e tots aquells qui ab cor molt ardent
> han bé amat, prech-vos no·us oblideu.
> Veniu plorant, ab cabells escampats,
> ubers los pits per mostrar vostre cor
> com fon plagat ab la sageta d'or
> ab què Amor plaga·ls enamorats (LXXIX, vv. 1-8).

This reference to the exemplariness of past lovers involves an allusion to past literary heroes. This is an example of imagination

as the creative fancy of the poet juxtaposing the world as it is, to the world as it should be according to romance. Consequently, it is only natural that one should turn to Ovid's Metamorphoses, in order to find the models of Ausias March's ideal, for it is from this tradition that references to Pyramus and Thisbe undoubtedly proceed.[172] The process of assimilation is fairly complex, for the Valencian poet may also have been inspired by part of Guiraut de Calanson's poem: "Celeis cui am de cor e de saber".[173] Martín de Riquer has remarked that Calanson's allegory is, "mig ovidiana, mig estil Roman de la rose".[174] This is the greatest concession made to the Ovidian influence in Ausias March's poetry. Pagès, Bohigas, and Rafael Ferreres have used possible influence of Calanson in order to substantiate the thesis that Ausias March is a belated troubadour.[175] Yet, they do not seem to have noticed the vast discrepancies between Calanson's allegory and that of Ausias March.

Guiraut de Calanson's poem is exceptional for having been the first to use an allegory of Love's power concerning three arrows, as opposed to the traditional two.[176] Marc-René Jung has pointed out that this poem is a static descriptive allegory,[177] and that the second stanza, which uses the image of the three arrows, describes the process of innamoramento.[178] This is also the opinion held by the troubadour Guiraut Riquier in his commentary on Calanson's allegory.[179] In his poem Calanson presents a tripartite division of love. One must note that in Calanson's poem this division is not related to the nature of the arrows which is developed in the allegory. Furthermore, this poem does not deal with the exposition of an ideal kind of love, like that of Ausias

March, but with "fin' amors", which in this instance is understood as carnal love.[180] The use of the arrows sent by the god, Amor, who is represented in the Provençal tradition as a woman, is never related to the subject of chaste love in Calanson's allegory. M.-R. Jung clearly sums up the content of this allegory:

> Après les flèches, les portes et les degrés, nous avons une nouvelle division de l'amour, cette fois en trois. A l'amour charnel (le "menor tertz d'Amor") s'ajoute soit l'amour naturel, donc l'amour des parents, soit l'amitié: les termes qui caractérisent ce "second tiers" ne sont pas assez explicites pour que la question soit tranchée. Le degré le plus élevé, enfin, est representé par l'amour de Dieu. Mais Guiraut de Calanson n'insiste pas sur les deux derniers "tiers". Le sujet de la chanson est bel et bien le "moindre" des trois amours. Qu'on veuille l'appeler "fin' amors" ou amour courtois - il s'agit de l'amour charnel.[181]

The tripartite division of the types of love in Calanson's poem is somewhat similar to that of Ausias March, but it is not exactly the same. It is a variation of this topic in mediaeval literature. Moreover, it is not explicitly defined, even though it may derive from a common source.[182] Finally, one notices that the division of love in Calanson's poem is purely accessory, whereas it is central to all of Ausias March's poetry, as in Poem LXXV above.

The context in which Guiraut de Calanson presents the allegory of the arrows is vastly different from that of Ausias March, who is concerned with the unrequited nature of intellectual love, or Charity. The second stanza of Calanson's poem describes Love's effects:

> Tant es subtils qu'om non la pot vezer,
> e corr tan tost que res no-il pot fugir,
> e fer tan dreg que res no-il pot gandir
> ab dart d'acier, d'on fai colp de plazer,
> on non ten pro ausbercs forts ni espes,
> si lansa dreit; e pois trai demanes
> sajetas d'aur ab son arc estezat;
> pois lans'un dart de plom gent afilat (vv. 9-15).

Love uses three kinds of arrows on the lover to achieve his end in

the process of innamoramento. The iron arrow introduces pleasure, or desire, of love, those of gold bring hope and delight, and that of lead signifies the end of love.[183] As M.-R. Jung has explained, this is an allegory describing the successive states undergone by the lover.[184]

The concept of succession is the single most important relation with Ausias March's use of the allegory of the arrows in Poem LXXIX. When examined closely this link is tenuous, because the type of succession and its implications are radically different from that of Calanson.[185] In the latter's poem a feminine figure first throws an iron arrow (verse 12), then several golden ones, and finally, a leaden one. In Poem LXXIX, Ausias March claims that the male figure of Love has used three kinds of arrows in three different ages. In antiquity Love used golden arrows, then, when he had none of these left, he used silver ones, and finally, by Ausias March's time Love had no silver arrows left and began to use leaden ones. Yet, Love has found one last golden arrow in his quiver and has used it on the poet. Ausias March's problem of unrequited love arises from this exceptional situation, for his beloved is only struck by a leaden arrow, and because she is inclined to concupiscent love, she does not care for his chaste love.

In Ausias March's Poem LXXIX the allegory of the arrows refers only indirectly to the innamoramento. Each arrow imparts a type of love, but it does not involve a process in the individual development of love. The quality of the arrows only determines that of the lovers in three eras. Unlike Calanson's imagery which describes the power and the court of Love, and is, therefore,

basically objective,[186] the allegory in Ausias March describes his own situation as an example of the treachery and failings of Love. As in Poem LXXV, this allegory serves to comment on the moral decadence of his age, which is contrasted with his "heroic" ideal. Hence, the relation between Calanson's allegory and Ausias March's rests on two points; that Love sends a succession of three arrows, and that the poet introduces a tripartite division of the types of love. In the first point of relation one finds that the three arrows come in a different order and that they have radically different implications. In the second point of relation, Calanson does not develop his tripartite division fully; this is only elaborated upon by his commentator, Guiraut Riquier, again, under the influence of a possible common source. The key difference is that in Calanson the allegory of the three arrows is absolutely distinct from the tripartite theory of love, whereas they are perfectly integrated in Ausias March's poem, exemplifying and furthering this constant of the Valencian's poetry.

Two separate images from Book I of the Metamorphoses provide Ausias March with the themes of temporal succession, and the opposition between the lover and the beloved resulting from the effects of Love's arrows. The first derives from Ovid's description of the fall of man from the Golden Age, to the silver, bronze and iron ages. The second refers to Apollo's unrequited love for Daphne.

As we have seen above Ausias March opens Poem LXXIX with an invocation to those lovers who died from the effects of Love's golden arrows (vv. 1-8). By so doing, he identifies his own plight with that of heroic ancient lovers. From verses 17-27 Ausias

March clarifies this reference. Arrows of gold kill the lover, who really feels all the effects of Love's power. Those of silver only wound him, and the leaden ones hardly draw blood. Beginning with the golden arrows the description of Love's power follows:

> De flexes tals molts passats foren morts;
> ja no té pus que fer guerra mortal.
> Ab les d'argent sol basta fer senyal,
> mas los plagats, de morir són estorts.
>
> Ab les de plom són huy tot sos deports,
> e son poder no bast• a traure sanch (LXXIX, vv. 21-26).

True love is, therefore, induced by golden arrows. At verses 17-18, Ausias March states that in the beginning of times Love threw only golden arrows:

> En aquells temps que primer d'aquest fon,
> les flexes d'or Amor totes lançà (LXXIX, vv. 17-18).

This reference to temporal sequence establishes a correlation between true love and antiquity. Thus, Ausias March develops his allegory according to a temporal succession describing the progressive corruption of man, who has ceased to seek true virtue in love.

As verses 25 and 26 indicate, Ausias March contends that in his times man is incapable of true love, and only he is endowed with this virtuous capacity, which we have seen him define in Poem LXXV as Augustinian Charity. In the temporal succession established by Ovid one finds a similar topos concerning the theme of the return to the Golden Age in which virtue reigned. The quality of the metal by which an age is described in Ovid also refers to the moral quality of the men who lived in that era. Thus, Ovid groups the different types of men who made up the various ages by referring to races of men, and the metal is used as an adjective describing the moral condition of each race:

> Sub Iove mundus erat, subiit argentea proles.
> .....
> Tertia post illam successit aena proles (I, vv. 114 and 125).

The Ovide Moralisé develops the moral implications of these divisions even more clearly:

> Lors li était le monde dorez
> Non pas pour ce que colorez
> Fust tous de dorée color,
> Maes, si com mains valent de l'or
> Tuit autre metal qui sont ores,
> Valoient miex les gents de lores (I, vv. 815-820).

In the context of Poem LXXIX Ausias March assimilates Ovid's description of man's progressive decadence in order to illustrate man's fall into cupidity. The loss of virtue is also a central concern of Ovid's description. A comparison between the description of the Golden Age and that of Iron evinces this point. In the age of gold men were virtuous:

> Aurea prima sata est aetas, quae vindice nullo,
> sponte sua, sine lege fidem rectumque colebat (I, vv. 89-90).

The age of Iron is base. Unlike the men of the Golden Age, who kept faith, the men of the Iron Age are ruled by vice and greed:

> protinus inrupit venae peioris in aevum
> omne nefas: fugere pudor verumque fidesque;
> in quorum subiere locum fraudesque dolusque
> insidiaeque et vis et amor sceleratus habendi (I, vv. 128-131).

The age of iron, as described by Ovid, is corrupted by the lack of pudency and the love of gain. To a Christian, such as Ausias March, this description corresponds to the reign of fornicatio and cupidity which he described in Poem LXXV. Hence, in Poem LXXIX, the progression in the succession of ages, represented by the allegory of the arrows, is a movement away from truth and purity that constitute Charity.

A problem in this comparison arises in that Ausias March describes the decadence of man in three stages: gold, silver and

lead, whereas Ovid uses four metals to describe this evolution: gold, silver, bronze and iron. Yet, in the Metamorphoses, Ovid does not describe the age of bronze elaborately. It is dispatched in a mere two verses, and only serves as a transfer from the age of silver to that of iron. The ages of bronze and iron are, therefore, dealt as one.[187] As such, only three ages are actually described in Ovid, and it is not surprising that Ausias March should have chosen to describe only three ages.

In the allegory of the arrows, as it is manipulated by Ausias March, the ages of bronze and iron are represented by that of lead. The use of lead takes on a new aspect when the allegory of the three arrows, which is originally used objectively, becomes the subjective problem of the poet. Thus, the implications of this succession comes to become subordinated to an opposition which is not present in Calanson's allegory. Ausias March is wounded by a leaden arrow, and aspires to emulate Golden Age virtue, which we have seen above, can be considered Augustinian Charity. His lady is hit (only) by a leaden arrow, and is not interested in the poet's intellectual love. She, therefore, shuns him. Significantly, the leaden arrow causes the lady to flee her lover, who is hit by a golden arrow. The quality of the arrows to have opposite properties and cause the lover to feel true love for the lady who rejects his love, returns to the traditional opposition of wills caused by an arrow of gold and one of lead, found in Ovid's metamorphosis of Daphne, and particularly as it is interpreted in the Ovide Moralisé.

In his subjective interpretation of the allegory Ausias March minimizes the importance of silver arrows. As we have seen

in Poem LXXV, mixed love, or the active life, is in fact very closely associated with the voluptuous life, or as he indicates, Venus understood to be fornicatio, in the broad sense, rules this world. Hence, the silver arrows which are an intermediary between bestial and divine love are a variation on the leaden arrows. The crux of his problem in Poem LXXIX is the opposition between carnal and chaste love. Already in verses 13-14 the poet preludes this conflict, before explaining the symbolic value of the metals as representing the quality of love imparted by the arrows:

> D'or e de plom aquestes flexes són,
> e d'un metall qu·s anomen· argent;
> cascú d'aquests dóna son sentiment,
> segons que d'ells differenç·à·n lo món (LXXIX, vv. 13-16).

As in Poem LXXV Ausias March's tripartite division of love in Poem LXXIX corresponds to the scale of values inferred in the allegory. According to Ausias March, love has at least three forms, carnal, human or mixed, and honest or angelical.[188] The angelical love of Ausias March, like Castiglione's, is not divine love excluding secular beauty, but the love of the intellect or soul perceived in the corporeal beauty of a person of the other sex, which reflects divine Goodness.[189] Thus, from verses 33 to 40 Ausias March creates an opposition between his ideal conception of love and the baseness of the one with which he is confronted on earth.

This conflict is attributed to Love's treachery, as one notes in verses 27 to 32. From verses 34 and 35 one also finds that this opposition is not only between the poet and his beloved, but also between the poet and Love. In the Ovide Moralisé the war between Apollo and Cupid, from which the image of the two arrows which cause the metamorphosis of Daphne originates, is understood to be a confrontation between "bone amours ou sapience".[190] The

solution given to this conflict by the author of the Ovide Moralisé is, "en Dieu ces deux qualites se trouvent unies".[191] The problem faced by Ausias March is essentially the same, as is his solution. Although he does not immediately turn his love strictly to God in an act of asceticism,[192] he does seek to find love in the divine part of man, the soul.[193] As a divine object the soul is immaterial and acts as an intermediary between the intelligible and material worlds.[194] It can, therefore, be a source of felicity. The tornada of Poem LXXIX makes this the object of Ausias March's love, in which the intellect opposes carnal love:

> O foll Amor, qui vostre delit vol,
> sobre loch fals ha son contentament;
> per ço repòs no té·n l'enteniment,
> car si no·l ver l'enteniment no col (LXXIX, vv. 41-44).

"Foll Amor" is essentially the carnal love induced by the leaden arrow, which has no virtuous quality. It is inconstant, unlike Ausias March's virtuous love which places its affection in the source of particular beauty, divine Goodness.[195] However, as Hughes de Saint Victor and M. Ficino have indicated, all love that is based on beauty perceived in imagination will eventually waver between the flesh and the soul, and can only be a source of torment since the object of this love is corporeal.[196] This is an ineluctable consequence of the "descensus ad inferos". "Foll Amor" is the earthly love that has wounded the poet, and caused his torment. It is this love that has caused his laetus horror by revealing the beauty of divine Goodness which is the real end, but it is also his demise, since love originates in the sense of sight and can either rise to the contemplative delights found in Charity, or fall to the lust of the senses in cupidity. It is, therefore, not the delight of corporeal beauty which is associated with "Foll Amor"

that Ausias March seeks, but the delight of the intellect (verse 44).

In Poem LXXIX Ausias March returns to the sapiential context of Ovid's Metamorphoses, as it was understood by the Chartrians.[197] The Ovidian image of Cupid's arrows and the topos of the ages of man are used in the light of the integumenta of the Ovide Moralisé, in order to represent a conflict between worldly love and intellectual love, that is, between the manifestations of cupidity and Charity. Certain aspects of the Latin original are, therefore, lost, such as Apollo's lust for Daphne. The modifications are conditioned by the authorial intention, which is primarily moral. As in Poem XXIII, this intention is a rejection of "courtly love" as it is depicted by writers such as Andreas Capellanus. It is in this framework that the possible influence of Guiraut de Calanson's allegory on Ausias March must be understood. Although Ausias March may have had Calanson's allegory in mind, the use he makes of the image is so vastly different that the predominant influence returns to Ovid.[198]

Ausias March raises the allegory of the arrows to a metaphysical level. It does not serve to describe the court and power of Love, but the inner problems that beset the Christian man seeking to recover from the "descensus ad inferos". The poem consists of five parts: an invocation to the virtuous ancients, the presentation of a tripartite theory of love, the explanation of the significance of the arrows as a temporal succession, an exposition of the poet's problem caused by Love's treachery, and finally, a tornada which sums up the poet's moral and metaphysical anguish. Poem LXXIX, like LXXV, is concerned with the opposition between Charity and cupidity. The allegory of Love's feats is,

therefore, relegated to the background, and the central protagonist is the poet. His anguish is the subject of this poem. Love has ceased to inspire virtue in all but the poet. The suffering that arises out of this unrequited love, which is based on the contemplation of a corporeal object, keeps the poet from attaining the state of bliss that is found only in the direct contemplation of God's Goodness.

Ovid's images of the decline of man and the unrequited love of Apollo, who incarnates Sapientia, are subordinated to the human dimension of Ausias March's problems. The invocation to the ancient "heroic" lovers, with whom the poet identifies, refers to the ideal world of Ovid's lovers, understood in the integumenta of their roles in the Ovide Moralisé. In his use of these sources Ausias March expresses an interior need, and reinterprets these images within the limits of his circumstance. The details of these images cease to interest him. What concerns Ausias March is their moral significance in the contrast of cupidity and Charity. Hence, his suffering is engendered by the desire to love in the light of Sapientia, or right reason, within a world which is fraught with cupidity. As we have seen in Chapter III and in the analysis of Poem XXIII, Ausias March's love is animated by a profound consciousness of the implantations of grace in nature. It is moved by an evangelical sensibility that is radically different from that of an Andreas Capellanus. Therein lies the justification for his frequent claim to exceptionality in love. His "heroic" love, based on Christian values,[199] is unrequited in this world. This inevitably leads him to seek to renounce the world which he loves, knowing that the source of the beauty he contemplates lies

beyond and that it can only be attained by a recovery from the "descensus ad inferos".[200]

As I have pointed out above, and in particular in Chapter III, the tension that pervades Ausias March's poetry is the product of the movement of imagination, which can deceive reason into becoming excessively enamoured of a corporeal object. Hence, the bitter-sweetness of Ausias March's erotic experience is closely associated with his consciousness of the composite nature of the beauty that he contemplates. This is accentuated by the limitations of his own duality which he attempts to transcend. Thus, although imagination can lead the poet to contemplate the reflection of the face of God, it can also sink to the torments of "melancolia negra". These extremes of love find their expression in Ausias March's use of Hughes de Saint Victor's image of the shirt of Nessus in the "De Unione Corporis et Spiritus", which is also used by Florentine Neoplatonists. This text is quoted and analysed in notes 26 and 31 of Chapter III, but it is of such importance that I will summarize its contents in order to stress the distance that separates Ausias March's "fin' amors" as an introspective love, from Andreas Capellanus' "amour courtois".[201] Extensive references to imagination, and an analogous usage of Hughes de Saint Victor's image of the shirt of Nessus, are present in Ausias March's poetry. I would suggest that owing to the popularity of Hughes de Saint Victor among Franciscans, such as Lull,[202] and translations, such as, Antoni Canals' <u>De arra de ànima</u>,[203] as well as the presence of other images in Ausias March's works proceeding from the Victorine mystic's writings (see Appendix II), Ausias March could well have had a first-hand knowledge of the "De Unione Corporis et Spiritus".

Hughes de Saint Victor's description of the fluctuation of reason is of particular interest because it identifies the problems inherent in the vision of Beauty in "heroic", or "angelical" love.[204] He explains that imaginations are conceived when the form of objects enters the eye of the beholder and reaches the cell of phantasy. These imaginations are corporeal and common to men and animals. In men, however, they are spiritualized by reason and reach the very substance of the rational soul. If these imaginations are contemplated in order to inform the intellect, they are easily shaken off, because such a contemplation is disinterested. However, if reason becomes enamoured of these imaginations they cling to it like a second skin or garment. I translate Hughes de Saint Victor's description verbatim:

> ... when imagination has ascended to reason, like a shadow coming into light, and coming upon light suddenly when it reaches it, it is made manifest and therefore circumscribed, and sometimes when it comes upon it, it veils reason, obscures it, envelopes it and hides it. And if, indeed, reason herself, by contemplation alone puts it on, as though it were a vestment, then imagination is outside reason and around it, so that it may be easily cast off and stripped. If, then, through delight imagination still clings to reason, the imagination herself becomes like a skin on it to which reason clings with love, in such a way that it cannot be cast off without grief or pain [205] (underlining is mine).

As Hughes de Saint Victor indicates the origin of this "enamourment" is in vision, or contemplation. The binding of reason by the imagination that drags it down to the senses entails a loss of will and the creation of a habit as a way of life, by which the soul forgets its divine destiny. This is the negative effect of Neo-platonic "sensualitas" acknowledged by Ficino.[206] The relation of the negative effects of the movement of imagination to Andreas Capellanus' definition of love as, "passio innata procedens ex visione et immoderata cogitatione formae alterius sexus",[207] with

its emphasis on "excessive meditation derived from sight" is self-evident.[208] However, it must be remembered that Capellanus focuses only on the negative aspects of imagination, as he does in the case of melancholy, whereas the concept of imagination as also being divine illumination, an "alta fantasia", is explicit in the entire opuscule of Hughes de Saint Victor.

In the above quotation (205), the imagery that Hughes de Saint Victor uses to describe the effects of imagination harks back to the topos of the shirt of Nessus. Indeed, the reference to imagination as a garment that becomes like a skin on the wearer, and cannot be torn off without causing great pain, recalls Ovid's metamorphosis of Hercules.[209] Ovid's account begins when Hercules is faced with the problem of crossing the Euenus with his weapons and his bride, Deianira. As a friend, the centaur Nessus offers to help him by carrying Deianira on his back while Hercules swims with his weapons. When the latter reaches the other side he sees Nessus about to rape Deianira. He therefore kills Nessus with an arrow dipped in the Lernean Hydra's blood. The dying centaur gives his blood-soaked tunic[210] to Deianira assuring her that it has the power to revive the waning love of whoever wears it. Years later, Rumour makes Deianira believe that her husband is now in love with Iole.[211] In order to regain Hercules' love, she sends him Nessus' shirt. As he wishes to please his wife, Hercules puts on the garment. While he is making the necessary sacrifices to the gods to celebrate his victory in Oechalia, the poison of the Lernean Hydra is released by the heat of the sacramental pyre and steals into his body. Ovid then describes the agony. The Theban hero is unable to take off the tunic which roots itself into the flesh:

nec mora, letiferam conatur scindere vestem:
qua trahitur, trahit illa cutem, foedumque relatu,
aut haeret membris frustra temptata revelli,
aut laceros artus et grandia detegit ossa
(IX, vv. 166-169).[211]

In his use of this image Hughes de Saint Victor creates an equivalence between the "habit", as a tunic worn by the lover, and the "habit" as a mental constitution that becomes ingrained in the lover's soul.

It is in this tradition that Ausias March uses this image in all his poetry, and, in particular, in the tornada of Poem LXXVII, which was to be one of his most influential images in Spanish Golden Age poetry.[213] Here too the lover has easily put on a garment which now tightens upon him:

Amor, Amor, un àbit m'é tallat
de vostre drap, vestint-me l'espirit;
en lo vestir, ample molt l'é sentit,
e fort estret, quant sobre mi·s posat
(LXXVII, vv. 25-28).

In the previous stanzas one learns that this has lead to great torment and suffering, which will culminate in the lover's death. This plight is described in verses 10 and 15: "d'aquell qui jau en turment i dolor", and "d'Amor n'om clam, si bé·m port' a morir". In Poem CXXI the image of the shirt of Nessus, as established by Ausias March in Poem LXXVII, is described a deceitful friend:

Solen pensar de fer-hi aparell
per a jaquir tan singular amich;
sí creu no sab que li sia·nemich
(CXXI, vv. 33-35).

On the basis of the contents of Poems LXXVII and CXXI one could reasonably establish a paradigm comparing Ausias March's use of this image with Ovid's in the Metamorphoses and the Ovide Moralisé.[214] Although the image of the shirt of Nessus as it was known in the Middle Ages undoubtedly originates in Ovid's Metamorphoses, the use

that Ausias March makes of this image is primarily based on the tradition of Hughes de Saint Victor. For both the French mystic and the Valencian poet, it serves to express primarily the difficulty of transcending a habit which originates in contemplative delight and inclines towards sensuality. Thus, Ausias March can say in Poem CXXI:

> No ha temptat de perdre hàbit vell
> qui fàcilment se pensa que·s fara;
> puix al vestir plaentment lo trobà,
> al despullar, tal pensa trob aquell
> (CXXI, vv. 29-32).

Yet, many critics, basing their judgement on the research of Pagès, attribute this image strictly to an imitation of Oton de Granson.[215] In view of other points at which we have seen that Ausias March is undoubtedly familiar with the work of Oton de Granson, there is no reason to deny that some aspects of this image in Ausias March's poetry may well have been affected by the French poet. However, although this influence may be present, it is strongly affected and modified by the implications of Hughes de Saint Victor's imagery, which is not present in Oton de Granson's original image. Furthermore, these critics overlook Ausias March's use of the shirt of Nessus topos, as it is found in a popular Spanish proverb, in Poem CVIII (see Appendix II : Proverbial Phrases). A close scrutiny of the tradition of Oton de Granson's image of the melancholy lover's black garment will reveal that although both may proceed from Hughes de Saint Victor, Ausias March retains the introspective implications, whereas Oton de Granson and his Spanish successors do not.

Ausias March goes beyond the strictly ludic implications of Oton de Granson's image. The gulf that separates the two uses

of this topos should illustrate the difference between Ausias March's "fin' amours" and "courtly love" as they are defined by Douglas Kelly. Unlike Oton de Granson, and especially his Castilian fifteenth-century imitators, Ausias March is conscious of the moral implications of this image as a metaphor of the role played by imagination as a source of tension between the body and the soul, as are his successors, Garcilaso and the Petrarquistas. The full significance of Ausias March's image is clear when it is read in the light of the "De Unione Corporis et Spiritus". References to imagination and phantasy in other poems, as studied in Chapter III, enable one to understand that the "àbit" in Poem LXXVII, and elsewhere (see Appendix II, A : 17), is the product of imagination that first loosely clothes the rational soul in contemplation, then overpowers the lover's reason, and binds it to the flesh.[216] As in Hughes de Saint Victor, the image of the garment consistently represents the loss of will and reason: "Tot nuu me trob, vestit de grossa manta, / ma voluntat Amor la té·n penyora" (LXIV, vv. 21-22). Yet, Ausias March also remarks that imagination is neither good nor bad: "Car lo delit e la dolor / que porten per los senys forans / e imaginacions grans / d'on mal e bé s'en consegueix" (CXXVIII, vv. 242-245). Thus, the garment image is used to represent a point at which reason becomes excessively enamoured of corporeal imagination, and the poet attempts to recover from his soul's fallen state.

This condition, which is described in verses 29 to 32 of Poem CXXI, quoted above, can be further illustrated in relation to the aesthetic principle that determines the nature of beauty contemplated, as well as the love which it animates, as we have

seen above in the analysis of Poem XXIII. Poem XVIII, analysed in Chapter III, describes at length the effects of imagination as a mystic rapture in which the soul soars and the flesh is quietened. The central problem in this poem are the "descensus ad inferos" of the soul and its ultimate return to its origin which is effected through love. Indeed, phantasy enables the poet to perceive divine light, or illumination, he is: "Sí com los sants sentints la lum divina" (XVIII, v. 25). Thus, love raises his soul from the immersion into chaos:

> Sí com sant Pau Déu li sostragué l'arma
> del cors perquè vés divinals misteris,
> car és lo cors del esperit lo carçre
> e tant com viu ab el és en tenebres,
> axí Amor l'esperit meu arrapa
> e no•y acull la maculada pensa,
> e per ço sent lo delit qui no•s canssa,
> sí que ma carn la ver• amor no•m torba
> (XVIII, vv. 33-40).

Clearly, this is a description of the first part of the fitting of the shirt of Nessus on the rational soul. It is, in Hughes de Saint Victor's terms, the moment at which the imagination is put on by reason as though it were a vestment, or as Ausias March states: "en lo vestir ample molt l'é sentit" (LXXVII, v. 27). In this phase, in which reason apprehends corporeal beauty as a reflection of divine Goodness, love is of a purely spiritual nature. This is the beginning of the problem presented by Hughes de Saint Victor's description of the bipolarity of imagination.

Ausias March describes his experience in terms that echo the epistemology of Hughes de Saint Victor. These are based on the contradiction of the flesh and the spirit, in which the former usurps the latter, that is, the flesh attempts to be spiritual. Poem LXXXVII presents some important examples of this state: "La

carn volar vol e l'arma s'aterra" (verse 89). The constant fluctuation of reason and imagination, as intermediaries between the intellect and the corporeal object is caused by the soul's reaction to the information that it receives from the senses, towards which it can incline excessively. In such instances the soul falls to the sensual delights of the flesh and becomes less than the soul; it forgets its nature:

> L'arma pel cors a son delit s'enclina,
> lexant lo seu, e sa natura·s lunya;
> lo cors en alt a delitar met punya,
> no coneix bé sa natura mesquina (LXXXVII, vv. 85-88).

At this point Ausias March pushes the image of the shirt of Nessus yet further. The soul becomes wrapped in vice. In a moment of extreme self-accusation in which he proclaims that the real nature of man lies in his soul and that his past life has been unfit for his nature, he states that his soul is wrapped in a garment woven by vice: "... m·arma·n tench vestidura, / tal com aquells vicis saber li feren" (C, vv. 23-24). This is an extreme use of the image of the garment.[217] What the soul perceives from the prison of the body is at the outset a divine reflection:

> tant com lo cors sa passió gran lexa,
> del espirit, és sa presó pus ampla,
> e ses virtuts e potences exampla,
> sí que no veu tras paret mas per rexa;
> sa pur·amor en interès no·s causa
> e la del cors és curt plaer sa causa (LXXXVII, vv. 195-200).

That which the soul perceives is evidently spiritual, since the love which the soul bears for the object is disinterested (verse 199). The subsequent description that he gives of his love is particularly noteworthy, because it runs counter to Andreas Capellanus' description of beauty,[218] which follows the Stoic materialist definition of beauty as the composite of harmonious parts.[219] Ausias March,

going somewhat beyond the limits of Oton de Granson's archetypal description of the lady, describes the manner in which he apprehends Beauty:[220]

> Mon espirit contemplant se contenta
> e dintre si huna persona forja;
> d'ella no pens braços, peus, mans ne gorja,
> car tot semblant altre semblant presenta.
> Solament vull d'ella tan clara penssa,
> que res de mi no·l fos cosa secreta
> (LXXXVII, vv. 231-236).

The reference in verse 235 to "clara penssa" is equivalent to his previous mention of "rahó clara" (LXXXVII, v. 214), which indicates illumination, or, natural reason guided by the light of "right reason". This is a manifestation of clear spirit.[221] Verses 214-215 of Poem LXXXVII which precede the above quotation leave no doubt as to Ausias March's intention to love according to "right reason":

> Quant al meu cors, Amor lo desempara
> perquè·l poder d'aquell ve a son terme;
> e·n pur· amor l'esperit meu conferme
> e·n aquell punt resta ma rahó clara
> (LXXXVII, vv. 211-214).

Thus, what Ausias March perceives in "clara penssa" is not merely a physical model or archetype, but a reflection of God's Goodness, as we have seen in Poem XXIII, and which is identified with the notion of "gest".

In spite of the tormented condition of the lover whose reason inclines excessively to the corporeal beauty that Ausias March describes, this love is not exclusively the cupiditas described by Andreas Capellanus. Indeed, if we are to believe Amédée Pagès, Ausias March was very familiar with Capellanus' De Amore.[222] The statement in Poem LXXXVII, vv. 233 quoted above, "no pens braços, peus, mans ne gorja" is, then, a deliberate

rebuttal of Andreas Capellanus' description of the lover's "complete meditation", which states that the lover thinks of fashioning a woman and differentiates her various parts in order to pry into the secrets of her body, and proceeds to action immediately.[223] Whereas this description describes lust, Ausias March's yearning for "right reason", for the clear sight of the eye of the soul, is a spiritual contemplation. The love described by Andreas Capellanus is based on courtly manners that accompany lust, which he ironically terms, "this complete meditation". Further comparison shews that Ausias March shies away from "active life": "mon delit és en vida contemplativa, / e romanch trist devallant en l'activa" (LXXXVII, vv. 269-270). Ausias March's delight is "fin' amors", understood as the intuition of the inner reality of the lady as a universal form reflecting divine Goodness. The problem remains for Ausias March, as it does for all Christian Neoplatonists, that the corporeal reflection is a means and not an end in itself, and it must, therefore, be transcended. The amorous experience of the Christian Neoplatonist is always based on the ambivalent role of imagination. This is perfectly summed up in the verse: "l'imaginar, amarch-dolç assaborea" (CXIX, v. 18). The vision is sweet because it is a reflection of God whose Goodness lies at the centre of all beauty, but it is bitter because it forces one to realize its inaccessibility as a result of the soul's fall.[224]

When in Poem CXIV Ausias March uses the image of the black melancholy garment, as it is used by Oton de Granson, the implications of this image are far more complex than in the French poet. It is used to refer to the melancholy that derives from the excessive meditation on a corporeal object, which has captured his reason

and impedes a recovery from the "descensus ad inferos":

> Mon mal no és tant com en altre·n vench;
> yo·l he fet gran, preant molt lo que pert,
> car, vent-me ser de tot· amor desert,
> la terra·m fall e al cel no·m estench.
> Mentre no pens, yo trob algun repòs,
> mas l'esperit meu tostemps està trist
> per l'àbit pres, que lonch temps és que vist
> d'un negre drap o celici molt gros
> (CXIV, vv. 41-48).

This poem, which seems to be written in old age since he refers to the loss of the saeculum (verse 48), expresses his concern at the fact that he is abandoned by his wordly condition and yet finds it impossible to reach Heaven (verse 44). The remaining verses shed light on the cause of this tension. The spirit, or soul, has taken on a habit, which is subsequently described as the black melancholy garment. This habit is Hughes de Saint Victor's metaphor of the shirt of Nessus, which the rational soul puts on and, when it takes excessive delight in the corporeal object, it cannot take off.

These implications of the shirt of Nessus image would be hard to find in the "courtly tradition" of Oton de Granson's Castilian successors. Whereas Ausias March delves into the various factors that are at the origin of his melancholy, these poets use the garment image as a social "pose" in which melancholy becomes an ornament of the lover's plight illustrating his "duelo amoroso". I will shew this by quoting three of the many possible choices found in the research of A. Pagès. Of Oton de Granson's use of the image, Pagès states that it is a leit-motiv of love's martyrdom:[225]

> Et pour mieulx semblant demonstrer
> Que trop m'est dure ma penance
> Vestu de noir par desplaisance
> Me suis sans prendre autre couleur. [226]

The same attitute is found in Juan Álvarez Gato:

Doloridas quantas, quantos
soys presentes y pasados,
llorad comigo mis llantos;
vestid, vestid negros mantos
los queridos deseados:
que yo tuue concertado
remedio de mi beuir,
y mi hado desdichado
hizome tan acechado,
que no me dexa sallir. [227]

Finally, it is repeated in Alonso de Cardona:

pues me mató disfauor
porque el mal se vea cierto
traygo negro con color
porque es la propia color
que deue cobrir al muerto. [228]

In these poems the black melancholy garment is worn as a sign of unreciprocated love, which results from the active pursuit of the desired object. There is no doubt that when Cardona tells us that he did not obtain his lady's favours, the frustration which he feels is expressed in the symbol of the black garment. Thus, the use of this image, even in Oton de Granson, has a strictly ludic connotation, and melancholy is seen as a socially acceptable posture within the arts of love. It is part of a social, or "courtly" game. Introspective wit as it is found in Ausias March, although it may be implied in the background of certain instances, is conspicuously lacking in this kind of poetry.

Ausias March knows, and describes, the extremes of love. It would be an injustice to his work, and to the research of his critics, to suggest that he is only concerned with divine contemplation. It is, however, equally misleading to suggest that his poetry only depicts tortured passion. The extremes of love range from the "melancolia generosa", which is evident in those poems that describe mystic illumination and the moments in which Ausias March's love is guided by the eye of the soul, or "right

reason" in the Augustinian sense, which is a turning of the soul towards Sapientia Dei, to the depths of "melancolia negra", which he seeks to escape, because it is an abyss of cupidity in which reason loses its rightful dominion. The image of the shirt of Nessus expresses this "melancolia negra". It symbolozes the melancholy, or tristesse that the poet experiences when he moves away from pure contemplation in order to pass to action: "romanch trist devallant en l'activa". This melancholy, which results from immoderate cogitation, is also the concern of the Florentine Neoplatonists who follow the doctrine of Marsilio Ficino. Indeed, we will recall that Ficino, drawing on standard mediaeval medical theory, describes the cause of "melancolia negra" as the movement of the vital spirits, which are in the blood, away from the heart where they are produced, and to the place where the soul contemplates the image of the beloved.[229] He adds to this description that the pure clear blood, wasted in the contemplation of a corporeal image, turns to black bile owing to the unrenewed vital spirits, and causes the lover's flesh to turn a dirty grey-green colour. This kind of description is also present in the work of Ausias March in the physiological analysis of "heroic love". Thus, in Poem LXXXVII the Valencian poet describes the puddling of the "clear spirits" that arise from contemplative love that degenerates into active love, and inclines the lover to "melancolia negra":

> Ladonchs lo foch d'Amor bé no s'amaga,
> e los meus hulls publich lo manifesten,
> e les dolors mes sanchs al cor arresten,
> acorrent lla on és donada plaga.
> Los meus desigs de punt en punt cambie,
> e la dolor no·m trob en un loch certa;
> ma cara és de sa color incerta;
> cerch lochs secrets e los publichs desvie;
> lanç-m en lo llit, dolor me'n gita fora;
> cuyt esclatar mentre mon ull no plora
> (LXXXVII, vv. 271-280).[230]

Clearly, this too describes a state of mental alienation resulting from contemplation. This is not the mystic rapture or divine alienation of Poems XVIII and XXIII, but one resulting from the vital spirits' requirement of the constant presence of the physical image of the beloved.[231] It is the "melancolia negra" of heroic love. The fire of Love in verse 271 refers to the burning of the vital spirits which are drawn away from the heart, causing sorrow (verse 273), and move to the place where the wound is given (verse 274), that is, the eyes, where the image of the beloved is found.[232] This leads to the melancholy instability of the lover (verses 275-280).[233] His physiology alters from the extremes of hot to cold caused by the depletion of the vital spirits which are gathered at one place only. This causes an instability in the elements among which melancholy predominates. Unlike the description of poems such as XVIII and XXIII in which the lover is said to be well tempered, here discord reigns. Thus, Ausias March claims that the colour of his face is altered (verse 277), and like a typical melancholic he shuns company and seeks solitude.[234]

Set in its proper context this reference to melancholy in "heroic love" does not have the same significance as that of Andreas Capellanus. Rather, as in Ficino and his successors, this "heroic love" is the closest approximation that man can find to divine love. Even though this contemplation seeks the interior beauty of a corporeal object, and, therefore, a reflection of God's Goodness, the fact that the object is physical will eventually cause the soul to fluctuate. "Melancolia negra" in Ausias March is associated with these fluctuations. In Andreas Capellanus "melancolia negra" is associated with unrestrained immoderate lust.

It is bestial love, the lowest of the tripartite division of love. Ausias March's description is representative of "heroic love" as a stage between the bestial and the purely contemplative loves. It is the inclination to cupidity restrained by reason which seeks Charity. "Melancolia negra" in the above verses is associated with the active life. As Ausias March notes in verses 269-270 of Poem LXXXVII, which precede the physiological analysis of melancholy given above: "Mon delit és vida contemplativa, / e romanch trist devallant en l'activa". This is, as we have seen in Poem LXXV, the inclination to cupidity, or the pursuit of the active life, the life of Juno, which Ausias March normally qualifies as "amor homenívol" (XLV, v. 55), because it partakes of both flesh and spirit. Thus, in the physiological description that follows verses 281-290 of Poem LXXXVII, he points out that he feels impelled by desire towards bestial love, but something restrains him:

> la gran cura d'Amor tots fets me lonya
> e no s'estén sino 'n cosses penssades;
> l'executar lo meu desig l'esforca,
> e no ssé què venç aquesta gran força
> (LXXXVII, vv. 286-290).

Thus, as he slips towards cupidity, something restrains him. It has been suggested that the force restraining him is his timidity.[235] It seems to me that this is but a peripheral answer that takes notice of the effects but not the cause. If this were only his timidity, Ausias March could certainly identify it. One must suppose, therefore, that something lies behind this timidity. The force that restrains Ausias March's lust is melancholy. As a cold and dry heavy humour, melancholy causes despondency and is contrary to action. Even though melancholy is the complexion of the contemplative man, and is responsible for the immoderate cogitation

that causes lust, its extreme instability has contrary effects.[236] Thus, the timidity, to which Ausias March alludes in verse 290, is caused by an excess of cold melancholy resulting from the venting referred to in verses 278-280.[237]

This description of melancholy resulting from the contemplation of the beloved indicates that Ausias March closely associates humoral disposition with the soul's afflictions. Indeed, he remarks that in lovers the humours are in a continual state of flux, and that at different moments one humour predominates:

> Sí com en l'om un humor predomina,
> que no és hu que per egual les haja,
> e ve per temps que s cambia ·l domini,
> axí Amor pratica en nosatres
> (CXVII, vv. 141-144).

Similarly, the flux of the humours is paralleled by the constant alterations of the kinds of love in which either the soul or the body predominates:

> Dins lo cors d'om les humors se discorden;
> de temps en temps llur poder se transmuda:
> en un sols jorn regna malenconia,
> n·aquell mateix còlera, sanch e fleuma.
> Tot enaxí les passions de l'arma
> mudament han molt divers o contrari,
> car en un punt per ella·s fan los actes,
> e prestament és en lo cors la causa
> (XCIV, vv. 17-24).

In the description of the cause of melancholy in Poem LXXXVII, verses 271-280, Ausias March is, therefore, discussing the extremes of melancholy, which he feels both physiologically and psychologically. It is evident from these quotations that he uses physiological analysis in order to account for psychological disturbances. He acknowledges this in Poem XCIV, verses 21-24 quoted above. The constant alteration of the humours determines the state of elemental equilibrium, and hence, the temper of the individual. This

indicates Ausias March's consciousness of the correspondences between the macrocosm and the microcosm, as in the Graeco-Arabic medical tradition inherited by the Chartrians.[238]

The interpenetration of the macrocosm and the microcosm, which has many points of affinity with the pseudo-Dionysian-Erigenian aesthetic in writers such as Ramon Lull, is fundamental to the symbolic mentality.[239] The universe described by Ausias March is rarely objective,[240] but rather it moves and breathes with his own physiological and psychological fluctuations. The imagery in Ausias March is symbolic of the microcosm's activity. As we have seen above in the interpretation of Poems LXXV and LXXIX, integumentum is essential to the significance of his poetry. On a macrocosmic level this becomes particularly true of the marine imagery in Poem XLVI.

In the symbolic world, the alterations of humours and elements, which are evident in Poems LXXXVII and CXVII referred to above, find their expression in imagery describing nature and the physical world. The first stanza of Poem XLVI uses the names of various winds to this end. The description of the movement of the winds expresses parallels with that of the humours in the lover's body. For the interpretation of this poem it is necessary to turn again to Bernardus Silvestris' Commentary on the First Six Books of the Aeneid, and to the elemental table of Jerónimo Cortés in the El non plus ultra de lunario y pronóstico perpetuo of 1638, which presents a complete picture of the tradition of elemental theory as it was circulated in the West from the beginning of the Christian era.[241] This tradition was well-known to Ausias March's contemporary, Alfonso Martínez de Toledo, who uses a less developed system in his popular work, El Arcipreste de Talavera, o Corbacho.[242] It is,

consequently, not out of place to suggest that when Ausias March lists the various winds that rage in the Mediterranean basin, he would have been aware of their medical significance.

Owing to the complexity of Poem XLVI, which describes a sea-storm, it is important that the significance of the sea and related symbols be first clearly identified. Bernardus Silvestris provides basic clues which, as I hope to shew, are applicable to the poetry of Ausias March. Indeed, the sea-storms in the Aeneid are taken to represent the agitation of the vices in the body. The sea symbolizes the body. Thus in two separate instances Bernardus Silvestris writes:

> Data Deiopea Eneas periculis lacessitur. Mare corpus humanum intelligitur quia ebrietates et libidines que per aquas intelliguntur ab eo defluunt et in eo sunt commotiones vitiorum [243].

The storm imagery of the sea, therefore, represents ebbings and flowings of the body, and the ship and its crew are the soul and its powers which are prey to the body's fluctuations: "Itaque his commotionibus maris, id est influxionibus et effluxionibus corporis, Eneas et socii eius, id est spiritus et eius potentie, vexantur".[244] The image of the ship is, then, principally representative of the soul and its volitional power. Silvestris sheds more light on this point: "NAVES: voluntates... LITORA: Exitus a mari et ingressus in portum est exitus a libidine carnis et commotione temporalium et incohatio studii, et hec vocat litus".[245] In the poetry of Ausias March, such as in Poem II, verses 1-8, any manifestation of land is a symbol of the spiritual and contemplative life. Silvestris goes on to explain that all references to land indicate the firmness of the spiritual life, which is opposed to the temporal life represented by the symbol of the sea.[246]

That these images function in Ausias March's poetry in the same manner as in Silvestris' commentary can be demonstrated by referring to the image of the ship in Poem LXXXII.[247] It is undeniable that the image of the ship in this poem symbolizes the soul. This provides a point of reference for the understanding of the sea images in his poetry. Ausias March states that when it pleases God even the boat in a safe harbour perishes:

> Quant plau a Déu que la fusta peresqua,
> en segur port romp àncores y ormeig,
> e de poch mal a molt hom morir veig:
> null hom és cert d'algun fet com fenesqua
> (LXXXII, vv. 1-4).

In death God does not take the body, but the soul of a man. Thus, in verses 3 and 4 Ausias March expresses his bewilderment at the ease with which death strikes where it is not expected. The soul in a seemingly healthy body is like a ship in a safe harbour.

In stanza I of Poem XLVI the sea-storm is a description of the contrary movements of the elements in the body, similar to that of Poem LXXXVII, verses 271-290. The images and references subsequent to stanza I serve to clarify its significance. The first two verses state that the lover will accomplish his desires by cutting dangerous paths through the sea, that is, against the raging of the sea, or the body:

> Veles e vents han mos desigs complir,
> ffahent camins duptosos per la mar.
> Mestre y ponent contra d'ells veig armar;
> xaloch, levant los deuen subvenir
> ab lurs amichs lo grech e lo migjorn,
> ffent humils prechs al vent tremuntanal
> qu·en son bufar los sia parcial
> e que tots cinch complesquen mon retorn
> (XLVI, vv. 1-8).

Here, as elsewhere in his poetry, the desires which Ausias March seeks to fulfil are those of the delights of the contemplative life

which are opposed to the lust of the flesh. This is what verses 1 and 2 indicate since these desires make their way against the torments of the sea. The wind image that follows is a storm that must be understood within its physiological context. The winds all come in pairs, except the tremuntanal which affects the power the first two, the mestre and the ponent. These winds, according to the chart of Jerónimo Cortés, represent the various humours and elements. As in standard mediaeval physiology, Ausias March respects the fact that the elements in the body are not found in their pure state but in a combined form in which one predominates. As he states in Poem CXVII, verse 177: "Tot element elementat no·s simple". The "elemented" form prevails over the simple element in the natural world. Hence, the "elemented" form in Ausias March's image is represented by the four predominant winds: migjorn, ponent, levant and tremuntanal, which are the winds of the south, west, east, and north.[248] The mestre is a north-west wind, the xaloch a south-east wind and the grech a north-east wind. The pattern of humours and elements depicted in Ausias March's image of the winds is represented in the following diagram:

mestre + ponent	vs.	xaloch + levant + grech + migjorn
cold		warm
warm & dry		cold & moist
fire		water
choler		phlegm
lust		constancy
		moist
		warm & moist
		air
		blood
		love

tremuntanal
cold & dry
earth
melancholy
pure contemplation

Verse 3 states that mestre and ponent, the north-west and western winds rise against his desires. Since his desire is to find pure love in contemplation, as we have seen in Poems XVIII and XXIII,

it is evident that if we acknowledge the significance of the symbol of the sea and follow the standard humoral interpretation of these winds, as given by Jerónimo Cortés, Ausias March is referring to the rise of the impetuous choleric humour which moves him to lust, but which he wishes to resist. The mention of the sails in verse 1 is reference to a part of the ship that propels it. This is the soul's will which, as we will see below, maintains the clear spirit of the lover. The soul which is tossed sets its course by tacking with the remaining winds. The xaloch and levant have the stability of phlegm that grants the constancy of the love which is found in the warmth of the blood. The grech and migjorn represent the blood that carries the vital spirits which catch the image of the beloved, and can cause love to incline towards lust. Hence, these four winds do not suffice to counter the effects of the mestre and ponent. Love and constancy on their own are insufficient to restrain the attraction to lust. Melancholy is needed to offset the power of choler. Thus, in verses 5 and 6 these winds ask that the tremuntanal be partial to them, and assist them in fulfilling the soul's desires. In this instance melancholy takes on a virtuous aspect. It is the source of pure contemplative, or honest, love. This is a development of its function as a source of restraint in Poem LXXXVII, verse 290. The opposition in these verses is, then, mainly between the tremuntanal and the mestre and ponent. It represents a conflict between choler, as lust, and melancholy, as constancy or honest love, around the stable humours of phlegm and blood. As Guido Bonatti, following Johannes Hispalensis' translation of Alcabitius, states, honesty in love is an attribute of Saturn - Melancholy: "Et si inciperet Saturninus diligere aliquem, quod raro contingit, diliget eum

dilectione vera".[249] The combination of the tremuntanal with the other four winds consequently represents a form of "melancholia adusta". The gathering of the xaloch and levant with the grech and migjorn is tantamount to the mixing of phlegm and blood. This leads to a predominance of warm and moist qualities (see diagram above). The mixture of warm and moist is traditionally considered to be the best disposition for intellectual ability. The warmth of the blood causes melancholy to heat up, though not violently because it is restrained by both phlegm and blood. This is not Albert the Great's "melancholia adusta", understood strictly as the firing of yellow bile, but a development of this notion in mediaeval medicine, following Avicenna's "squaring" of melancholy, which in his view can arise from the scorching of any of the four humours. The conflict of the four humours in Poem XLVI, which results in a "boiling", is a form of adustio. Hence, one can turn to Avicenna's Liber cannonis in order to understand what this favourable combination is, as a form of "melancholia adusta", leading towards the concept of "melancolia generosa", according to which Ausias March will claim that he is an exceptional man:

> If the black bile which causes melancholy be mixed with blood it will appear coupled with joy and laughter and not accompanied by deep sadness; but if it be mixed with phlegm, it is coupled with inertia, lack of movement, and quiet; if it be mixed with yellow bile its symptoms will be unrest and violence, and obsessions, and it is like a frenzy. And if it be pure black bile, then there is very great thoughtfulness and less agitation and frenzy except when the patient is provoked.[250]

In the context of Ausias March's sea-storm a combination of choler and melancholy would be indicative of violence and physical frenzy. For this reason, xaloch, levant, grech and migjorn request the assistance of the tremuntanal. This results in the combination of black bile with blood and phlegm, which should lead to the joy of

peaceful contemplative love which Ausias March desires.

The concept of the ensuing stanzas casts more light on this use of the concept of "melancholia adusta". The second stanza uses the image of the boiling sea, which is generally attributed to Job XLI, 22 (see Appendix II). Its significance in this context, however, is consistent with the description of melancholy, as we have found it in the analysis of Poem LXXXVII, vv. 271-290. This image is, then, a description of the physiological disturbances which is used to enlighten the significance of stanza I:

> Bullirà·l mar com la caçola n forn,
> mudant color e l'estat natural,
> e mostrarà voler tota res mal
> que sobre si atur hun punt al jorn;
> grans e pochs peix a recors correran
> e cerquaran amaguatalls secrets:
> ffugint al mar, hon són nudrits e fets,
> per gran remey en terra exiran
> (XLVI, vv. 9-16).

The boiling of the sea refers to the agitation of the soul and the humours in the body. As Bernardus Silvestris remarks, "the spirit and its powers are assailed by these agitations of the sea" (see above). The boiling is caused by the scorching of the spirits in the constant contemplation of the image through imagination.[251] Hence, this contemplation results in the alteration of the flesh's colour (XLVI, v. 10), as it does in Poem LXXXVII, verse 277, and to the characteristic misanthropy of the melancholic (XLVI, v. 11), as in Poem LXXXVII, verse 278, as well as the constant physical torment (XLVI, v. 11-12), as in Poem LXXXVII, verse 276 and 279.[252] The result of this melancholy adust, which originates in the movement of imagination that causes Ausias March to seek a reflection of the divine telos, is that the fish, or senses, which are born and bred in the flesh, are stilled as they hide or rise to the land,

or the firmness of spiritual life (verses 13-16).

This interpretation of the second half of stanza II in Poem XLVI is confirmed by the implications of the imagery in stanza III. Verses 17-20 contain images of light and truth contrasting falsehood. They imply that the false gifts and promises made by "the pilgrims" will be recognized as such, and like the greatest secrets held in the seal of confession they will come to light:

> Los pelegrins tots ensemps votaran
> e prometran molts dons de cera fetś
> la gran paor traurà·l lum los secrets
> que al confés descuberts no seran (XLVI, vv. 17-20).

The pilgrims' false gifts represent the transitory delights of the senses. The transient nature of the gifts of the flesh is revealed by the light of truth. This light is the inner light of the soul which is found in pure contemplation. Hence, in all this turmoil the image of the beloved, which as we have seen above in Poems XVIII and XXIII is a reflection of Sapientia Dei, remains constantly present to the poet's eye:

> En lo perill no·m caureu del esment,
> ans votaré hal Déu qui·ns ha ligats,
> de no minvar mes fermes voluntats
> e que tots temps me sereu de present (XLVI, vv. 21-24).

This is accomplished by a proper direction of the will to the polishing of the Clear Spirit. The use of the plural of will in verse 23 corresponds to the image of the sails in verse 1. The will is the sail that helps Ausias March fulfil his desire of pure love.[253]

The remainder of this poem deals specifically with Ausias March's awareness of the distance that separates his desire from its reality in the sublunar world. It reveals his consciousness of "laetus horror". Thus, in verse 24 Ausias March refers to the

metaphysical problem that lies at the heart of contemplation in "heroic love". This is the need that the heroic lover feels, if his soul becomes excessively enamoured of a corporeal image, for the constant presence of the person. As we will recall, Ficino, like Hughes de Saint Victor in his description of imagination, stated in his exposé of this problem that the eyes and the spirit felt the continuous need for the presence of the image and that if this contemplation were excessive the soul would follow the senses.[254] The problem of the "heroic" lover is that he must use the beauty which he finds in corporeal objects to lead him to divine contemplation, but since his love fixes its attention on a corporeal image the soul will waver with the imagination. Hence, in the first part of stanza IV, Ausias March claims that although he wishes this presence, he believes that his love will endure even if death should take away the beloved. This confirms his prior claims in poems such as XVIII and XXIII that what he contemplates transcends corporeality:

> Yo tem la mort per no sser-vos absent,
> per què Amor per mort és anullats
> mas yo no creu que mon voler sobrats
> pusqua esser per tal departiment (XLVI, vv. 25-28).

In verse 26 Ausias March recognizes that sensual love can be ended by death, but since his love attempts to be spiritual it will last beyond any separation caused by death. Yet, in spite of this these verses reveal Ausias March's consciousness of the limitations of his love. As I have pointed out before, he is acutely aware, like the Florentine Neoplatonists, that all human love that is not turned exclusively to God, is prey to the ebbings and flowings of the body. As he states: "Jamés amí que no fos desijós / d'aquell desig que per fretur• avem" (LXXXV, vv. 33-34), yet his will has sought a chaste spiritual love, and a man can do no more.

Hence, his poetry describes the efforts of the will to live according to Charity in the secular world, and a rejection of cupidity. The rest of Poem XLVI discusses this problem on the basis of the contradiction predicated in verses 26-28. Ausias March rightly concludes of the uncertainties caused by love which sets its affection on the movement of imagination, that it is a game of hazard and wordly Fortune: "A joch de daus vos acompararé" (XLVI, v. 60).

From the analysis of his manipulation of the theory of imagination in Chapter III and of his poetic imagery in this chapter, it seems obvious that the beauty that moves Ausias March is not merely harmonious beauty, as some critics have thought.[255] He himself notes that the beauty which he finds in the lady is not in the lines or colours, but interior (XXIII, vv. 5-16). As a result the love which he describes seeks Charity in the Augustinian sense; it is the love that turns his soul towards the light of right reason in the embodiment of Sapientia Dei, as we have seen in Poems XVIII and XXIII. The aesthetic principle underlying his poetry is that of the pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite and John Scotus Erigena, the thought of whom weighs heavily on the philosophy of Ramon Lull, which is emulated by Ausias March. This Valencian poet's sensibility is, then, that of the evangelical current which is: "la lumière intérieure qui suscite... une conscience nouvelle des implantations de la grâce dans le sol de la nature."[256] This has many points of affinity with Douglas Kelly's definition of "fin' amors" which is the intuition of the inner reality of the experience of love. It is this very preoccupation with interior spiritual reality, which reaches the limits of an individual approach

to God in the "Cant Espiritual",[257] that differentiates the theory of love in Ausias March from the "courtly love" of Andreas Capellanus and the cancionero poets of the "troubadour revival" in Spain.[258]

The obvious preoccupation of Ausias March for melancholy naturally indicates that his love is "amor hereos". This term cannot be dealt with adequately if it is understood as a monolithic concept. It is intimately associated with melancholy and Imagination, and since both of these terms have nefarious and beneficial qualities, "amor hereos" cannot be reduced to mere "melancolia negra".[259] Like melancholy and imagination, it spans the extremes of mental alienation. It can take the lover from worldlymadness, which reduces him to the level of beasts, to the heights of divine illumination which raises him to angelical bliss. The heart of the problem of "amor hereos" is that, since it is based on the movement of imagination, it is subject to physiological and psychological fluctuations. The "courtly love" of Andreas Capellanus emphatically denies the redeeming value of imagination and melancholy, because it does not acknowledge the presence of grace in the secular world, which is the basis of "amor hereos". Logically, since Ausias March recognizes the value of imagination, melancholy is also recognized as a potentially virtuous quality, because it leads to introspection. This is contrary to the sensibility of an Andreas Capellanus. There is no doubt that Ausias March received the notion of the cult of tristesse from his French predecessors, but he is not a slavish imitator and goes somewhat beyond them.[260] His imitation of classical "heroes", which is normally confused with "hereos" and leads to the popular acceptance of the term "heroes love",[261] is evident in Poem LXXIX. Ausias March's practice of the

"love of heroes" is an effort to retrieve the virtuous love of the Golden Age as it is depicted in the Ovide Moralisé, that is, as "sapience". Hence, much like Alain de Lille's Complaint of Nature it is an attempt to return to cosmic order. This order lies in the aspiration to Charity, that is, in the love of any object, not for its sake but for that of God. This is what Ausias March describes in Poem LXXV. In the words of Ficino, it makes him another of the "alii Diane et Palladi consecrati."[262] Yet, Ausias March facing his ideal of Charity from a very realistic point of view, like Philip Sidney, acknowledges the problem of his "descensus ad inferos", and does not confuse his theoretical ideal with his experience. He remains profoundly conscious of the limitations of imagination and its corporeal origins. Thus, like Castiglione, imagination is for him a beauty far greater than it is in worldly reality: "per virtù della immaginazione formerà dentro in se stesso quella bellezza molto più bella, che in effetto non sarà".[263] This focal problem, present in all Christian Neoplatonic theory, forces Ausias March to experience the deceit of imagination, which he recognizes as corporeal. Out of this arises his endeavour to rid himself of the shirt of Nessus, in order to transcend corporeal beauty, and enjoy divine Goodness which is imperfectly perceived in this secular world but yearned for by his soul.

Footnotes to Chapter V

1

See Chapter III, note 100; and Chapter IV, note 170.

2

See René Nelli, L'Erotique des troubadours, Toulouse: Edouard Privat, 1963, p. 256; D. Kelly, "Courtly Love in Perspective: The Hierarchy of Love," Traditio XXIV, 1968, p. 131, and his discussion of this point. Also, Paul Zumthor, "Notes en marge du traité de l'amour d'André le Chapelain," Zeitschrift für romanische Philologie 63, 1943, pp. 181-182. In the text see Andreas Capellanus, De Amore, E. Trojel (ed.) München: Eidos, 1964, pp. 183-184 and 263-265; and Andreas Capellanus, The Art of Courtly Love, trans. J. J. Parry, New York: Frederick Ungar, 1970, pp. 122 and 163-163. For the reader's convenience all references to the De Amore from here onwards, will be given for these two texts.

3

Thus, Capellanus points out in the De Amore that "mixed love" and "pure love" are essentially the same, (Trojel, pp. 264; Parry, p. 164). Similarly, he rejects this definition of pure love in Book III, (Trojel, pp. 331-332).

4

This is, of course, the theory propounded by A. J. Denomy in "Fin' Amors: The Pure Love of the Troubadours, Its Amorality, and Possible Source," Mediaeval Studies VII, 1945, pp. 139-207; "The De Amore of A. Capellanus and the Condemnation of 1277," Mediaeval Studies XV, 1946, pp. 107-149; The Heresy of Courtly Love, New York: The Declan X McMullen Co., 1947. This is the basis for Otis Green's theory of cancionero love in "Courtly Love in the Spanish Cancioneros," P.M.L.A.LXIV, 1949, pp. 247-301, which is the source of endless error concerning the interpretation of Ausias March's poetry.

5

See, R. Klibansky, F. Saxl, and E. Panofsky, Saturn and Melancholy, London: Nelson, 1964, pp. 240-274, inter alia.

6

Saturn and Melancholy, p. 242.

7

See Chapter IV, note 201.

8

See Chapter III, note 87.

9

Gaston Paris, "Le Conte de la Charrette," Romania XII, 1883, pp. 459-534, in particular, 513-534. This theory was accepted and developed by C. S. Lewis, The Allegory of Love, Oxford: Clarendon, 1975, pp. 1-43.

10

J. F. Mahoney, "The Evidence for Andreas Capellanus in Re-Examination," S.P. LV, 1958, p. 1.

11

A. Pagès, Ausias March et ses prédécesseurs, Paris: Honoré Champion, 1912, pp. 183, 230, 317,318,323, etc.

12

See J.J. Parry, Andreas Capellanus, The Art of Courtly Love, pp. 13-21. Two other different approaches to the De Amore have been established. W. T. H. Jackson, ("The De Amore of Andreas Capellanus and the Practice of Love at Court," Romanic Review XLIX, 1958, pp. 243-251) believes that Capellanus makes a caricature of the practice of "courtly love" without condemning it. D. W. Robertson ("The Subject of the De Amore of Andreas Capellanus," M.P. 50, 1953, pp. 145-161, and "The Doctrine of Charity in Mediaeval Literary Gardens: A Topical Approach through Symbolism and Allegory," Speculum XXVI, 1951, pp. 24-49) believes that it is a humourous work with an ironical intention condemning concupiscence. As it will be obvious in the course of this exposé my own approach wavers between Jackson and Robertson. Thus, on the problem of "courtly love",although not in complete agreement, my own position has much affinity with the more moderate approach taken by the collection of intelligent essays edited by Joan M. Ferrante and George D. Economou (In Pursuit of Perfection, Port Washington: KENNIKAT, 1975). For an example of misplaced traditionalism, intended to be a criticism of the Robertsonian approach, see William Calin, "Defense and Illustration of Fin' Amor: Some Polemical Comments on the Robertsonian Approach," (in The Expansion and Transformations of Courtly Love, Nathaniel B. Smith and Joseph T. Snow, eds. , Athens: Georgia,U.S.A., 1980, pp. 32-48). After a long moanful diatribe over the intolerance of Robertsonians, Calin attempts to demonstrate the errors of D.W. Robertson, by listing previous authorities. Furthermore, Calin demonstrates his ignorance of Robertson's work by insisting on the fact that the latter is a Chaucerian, and his bibliography of Robertson's works diligently avoids references to the two key works above.

13

J. F. Benton, "The Court of Champagne as a Literary Center," Speculum XXXVI, 1961, pp. 551-591.

14

See P. Dronke, Medieval Latin and the Rise of the European Love-Lyric vol. I, Oxford: Clarendon, 1968 (2d ed.), pp. 1-56.

15

A good analysis of this situation can be fond in René Nelli, L'Erotique des troubadours, pp. 21-274. See also D. Kelly, "Courtly Love in Perspective," pp. 119-148, as well as, René Girard's analysis of the Tristan myth in Mensonge romantique et verité romanesque, Paris: Grasset, 1961, pp. 181-215, and also on the symbolic functions of individuals in society, Violence and the Sacred, trans. Patrick Gregory Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1977, and finally, of particular importance for this section of my thesis, especially concerning the analysis of Poems LXXVII and LXXIX, "The Mimetic Desire of Paolo and Francesca," "To double business bound": Essays on Literature, Mimesis and Anthropology, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1978, pp. 2-7.

16

See, Marc-René Jung, Etudes sur le poème allégorique en France

au moyen âge, Berne: Francke, 1971, p. 181. He demonstrates that "fin' amors" in the poetry of Guiraut de Calanson is concupiscent love. Yet, M. de Riquer (Los trovadores II, Barcelona: Planeta,1975, p. 1082), while hesitating, still attempts to see this as the source of Ausias March's Poem LXXIX (see my analysis below).

17

Douglas Kelly, The Medieval Imagination, Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1978, p. 20.

18

Saturn and Melancholy, pp. 217-218.

19

Hence, the notable affinity between this aspect of "fin'amors" and Ficinian Neoplatonism. The "evangelical" premiss of both types of love need not be reiterated.

20

See J. Huizinga, Homo Ludens, trans. R. C. F. Hull, London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1949, p. 9.

21

See D. Kelly, "Courtly Love in Perspective," pp. 119-148.

22

J. F. Benton,("The Court of Champagne as a Literary Center," pp. 581-582), argues that the appearance of Marie in the De Amore may not be a reflection of her "corts d'amor", but perhaps a criticism of her rapid re-marriage, and her politics. I might add, with due caution, that it may reflect a criticism of the interest in speculative theology, which the entourage of Count Henri and his wife seems to have manifested.

23 J.F. Benton, "The Court of Champagne as a Literary Center," p. 587.

24

See, M. D. Chenu, La théologie au douzième siècle, Paris: Vrin, 1957, pp. 223-398.

25

As such, my approach is in agreement, here as elsewhere, with D. W. Robertson's analysis of the De Amore, which supposes that there is no sic et non, but that it functions as an organic whole.

26

D. W. Robertson, "The Doctrine of Charity," p. 24.

27

M. D. Chenu, La théologie, pp. 289-308.

28

M. D. Chenu, La théologie, pp. 295-296; Charles Trinkaus: "The Dignity of Man in the Patristic and Medieval Traditions and in Petrarch," In Our Image and Likeness vol. I, London: Constable, 1970, pp. 179-199. See also, Chapter III, notes 107-109.

29

A line of approach that can be taken to understand this point is that the twelve rules of love listed by Capellanus imitate the twelve rules of Clairvaux. This is a parody of secular aspirations to imitate monastic sanctity. See, R. J. Schoeck, "Andreas Capellanus and St. Bernard de Clairvaux," M.L.N. 66, 1951, pp. 295-300.

30

See D. W. Robertson, "The Doctrine of Charity in Medieval Literary Gardens," p. 26. This raises a point that underlies all this thesis. The distance that separates cupidity from Charity is determined by St. Augustine's definition of evil as the absence of goodness. Cupidity is the move of reason away from the Good that lies in Charity. Thus, St. Augustine states: "For evil is not a positive substance: the loss of good has been given the name of evil", (City of God, Book XI: 10, ed. D. Knowles, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972, p. 440). As it will be acutely obvious in this chapter and in the conclusion, if it is not yet, this is the point of view staunchly defended by the Florentine Neoplatonists, especially Ficino in his quintuple division of love.

31

D. W. Robertson, "The Subject of the De Amore of Andreas Capellanus," pp. 152-153. This author perceives the essential opposition between scientia and sapientia, but he does not develop the implications of these points along an opposition between right reason and natural reason in its evangelical context.

32

Furthermore, the notion of sin pervades the entire De Amore, because what the lover does he has conceived it "in his heart", which in the tradition of the Psalms is considered to indicate the seat of sin. Thus, Capellanus states: "statim ea incipit concuspicere corde", (Trojel, p. 5, and Parry, p. 29). This passage, which proceeds from Proverb VI: 25, according to D. W. Robertson ("The Subject of the De Amore," p. 155), has repercussions for A. Capellanus' use of Psalms XIV and LI, as I will shew below.

33

This is a point universally acknowledged by critics, such as, Moshé Lazar, Amour courtois et fins' amor dans la littérature du XII^{e} siècle, Paris: Klincksieck, 1964, pp. 268-269, and A. J. Denomy, The Heresy of Courtly Love, p. 36. Unfortunately, because they deal with reason as a monolithic, immobile term, they developed misleading theories about a "double truth", which Robertson's work greatly invalidates. (see note 36 below).

34

See discussion below on foolishness. Without referring to each case of implicit foolishness that can be found in Books I and II, in which the women politely brush off the nagging suitors, as well as Book III where the word "stultus" abounds, one can find references to "stultitia' and related terms in Trojel, pp. 40-41, 66, 136, 140, 177, (Parry, pp. 46-47, 60, 97 , 100,119).

35

D. W. Robertson, "The Doctrine of Charity," p. 24.

36
Trojel, p. 358, and Parry, 210-211. Robertson's criticism of Parry's translation is, in this instance, essential: "The word sententiam is singular, not plural, so that it implies a single lesson with two sides. And Andreas goes on to describe exactly this kind of lesson. Love of the kind Walter wished to have explained was described in the first two books; and a careful reading of the work will show 1) that this love leads to the delights of the flesh but 2) that it alienates the lover from the grace of God, from the approval of good men, and from honor in the world" ("The Subject of the De Amore," p. 146).

37 Trojel, p. 3; Parry, p. 28. And see Chapter III, note 7.

38
See "The Subject of the De Amore," p.154. Again, D.W. Robertson demonstrates the lack of validity in Parry's translation of passio as merely "suffering".

39
See, St. Augustine, City of God, p. 551, Book XIV: 3; and in Chapter IV, note 145.

40
Trojel, pp. 5-6; Parry, p. 29.

41
See Parry, p. 32, note 8; p. 60, note 30; p. 72, note 36; p. 103, note 47; p. 122, note 68a; p. 139, note 83; p. 177, note 36; and also all of D. W. Robertson's "The Subject of the De Amore."

42
Trojel, p. 8; Parry, p. 30.

43
Chapter III, note 53.

44
This point, which I will attempt to demonstrate below in the text, is a subject of controversy in the study of the De Amore. Thus, although I accept the point of view taken by D. W. Robertson, which I endorse, D. Kelly has presented some very intelligent arguments to the contrary ("Courtly Love in Perspective," Traditio XXIV, 1968, p.). Kelly states, "Andreas will not be so severe in Book III,where, as we shall see, his alternative to the courtly lover resembles the virtuous Christian gentleman more than the penitent monk... for Andreas courtly love is subordinated to love for God, but not set off against it as an absolute evil". My main reasons for disagreeing with this interpretation are that in Book III courtly love, or worldly love, is seen as a "damnabile crimen" (Trojel, p. 326), and because the entire book focuses on the nobility of the clericus. The cleric is noble because his life is devoted to the Church and he avoids the desires of the flesh: "clericus enim ecclesiasticus tantum debet vacare ministeriis et omne carne declinare..." (Trojel, pp. 184-185; Parry, p. 123). The half-truth of Kelly's thesis arises from the problem that sin is the absence of goodness (see note 30), as such, an absolute evil would be the absence of all goodness, that is,

the death of the soul as it is described by St. Augustine: "Thus the death of the soul results when God abandons it..." (City of God, Book XIII, 2, p. 510). This is precisely what Andreas warns Gauthier of in Book III. Courtly Love, which Andreas describes as a "damnabile crimen" and the work of the Devil that causes man to lose the love of God, is never seen as a means to Charity in the De Amore, but only as the inclination to cupidity which is the way to evil. Andreas stresses that through this love man loses his celestial heritage, that is, the death of the soul. Hence, Andreas conceives of secular beauty strictly as a source of deceit, and states that it is an evil from which only nuns and clerics are supposed to be exempt. If Andreas were to have thought of secular beauty as a means to divine love, then I should agree fully with Kelly.

45

D. W. Robertson,"The Doctrine of Charity," pp. 26-43.

46

See above note 24, and Chapter 1, note 1.

47

It was originally believed that Gauthier was a young nobleman. Attempts to identify him have failed (see Parry, p. 28). It is now generally agreed that he is a fictional character used by Andreas as an interlocutor ("The Subject of the De Amore," p. 147).I would like to suggest that Gauthier is a folkloric character who would have been well-known to Andreas' readers, and would have made Andreas' intention clear. Indeed, the mediaeval folkloric pastoral tradition provides a character who may shed some light on Andreas' text. The names of folkoric shepherds in the English tradition are Jolly Watt and Jolly Robin; in the French tradition these are Gauthier and Robin (see, Helen Cooper, Pastoral: Mediaeval into Renaissance, Ipswich: D. S. Brewer, 1977, p. 54). The popularity of Gauthier is evinced by Philippe de Vitry's Les Dictz de Franc Gonthier. The figure of the shepherd in literature is contradictory, for on the one hand he represents the simple life of the Good Shepherd, and on the other hand, he is a despicable foolish rustic, therefore: "On one level, then, the court accepted, even valued, the shepherd; on the other, it despised him" (Cooper, p. 68). If,as I believe, Andreas refers to this pastoral figure the thrust of his irony is indeed "two sided". The pastoral figure is commonly used as a means of social criticism. Hence, Gauthier serves to criticize the moral values at court (Cooper, p. 47). This is consistent with Jackson's, Benton's and Robertson's opinions. Furthermore, the shepherd represents pastoral-evengelical ideals (Cooper, pp. 47-79; J. Huizinga, Men and Ideas: History, The Middle Ages, the Renaissance, trans. J.S. Holmes and H. van Merle, London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1960, pp. 83-86). On the basis of this aspect of the pastoral tradition, and Andreas' denial of the value of introspective qualities such as imagination and melancholy, as well as, the aesthetic of the presence of grace in nature, I would suggest with great reservations that could be the object of another thesis, that Andreas attacks the secular evangelicalism of the laity through his teachings to the simple fool, Gauthier, (see also note 22 above). If this is so, the object of the two sided lesson is ironically Andreas demeans what he sees as the immorality of the court and the secular concept of Charity, in favour of a monastic point of view.

48 See, D. Gifford, "Iconographical Notes Towards a Definition of the Medieval Fool," Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes XXXVII, 1974, pp. 336-342.

49 Trojel, pp. 359-359; Parry, p. 210.

50 "Iconographical Notes Towards a Definition of the Medieval Fool," p. 336.

51 Richard Holbrook, "A Fifteenth-Century Satirical Dialogue, Seemingly Akin to the Species Known as fatras or fatrasie, and Dealing with Fools called Coquars," Modern Language Notes XX, 1905, pp. 70-77. Presents a fairly extensive partial edition.

52 See, Trojel, pp. 23-24; 40-41; 64; 73-74; 111-112; 143-145 (In this passage the woman of simple nobility defends marital love on the basis of "quod inter omnes constat etiam ab antiquo reprehensibile plurimum iudicari et tamquam odibile reprobatori", which the lover attempts to subvert); pp. 171-172 (against adultery), and p 173-4 (by courting a widow the lover of the higher nobility is accused of spreading confusion in the descent of families). Parry, pp. 38, 46, 58-59, 64, 84-85, 101-102, 116-117, and 118.

53 Trojel, pp. 350-351; Parry,pp. 206-207.

54 The very reasonable nature of these arguments is referred to by Moshé Lazar, (Amour Courtois et Fin' Amors, p. 275):"Les expressions dans ce monde, ici-bas, vie terrestre, reviennent avec la même fréquence que les mots nature et raison". Similarly, one finds the same idea in A. J. Denomy, (The Heresy of Courtly Love, p. 36): "Invariably, the man appeals to the reasonableness of his case, to the truth inherent in the matter". However, these critics fail to understand that the irony of Andreas lies in who is speaking and his actual intention.

55 "The Doctrine of Charity in Mediaeval Literary Gardens," pp. 36-37.

56 Trojel, p. 326; Parry, p. 194.

57 Trojel, p. 326; Parry, p. 194.

58 Trojel, p. 328; Parry, p. 194.

59 Parry, p. 172 note 55.

60 Trojel, p. 164; Parry, p. 112.

61
Trojel, p. 220; Parry, p. 142.

62
That is, for Capellanus whose book is intended to praise monastic life, above secular life; not,as D. Kelly believes, to create a Christian gentleman (see note 44).

63
Trojel, p. 221; Parry, p. 142.

64
Trojel, p. 221; Parry,p. 142.

65
Trojel, p. 17; Parry, p. 35.

66
Trojel, p. 161-162; Parry, p. 110-111.

67
Trojel, pp. 82-83; Parry, p. 69.

68
Andreas does say that love is a source of all virtues in the the first two books, but this is to be understood as worldly virtues, which go together with pride and vanity. They are part of the cupidity that impels man to seek worldly goods.

69
D. Kelly, The Medieval Imagination, p. 180.

70
M. de Riquer has attempted to register variations in the description of the lady throughout the various cycles of Ausias March's poetry (see Historia de la literatura catalana II, Barcelona: Ariel, 1964, pp. 507-508.

71
Arthur Piaget (ed.), Oton de Grandson: sa vie et ses poésies, Genève: Payot, 1941, p. 190.

72
Oton de Granson: sa vie et sa poésies, p. 191.

73
The Medieval Imagination, p. 180.

74 See D. W. Robertson, "The Concept of Courtly Love as an Impediment to the Understanding of Medieval Texts," The Meaning of Courtly Love, ed. F. X. Newman, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1968, p. 12.

75 Marie-Louise von Franz, Aurora Consurgens, Princeton: University Press, 1966, pp. 155-156.

76

On this problem see, A. Terry, Ausias March: Selected Poems, Edinburgh: University Press, 1976, p. 6; M. de Montoliu, Ausias March, Barcelona: Alpha, 1958, pp. 56-61; A. Pagès, Auzias March et ses prédécesseurs, Paris: Honoré Champion, 1912, pp. 209-212; Commentaire des poésies d'Auzias March, Paris: Honoré Chapion, 1924, pp. 32-35; M. de Riquer, Historia de la literatura catalana II, pp. 500, 507-508.

77

Commentaire, p. 33.

78

Commentaire, p. 33.

79

Commentaire, pp. 33-34; See also P. Bohigas (ed.), Ausias March: Poesies II, Barcelona: Barcino, 1952, p. 86; M. de Riquer, Historia de la literatura catalana II, p. 500.

80

Ferran Soldevila (Historia de Catalunya, Barcelona: Alpha, 1963, p. 532) refers to a forlorn place called Montbui. The Diccionari Català - Valencià - Balear VII (A. M. Alcover and F. de B. Moll (eds.), Palma de Mallorca, 1956) registers this location as Montbò: "Llogaret del terme de Montcalb, districte municipal de Canet d'Adri (Gironès)" (p. 549). Thus, in Poem XXIII Ausias March compares his beloved to Venice, whereas in the injurious Poem XLI he compares her to a small rustic location.

81

Peter Dronke, Medieval Latin and the Rise of the European Love-Lyric, vol. I, pp. 57-97.

82

Hugh of Saint Victor, Selected Spiritual Writings (anon. trans.) London: Faber and Faber, 1962, p. 184, from P.L. CXXV, p. 117.

83

Such descriptions of melancholy in the portrait of the lover are frequent in mediaeval lyric poetry (see Appendix II, G:1:c and I:1). It is not, however, their presence or frequence that matters, but their significance and the use Ausias March makes of them in his poetry. For a definition of the effects of "melancholia adusta" see Chapter IV, note 188.

84

Although Pagès considers this image to be an expression of pure love (Commentaire, p. 5), Bohigas believes that it is exclusively an expression of hidden love (Poesies II, p. 13).

85

See Chapter III, note 41. The error of traditional criticism is evident in the words of Bohigas. He believes that Ausias March sees only "harmoniosa belleza" or symmetry in his perception of the lady (Poesies I, p. 55).

86
For a comparison of frequencies, see B. Flam, A Concordance to the Works of Auzias March, University of Michigan: Ph.D., 1962.

87
See, Arthur Terry, Ausias March:Selected Poems, pp. 8-9; M. de Riquer, Historia de la literatura catalana II, pp. 546-548.

88 Diccionari Català-Valencià-Balear, p. 280: "Moviment de la boca, del cap...".

89
See Chapter III, note 49, and Chapter IV, notes 129 and 130.

90
On the significance and repercussions of this symbol see C.G. Jung, Mysterium Coniunctionis, trans. R. F. C. Hull, Princeton: University Press, 1970, pp. 129-146; as well as, Psychology and Alchemy, trans. R.F.C. Hull, Princeton: Princeton University, 1968 (re-1980), pp. 376-396; and Edward F. Edinger, Ego and Archetype, Baltimore (Maryland): Penguin, 1973, pp. 274-281. It is worthy of note in this context that since Sapientia is intimately related to the symbol of the moon and sun, and that these two are equally related to the philosopher's stone, and Ausias March refers to the latter as a symbol of pure love: "Aquest amor és philosofal pedra / que lla on cau ço que res no val medra" (LXXXVII, vv. 159-160), it would seem that Ausias March had some knowledge of alchemy. See also for the use of this image in medieval literature, Jean Frappier, Histoire, Mythes et Symboles, Geneve: Droz, 1976, pp. 149-152, Frappier studies it as the mirror reflecting divine archetypes.

91
Canticum Canticorum VI: 9. Biblia Sacra Latina ex Biblia Sacra Vulgatae Editionis, London: Bagster, 1970, p. 430.

92
M. de Riquer, Historia de la literatura catalana II, pp. 491-508.

93
P. Dronke, Medieval Latin and the Rise of the European Love Lyric vol. I, p. 69.

94
Canticum Canticorum II: 2. Vulgata, p. 428.

95
Beryl Smalley, The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1952, p. 352: This book, according to western tradition, had always been expounded of Christ and the Church, Christ and the faithful soul, or, from the twelfth century, of the Blessed Virgin".

96
On this subject see: R. Menéndez Pidal, Romancero hispánico, Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1953, pp. 66-67, and L. Spitzer, "El Romance Abenámar," Sobre antigua poesía española, Buenos Aires: Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, 1962, p. 68.

97
Romancero hispànico, p. 67.

98
See C. T. Lewis and C. Short, Latin Dictionary, Oxford: Clarendon, pp. 522-523.

99 Ibid. pp. 298-299.

100
P.L. CLXXXIII, p. 737.

101
E. Gilson, Saint Bernard: textes choisis, Paris: Plon, 1949, p. 204.

102
La Sainte Bible, ed. A. Crampon, Paris: Desclee, 1960, p. 761.

103
Testamenti Veteris, Biblia Sacra,Geneva: Ioan Tornxium, 1590.

104
PP. Peultier, Etienne Gantois, Concordantiarum Universae Scripturae Sacrae Thesaurus, Paris: S. P. Lethielleux, 1939, p. 1128.

105
For references to Thersa as a city see: Kings III, 14:17; 15:21; 16:9; 16:17; Kings IV, 15:14; 15:16.

106 One is remonded that one hundred and fifty years later an admirer of Ausias March, Francisco de Quevedo, named his beloved Teresa, Tirsi. (see O.H. Green, El amor cortés en Quevedo, Zaragoza: Libreria General, 1955, p. 65).

107
Marvin H. Pope, Song of Songs: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, New York: Doubleday, 1977, in particular pp. 558-560.

108
See, W, Cannon, The Song of Songs, Cambridge: University Press, 1913, p. 78.

109
Paul de Lagarde, ed. Onomastica Sacra, Gottingae: Dieterichiannis Luederi Horstmann, 1887 (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1966), pp. 49, 60, 74.

110
On this problem see, J. Palau i Fabre, "Ausias March: poète féroce," Les lettres nouvelles, 1956, pp. 382-387; as well as Chapter II and Appendix I.

111
Beryl Smalley, "A Commentary on the Hebraica by Herbert of Bosham," Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale XVIII, 1951, pp. 29-65.

112
Rashi is the pen-name of "Rabbi Salomon ben Isaac".

113
The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages, p. 360.

114
The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages, pp. 338-340.

115
The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages, p. 331.

116
A. Rubió i Lluch, "Joan I Humanista i el primer periode de l'humanisme català," Estudis universitaris catalans X, 1919, p. 6.

117
L. A. Feldman, R.Abraham b. Isaac ha-Levi TaMaKh: Commentary on the Song of Songs, Assen: Royal Van Gorcum, 1970, p. 9.

118
R. Abraham ben Isaac, p. 147.

119
R. Abraham ben Isaac, p. 8.

120
J. Rubió i Balaguer, La cultura catalana del Renaixement a la Decadència, Barcelona: 62, 1964, p. 61.

121
A. Pagès, "Documents inédits relatifs a la vie d'Auzias March," Romania XVII, 1888, p. 201.

122
Marvin H. Pope, p. 243.

123
Strictly as a matter of speculation, one has also to take into account the loss of Bibles in the vernacular that were burned by the Inquisition, before and after 1492, because of their "gusto judaizante". See, Eugenio Asensio, "El erasmismo y las corrientes espirituales afines," Revista de Filología Española XXXVI, 1952, p. 51.

124
See Emile Mâle, The Gothic Image: Religious Art in France of the Thirteenth Century, New York: Harper and Row, 1958, pp. 254-258. Male ascribes this to Jacobus de Voragine (Legenda Aurea, Osnabrück: Otto Zeller, 1969, reprint of 1890, p. 506). However, the actual source is the apocryphal Book of St John the Evangelist Chapter IXL (Aurelio de Santos Otero ed. , Los Evangelios Apócrifos, Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1975, p. 600). Its significance is developed in the Book of John, Archbishop of Thessalonica, where it is used in the parable of the two slaves, as the symbol of the soul which is always prepared to receive the grace of God, much like the Wise Virgins (Los Evangelios Apócrifos, pp. 630-634).

125
See above, and W. Wetherbee, Platonism and Poetry, Princeton:

University Press, 1972, p. 130.

126
Alain de Lille, The Complaint of Nature, trans. Douglas M. Moffat, Hamden: Archon, 1972, p. 7.

127 See, D. W. Robertson, "Some Medieval Literary Terminology, With Special Reference to Chreyién de Troyes," S.P. 48, 1951, p.671.

128
"Dejo las invocaciones / de los famosos poetas / y oradores; / no curo de sus ficciones", (Jorge Manrique, "Coplas por la muerte de su padre", Obra completa ed. Augusto Cortina, Buenos Aires: Espasa-Calpe, 1966, p. 116).

129
The Complaint of Nature, pp. 39-40.

130
Trojel, p. 3; Parry, p.28; and see Chapter III, note 7.

131
D. W. Robertson, "The Subject of the De Amore," p. 155.

132
Critics have paid little attention to this poem. The lack of comprehension surrounding it is obvious in Pagès, (Commentaire sur les poesies d'Auzias March,Paris: Honoré Champion, 1925, p. 87, and reaches a paroxysm of misplaced references in the footnotes of Rafael Ferreres (Ausias March, Obra poética completa I, Madrid: Castalia, 1979, pp. 384-387) who interprets each figure by referring to classical mythology, and overlooking the difference with their medieval significance.

133
See Thomas Wright ed. The Latin Poems Commonly Attributed to Walter Mapes, London: Cambden Society, 1841 (reprinted New York: AMS Press. 1968), pp. 21-30; and W. Wetherbee, Platonism and Poetry, pp. 127-141.

134
Poems Commonly Attributed to Walter Mapes, p. 30, verse 218; Platonism and Poetry, p. 133, who translates this as, "the monkish throng".

135 See Peter Dronke, Medieval Latin and the Rise of the European Love-Lyric, vol. II, Oxford: Clarendon, 1968, pp. 367-369; and Platonism and Poetry, pp. 134-138.

136
See Leo Spitzer, Classical and Christian Ideas of World Harmony, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1963, pp. 69-73.

137
Platonism and Poetry, p. 47.

138
Rafael Ferreres (Ausias March, Obra poética completa I, p. 358)

translates the first two verses erroneously:"¿Quién es aquel que contemple a Amor como yo, que sienta que sean suficientes sus deleites?" (LXXV, vv. 1-2). The sense of verse two is lost, "on abasten" means "up to where they reach or stretch. Here "abastar" has the sense of "alcanzar", or "llegar".

139

See Chapter III, note 100.

140

See Chapter III, interpretation of Poem CXIX, interpretation of verse 18, between notes 47 and 48 in the text.

141

The "temple of Venus" in Poem LXXV, may also have sexual connotations, as in the castle image in the last part of the Roman de la Rose.

142

See I Corinthians, 3: 16-17 and 6: 19, and II Corinthians, 6: 16.

143

See Appendix I.

144

I am here following the normal interpretation of verse 8 in which "seny" is understood to mean "sense". A. Pagès notes that in verses 8 and 12, "seny" signifie d'abord sens puis intelligence" (Commentaire, p. 87). P. Bohigas also indicates that in verse 8 "seny" signifies "sentit" (Poesies III, p. 111). Rafael Ferreres follows Bohigas' interpretation (Ausias March, Obra poética completa I, p. 385).

145

See Chapter III, note 26.

146

See note 144. Here "seny" has the sense of "intelligence" (Pagès, Commentaire, p. 87). According to Bohigas, Ausias March "Contraposa voler i seny, com a equivalents de passió i intelligència" (Poesies III, p. 111). Ferreres maintains the ambiguity by translating "seny" as "sentido", as he does in verse 8 (Ausias March, Obra poética completa I, p. 385). The verse is ambiguous , but I am inclined to agree with Pagès that it signifies "intelligence" in this context. The sense would be that his love , which is all that he understands and turns his attention to as he states in verses 5-7, has captured his intelligence. That is to say, his intellect is captivated by love. Hence his love does not reject intelligence, but dwells on it. Such a love would naturally be chaste, as the context indicates. Two points can be raised in support of this interpretation. First, the capture of reason leads to a kind of "wise folly" to which Ausias March refers in Poem XVIII, vv. 49-56, analysed in Chapter III. In second place it leads it leads to a contrast between his wise folly, and the folly of mankind, as I will shew below.

147

See Appendix I for the problem of predestination as handled by

Ausias March.

148

Although this aspect is developed in the involucrum of Bernardus Silvestris, the standard classical reference which serves as a point of departure is also present in his works. (see Bernardus Silvestris, The Commentary of the First Six Books of the "Aeneid" of Vergil, eds. J. W. Jones and E. F. Jones, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1977, p. 47; and D. C. Meerson, The Ground and Nature of Literary Theory in Bernardus Silvester's Twelfth-Century Commentary on the Aeneid. Chicago: Ph.D. thesis, 1967, p. 147. Again for the convenience of the reader al future references will refer to Jones' edition and to Meerson's translation.

149

Siegfried Wenzel, "The Seven Deadly Sins: Some Problems of Research," Speculum XLVIII, 1968, p. 5. See Chapter III, note 93.

150

Jones, Commentary, p. 147; Meerson, p. 108. It is worthy of note that Ficino repeats this concept in his De Vita when he warns that Venus, Bacchus and Ceres are part of the three monsters that besiege the soul on its way to Wisdom, because they are a source of "melancolia negra": "longuissima via est quae ad veritatem sapientiamque perducit, gravibus terraeque marisque plena laboribus. Quicunque igitur hoc iter aggrediuntur, ut Poëta quispiam diceret, saepe terra marique periclitantur. Sive enim mare navigent, continue inter fluctus, id est, humores duos, pituitam scilicet et noxiam illam melancholiam, quasi inter Scyllam Charybimque iactantur. Sive terra (ut ita dixerum) iter agany, tria monstra protinus sese illis obijiciunt. Primum terrena Venus, secundum Bacchus et Ceres, tertium nocturna Hecate frequenter opponit". (Liber I, Cap. VII) (Marsilio Ficino, Opera omnia I, Torino: Bottega d'Erasmo, 1962, reprint of Basilea: Henric Petrina, 1576, p. 499). In more modest terms this is also the point made by Ausias March.

151

See C. de Boer (ed.) Ovide Moralisé en Prose, texte du quinzième siècle, Amsterdam: North-Holland (K. N. A. W.), 1954. p. 75: "Juno est royne et deesse des richesses et seigneuries mondaines". See also, P. G. C. Campbell, L'Epître d'Othéa: Etude sur les sources de Christine de Pisan, Paris: Honoré Champion, 1924, p. 146.

152

Saturn and Melancholy, pp. 147-148.

153

"The Seven Deadly Sins: Some Problems of Research", p. 5.

154

The tradition of the planets, or gods, as representatives of the various humours was widespread. Thus one finds the tradition of Aeneas Servius repeated by Isidore of Seville (Isidori Hispalensis Episcopi, Etymologiarum sive Originum t. I, ed. W.M. Lindsay, Oxford: Clarendon, 1911, v. XXX, 8-9).

155

Servii Grammatici, In Vergilii Carmina Commentarii II, eds., Georgius Thilo et Hermanus Hagen, Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1961, p. 98.

156

See Chapter IV, note 170.

157
Jones', Commentary, p. 46; Meerson, p. 147.

158
As in Poem XLV, verses 41-44 and 49-56: "Cells qui amor bestialment pratiquen / sens acollir en part delit d'entendre, / sol per la carn llur apetit se liga / que, sinó brut, plaer no·ls acompanya. / ..../ Alguns elets, en molt espoquat nombre, / qui solament d'amor d'espirit amen, / d'aquest·amor participen ab àngel, / e tal voler en per null temps se canssa. / Los qui amor ab cors e arma senten, / amant lo cors e més la part de l'arma, / grau de amor homenívol atenyen: / sobre dos colls lo jou d'Amor aporten".

159
See Chapter IV, note 216.

160 Servii Grammatici, Vergilii Carmina Commentarii, vol. II, p. 482: "cum nasci coeperimus, sortimur a Sole spiritum, a Luna corpus, a Marte sanguinem, a Mercurio ingenium, a Iove honorum desiderium, a Venere cupiditates, a Saturno humorem...".

161
Jones', Commentary, p. 25; Meerson, p. 124.

162
C. de Boer, Ovide Moralisé en Prose, p. 106. The Metamorphoses were extremely popular in Catalonia during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, whether in Berçuire's Ovidius Moralizatus or Chrétien le Gouays' Ovide Moralisé (see J. Ruiz Calonja, Historia de la literatura catalana, Barcelona: Teide, 1954, p. 282; and Martín de Riquer, L'Humanisme català, Barcelona: Barcino, 1934, p. 86). Although many critics have spoken of the possible influence of Ovid in the poetry of Ausias March, comparisons have only been made with the Ars Amatoria, the Remedia, and the apocryphal Facetus (see A. Pagès, Auzias March et ses prédécesseurs, p. 228; Commentaire des poesies, pp. 10, 11, 89, 96, 352; P. Bohigas, Poesies I, p. 84, Poesies III, p. 162). No critic seems to have paid sufficient attention to the influence of the mediaeval tradition of the Metamorphoses on the significance of the poetry of Ausias March. Only M. de Riquer indicates in passing that the allegorical image in Poem LXXIX is somewhat Ovidian ("Ausias March", Historia de la literatura catalana II, Barcelona: Ariel, 1964, p. 516).

163
Thus, Mercury is also considered to be Christ, (Ovide Moralisé en Prose, p. 107).

164 Ovide Moralisé en Prose, p. 68.

165
See, Bohigas, Poesies III, p. 111.

166
See Appendix II, N:7.

167
See Chapter III, notes 26 and 31.

168

The Complaint of Nature, p. 68.

169

See Chapter IV, notes 201-209 in text.

170

Chapter IV, note 329.

171

See, Chapter III, analysis of Poem IX, and in this Chapter, note 15.

172

Although both the texts of Berçuire and Le Gouays may have been available to Ausias March (see note 162), one cannot be certain of his exact source. I have, therefore, chosen to use the standard Latin text for quotation (P. Ovid, Metamorphoses vols. I-II, ed. G. P. Goold, London: William Heineman, 1976), with occasional references to , Chrétien Le Gouays, Ovide Moralisé, vols. I and II, ed. C. de Boer, Amsterdam: Verh. de Konh. Akad. van Vetenschapen, 1915, 1920).

173

See, Martín de Riquer, Los trovadores II, Barcelona: Planeta, 1975, pp. 1081-1084.

174

M. de Riquer, Historia de la literatura catalana II, p. 516.

175

See, A. Pagès, Auzias March et ses prédécesseurs, pp. 247-248; Commentaire des poesies d'Auzias March, p. 89; P. Bohigas, Poesies III, p. 123; Rafael Ferreres (ed.) Ausias March, Obra poética completa I, pp. 60-62.

176

On this subject see, Marc-René Jung, Etudes sur le poème allégorique en France au moyen âge, Berne: Francke, p.139.

177

Etudes sur le poème allégorique, pp. 133-146.

178

Etudes sur le poème allégorique, p. 139.

179 Etudes sur le poème allégorique, p. 139.

180

See above the discussion around footnote 16 in the text.

181

Etudes sur le poème allégorique, p. 144.

182

Etudes sur le poème allégorique, footnote 63, p. 144; Auzias March et ses prédécesseurs, pp. 316-320; and see in this thesis Chapter IV, note 170.

183
I am here following Guiraut Riquier's explanation of the allegory. M. - R. Jung's study of this subject has clearly denied the validity of A. Pagès' extremely subjective interpretation.

184
Etudes sur le poème allégorique, p. 139.

185 Critics agree that the arrows refer to three types of love of varying quality, but have utterly failed to understand the importance of the temporal succession in this image. Poesies II, pp. 155-156; Poesies III, pp. 123-124; Auzias March et ses prédécesseurs, pp. 247-248; and Riquer, Los trovadores II, p. 1082.

186
Etudes sur le poème allégorique, p. 138.

187
In the Ovide Moralisé the third age is also rapidly glossed over (Book I, vv. 937-948) and serves a purely transitional purpose.

188
See above, note 182. For Ausias March's own exposé of this problem see inter alia Poem CXXIII and Chapter IV, note 170.

189 See Bohigas' discussion of Ausias March's use of the tripartite division of love in Poesies II, pp. 155-156 contrasted to that of Guiraut Riquier. It concerns Ausias March's discussion of the three loves in Poem XLV (above note 158); see also Chapter IV, note 318.

190
Ovide Moralisé, I, v. 3670.

191
Ovide Moralisé I, vv. 3272-3274.

192
See Poems CV and CXXVIII. This ultimate ascesis is also sought by the Florentine Neoplatonists (see Chapter IV, note 158), and is not like that of Andreas Capellanus which is an ascesis a priori.

193 See Poem CVI, verse 123, and Appendix I, in text between notes 9 and 18.

194
See Chapter IV, note 121.

195 This interpretation is not opposed to that of P. Bohigas, who considers that the poet has placed his affection on the wrong object (Poesies III, p. 124). Simultaneously, Ausias March admits the impossibility of finding the lasting quality of divine love in a corporeal object, as do Castiglione and the other Florentine Neoplatonists. This is a frequent theme in Ausias March's poetry, as in the first verse of Poem CXVII.

196
See Chapter IV, and notes 143, 149, 155 and 162.

197

"Arnulf of Orleans... says Ovid has attempted 'so to describe the mutability that one may understand by it not simply those changes which take place around us, altering material things for good or ill, but those also which take place inwardly, in the soul'. By these means, Arnulf tells us, Ovid seeks 'to recall us from error to a recognition of the true creator" (Platonism and Poetry, p. 11).

198

In a footnote to his edition of Calanson's Poem M. de Riquer expresses a certain reserve as to the way Ausias March used the Gascon poet's image: "la aplicación de estas tres flechas simbólicas hecha por Ausias March... tal vez glosando y aclarando esta alegoría" (Los trovadores II, p. 1082). The general fallacy of this interpretation has been repeated by many critics who follow A. Pagès' erroneous judgement on the direct imitation of Calanson's verses.

199

This clearly flies in the face of O. H. Green's statement based on his third-hand analysis of Ausias March, "En la época en que Boscán empezó a escribir, este amor-gentileza coincidía en líneas generales con la concepción trovadoresca del fin' amors - concepción muy particular y del todo extraña a la naturaleza humana y las ensenanzas morales del cristianismo. Su estímulo era la belleza y la virtud de la amada, pero no era platónico, sino carnal y sensual ..." (El amor cortés en Quevedo, Zaragoza: Librería General, 1955, p. 135). This is a blatant case of academic myopia aggravated by the poor lenses of "courtly love".

200

This attachment to the world, and the eventual renunciation which we find in Poem CXXVIII, is best explained in Poem CVII, especially in verses 49-56: "Cascuna part de nós tira d'on ve: / lo cors terreny deçà vol romanir; / l'arma d'aquell no·s volrria partir, / e lo seu bé per la mort li pervé. / Mas tant abdós han estret amistat, / que·l hu dolor pel companyó soffer, / hoc fins en tant que·l mal torna·n plaer, / y ell mal aquell ha per grau estimat". As man is made of body and spirit, he longs for earthly joys, because the spirit is drawn to the body through the "descensus ad inferos", hence, the soul finds its true end in death.

201

See note 17 above.

202

See R. Pring-Mill, El microcosme lul·lià, Palma de Mallorca: Moll, 1962, p. 122 inter alia.

203

Antoni Canals, Scipió e Anibal, De Providència, De Arra de Ànima, ed. M. de Riquer, Barcelona: Barcino, 1935, pp. 121-171.

204

I deliberately introduce "heroic" as "angelical" love for their contemplative affinity, which is evidently an aspect of the former. Thus Ausias March can say "a temps volent com hom, com brut, com àngel" (CXVII, v. 168). See Chapter IV, discussion on

Castiglione's Cortegiano, and note 318; the discussion on Bembo in the text; on Hebreo, between footnotes 256-260; and the discussion on Ficino between footnotes 170 and 180. See also, Chapter III, notes 86, 87, 95, 100.

205

Translation from Chapter III, note 31.

206

See Chapter IV, note 136, and Chapter III, page 52.

207

Andreas Capellanus, De Amore, ed. E. Trojel, p. 3.

208

See Chapter III, notes 7 and 31.

209

Metamorphoses, Book IX, vv. 1-272 (vol. II, pp. 2-22).

210

The Latin word used is velamina, which has the meaning of: garment, tunic, shirt or robe, all of which are also implied in "hàbit". The Ovide Moralisé is somewhat inconsistent in the translation of velamina, and uses both "chemise" (IX, v. 431) and "robe" (IX, v. 763).

211

In the Ovide Moralisé Hercules does fall in love with Iole (IX, vv. 488-599). This is an ornamental addition of Le Gouays which does not affect the basic plot of the myth.

212

Ovide Moralisé, (IX, vv. 679-682).

213

Bohigas, Poesies I, p. 154; A. Comas, "Cuatro influencias de la literatura catalana medieval sobre la castellana de la edad media y del renacimiento," Ensayos sobre literatura catalana, Barcelona: Taber, 1968, p. 38.

214

Five years ago I wrote a paper which I read at the Asociación de Hispanistas Canadienses in Fredericton, New Brunswick. May 1977. This paper was subsequently re-written and accepted for publication. It is forthcoming in Hispanófila as "The Hercules Theme in the Poetry of Ausias March". This paper does not take into account the tradition of Hughes de Saint Victor, and is limited to a paradigmatic analysis of Ausias March's use of the image of the shirt of Nessus.

215

See, A. Pagès, "Le thème de la tristesse amoureuse," Romania LVII, 1932, pp. 29-43; P. Bohigas, Poesies V, p. 52; R. Ferreres (ed.), Ausias March, Obra poética completa II, pp. 234-235.

216

Like Ficino, Ausias March actually refers to the clothing of the spirit ("esperit", Poem LXXVII, v. 26), which implies "vital spirit"

as the mirror of the soul (see Chapter III, notes 21, 26, 104 and 105, as well as, Chapter IV, note 192). For the sake of brevity I am referring to the composite soul-spirit as "rational soul", since in medical theory, as exposed by Ficino in Chapter IV, the soul is always present where the vital spirits are. Their function is directly related to the generation of melancholy as "negra" or "generosa".

217

Similarly, in a moment of disillusion, Ausias March points out that because worldly love originates in sensual perception, it remains fundamentally sensual. The problem is like that of Sidney's Astrophel and Stella, in which the poet recognizes the limitations of natural reason (see Chapter IV, conclusion). Thus, just as Ausias March can say: "Jamés amí que no fos desijós / d'aquell desig que per fretur avem" (LXXXV, vv. 33-34), so can he say in Poem LV: "Lir entre carts, molts trobadors an dit / que·l bé d'Amor és al començament; / yo dich que està prop del contentament. / D'aquell ho dich qui mor, desig finit" (LV, vv. 41-44). This reflects disillusion at the possibility of finding spiritual love on earth, as in Poem CV, vv. 23-24. One must note, however, that this is absolutely consistent with the theory of love present in Ficino and his successors, who stress the limitations of natural reason and the need for an ascesis from this world, because the beauty of this world should only spur man to turn his attention to his origin, that is, to God's Goodness (see Chapter IV).

218

See note 40 above.

219

See inter alia Chapter IV, notes 69, 123, 130, and Marsile Ficin, Commentaire sur le Banquet, ed. Raymond Marcel, Paris: Societé Les Belles Lettres, 1956, p. 147.

220

This is reminiscent of Bembo's Lavinello, as seen in Chapter IV, in text between notes 298-300.

221 On this problem see Chapter III, note 104. Furthermore, Ausias March's rejection of the Stoic definition of beauty is also evident in Poem CXIX, verses 81-90. See Chapter III, notes 40-49, as well as, the discussion of "gest" in Chapter III, pages 55-60.

222

A. Pagès, Auzias March et ses prédécesseurs, pp. 183, 230, 317, 318, etc. I am inclined to believe, with Peter Dronke (Medieval Latin and the Rise of European Love-Lyric, vol. I, p. 85), that Capellanus' De Amore is only one of many such love treatises written in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and that excessive attention has been paid to it in isolation. This naturally invalidates Pagès' claims of an influence; I believe that many of references he uses are actually coincidental.

223

See note 40 above.

224

Ausias March can rightly say of the "gest", which is the spiritual reflection of the soul's beauty and the immediate source of his delight (see note 221 above): "quin delit és lo que d'amor yo taste. / No és en carn, e la carn mi enclina: / entra per l'ull e en lo tot d'ella fina" (CXIX, vv. 78-80).

225

A. Pagès, "Le Thème de la tristesse amoureuse," Romania LVII, 1932, p. 30.

226

"Le Thème de la tristesse amoureuse," p. 30.

227

"Le Thème de la tristesse amoureuse," p. 37.

228

"Le Thème de la tristesse amoureuse," p. 36.

229

See Chapter IV, note 192. Although I refer to Ficino for the sake of the comparison which is the object of this thesis, I am not attempting to explicate Ausias March by a reading of Ficino. The latter's knowledge of medicine is scholastic and Salernitan. His descriptions are standard mediaeval ones that belong to a previous heritage. I have not sought out these sources in this case because it was not my intention to suggest that Ausias March "precedes" Ficino, but that the two are not incompatible, as some critics have pretended (see Chapter I). In this instance it is more important to turn to Ficino's text. For a description of the medical tradition used by Ficino see, Saturn and Melancholy, in particular, pp. 82-97.

230

A similar physiological description of melancholy is evident in Poem XI, vv. 33-40, which Ausias March uses to claim exceptionality.

231

See Chapter IV, note 137.

232

Rafael Ferreres, (Ausias March, Obra poética completa I, p. 431), translates verses 273-274 by, "y mis dolores detienen mis sangres al corazón acudiendo allá donde está hecha la llaga". Although it has the merit of being one of the rare attempts to interpret this verse, I disagree with Ferreres. The actual sense is: "My spirits cause sorrow to gather in my heart by fleeing to where the wound is given". Since the wound is given in the eyes (v. 271), where the image of the beloved is seen, the vital spirits move there. The depletion of vital spirits which the heart cannot renew, because they are scorched by the constant effort to maintain the presence of the image and their vapours cloud the cell of phantasy, results in an accumulation of black bile, which causes sorrow. The poet's love is then, "morbosus melancholicusque". If the spirits, contained in the blood and therefore referred to as "sangres" by Ausias March, were to rush to the heart, as Ferreres believes, then joy would ensue. Clearly this is not the case. (see Chapter IV, page 233, notes 200 and 327). This is hence,

a medical description of the source of melancholy, and its predominance in the lover's distempered condition, caused by an immoderate cogitation on a corporeal object.

233

See Saturn and Melancholy, p. 34. Problem XXX, i decribes instability as a characteristic of the melancholic. Also the Tractatus de complexionibus, quoted in a footnote of Saturn and Melancholy (p.115),states that he is of "inconstans animo". This proceeds from Problem XXX,i in which Aristotle states that melancholy is like wine, "making men ill-tempered, kindly, merciful or reckless" (Aristotle, Problems vol. II, trans. W. S. Hett and H. Rackham, London: William Heineman, 1965, p. 157, and see also p. 169).

234

Saturn and Melancholy, p. 14. Thus, in the Tractatus de complexionibus by Johan von Neuhaus, quoted in Saturn and Melancholy, p. 115, the melancholic "semper diligit esse solus". This trait has its origin in Problem XXX, and the medical tradition preceding it, thus Aristotle states: "The same is true of Ajax and Bellerophontes; the former went completely insane, and the latter craved for desert places" (Aristotle, Problems vol. II, p. 155).

235

See P. Bohigas, Poesies III, p. 290. See also note 233. This aspect of this description is subordinated to the verse 286: "e lo meu cors me vist sola vergonya" (LXXXVII, v. 285). Thus, the explanation that this force which Ausias March cannot readily identify cannot be said to be the effect, timidity, which he has already identified. One is reminded here of the sense of "vergonya" in Poem LXXV: Vergonya = Diana, and Rahó = Pallas.

236

This aspect of the melancholy individual goes back to Aristotle's Problem XXX, i (see op. cit., p. 155 ff.: "Why is it that all men who have become outstanding in philosophy, statesmanship, poetry or the arts, are melancholic?"). This is repeated by mediaeval natural philosophers such as Alexander Neckham, William of Auvergne, Avicenna and Hughes de Fouilloi (Saturn and Melancholy, pp. 70-71, 73, 89 and 108). Constantine the African, referred to in Saturn and Melancholy, provides a standard mediaeval medical description of the melancholy unbalance and the over-exertion of the soul: "We say that their moods constantly fluctuate between irascible excitement and a peaceable frame of mind, recklessness and timidity, between sadness and frivolity, and so on... There are very many holy and pious men who become melancholy owing to their great piety and from fear of God's anger or owing to their great longing for God until this longing masters and overpowers the soul; their whole feeling and thoughts are only of God, the contemplation of God.... They fall into melancholy as do lovers and voluptuates.... And all will fall into melancholy who overexert themselves in reading philosophical books etc." (op. cit. pp. 84-85). Thus, more popular writers such as Guido Bonatti, following Johannes Hispalensis' translation of Alcabitius, note the beneficial aspects of Saturn-melancholy: "significat profunditatem scientiae et consilium bonum et profundum" (Op.cit., p. 190).

237
"black bile, which is naturally cold... produces apoplexy, or torpor, or despondency or fear" (Aristotle, Problems II, p. 161).

238
See Saturn and Melancholy, pp. 67-111 (inter alia), and D. C. Meerson, The Ground and Nature of Literary Theory in Bernardus Silvester's Twelfth-Century Commentary on the "Aeneid", Chicago: Ph.D. thesis, 1967.

239
See M. D. Chenu, La théologie au douzième siècle, Paris: Vrin, 1957, pp. 159-209.

240
For a particularly insensitive interpretation of this point in the poetry of Ausias March, see W. Rolf, "Conflict and Choice: The Sea Storm in the Poems of Ausias March," H.R. (39), 1971, pp. 69-75. A very intelligent analysis of the sources of Ausias March's imagery can be found in Rosa Leveroni, "Les imatges marines en la poesia d'Ausias March," B.H.S. XXVIII, 1951, pp. 152-166. A contrast between these sources in Leveroni's article and my analysis should shew how the poet uses a topical image and modifies it to meet his authorial intention.

241
See, F. Rico, El pequeño mundo del hombre, Madrid: Castalia, 197 , p. 165.

242 A. Martínez de Toledo, El Arcipreste de Talavera o Corbacho, ed. G. Muela, Madrid: Castalia, 1970, pp. 180-207.

243
Jones (ed.), Commentary, p. 10; Meerson, p. 108.

244
Jones (ed.), Commentary, p. 11; Meerson, p. 108-109.

245
Jones (ed.), Commentary, p. 33; Meerson, p. 132.

246
Jones (ed.), Commentary, p. 50; Meerson, p. 151.

247
See Appendix I, note 60.

248
See Jerónimo Cortés in El pequeño mundo, p. 165. The direction of the winds determines the predominant quality. Thus, the Mestre is a north-west wind which combines with the westerly Ponent, the direction is then west by north-west. The direction is then predominantly west and the Ponent predominates. This pattern is repeated in all other wind references.

249
Saturn and Melancholy, p. 190. This is also attributed to melancholics by Ficino, see Chapter IV, notes 192-198.

250

Saturn and Melancholy, p. 89.

251

Thus, Juan Huarte de San Juan (Examen de Ingenios para las ciencias, ed. Esteban Torre, Madrid: Nacional, 1976, p. 191) uses a very similar metaphor to describe melancholy adust: "la imaginativa .... esta calidad levanta figuras y las hace bullir".

252

This is a commonly repeated variation of Aristotle's description of hot bile, or melancholy adust: "but if it becomes overheated, it produces cheerfulness with song and madness, and the breaking of sores and so forth" (Problems II, p. 163).

253

It seems to me that the reference to the "Déu qui ·ns ha ligats" may indicate that Ausias March is adressing this poem to his wife. This would support the thesis of M. de Riquer (Historia de la literatura II, Barcelona: Ariel, 1964, pp.491-508).

254

See Chapter IV, note 137, as well as 136, 149-150.

255

See Chapter III, note 41.

256

M. D. Chenu, La théologie, p. 226.

257

See Appendix II.

258

Roger Boase, The Troubadour Revival, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976.

259

See Chapter III, note 87.

I should like to add to this note by pointing out that when Chaucer refers to "Hereos", which moralists and medical writers after him frequently equate with the demented passion of Arcite, he does not specifically equate "Hereos" with manic depression: "Not only like the loveres maladye / Of Hereos, but rather lyke manye" (vv. 1374-1375), and only then does he describe Arcite's plight as "melancolia negra".

260

See Saturn and Melancholy, p. 225.

261

See John Livingston Lowes, "The Loveres Maladye of Hereos," Modern Philology XI, 1913-1914, pp. 491-546.

262

Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 199; see Chapter IV, note 216.

263 B. Castiglione, op. cit., Opere Volgare e Latine, ed. Cornelio Bentivoglio, Padova: Giuseppe Comino, 1733, p. 238

Chapter VI: Conclusion

The heritage of Chartrian-Victorine Platonism, common to all Renaissance Neoplatonists, creates many points of deep affinity between Ausias March and the Florentine Neoplatonists. His manipulation of the extremes of the theory of imagination, as well as the opposite qualities of melancholy, demonstrates that his sensibility was not that of a "troubadour attardé",[1] and that his love was not exclusively a lascivious passion. To the contrary, for him and the Florentine Neoplatonists, this love is a struggle to transcend the limits of an unreliable natural reason, in order to find the light of right reason, perceived imperfectly in the beauty of this world. There is, in this, none of the divorce from Christian morality, so frequently associated with "courtly love".[2] To the contrary, it is a passionate expression of interior devotion, for both Ausias March and the Ficinian Neoplatonists. In both, their sensibility remains anchored in the evangelicalism which originates among the Chartrians and Victorines. For these mystic thinkers the world is primarily a reflection of the thought of God. Ausias March assimilates this theory from Ramon Lull, who remains important for Christian humanists of the Renaissance.

The variations between the work of Ausias March and that of the Florentines is largely a matter of personal emphasis and literary fashion. Hence, whereas, according to Raymond Marcel, the primary intention in Ficino's Commentarium in Convivium is to provide a demonstration of the soul's immortality,[3] and only subsequently is it a theory of love, Ausias March acknowledges the soul's immortality a priori, and his real concern is to illustrate the

difficulty of recovering from the soul's "descensus ad inferos".[4] The followers of Marsilio Ficino, with the exception of Leone Hebreo whose approach goes beyond Ficino, still continue to place the emphasis on the subject of the immortality of the soul, and the question of the soul's recovery becomes secondary, although it is nonetheless constantly present. Further distinctions can be drawn on the basis of Ficino's literary background and his far more extensive use of Platonic and Classical texts. Hence, there is an unmistakable difference in style and elegance. Even with this in mind, one must never forget that for the Christian Platonists, such as Ficino, these classics are subordinate to his religious intention, and the text is read for its integumenta. Moreover, at this point one must note that the comparison is unequal, being between a professional philosopher and a poet. What matters is that the essential content remains the same, and as Thomas Gould states:

> In the history of the idea of love, at least, the Renaissance does not appear to have been a crucial turning point. After all, there is not really much more Plato in Spenser or Ficino than there is in Dante.[5]

The introduction of the Italianate sensibility in Spain, which infused a renewed serious content into Petrarchan topoi, was well prepared by the work of Ausias March. The admiration professed for him by the first generation of Petrarquistas attests this. This shift that occurs apparently around the time of Boscán's translation of the Cortegiano is, then, largely an adjustment of literary fashions to the wave of evangelicalism which sweeps through Europe between 1520 and 1550.

As Milà y Fontanals remarked, and as I hope to have demonstrated, Ausias March has an uncommon knowledge of medical

theory.[6] This is sufficient at least to enable him to articulate the same concepts that Ficinian Platonism will disseminate in the sixteenth century. His imagery reflects a symbolic mentality inherent in the Dionysian-Erigenian aesthetic theory of Christian Platonists. These factors contribute to the compatibility of Ausias March's poetry to the Italianate Neoplatonic love theory introduced in Spain by his admirers, Garcilaso de la Vega and Juan Boscán. It would be pointless to reiterate the conclusions which I drew in the last section of Chapter IV, since I consider that the proposition of this thesis, that the poetry of Ausias March is not radically incompatible with Florentine Neoplatonism and that as a consequence the introduction of the latter in Golden Age Spain does not constitute a "miraculous" shift in sensibility, has been demonstrated on a conceptual level in Chapters III and IV, and through the practical dynamics of his imagery in Chapter V.

A point which is raised, beyond the demonstration of my basic proposition, is the inadequacy of the broad concept of courtly love used as a vertical barrier between what is mediaeval and Renaissance.[7] This very point has plagued the proper interpretation of Ausias March's poetry. It creates the most violent and distorting anachronisms. What must be sought is a distinction between the various types of sensibility. The question of poetic sensitivity does not move in linear blocks. There are only individuals who reflect different degrees of sensibility, particular to their condition and experience, literary or otherwise. Whether it be Andreas Capellanus, Ausias March or Marsilio Ficino, all three are Christians whose writings express their concern for Charity and their rejection of cupidity. For these writers the considerations

of Classical, Arabic and Jewish writers undoubtedly contribute to their cultural formation, but these "influences" are external factors in their thought, they are part of the tools used to answer a question, and they should not be confused with that question.[8] The fulcrum of the problem is one of particular importance for Western Christianism; it is the question of evil and whence it came.[9]

This is the object of an extensive discussion by St. Augustine in the City of God Book XII, 6-8. I believe that the implications of this discussion come to bear directly on the works of the writers mentioned above. For St. Augustine, evil cannot be an opposite autonomous force. It must originate in the will, because by the act of Creation God made all things good. Out of nothing He infused goodness into all things, and gave them a nature and existence which proceeds from Him. Hence, this nature and the will can only be good:

> But any existing thing which is inferior, even to the lowest depth of earth, is a nature and an existence, and therefore it is undoubtedly good, having its own mode and form in its own kind and order.[10]

From the outset St. Augustine posits the question of the efficient source of evil in the "mutable nature" of man. Thus, he formulates the problem of the source of evil as it is related to the problem of perception, which is directly affected by this mutability, although he takes care never to say that this nature is the efficient cause. His illustration of this problem is the kind of consideration that serves as a point of departure for Andreas Capellanus, and is subjacent in Ausias March and Ficino:

> Suppose that two men, of precisely similar disposition in mind and body, see the beauty of the same woman's body, and the sight stirs one of them to enjoy her unlawfully, while the other continues

unmoved in his decision of chastity. What do we suppose to be the cause of an evil choice in one and not in the other?... It was not the beauty of the woman; for it did not have that effect in both of them, although both had precisely the same view of her.[11]

St. Augustine then denies that evil has an efficient cause. Evil is a deficiency that consists in the failure of the will to turn to the light of "right reason", that is, it is a movement away from the Good.[12] Hence, it is a voluntary matter:

the failure is voluntary, not necessary... it is not a falling away to evil natures; the defection is evil in itself, as a defection from him who supremely exists to something of a lower degree of reality; and this is contrary to the order of nature.[13]

The problem of evil for Christian writers is, then, based on a contradiction which Augustine points out, but avoids by specifying that one should not attempt to find an efficient cause for evil. This consideration is that our nature is essentially good, but yet, by its very mutability it is the source of our demise or deficiency.[14] This aspect of the question of evil is present in any discussion of Charity and cupidity. It is closely associated with the degree to which man is capable of apprehending the Good in particular beauty. St. Augustine's proposition, quoted above (note 11) is, thus, fundamental to Andreas Capellanus, Ausias March, and the Florentine Neoplatonists, all of which approach the question from the point of view of an aesthetic consideration directly affected by their conception of melancholy and imagination.

For Andreas Capellanus, who maintains a monastic perspective on the question of evil, the secular world is a source of deceit, and spiritual fulfilment can only be found within the structure of the Church. His view is absolutely consistent with the elaborate feudal system of relations that prevades the narrations of the De

Amore. Thus, man's will is deceived by the temptations of secular beauty; it needs the guidance of ecclesiastical piety to turn it in the right direction. At best, his lovers can see harmonious symmetry in the beauty of the lady. This beauty is a vain artifice by which man's imagination lures reason away from the Good, and this is evil for Capellanus, because "to defect from him who is Supreme Existence, to something of less reality, this is to begin to have an evil will".[15] In the De Amore the interior meditation of the lover can only lead to the madness of "melancolia negra". This is the kind of torment experienced by Bembo's Perrotino in Gli Asolani. The lover is unaware of the interpenetration of Goodness and beauty and that the source of deceit is his deficient will. Capellanus excludes the presence of grace from the secular context, and curtails the power of the individual to perceive this grace outside of the ecclesiastical machinery. Contrary to the dignitas hominis of the evangelical current, he presupposes a weakness in man's will. This is, indeed, what R. O. Jones considers to be "the central medieval view",[16] although it might be more correct to call it the "centralist" point of view. Like the monastic ideal it is representative of the Church's difficulty in adjusting itself to the decay of the feudal system and its consequent incapacity to meet the spiritual needs of a growing urban laity in the later Middle Ages.

There is, however, throughout the last centuries of the Middle Ages, a constant intellectual ferment, even from within the monastic centres of learning, that found it necessary to revalue secular spirituality. Already in the twelfth century it became evident that, with the growth of urbanization and the revival of

culture outside the monastic schools, there was a need to return to the very sources of the faith and to the simplicity of the devotion of the Early Church. From St. Victor, Cîteaux and Chartres, the evangelical awakening set astir a consciousness of the importance of the apostolic life with its emphasis on interior spirituality. As such, the intrinsic value of imagination, as a movement between the intelligible and sensible worlds to be controlled by the will, came to be recognized, as did its corollary, melancholy, which is characteristic of interior meditation. Released from the bonds of the monastic tradition, the individual could approach God without intermediaries, and apprehend the presence of grace in nature. The emphasis is, then, on the participation of grace in the secular world with the ever present consciousness of man's limitations originating from his good but fluctuating will in an equally mutable nature, that is, a consciousness of the soul's "descensus ad inferos".

Thus, for Ausias March and the Florentine Neoplatonists worldly love is never free from the potential torment caused by a misdirection of the will, but their reason seeks the guidance of the light of "right reason". It is by interior faith that they seek an ideal of chastity and Charity. Although their discussion of love focuses on a problem of beauty, the latter is exonerated of all responsibility for the individual's love; as Bembo's hermit tells Lavinello, his love is first and foremost a desire of the will, and only then, a movement towards the goodness apprehended in beauty. There is in the love described by these authors a potential for "heroic virtue" attained through the beneficial aspects of imagination and melancholy. Their secular learning, especially the medical theory of the "spiriti" enables them to focus their attention on

the importance of the soul as a mirror which can perceive right reason darkly. Now, Ausias March, who does not have the trappings of the classical culture of Ficino, Bembo, Hebreo and Castiglione, is not a Florentine Neoplatonist. The serious content of his poetry, nonetheless, has many points of affinity with the Florentine Neoplatonists, that preclude the notion that the introduction of Castiglione's Cortegiano and Bembo's Neoplatonic Petrarchism marked a rejection of "earlier Spanish literature root and branch".[17] Ausias March is, then, an important link in Spain between the Chartrians and the Florentines. He represents "an influence not to be underestimated in sixteenth-century Castilian poetry",[18] for, indeed, he stands besides those who, like Giordano Bruno, cultivated "gli heroici furori".

Notes to Chapter VI

1
A. Pagès, Auzias March et ses prédécesseurs, Paris: Honoré Champion, 1912, p. 223.

2
See O. H. Green, El amor cortés en Quevedo, Zaragoza: Librería General, 1953, p. 21.

3
Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, Paris:"Les Belles Lettres", 1958, p. 649; Marsile Ficin, Commentaire sur le Banquet de Platon, Paris: "Les Belles lettres", 1956, p. 19.

4
See Appendix I.

5
Thomas Gould, Platonic Love, New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963, pp. 9-10.

6
See Chapter III, note 53.

7
It should be noted that in this statement I do not entirely reject the concept of courtly love as a novelty, as it was originally applied to troubadour poetry. I do, however, question its validity beyond that period, for if there are a series of courtly loves, as Frappier suggests, then the whole problem might be solved by simply referring to all this as "love". Furthermore, since relations between Provence and Northern France do not seem to have been as close as Gaston Paris suggested in his theory of courtly love which he based on the De Amore, then the often heard suggestion that the De Amore has been a source of error, but that courtly love still exists, as critics following Paris' theory have found in other works, seems to be a posterior justification for error. Given that the De Amore has long been the bastion of courtly love, and that it was considered the only valid document of its existence and codification, such suggestions are a shameless subterfuge.

8
It should be remembered that the texts that came to Europe were mainly philosophical and scientific, literary contacts are very difficult to establish. These texts were read to answer Christian questions, and they do not form a separate cultural entity in mediaeval Europe. Many critics, such as A. J. Denomy,have turned to these texts as a source of sensibility. This seems to me particularly unwarranted.

9
See Steven Runciman, The Medieval Manichee, Cambridge: University Press, 1960, p. 5. In this context, contrary to the belief of many recent supporters of the theory of "courtly love", the thesis of Denis de Rougemont should not be underestimated, in spite of its somewhat romantic and erroneous approach.

10 Augustine, City of God, ed. David Knowles, trans. Henry Bettenson, Penguin: Harmondsworth, 1972, p. 478.

11 City of God, p. 478.

12 City of God, p. 480.

13 City of God, p. 480.

14 At the end of Chapter 6 St. Augustine states: "How can a nature which is good, however changeable, before it has an evil will, be the cause of any evil, the cause, that is, of that evil itself?", City of God, p. 479.

15 City of God, Book XII, 7, pp. 479-480.

16 R. O. Jones, "The Idea of Love in Garcilaso's Second Eclogue," M. L. R. XLVI, 1951, p. 391; Chapter IV, note 356.

17 R. O. Jones, A Literary History of Spain: The Golden Age, London: Barnes and Noble, 1971, p. 29.

18 R. O. Jones, A Literary History of Spain, p. 92.

APPENDIX I: THE QUESTION OF AUSIAS MARCH'S ORTHODOXY

Orthodoxy is largely a matter of definition and conformity.[1] For this reason it is difficult to determine whether an author can be considered religiously orthodox or not. In recent years two basic divergent views concerning this aspect of Ausias March's sensibility have emerged, neither of which I find possible to accept entirely.

Much of the research done on the poetry of Ausias March rests on the very legitimate presupposition that if Ausias March was a scholastic poet following the doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas, as claimed by Amedée Pagès and Josep Torras i Bages, his orthodoxy could not be questioned.[2] Yet, this point of view has been seriously challenged. Joan Fuster refuses to see in Ausias March a scholastic poet.[3] Although he does not question the idea that the Valencian poet had a good knowledge of St. Thomas' Summa theologica, he interprets his religious poetry as the product of a rationalist sceptical attitude:

> ... ens obliga a eludir una confusió previsible: mencionada com a font de March l'Escolàstica, sabent-lo autor del Cant espiritual i implantat encara en el mon de l'Edat mitjana, podriem apressar-nos a identificar l'actitud ètica d'Ausiàs amb la del cristianisme. Estic persuadit que una tal identificació resultaria imposible, mirant-ho de prop. No negaré que les linies generals del pensament ausiasmarquià coincideixin amb les del tomisme. Però trobo que això només és fins a un cert punt, ... El refus dels sentits, en l'eròtica sublimada d'Ausiàs, no es fa en nom ni per inducció de cap força sobrenatural, sinò per mer convenciment racional...[4]

Fuster's point of view is a meritorious attempt to move away from the interpretation of Ausias March as a belated mediaeval troubadour imposed by Pagès' analysis. This, however, has serious drawbacks. It is an attempt to make of Ausias March a harbinger of the Renaissance. By attributing to Ausias March's poetry rationalist and sceptical tendencies, Fuster adjusts his perspective to the interpretation of the

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Renaissance made by Arnaldo della Torre and J. Burckhardt.[5] One of the key arguments in favour of Fuster's thesis is his interpretation of a central verse in the "Cant Espiritual":

> no sols es tracta d'una mera convicció d'empecatament en les accions i en les volicions... hi ha més profunda, una altra mancança. "Catòlic só, mas la fe no m'escalfa", escriu.... Ausiàs reconeix taxativament el deficit fonamental de la seva religiositat....[6]

Taken at face value verse 185 of Poem CV, which Fuster quotes above, is an expression of Ausias March's acknowledgement of his weak faith and real love for God. Nevertheless, in its proper context it is one of the clearest statements of his profound devoutness. It is one of the expressions of the "constant exalted piety" of Ausias March, as noted by Eugène Baret.[7] In the "Cant Espiritual", verse 185 introduces a stanza that describes the heterodox fervour of Ausias March's faith:

Cathòlic so,	mas la Fe no·m escalfa	
que la fredor	lenta dels senys apague	
car yo leix so	que mes sentiments senten,	
e paradis	crech per fe y rahó jutge.	
Aquella part	del esperit és prompta	
mas la dels senys	rocegant-la'm acoste;	
donchs tu, Senyor,	al foch de fe m'acorre,	
tant que la part	que·m port fret abrase	(CIV, vv. 185-192).

The tension in these verses is between reason and faith, and Ausias March expresses his anxiety and desire for a movement of personal revelation. This is, in fact, the kind of self-accusation found in the writings of the devotio moderna. Thomas à Kempis, Ausias March's Dutch contemporary, provides an excellent counterpart for these verses in his The Imitation of Christ: "Appease the hunger of this Your beggar; warm my coldness by the fire of Your love and lighten my blindness by the light of your presence" (underlining is mine).[8] It is not a real lack of faith, or scepticism, that Kempis and

Ausias March express in these statements, but a need to heighten their interior experience. Hence, Fuster is correct in noting the tensions that beset Ausias March's religious experience, and the intensity with which he seeks a transcendent love. Contrary to Fuster, however, I believe that the tensions and doubts inherent in the work of Ausias March are not the product of rationalism. They are profoundly Christian and pertain to a quasi-mystic sensibility.

Problems of faith pervade Ausias March's poetry. For the Valencian poet, however, faith is not passive; it is a living experience. As I have indicated in Chapter IV of this thesis, this is also a key factor in the spirituality of Petrarch and Ficino, which leads to their avowed Christian Platonism. A similar situation occurs in the work of Ausias March through the influence of Ramon Lull. In his poetry Ausias March expresses his awareness of the conflict that exists between natural reason and faith which remains unsoundable. Much of his religious and moral poetry constitutes an effort to summon his confidence in faith, since reason cannot demonstrate its basic tenets: "Ésser un Déu l'enteniment ho mostra; / en lo restant és mester la fe nostra" (CXIII, vv. 129-130). Thus, in this poem Ausias March seeks to express the sense of mystery by which the intellect apprehends the veracity of the faith. Such a preoccupation naturally entails an inquiry into the realist notion of causation.[9] Ausias March, therefore, turns to the concept of the great chain of being: "Les fins dels fets estan encadenades / secretament, que no és ull les veja" (CXIII, vv. 245-246).[10] What the eye of flesh does not see, the intellect can conceive imperfectly. Ausias March's statement also implies a reference to the problem of predestination, with which I will deal

below. It can be seen in March's poetry as a source of anxiety stemming from the conflict of faith and reason. Thus, in certain poems, such as the "Cants de Mort", one finds expressions of possible scepticism:

> Tu, Pietat, ¿com dorms en aquell cas
> que·l cor de carn fer esclatar no sabs?
> No tens poder que tal fet no acabs?
> Qual tan cruell qu· en tal cas no·t loàs?
>
> (XCIII, vv. 37-40)

and:

> Déu piadós e just cruel se mostra:
> tant és en nos torbada conexença
>
> (XCII, vv. 175-176)

As in Ficino and Petrarch, these occasional moments of doubt in Ausias March's poetry, find some solution in his belief in the primitive doctrine of the dignity of man, which is intimately related to the concept of the great chain of being, since it allows man to partake in the divine nature of his cause.[11] Four references to this concept can be found in his poems. These are partially integrated into the general problem of the composite nature of man.[12] In spite of this reference to the duality of man Ausias March does stress that man's real nature is his soul. For Ausias March, man's nature inclines him to seek to transcend the delights of animals. These animal delights,[13] as they are frequently called in Ausias March's poetry, refer to the pleasures of the flesh. Hence for the Valencian poet man's true end is to seek intellectual fulfilment, this befits his nature:

> Qui·n aquest món d'ésser hom se contenta
> cerque delits que ssa natura vulla
> llexant als bruts los camps e llur despulla,
> e sos delits no·ls acurt ne·ls dó·npenta.
> Lo delit d'om en l'entendre s'assenta
> quant veritat per aquell és sabuda
>
> (C, vv. 61-66)

The soul, then, constitutes the real seat of human nature. It is to the rational soul that the intellect pertains, and through the operations of the latter man achieves his true end. The soul is divine and it yearns to return to its origin; because of this man can be said to have been made in the similitude of God:

> L'animal hom és animal comú
> toquant de brut e de celestial
> brut per la carn; per l'arma divinal
>
> (CVI, vv. 121-123)

Like most Neoplatonist thinkers, Ausias March is conscious of the dual condition of human nature after the soul's immersion in the body. He, nevertheless, recognizes the inherently divine, and therefore good, capacity of human nature which lies in the transcendent power of his soul. Thus, he can say, like St. Augustine and the Chartrian Platonists, that man can find in himself the real end of his activity. In other words, man can perceive the divine cause reflected in the mirror of his soul. This is a point which has escaped Pagès' interpretation of verses 43-44 in Poem CIV:

> On ne voit pas comment ce principe suivant lequel l'homme peut trouver en lui-même la fin de son activité, s'accorde avec la morale chrétienne pour qui la nature est mauvaise.[14]

Ausias March understands man's real nature to be good, in a manner foreshadowing the humanist belief in pagan virtue,[15] which is consistent with the evangelical tradition:

> Si Déu no fos, ne lo món donàs premis,
> per si mateix hom deu fer bones obres,
> car en ben fer lo bon hom se delita
> e l'ome reb de sa bon' obra paga
>
> (CIV, vv. 41-44)

This statement may not be in agreement with the Aristotelian scholastic tradition, followed by Pagès, but it is consistent with the evangelical

sensibility within which Ausias March works. Nature cannot be bad if its beauty is a reflection of God's goodness. Ausias March is conscious of the reflection of divine attributes in nature, and he seeks to apprehend it intellectually. Yet, he is also aware of the innate contradiction of man's fallen state:

> Pren-me n axí com aquell qui contempla
> l'ésser del hom e com és de Déu obra,
> e puix ell ve a contemplar sos actes,
> tant avorreix trobar-s·en lo món home
>
> (CXVII, vv. 57-60)

As these verses indicate, human nature is divine but its undoing is the "descensus ad inferos". Ausias March's concern is with the soul's recovery of its plenitude. Spiritual tension in his poetry consequently arises from the knowledge of the soul's fall and his desire to assert his divine nature.

It is the emphasis that Ausias March places on man's divine nature that forces him to seek a pure love. As such, the erotic experience in Ausias March constitutes a basic incentive for the soul's return to its origin, for love causes it to recall the real source of all beauty, and this necessitates a rejection of scepticism:

> Qui l'esperit infinit lo vol creure,
> molt li és prop que part de Déu lo crega;
> e qui tornar a son principi nega,
> no li és luny que toqu·en Déu descreure.
> E donchs puix Déu és lo principi nostre,
> complit és foll qui tornar no·y desija
>
> (CXII, vv. 361-366) [16]

The problem of scepticism is present in the poetry of Ausias March, as some of the above references indicate. One cannot, however, deduce from these occasional comments that Ausias March's own position was consistently sceptical. In his poetry, the conflict between reason and faith is resolved by an ardent desire to transcend

worldly beauty, in order to contemplate its real source. Ausias March, like Hughes de Saint Victor and the Florentine Neoplatonists, finds it impossible to serve both God and the world, because his soul, which is a "tertium quid" between the world and God, would be torn between the two.[17] It would constantly fluctuate between divine and earthly beauty, which state would lead to sorrow. He sums up this situation, which is in fact the subject of all his poetry, in a later poem: "Déu e lo món ensemps no·s poden colre; / qui·u vol fer tot, aparell-se a dolre" (CXII, vv. 369-370). This is the key spiritual problem in his poetry. He is faced with the desire to love both the world and God, because he is conscious of the divine presence in particular beauty, but he must transcend the particular.

The spirituality of Ausias March can then be said to have an evangelical basis. Ausias March probably never had any knowledge of The Imitation of Christ which certain passages of his work recall, as I have noted above. As recent research, such as that of Pere Ramírez i Molas, following in the steps of M. Menéndez-Pelayo and Mario Casellà, has shown, Ausias March's thought is not affected as much by St. Thomas Aquinas as by Ramon Lull.[18] This evidently places Ausias March in the ambience of the evangelical current. Naturally, a complete study of Ausias March's religious sensibility would be the object of a separate thesis examining the various religious currents present in Catalonia between 1400 and 1460. Such a work would involve a complete analysis of the writing of Ramon Lull, Arnau de Vilanova, San Vincent Ferrer and Isabel de Villena. I will limit myself to a brief examination-enumeration of several definite points of heterodoxy that are strikingly evident in Ausias

March's work.

The study of pre-Erasmian spiritual currents in Spain generally distinguishes three principal figures: Arnau de Vilanova, San Vincent Ferrer and Ramon Lull, all of whom are Valencian.[19] The prominence of these three figures indicates that the Aragonese kingdom was fertile for heterodox spirituality,[20] and undoubtedly its mercantile economy was a contributing factor. In Castilian literature it is common to focus attention on the contribution of _conversos_ in order to explain heterodoxy. Yet, in Catalonia and Valencia the situation is considerably altered by the additional presence of the Cathar phenomenon, which continues to play an active role well into the middle of the thirteenth century.[21] It can also be seen to contribute to the shaping of Ausias March's sensibility, if not directly, at least through Ramon Lull. The merging of Judaic and Cathar elements in the general evangelical current further complicates any explanation of the problem of heterodoxy. Thus, the problem with the theory of Judaic influences, or _converso_ particularities, as studied by Charles Fraker in the _Cancionero de Baena_, is that points of heterodoxy which he identifies with _converso_ literature are also those identified with Catharism by specialists in that subject.[22] One cannot, in Catalan literature, associate certain traits exclusively with Judaism, and it is necessary to set aside this common means of distinction. What must be understood is that these currents merge, because both Catharism and the evangelical movement represent an effort to return to the doctrines and sensibility of the Early Church.[23] As Frances Yates has demonstrated, Ramon Lull's work is an attempt to convince those Cathars, who had taken refuge in Catalonia after the disaster of Montségur, by using their

books: "in the right way for the most pious purpose of Christian apologetic".[24] Hence, Cathar spirituality merges into the evangelical tradition independently from the Judaic and Arabic elements in Spain. Cathar spirituality came to the Catalan countries principally through the immigration and establishment of the corporations of weavers, as it had in Provence and Italy.[25] It is to be noted that the development of the textile industry in the Valencian kingdom, and in particular, in Ausias March's native Gandia,[26] coincides with the massive immigration of weavers fleeing the Albigensian Inquisition at the end of the thirteenth century.[27] As Jordi Ventura Subirats explains, in the first half of the thirteenth century, Valencia became a centre of Catharism in the west.[28] This spiritual current became indistinguishable from certain later forms of modern devotion, such as the bequinatge of Arnau de Vilanova.[29] It is not surprising, therefore, that in the fourteenth century the inquisitor, Nicolás Eymerich, could find ground to question the orthodoxy of Ramon Lull.[30]

Ausias March writes over a century after the decline of Catharism in Valencia. By then the Albigensian tendencies as a separate entity had become lost in the greater current of evangelical spirituality that was sweeping Europe. It would be misleading if not erroneous, to identify Ausias March's sensibility with Catharism, since the latter had ceased to exist separately. One does note, however, that in one particular instance there is an unmistakable reference in his work which proceeds from a fragment of Cathar writings. This gives one sufficient ground to question his orthodoxy. It is a phrase that is found in a Cathar ritual, and can have been integrated into a manual of popular devotion. Thus, in the "Cant Espiritual", which Amedée Pagès considers to be "le testament

poètique d'un disciple de saint Thomas",[31] Ausias March makes a very explicit dualist statement:

> Yo•m trob offès contra Tu ab gran colpa,
> e si no•y bast Tu de ma carn te farta
> ab que no•m tochs l'esperit, qu•a Tu sembla
>
> (CV, vv. 210-212)

In this instance it is obvious that Ausias March makes a sharp distinction between the flesh and the spirit. The fact that he condemns the flesh, but asks for the redemption of the soul indicates that he attributes the source of sin to the former. This is a proposition that St. Augustine expressly rejected as fundamentally Manichaean.[32] Ausias March does not normally advocate such a strongly dualist position. One notes that he repeats St. Augustine's definition of sin in Poem CXXVIII,[33] and that in other poems he frequently makes statements concerning the responsibility of the will that are consistent with the Augustinian definition.[34] In the "Cant Espiritual" we are faced with a situation of interior devotion in which Ausias March transcends the limits of formal religion and expresses the very tensions of his faith.

It seems to me that the source of verses 211-212 in Poem CV is the Servitum of the Cathar catechism.[35] The phrase used by Ausias March is of exceptional importance, because it is exclusively Cathar, and it does not seem to be attributable to any other source. Specialists in the history of Catharism single it out as one of the most representative statements of Cathar sensibility.[36] As in the "Cant Espiritual" the phrase found in the Servitum requests the damnation of the flesh and the salvation of the soul: "O Senhor, juja e condapna los vises de la carn, no aias mercé de la carn nada de corruptio, mais aias mercé del esperit pausat en carcer."[37]

Steven Runciman presents this section of the Servitum by explaining that the complete Ritual does not contain any overtly heretical statements,[38] but that this phrase is a key to the dualist implications of the doctrine contained in the Ritual:

> The Servitum was apparently recited in the vernacular. It contained no heretical statement. Only the stress it laid upon the sins of the flesh and the phrase "Have no mercy on the flesh born in corruption but have mercy on the spirit held in prison" indicate the dualist nature of its reciters.[39]

The affinity of Ausias March's verses 211-212 with the Cathar phrase is self-evident, although it is not a verbatim repetition. The language and concepts manipulated are the same. Certain facets of the Cathar phrase are immediately lacking in verses 211-212 of Ausias March, such as the adjectival phrases "born of corruption" and "held in prison". These qualifications are implicit in Ausias March's use of the Cathar phrase. References to the prison of the spirit are found in other poems of Ausias March, and in Poem CV, only a few verses above 211-212, the "descensus ad inferos" is given an extreme interpretation. Ausias March conceives of it as a kind of eternal damnation. It is the fall of the soul into its prison of corruption: "Torn a no-res, yo·t suplich, lo meu ésser, / car més me val que tostemps l'escur càrcer" (CV, vv. 197-198). In another poem Ausias March explicitly refers to the flesh as a source of corruption: "Lo cors, qui és corrupta creatura" (LXXXVII, v. 13). There is no reason to doubt that in verses 211-212 of Poem CV Ausias March understood the concepts implicit in the Cathar phrase which he echoes. In the last section of the "Cant Espiritual", Ausias March is particularly concerned with the sins of the flesh.[40] In this context his usage of a Cathar metaphor is a good indication of his heterodox leanings. Again it is important

to stress that this does not mean that Ausias March was a belated Cathar, but that without necessarily being a converso the socio-cultural circumstance within which he lived could lead him to be affected by currents of heterodox spirituality. This is possible only because Catharism is not a cryptic religion, but principally an evangelical reaction:

> C'est dans une atmosphère de haute spiritualité chrétienne que le catharisme s'est développé; et il s'inscrit dans un mouvement plus large de rénovation religieuse d'esprit evangélique. Il est de fait que les Cathares n'ont jamais parlé de Mani, ni de Sophia, ni des Eons: ils ne citent que les Evangiles et les paroles mêmes de Jésus-Christ.[41]

A perusal of Ausias March's poetry reveals that he was, indeed, very familiar with the Psalms and the New Testament, as one can verify in the long list of Biblical references found in his poetry which I have catalogued in Appendix II (L: 2). Although these aspects of Ausias March's poetry might have been attributable to Catharism had Ausias March written in the fourteenth century, his familiarity with the New Testament cannot be considered a sign of Catharism in the fifteenth century, but merely one of evangelical devotion.

A fundamental characteristic of heterodox sensibility is the desire to penetrate the mysteries of divine Providence.[42] Thus, one of the themes frequently associated with heterodox spirituality is the question of predestination, in which the freedom of will is denied. The importance of this problem for many Spanish poets of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries has been evinced by Charles Fraker's studies on the Cancionero de Baena.[43] Although his ideas on this subject do not present any particular exceptionality, it is important to note that Ausias March, like his Castilian contemporaries, expresses certain heterodox points of view. In his research Fraker,

following F. Márquez Villanueva, attributes the interest manifested for this theme by the poets of the Cancionero de Baena, to a development of Wyclifism among conversos. One of the main arguments used by Fraker, who recognizes that there might have been other sources, is that the converso poets use the word "preçito" in order to refer to the reprobate. This word is considered by Fraker and Márquez-Villanueva to be particularly Wyclifite, and to have been introduced in Castile at the time of the debate on predestination:

> In other words the connexion between the word and a school of thought is visible even at a distance of four or five centuries, and it is not unbelievable that it would be more visible at closer range. In this connexion the early history of preçito in Castilian is revealing. Apparently the use of this word (with its cognates) by the Baena poets along with one late passage in the Rimado de palacio are the earliest that can be found. The date for the first of these appearances must therefore be about 1400... This takes on greater significance, if we realize that preçito appears precisely at the same time that predestination is first discussed in Castilian vernacular literature; as we know, it is in such discussions that preçito is used. It is true that not every such context treats predestination in Wyclifite style, but even when the connexion is apparent Wyclifism is not obvious, it is at least believable that widespread lay discussion of predestination might well have been sparked from a Wyclifite flint and that the presence of preçito signals precisely that fact.[44]

Ausias March uses the Catalan form of the Latin praescitus, which is at the origin of the Castilian preçito, in a secular reference to the theme of predestination. In a love poem Ausias March compares himself with a reprobate,[45] who pleads for God's mercy although he knows that his damnation is inevitable:

> Sí co·l precís — que no·s de mort deliure,
> vehent-se prop — d'aquell seu jorn derrer,
> ne prega Déu — li sia mercener
> e sab que va — hon null hom se pot riure
>
> (XXXV, vv. 25-28)

The view of predestination implied in these verses is extreme. At no point is it suggested that the reprobate might ever be saved; he is condemned by God's judgement and can expect no mercy. That precís

refers to the reprobate in this context is evident from verse 28. Now, the question that arises is that if, as Fraker suggests, the use of praescitus signals Wyclifism, then Ausias March might be considered a Wyclifite. It is in such instances, however, that one becomes especially aware of the cultural independence of Catalan literature from Castile. As Fraker notes, the word praescitus was used by European theologians long before Wyclif. The remarkable aspect of Fraker's discussion is that the use of praescitus, instead of the more common reprobatus, belongs to a long tradition divergent from that of the Schoolmen such as Aquinas and Scotus, and is principally found in Franciscan circles.[46] Thus, although Ausias March takes a "hard view"[47] of predestination, as the above quotation implies and other quotations will elucidate, one notes that the presence of the word precís in his poetry probably does not proceed from a Wyclifite source, but from Ramon Lull. Indeed, this word is found in Catalan vernacular discussions of predestination at least a century before it is in Castilian. In the one hundredth chapter of his Libre de Meravelles, which is entitled "De predestinació e de franc arbitre", Lull discusses the question of the reprobate and the possibility of his salvation through merits:

> Molt cogità Felix en ço que l'ermità hac dit de predestinació e de franc arbitre, e meravellà's fortment que hom predestinat se pusca perdre, ne que hom precís se pusca salvar;...[48] (underlining is mine).

Given that Ausias March is known to have read Ramon Lull, one cannot assume that his use of the word precís signals a Wyclifite influence. Lull's interpretation of the problem of predestination in the Libre de Meravelles is orthodox, but it must be remembered that this theme is central to the evangelical sensibility, inasmuch as the question of necessity is inevitably present in the Platonic system.[49] Thus,

the points of doctrine raised by Ausias March are not necessarily Wyclifite. His sensibility may have been affected by any number of evangelical currents, including the Cathar.[50] Furthermore, the problem of the predestination of the elect remains central to the writings of St. Augustine, who never entirely rejected this aspect of his Manichaean sensibility.[51] The discussion of this problem, therefore, remains bound with the derivations of Augustinianism.

Discussion of the theme of predestination involves two basic aspects, one theological and the other astrological.[52] The heterodox approach to the first aspect is that the salvation or the damnation of the individual is in no way related to his personal merits or the performance of good works. This point of view is expressed by Ausias March in various instances.[53] It is, however, in the "Cant Espiritual" that Ausias March raises various theological points questioning God's Wisdom and His Justice most explicitly. Towards the beginning of the "Cant Espiritual" he questions the value of works:

> Mas yo•m recort que meritist lo Ladre
> (tant quant hom veu no•y bastaven ses obres);
> ton spirit là hòn li plau spira:
> com ne per què no sab qui en carn visca
>
> (CV, vv. 29-32).

As verse 31 indicates, the thief, whose works would not have sufficed to save him, was redeemed by the arbitrary justice of God, which cannot be understood rationally but by faith alone (verse 32). This is a case which Ausias March attributes entirely to God's election. Similarly, the irreconcilable nature of predestination with reason leads Ausias March to question the goodness of God. He formulates a question which Fraker would attribute specifically to the converso sensibility, but which can also be attributed to Cathar sources.[54]

Fraker refers to the question made by Alfonso Martínez de Toledo in the Corbacho concerning God's justice in having created a man knowing that this same man was to be damned:

> O Señor!, pues de necesario me tengo de dañar, ¿por qué quesiste que nasciese, pues a Ty era notorio, en tu paresciencia eternalmente dispuesta, que yo avía nasciendo de dañar? Pues, sy Tú lo quesyste asy, a Ty sería gloria como soberano señor, pero, Señor, por Tú ser verdadera justicia pienso que non me fazes justicia; ca mejor fuera que non nasciera para tal condepnación aver...[55]

Ausias March repeats this unresolved question with its Wyclifite implications in the "Cant Espiritual":

> Tu creïst mé perquè l'ànima salve,
> e pot-se fer de mi sabs lo contrari.
> Si és axí, ¿per què, donchs, me creaves
> puix fon en Tu lo saber infallible?
> Torn a no-res, yo·t suplich, lo meu ésser,
> car més me val que tostemps l'escur càrcer;
> yo crech a Tu com volguist dir de Judes
> que·l fóra bo no fora nat al món home
>
> (CV, vv. 193-200)

Like Martínez de Toledo, Ausias March expresses his doubts concerning God's justice, much as we have seen him do in Poems XCII and XCIII above. These verses are of interest inasmuch as they illustrate the tension in Ausias March's poetry that arises from the conflict of faith and reason. Thus, in subsequent verses Ausias March transforms the question of predestination into an outright expression of doubt:

> Per mi segur, havent rebut batisme,
> no fos tornat als braços de la vida,
> mas a la mort hagués retut lo deute
> e de present yo no viuria·n dubte!
>
> (CV, vv. 201-204)

Whether one interprets the word "dubte" as "fear" or as "doubt", the fact remains that fear of his predestination would not exist if Ausias March did not doubt God's justice, like many of his

contemporaries.[56] Since the question of predestination cannot be resolved by reason, Ausias March turns to a highly intense expression of interior faith. Were Ausias March's orthodoxy unquestionable, this kind of scrupulosity would be avoided by a greater confidence in works and his free-will.

Without necessarily going to the extremes of heterodoxy and scepticism Ausias March is aware of the influence of cosmic determinism.[57] Thus, the questions which he raises in the "Cant Espiritual" can be shown to be closely associated with the problem of astrological predestination.[58] As I pointed out above, Ausias March has recourse to the theory of causality in order to demonstrate the validity of his faith. The concept of the chain is closely related to the problem of cosmic determinism. Although it is not supposed to affect the individual's free-will, the astral machine is considered to determine the individual's nature or temperament. It is, then, interesting to note that in the "Cant Espiritual" Ausias March introduces the problem of his own predestination in terms of causality:

> Ajuda'm Déu, car ma força és flaca;
> desig saber què de mi predestines:
> a Tu·s present y a mi causa venible
>
> (CV, vv. 150-152)

Just as in the subsequent verses Ausias March is concerned with the fate of his soul, "causa" in verse 152 refers to the concept of the procession and return of the soul, in the most elementary implication of causality.[59] Within the great chain of being all events are secretly linked together, as Ausias March states in Poem CXIII, vv. 245-246 quoted above. The poet's predestination is known to God, not only in virtue of St. Augustine's concept of God's time, but

because He is the efficient cause He also knows the final cause, which remains for Ausias March "a forthcoming cause". Thus, in a poem in which Ausias March speaks to his heart, he repeats his belief in the immutability of God's decree:

> Ans que lo món, fon vostra mala sort,
> puix fon en Déu lo vostre cas present,
> e lo saber de Aquell no consent
> que sia menys vostre cas ne pus fort,
> sinó aytal com per Ell és sabut
>
> (LII, vv. 9-13).

Strictly speaking this view is orthodox inasmuch as Ausias March limits his statement to the idea that predestination is determined before any foreseen merits. The point that draws our attention is that Ausias March introduces into the discussion a reference to Fortune, "mala sort".[60] Although it is of no consequence in this instance, it has astrological implications in other verses.

The question of the great chain of being and causality introduces the concept of astrological influences. This can have deterministic consequences if it is considered that the power of the stars exceeds that of the individual's free-will in determining his future. It is, then, imperative to know to what extent Ausias March considers that astral influence encroaches on the individual's free-will. That Ausias March believes in astral influence is evident in his reference to the fact that all men desire good that comes from "accident or nature":

> Voler honor, glòria, bens o fama,
> e tot quant ve d'accident o natura,
> y aquella fi qu·en la virtut atura:
> d'aquestes fins lo voler d'hom s'enflamma
>
> (CXII, vv. 335-338).

"Accident" and "nature" are technical astrological terms. "Accident"

refers to an event in the course of a man's life brought about by the position of the stars at the time at which the event occurs. "Nature" refers to the temperament of the individual which is caused by the astral configuration dominant at the moment of his birth.[61] Thus, in Poem LXXV, in which Venus is shown to rule the world, Venus declares that her own power is inherent, or natural, whereas that of the other planets is merely accidental:

> Mas Venus diu: - Yo són rey natural,
> ab alguns dēus, senyors jus mi sients;
> per mi són bons e per si no valents;
> los altres han poder accidental
>
> (LXXV, vv. 29-32).

Now, the temperament, or nature, of the individual as it is determined by the stars at the moment of his birth is not supposed to affect his free-will. However, certain writers do suggest that the temperament affects the individual's moral acts.[62] In Ausias March the constant interrelation between body and soul is a strife, in which the desire of the body frequently usurps that of the soul, and the temperament of the body is said to overpower the soul's will. Ausias March sums up this situation:

> l'arma coman a Dēu, lo qui l'à feta,
> lexant lo cors desastruch per mal astre;
> ja no li plau de sos volers lo rastre,
> puys ab dolor viu per ell, no discreta
>
> (LXXVI, vv. 29-32).

In these verses Ausias March suggests that the body which is "ill-starred", causes the soul to lose its discretion, which is the source of its free-will, and therefore, the poet seeks to release the soul. The stars, then, influence the soul indirectly. This kind of astrological influence is passive, and Ausias March does not develop its implications to the extreme that Villasandino does in

the Cancionero de Baena. It should be noted, however, that he does lean in that direction and stops short of overtly associating the ill-starred man with the reprobate. Thus, although his approach to theological predestination tends towards the "hard view" in certain instances, he does not carry this to its consequences in astrological determinism. These instances of deviation from the orthodox position are not exceptional; they are of a topical nature in fifteenth century, and indicate that Ausias March was affected by the general spiritual unrest. From this point of view they are insufficient to suggest that Ausias March deviated from the norm towards a heretical position.

Those statements in Ausias March's poetry that can be considered to have heretical implications are made in instances of extreme emotional pressure. It must be noted, however, that although they blend within the overall intense personal tone of Ausias March's poetry, they are neither consistent nor well developed. Thus, for instance, in the fifth Song of Death, Poem XCVI, Ausias March declares that his prayers for his beloved are vain, for if she is in heaven he could not express his bliss, and if she is in hell his prayers will not change anything:

> Preguant a Déu, les mans no•m cal pleguar,
> car fet és tot quant li pot avenir:
> si és e•ll cel, no•s pot lo bé spremir;
> si en infern, en foll és mon preguar
>
> (XCVI, vv. 17-20)

This statement is an obvious denial of the value of prayers for the dead. It is worthy of note that Ausias March makes no reference in this passage to purgatory, which lies behind the purpose of the prayers for the dead. In order to have value this statement would

have to deny the doctrine of Purgatory. Yet, in a previous poem Ausias March addresses a prayer to Mary requesting her intervention before Christ if his beloved is in purgatory:

> Mare de Déu, si és en purgatori
> son esperit per no purgats delictes,
> sí ton Fill prech no guart los prechs d'on vénen
> (XCIV, vv. 129-131).

These two quotations tend to contradict each other. We must, then, take into account that Ausias March's denial of the value of prayers for the dead, which would involve a denial of purgatory, is made in a moment of intense personal grief. In these instances the finer points of theology are overlooked in order to intensify the expression of the poet's emotion. It is not, as such, heterodox belief.

One is struck, nonetheless, by the fact that Ausias March's statements reflect the instability of the religious atmosphere in fifteenth-century Valencia. The very fact that Ausias March could allow himself to make such statements does reflect an interiorization of religion compatible with an anti-clerical feeling which he expresses with reserve in a moral poem:

> tot estament son ofici no serva
> (no·m sé·ls prelats; perdon-m'o Déu com dubte).
> Papes e reys fins al estat pus minve
> fan lo que·ls plau, mas no pas lo que volen (deuen)
> (CIV, vv. 11-14).[63]

Ausias March expresses the religious unrest and doubt of his age. For this reason, he cannot be considered to be truly heretical, because his position does not seem to differ substantially from the community in which he lived.[64] His doubts are those that preoccupy the men of his age, and they are expressed within the desire to strengthen his faith. Yet, it is an unrest that is not entirely

compatible with strict orthodoxy. The Reformation and Counter-Reformation arose out of the religious instability that was common at the time of Ausias March, and which could then make his heterodox statements seem acceptable. After the first Erasmian period in Spain, it is interesting to note that the translators of Ausias March found it necessary to alter these statements which had become absolutely unacceptable in the eyes of the Inquisition.[65]

NOTES TO APPENDIX I

1 "L'hérésie, qui est une rupture (par choix) dans l'assentissement, implique donc, sociologiquement une rupture avec la communauté, qui, sous une forme ou sous une autre, est le lieu de l'orthodoxie....

L'hérétique, c'est-à-dire le croyant qui "choisit", commet donc: 1° une impertinence vis-à-vis du Dieu dont il prétend écouter la Parole, et 2° un écart, bientôt une rupture, vis-à-vis de la communauté dont le consensus est, sinon une règle juridique, du moins la surface portante de la communication des mystères divins. Le croyant n'a pas le droit à l'hérésie" (M. D. Chenu, "Orthodoxie et hérésie: le point de vue du théologien," Hérésies et sociétés dans l'Europe pré-industrielle, 11e-18e siècles, ed. Jacques Le Gof, Paris: Mouton, 1968, p. 11). This definition avoids confusing heresy and infidelity, which is often the case in the history of the Spanish Inquisition. As I. S. Revah points out in his comment on Chenu's definition: "Dans 10% des cas seulement l'hérétique veut demeurer à l'intérieur de la foi. L'immense majorité des hérétiques poursuivie veut être infidèle: juifs et morisques placés de force dans la communauté catholique" (Ibid., p. 17). Out of this arises the confusion that causes some critics to associate, all too easily, the deviant forms of spirituality with Judaism in Spanish literature.

2 Amedée Pagès, Auzias March et ses prédécesseurs, Paris: Honoré Champion, 1912, p. 308 (inter alia); Josep Torras i Bages, La tradició catalana, Barcelona: Selecta, 1966 (original 1892), pp. 321-348.

3 Joan Fuster (ed.), Ausiàs March, Antologia poètica, Barcelona: Selecta, 1959.

4 Joan Fuster (ed.), Ausiàs March, Antologia poètica, p. 34.

5 Arnaldo della Torre, Storia dell' Academia Platonica Firenze: Carnesecchi e Figli, 1902, and Jacob Burckhardt, The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy, trans. S. G. C. Middlemore, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1921; and see Chapter IV of this thesis, notes 78 and 99.

6 Joan Fuster (ed.), Ausiàs March, Antologia poètica, p. 35.

7 Eugène Baret, Espagne et Provence: Etudes sur la littérature du Midi de l'Europe Genève: Slatkine reprints, 1970 (original Paris, 1857), p. 173: "la piété exaltée d'Auzias March est constante."

8 Thomas à Kempis, The Imitation of Christ, trans. Leo Sherley-Price, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976 (re-ed. of 1952), p. 213.

9 See M. D. Chenu, La théologie au douzième siècle, Paris: Vrin, 1957, pp. 310-314.

10 The concept of the great chain of being is completed by Ausias March's reference to the theory of the microcosm in Poem CXII, vv. 375-376: "Per menor món 1'om per tots se nomena, / e lo major resembla·n moltes coses."

11 See Chapter III, note 109 and Chapter IV, notes 107 and 120.

12 See Chapter IV, note 170.

13 See Poems XLV, v. 44; C, v. 114; CVI, v. 103; CXII, v. 243.

14 Amedée Pagès, Commentaire des poésies d'Auzias March, Paris: Honoré Champion, 1925, p. 118.

15 Anthony H. T. Levi, Pagan Virtue and the Humanism of the Northern Renaissance, London: The Society for Renaissance Studies, 1974.

16 A serious problem of interpretation arises in verse 362 of Poem CXII. Rafael Ferreres (ed., Ausias March, Obra poética completa II, Madrid: Castalia, 1979, p. 213) translates it as, "está muy cerca que la parte de Dios la crea". The use of the definite article "la" before "parte", and the mood of "crea" either as the present subjunctive of "creer," or as present indicative of "crear", leaves the sense of the passage very unclear. The sense of the original Catalan phrase "que part de Déu lo crega" is: "that he believes it to be part of God". "Lo" refers to "esperit" in verse 361. This is a very heterodox statement of definite Cathar implications, if not inspired by Cathar writings (see Christine Thouzellier, Catharisme et Valdéisme en Languedoc, Paris: Béatrice Nauwelaerts, 1969, pp. 362-364). The soul partakes of the divine nature, but it is not part of the divine substance as Ausias March claims. It seems to me that this reflects in the poetry of Ausias March the influence of popular spirituality, such as the beguinatge of Arnau de Vilanova, which absorbed various Cathar elements (see Chapter III, note 109, and Jorge Ventura Subirats, "El catarismo en Cataluña," Boletín de la Real Academia de Buenas Letras de Barcelona, t. 28, 1960, p. 147; and Chapter IV, note 121 on St. Augustine's rejection of this Manichaean point).

17 See Chapter III, notes 21, 104 and 105; and Chapter IV, note 121.

18 M. Menéndez-Pelayo, Historia de las ideas estéticas en España t. II, Madrid: Viuda e Hijos de M. Tello, 1910, pp. 221-222; Mario Casellà, "A. Pagès, Auzias March et ses

prédécesseurs," Bulletino della Società Dantesca Italiana: Rassegna critica degli studi danteschi XX, 1913, p. 214; Pere Ramírez i Molas, La poesia d'Ausias March: anàlisi textual, cronologia, elements filosòfics (Ph.D.), Basle: University Publication, 1970, pp. 313-387.

19 See C. F. Fraker, Studies on the Cancionero de Baena, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1966, pp. 32, 66-67; "The Theme of Predestination in the Cancionero de Baena," B.H.S. LII, 1974, p. 229; "The 'Dejados' and the Cancionero de Baena," Hispanic Review XXXIII, 1965, p. 115; Eugenio Asensio, "El Erasmismo y las corrientes espirituales afines," Revista de filología española t. 36, 1952, pp. 75 and 96.

20 J. B. Avalle-Arce, "Los herejes del Durango," Temas medievales, Madrid: Gredos, 1974, pp. 120-123; José Antonio Maravall, "Franciscanismo, burguesía y mentalidad precapitalista: la obra de Eximenis," VIII Congreso de la historia de la Corona de Aragon II, 1, Valencia: Vives Mora, 1969-1973, pp. 285-306; J. Rubió i Balaguer, "El beat fra Mateu d'Agrigento a Catalunya i a Valencia: Notes sobre la vida religiosa en una cort del Renaixement," La Cultura Catalana del Renaixement a la Decadència, Barcelona: Edicions 62, 1964, pp. 27-47.

21 See Jorge Ventura Subirats, "El catarismo en Cataluña," pp. 136-141. Ventura Subirats documents continued Cathar activity well into the fourteenth century.

22 Certain themes, such as, anti-clericalism, interior devotion, predestination, the denial of personal immortality, and Stoicism, are frequently associated with Judaism (see C. F. Fraker, "Judaism in the Cancionero de Baena," in Studies on the Cancionero de Baena, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1966, pp. 9-62). Yet, these themes are also common to Cathar spirituality (see Steven Runciman, The Medieval Manichee: A Study of the Christian Dualist Heresy, Cambridge: University Press, 1960, pp. 88, 116, 118, 121 and 171; René Nelli, Ecritures Cathares, Paris: Denoël, 1959, pp. 21-23 and 26-27; L'Erotique des troubadours, Toulouse: Edouard Privat, 1963, pp. 221-225).

23 M. D. Chenu, La théologie au douzième siècle, p. 233; see in this thesis Chapter IV, note 58.

24 Frances Yates, "Ramon Lull and John Scotus Erigena," Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes vol. 23, London: University of London, 1960, p. 38.

25 Steven Runciman, The Medieval Manichee, p. 133.

26 See Chapter II.

27 Jorge Ventura Subirats, Els heretges catalans, Barcelona:

Selecta, 1976, pp. 58-59; "El catarismo en Cataluña," pp. 80-83.

28 J. Ventura Subirats, Els heretges catalans, p. 58; "El catarismo en Cataluña," p. 141.

29 See Chapter III, note 109; J. Ventura Subirats, "El catarismo en Cataluña," pp. 148-149. It is also important to note that the "Jerónimos" who were largely responsible for the propagation of the Bible in Spain, as well as, the introduction of the devotio moderna, were originally beguins, and that the latter were closely associated with Arnau de Vilanova (see C. F. Fraker, "Gonçalo Martínez de Medina, the Jerónimos and the Devotio Moderna," Hispanic Review XXXIV, 1966, p. 203).

30 F. Yates, "Ramon Lull and John Scotus Erigena," p. 39.

31 A. Pagès, Auzias March et ses prédécesseurs, p. 388.

32 See Chapter IV, notes 121, and especially 145 and 224.

33 "Lo mal, en les coses no és: / instrument son ab què hom fa; / perço en elles mal no ha" (CXXVIII, vv. 16-18).

34 See Amedée Pagès, Auzias March et ses prédécesseurs, pp. 292-293, and Chapter III of this thesis, discussion of Poem CXV.

35 This text is found in René Nelli, Ecritures Cathares, pp. 205-228; and L. Clédat, Le Nouveau Testament traduit au XIIIe siècle en langue provençale suivi d'un rituel cathare, Genève: Slatkine, 1968 (reprint of Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1887, p. XI); See also Chapter IV of this thesis, note 58.

36 See J. Ventura Subirats, "El catarismo en Cataluña," pp. 165-166; Steven Runciman, The Medieval Manichee, p. 154.

37 L. Clédat, Le Nouveau Testament traduit au XIIIe siècle en langue provençale suivi d'un rituel cathare, p. XI.

38 In spite of his statement that the Servitum, "contains no heretical statement", Steven Runciman goes on to explain the veiled sense of the work (The Medieval Manichee, pp. 163-170).

39 Steven Runciman, The Medieval Manichee, p. 154.

40 The "Cant Espiritual" takes this direction from stanzas XXI and XXII onwards. In these Ausias March emphasizes his consciousness of the sins of the flesh which keep him from attaining spiritual delight: "Prech-te, Senyor, que·m fasses insensible / e qu·en null temps alguns delits yo senta, / no solament

los leigs qui·t vénen contra, / mas tots aquells qu·indifferents se troben" (CV, vv. 169-172).

41 René Nelli, Ecritures cathares, p. 14.

42 "L'hérétique est un croyant fervent, voir passionné, intellectuellement, avant de l'être sociologiquement. La foi a déclanché dans son esprit - et au delà de son intellect même, dans son comportement mental - une curiosité de pénétrer le mystère, d'en avoir, en l'obscurité de sa transcendance, une intelligence intellectus fidei (M. D. Chenu, "Orthodoxie et hérésie," p. 12).

43 See note 19 above.

44 C. F. Fraker, "The Theme of Predestination in the Cancionero de Baena," p. 239.

45 Precís in Poem XXXV, verse 25 has been the source of some confusion for the commentators of Ausias March. A. Pagès (Commentaire des poésies d'Auzias March, p. 48) interprets it to mean "condamné à la décapitation". P. Bohigas (Ausias March, Poesies II, Barcelona: Barcino, 1952, p. 122) basically repeats Pagès' interpretation: "el condemnat a mort", and more recently Rafael Ferreres seems to realize that the sense is reprobate in his translation: "Así como el precito que no es librado de muerte" (Ausias March, Obra poética completa I, Madrid: Castalia, 1979, p. 249). There is no doubt that in this context, with the explicit hopelessness of the precís' request to God for salvation, Ausias March intends this word to mean "reprobate".

46 C. F. Fraker, "The Theme of Predestination in the Cancionero de Baena," pp. 238-240.

47 C. F. Fraker uses this term to refer to, "the notion that salvation or damnation is related in no way whatever to personal merits or sins of the person saved or damned" ("The Theme of Predestination in the Cancionero de Baena," p. 233).

48 Ramon Llull, "Libre de Meravelles," ed. M. Batllorí, Obres Essencials vol. I, Barcelona: Selecta, 1957, p. 474.

49 On this point see A. O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936, pp. 63-66. C. S. Lewis gives an account of how this problem is traditionally avoided by Christian Platonists, The Discarded Image, Cambridge: University Press, 1964, pp. 87-90.

50 See Christine Thouzellier, Catharisme et Valdéisme en Languedoc, pp. 365-368.

51 Steven Runciman, The Medieval Manichee, p. 16.

52 C. F. Fraker, "The Theme of Predestination in the Cancionero de Baena," p. 233.

53 See Chapter III, note 35.

54 See C. F. Fraker, Studies on the Cancionero de Baena, p. 52; "The Theme of Predestination in the Cancionero de Baena," pp. 228-232, and René Nelli, L'Erotique des troubadours, p. 223, in which he attributes the same question to the Catharism of Peire Cardenal, who might well be a possible source for Ausias March.

55 Alfonso Martínez de Toledo, Arcipreste de Talavera, o Corbacho, ed. J. Gonzalez Muela, Madrid: Castalia, 1970, p. 212.

56 In this instance "dubte" could be translated as either "fear" or "doubt". A. Terry in Ausias March: Selected Poems, Edinburgh: University Press, 1976, p. 127 translates this as "doubt", which I believe is exact.

57 In a metaphorical manner Ausias March refers to the influence of the stars in two instances: Poem XV, verses 25-28, and Poem XX, vv. 29-32.

58 The question of astrological or natural predestination is understood as the influence of the temperament on the individual's moral acts, see C. F. Fraker, Studies on the Cancionero de Baena, p. 42, and "The Theme of Predestination in the Cancionero de Baena," p. 233.

59 Pere Bohigas (Ausias March, Poesies V, p. 211) believes that "causa" in verse 152 of Poem CV means "cosa". Arthur Terry translates "causa" by "cause" (Ausias March, Selected Poems, p. 123). Rafael Ferreres (Ausias March, Obra poética completa II, p. 137) also translates "causa" by the Castilian "causa". Since Ausias March never uses "causa" to mean "cosa" in any other poem, Pere Bohigas' interpretation seems groundless.

60 The role of Fortuna, which generally has astrological implications for fifteenth-century Spanish poets (see C. F. Fraker, "The Theme of Predestination in the Cancionero de Baena," pp. 231-233), in relation to predestination is obvious in the short one stanza Poem LXXXII: "Quant plau a Déu que la fusta peresqua, / en segur port romp àncores y ormeig, / e de poch mal a molt hom morir veig: / null hom és cert d'algun fet com fenesqua. / L'ome sabent no tē pus avantatge / sinó que·l pech sol menys fets avenir. / L'esperiment y ells juhís veig fallir; / Fortuna y Cas los torben llur usatge" (LXXXII, vv. 1-8). As I tried to shew in Chapter V, the marine metaphor of the boat and the port refers here to the soul

and the body, and therefore to the soul leaving the body, or death. In verses 7 and 8 Ausias March explicitly states that death, which is arbitrarily willed by God (verse 1), defies reason and is ruled by Fortune and Chance.

61 See C. F. Fraker, "The Theme of Predestination in the Cancionero de Baena," p. 233. On the repercussions of this point specifically concerning the heterodox implications of the theory of melancholy-imagination see Michel Foucault, "Les déviations religieuses et le savoir médical," Hérésies et sociétés, pp. 19-29.

62 C. F. Fraker, "The Theme of Predestination in the Cancionero de Baena," p. 233.

63 Although the Bohigas edition (Ausias March, Poesies IV, p. 102) uses the word "volen" in verse 14 of Poem CIV, the editor notes that later manuscripts substitute "deuen" for "volen", and that "deuen" is probably the correct reading (p. 114).

64 See Chapter II, note 17, and notes 1 and 20 above.

65 See M. de Riquer, Traducciones castellanas de Ausias March en la Edad de Oro, Barcelona: Instituto Español de Estudios Mediterráneos, 1946, p. XXIV.

Appendix II Index to the Imagery of Ausias March

Introduction to the Index of Ausias March's Imagery

The purpose of an index of images and proverbial phrases present in the poetry of Ausias March is to provide the critic with a guide to the sets of ideologically and thematically related images used by this poet. It is designed to be used for further investigation on the work of Ausias March, and its influence on the poetry of successive generations of Spanish poets. While it is not intended to replace the reading of the complete poems of Ausias March, nor the concordance to his works,[1] it can be used independently from the latter, and should be used as a complementary tool for literary research.

Although the two existing commentaries[2] to the works of Ausias March, do refer to related images, they do so only in a sporadic manner and seem incomplete and unreliable in this matter. For the purpose for which it was designed the basic advantages of the index over the concordance are that, it lists all known sources of an image, with a reference to the most accessible edition of the source where necessary, next it enables the reader to locate all references to an image rapidly,[3] without having to conjure up a series of words that might be related to a theme or image, and finally, this index is not bound to a single edition, I have used the editions of A. Pagès and P. Bohigas, and have listed all manuscript variants of the images, that is, when there was a variation of the metaphor or theme, referred to. The index can, therefore, be used with any future edition of Ausias March, provided that these respect the numbering of the poems established by Pagès, which is now the acknowledged standard. This work should help overcome the general unfamiliarity of scholars with the poetry of Ausias March, by making reference to his work easier.

A number of important problems concerning imagery and cataloguing were fundamental to the preparation of this index. The

foremost problem was that of defining imagery in such a way as not to break up the logical unity of the verses, and yet not to combine sets of images. The main difficulty rested in the nature of the poetry in question. Ausias March has been called the "transmitter of the Dante heritage in Spain",[4] a remark which may not be entirely correct, but which serves to remind us of the predominant role which allegory plays in his poetry, as a means of psychological expression.[5] Allegory is image-forming since it animates, or illustrates, concepts and thought patterns.[6] Owing to the nature of allegory, had I included every form of verbal animation in my conception of imagery, I would have been forced to classify each verse in Ausias March's poetry according to its frame of reference. I, therefore, restricted my definition of imagery to symbols, metaphors and similes, considering each image to be a sign in the language of the poet, illustrating and defining the terms of verbal communication, and thereby, containing and revealing a notion dear to the poet's verbal needs of communication. Poem IV will provide an example of the problem of defining and limiting. The second stanza of this poem, verses 9-16, consists of two basic parts, a sea image, and an ensuing explanation. The image is a simile representing the emotional conflict of the poet. In this instance it is clear that the image exists. However, in verses 14-16:

> dos grans desigs han combatut ma pensa,
> mas lo voler vers hu seguir dispensa;
> yo·l vos publich: amar dretament vós (IV, vv. 14-16).

the presence of the participle "combatut" implies battle, and therefore, a military reference or image, but it does not form one; it only remotely evokes one. It does not form an image, because it is not the "sign" in the language, but the communication itself. I, consequently, classified verses 9-13 as an image, but omitted the ensuing verses.

A corollary to this problem was that of external references and their classification. By its nature an image is an external sign

conceptually brought into the poet's language. There is a similarity between this and the introduction of historical, literary, biblical, or agricultural references into a linguistic structure: they form an illustration. I have, therefore, included these "references" in the index, especially since their function as "images" is revealed because they are, at times, used as similes.[7]

With the selection of images to be included in the index a final problem arose concerning the internal classification. Images are conceptual; they arise out of a series of associations of symbols or motifs that have a particular significance for the poet. An image is a composite structure. Rarely is an image in Ausias March's poetry simple; it usually extends over several verses and draws in various elements. The problem of classifying all these elements was primarily solved by cross-referencing the occurence of the various constituent elements. However, the various elements, or motifs, constituting an image are sometimes equally important to the image, they list a series of associations with no necessarily predominant element. In those instances the problem could only be solved by reasoned subjective choice, but this was compensated by the fact that each element was cross-referenced, and, therefore, easily accessible to the researcher. I chose what seemed to be either the key element, or the first listed, put it under the heading of "Main" image, and then, placed the remaining ones under the heading, "subordinate" images. An example of such a situation can be found in Poem VI, verses 29-32:

> e més que mal administrador és:
> al cavador dóna loguer de metge;
> en lochs plans fa durar l'estret setge,
> e fort castell en tera tost l'à mes (VI, vv. 29-32).

The stanza from which these verses proceed is introduced by the image of "folly" caused by a "lord" or "king" figure. The "administrador" in verse 29 is a form of the "lord" whose function is that of ruling

and commanding, that is, of bearing the responsibility for the order of the "state" or, "place", "locus", under his administration. He is a variation on the basic motif of the king. In consequence, the elements present in this image are: a main thematic image of Folly, which subordinates those of the kind ("administrador"), the labourer, the doctor, military, and the castle. The imagery in these verses is listed in this manner in the index.

The third major problem rested in finding a viable classification for poetic images. I was unable to find a previous complete model for this kind of work. Indices of poetic imagery are generally limited to one theme,[8] and are, therefore, unsatisfactory for my intent to compile a complete classification. There remained the possibility of using the classification of two other models, that of Stith-Thompson and his followers[9] in their work on the preparation of a folk-motif index, and the ideological classification of proverbs by subject or theme, as used by Luis Martínez Kleiser, in the Refranero General Ideológico Español.[10] The Stith Thompson model presented the advantage of a well worked-out classification by groups. However, the grouping used by Stith Thompson is not applicable to poetic motifs. The imagery of the myth is diametrically opposed to that of poetry. Both Claude Levi-Strauss and C.S. Lewis have pointed out that poetry and myth are at opposite poles of expression.[11] This difference is made clear by the French anthropologist:

> Myth is the part of language where the formula traduttore, tradittore reaches its lowest value. From that point of view it should be placed in the gamut of linguistic expressions at the opposite end to that of poetry, in spite of all claims which have been made to prove the contrary. Poetry is a kind of speech which cannot be translated except at the cost of serious distortions; whereas the mythical value of the myth is preserved even through the worst translation. Whatever our ignorance of the language and the culture of the people where it originated, a myth is still felt as a myth by any reader anywhere in the world. Its substance does not lie in the style, its original music or its syntax, but in the story which it tells. Myth is language, functioning on an especially high level where meaning succeeds

practically at "taking off" from the linguistic ground on which it keeps on rolling. 12

Since in myth the meaning is the principal medium communicated it follows that the "motifs" or images, belong to a fairly simple and common heritage. They draw on a common experience, which is given collective expression.

This is not the case of poetic imagery. Poetry is a well established and highly codified form of expression dependent on the intellectual use of language in particular and limited ways. It is, from this point of view, not a collective, but an individual expression.[13] Robert Scholes has correctly noted that:

> In poetry the lexical and paradigmatic side of language dominates - the reverberations of a given word in its own linguistic heritage. Naturally, this is, as Robert Frost said, "what gets lost in translation". Poetry celebrates the unique in a culture, a language, a man's way of using his language. In myth, however, the structural and syntagmatic side of language dominates, and at this level languages have much more in common. Linguistic structures and hence myths, have a universality which linguistic units, being arbitrary, do not have. 14

The poetic image has implications dependent upon an intellectual and historical "tradition" alien to the myth. Especially in the case of Medieval and Renaissance poetry, imagery is closely related to a highly codified scale of social and intellectual values conditioned by theories of love and courtship.

These basic differences made it impossible for me to classify the imagery of Ausias March under the folkloric headings of Stith Thompson. The ideological classification of Luis Martínez Kleiser, seemed more compatible to my project. It lists alphabetically the occurrence of proverbial themes. The major drawback being that, it is very haphazard and not cross-referenced. I, consequently, produced my own classification which is a hybrid of these two models. I listed every item thematically and ideologically, and then grouped them under twenty general headings. The classification of the proverbs is a separate matter.[15]

All of Ausias March's poetry is concerned with problems of Love, profane and divine; all his imagery is related to this theme. It should be borne in mind, however, that a certain section of this imagery refers directly to the courtly tradition and forms a basis for Ausias March's poetry. In my classification I began by setting aside the four great "metaphysical" themes that predominate in his poetry: Love, Fortune, Folly-Wisdom-Fool, and Death. The section on Love includes all images that are closely related to the stock of courtly imagery, and I included a section on images referring to courtly love terminology. Throughout the index I did not arrange the classification alphabetically, but grouped them according to related themes within the major groupings. Hence, the image of the Bread of Love is followed by that of the Oven of Love, and the Religion of Love is followed by images of the beloved as a goddess, and of Love as an idol, similarly images concerning Death are followed by those of Time and the Worm.

After having grouped images under these four main themes, I found it appropriate to form another three main categories based on man's means of relating to the four metaphysical themes. These three themes are, "Religious" imagery, "Military" imagery related to the martial arts, and "Science", which groups all images related to medicine, apothecary science, alchemy and astrology. This grouping which is based on man's understanding of the universe is succeeded by imagery based on man's vision of the world; it includes all imagery concerned with marine life, the elements, nature and geography. The latter theme is, in fact, a "Geography of Love", it is an allegorical topography of the lover's universe modelled on the topical scenery of the medieval world. The next group involves four large themes found in Ausias March which describe the manifestations of man in this world. This includes literary imagery, references to man's infirmities which are seen as a manifestation of his limitations, as well as images

based on his emotions which are understood as his expression of his limitations, and the final theme in this group includes all musical images. Finally, the last major definite group gathers all images concerned with the description of man, his civil structures, his commodities, and his social organization. This is followed by a collection of miscellaneous images, a list of which can be found on pages 485 and 486.

In this section I have included additional short indices to help guide the researcher. These include, a numerical index which lists all the poems referred to in the Index, the main images in each one and at which verses they are found; an alphabetical index of the image items, or themes, and their position in the index; an index to the miscellaneous images, and an index of the sources referred to. This is preceded by a general synopsis to the Index.

Footnotes

1. Presently, the only existing concordance is that of Bernard Flam, A Concordance to the Works of Auzias March, University of Wisconsin: Ph.D. thesis, 1962. It seems that Constanzo di Giroloma is preparing a new computerized concordance to the works of Ausias March (see, Joseph Gulsoy and Josep M. Sola-Solé, Catalan Studies in Memory of Josephine de Boer, Barcelona: Borras Edicions (Hispam), 1977, p. 12).

2. A. Pagès, Commentaire des poésies d'Auzias March. Paris: Honoré Champion, 1925, and P. Bohigas (ed.) Ausias March Poesies I-V, Barcelona: Barcino, 1952-1959. I do not consider the philological critique of P. Ramírez i Molas, La poesia d'Ausias March: anàlisi textual, cronologia, elements filosofics, Ph.D. thesis, University of Basle, privately printed, 1970, is actually a commentary, the second part only comments on certain textual problems.

3. An example of the greater value of the Index over the concordance can be seen in the case of the image of the worm. In the concordance of B. Flam one finds listed under "verm" and "verme", five verses and locations. In the preparation of this index I found seven references to this image, one of which is a manuscript variant innaccessible through the concordance.

4. Myron A. Peyton. "Auzias March as Transmitter of the Dante Heritage in Spain", Italica vol. XXXIV, no. 1, 1957, p. 83.

5. Poem X is an excellent example of allegory used to describe a psychological problem.

6. As T.S. Eliot pointed out: "We have to consider the type of mind which by nature and practice tended to express itself in allegory: and, for a competent poet, allegory means clear visual images. And clear visual images are given much more intensity by having a meaning- we do not need to know what that meaning is, but our awareness of the image we must be aware that the meaning is there too", in "Dante: I, The Inferno", Selected Essays, London: Faber and Faber, 1972, p. 243.

7. Examples of such cases are clear in IX, 10, and CXXVII, 25, among others.

8. Two examples of such limited classification are, Helga Bauer, Der Index Pictorius Calderons: Unterschungen zu seiner Malermetaphorik, Hamburg: Cram, De Gruyter und Co., 1969, p. 233-260, and Ana M. Komornicka, Métaphores, Personnifications et Comparaisons dans l'Oeuvre d'Aristophane. Warszawa: Wyclawnictwo Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 1964, p. 182-195.

9. Stith Thompson, Motif-Index of Folk Literature I-VI, Bloomington: University Press, 1955 (1966), and John Esten Keller, Motif-Index of Medieval Spanish Exempla, Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1949.

10. Luis Martínez Kleiser, Refranero General Ideológico Español, Madrid: Real Academia, 1953.

11. Claude Levi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology I, trans. C. Jacobson and B. Grundfest Schoepf. New York: Basic Books, 1963, p. 210. and C.S. Lewis, An Experiment in Criticism, Cambridge: University Press, 1961, p. 41.

12. Structural Anthropology I, p. 2 0.

13. This general statement obviously raises the problem of "epic" poetry, which is a collective expression. I would resolve this serious problem by pointing out that pre-Renaissance epic poetry belongs to a certain group of people, it has a historical and social significance particular to an ethnic group. Moreover, in either the composition or the recitation the poet or the joglar introduces his own particular style and interpretation, in which more than the "story" counts, hence the importance of language in the epic, as opposed to the myth.

14. Robert Scholes, Structuralism in Literature, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1974, p. 62.

15. On the problem of the proverbs see pages 619-620.

General Synopsis of the Index to the Imagery of Ausias March

A. Love
1. Arrow-Spear
2. Bond of Love (rope, chain, knot, etc.)
3. Bondage of Love (service and Vassalage)
4. Bread (food of Love)
5. Oven
6. Cloth
7. Court of Love-Fortune
8. Courtly Love
9. Feast
10. Religion of Love
11. Goddess
12. Idol
13. Hostal of Love
14. Nest of Love
15. Novice of Love
16. Power of Love
17. Robe-Garment
18. Wound of Love
19. Envious Man (see Man: Types, P:a:4)

B. Fortune
1. Fortuna
2. Game a: chess
b: dice

C. Folly-Wisdom-Fool

D. Death
1. Death
2. Time
3. Worm
4. Tetric
5. Poison

E. Religious (as distinct from the Religion of Love)
1. Crucifixion
2. Devil
3. Devout Man
4. Religious
5. Mystic
6. Martyr-Saint
7. Eschatological, (Paradise, Glory, Hell)
8. God

F. Military
1. Military
2. Armed Man, sword
3. Equestrian
4. Hunting

G. Science
1. Medicine
a. Bitter-sweet
b. Doctor
c. Heat-Cold
d. Humours
e. Sick Man
f. Opposites
2. Alchemy
3. Apothecary
4. Astrology

H. Marine
1. Sailor
2. Port
3. Sea
4. Ship
5. Wind (see Elements, 1:5)

I. Elements
1. Fire-Ice, non-medical Hot-Cold
2. Light-Darkness (illumination)
b. Dark place
3. Sun
4. Water
b. Rivers
c. Sea (see Marine, H:3)
5. Wind

J. Nature
1. Agricultural
2. Animal
b. worm (see Death, D:3)
3. Landscape-flowers
4. Tree

K. Geography of Love
1. Path-Way-Road
2. Traveller-Travelling
3. Bridge
4. Hill
5. Wall
6. Door
7. Key
8. House
9. Castle
10. Prison-Prisoner

L. Literary
1. Literary, General
2. Biblical
3. Book
4. Classical
5. Golden Age
6. Historical
7. Mythological
8. Petrarchist

M. Infirmity
1. Blind
2. Deaf and Dumb
3. Lame
4. Short-sightedness

N. Emotions
1. Fear-Flight
2. Laughing-crying
3. Tears
4. Cruelty
5. Friendship

O. Music
1. Music
2. Dance
3. Trumpet

P. Man

a. Types:

1. Child
2. Coward
3. Dwarf-Giant
4. Envious Man
5. Old Man
6. Sad Man
7. Sterile Man
8. Sodomite
9. Strong Man
10. Weak Man

b. Occupations:

1. Beggar
2. Hermit
3. Labourer
4. Penitent
5. Philosopher
6. Pilgrim
7. Armed Man (see Military, F:2)
8. Traveller (see Geography, K:2)
9. Rich Man-Merchant
10. Robber
11. Prisoner (see Geography, K:10)
12. Sailor (see Marine, H:1)
13. Miser

c. Parts of the body:

1. Eyes
2. Hair
3. Heart

d. States:

1. Hunger
2. Thirst
3. Sleep
4. Solitude

Q. Civil Structures

1. Bridge (see Geography, K:3)
2. Castle (see Geography, K:9)
3. Door (see Geography, K:6)
4. House (see Geography, K:8)
5. Pillar
6. City (see Literary, Biblical, L:2)

R. Commodities

1. Axe
2. Bed
3. Table
4. Vessel
5. Oven (see Love, A:5)
6. Money-Gold
7. Sword (see Military, F:2)
8. Closet (see Geography, K:7)

S. Social Organization
   1. King-Lord
   2. Servant
   3. Juridical
   4. Vassalage (see Love: Bondage of Love, A:3)

T. Miscellany

U. Proverbial phrases.

Alphabetical Index of Image Items in Ausias March's Poetry

Left column lists the items alphabetically, right column in letters and numbers refers to the location of the items in the index, as may be found in the Synopsis.

Fear-Flight	N:1
Feast	A:9
Fire	I:1
Flight-Fear	N:1
Folly-Wisdom-Fool	C
Food of Love	A:4
Fortuna	B:1
Friendship	N:5
Game	B:2
Garment-Robe	A:17
Giant-Dwarf	P:a:3
God	E:8
Goddess	A:11
Gold	R:6
Golden Age	L:5
Hair	P:c:2
Heart	P:c:3
Heat-Cold (Medical)	G:1:c
Hell	E:7
Hermit	P:b:2
Hill	K:4
Historical	L:6
Hostal of Love	A:13
Hot-Cold (Non-Medical)	I:1
House	K:8
Humours	G:1:d
Hunger	P:d:1
Hunting	F:4
Idol	A:12
Illumination	I:2
Juridical	S:3
Key	K:7
King	S:1
Knot of Love	A:2
Labourer	P:b:3
Lame	M:3
Landscape	J:3
Laughter-Crying	N:2
Light-Illumination	I:2
Literary Reference (General)	L:1
Lord	S:1
Martyr-Saint	E:6
Merchant-Rich Man	P:b:9
Military	F:1
Miscellany	T
Miser	P:b:13
Money-Gold	R:6
Music	D:1
Mystic	E:5
Mythological	L:7

Wall	K:5
Water	I:4
Way-Road-Path	K:1
Weak Man	P:a:10
Wind	1:5
Wisdom-Folly	C
Worm	D:3
Wound of Love	A:18

Alphabetical Index to Miscellaneous Images

The left-hand column lists the items alphabetically. Roman numerals in the right-hand column indicate in which poems these items are found. The arabic numbers refer to the particular verses in which these items occur.

Numerical Index to the Poems of Ausias March

This index lists all the poems of Ausias March and the main images found in them. Roman numerals indicate the number of the poem. The arabic numbers refer to the verses containing an image. The word found next to these numbers refers to the Main heading under which I have catalogued these images in the "Index to the Imagery of Ausias March".

I 1-2, Sleep; 13-16, Prisoner; 19-20, Proverb; 22-24, Child; 31-32, Sick Man; 33-40, Hermit; 41-42, Worm; 43-44, Envious Man.

II 1-8, King; 9-10, Wind; 11-12, Key; 17-18, Animal; 24, Fire; 27-28, Sun; 37-40, Sleep; 41-44, Bread.

III 5-6, Fire; 9-12, Heat (Medical); 13-14, Sick Man.

IV 1-6, Hunger; 9-13, Sea; 27-30, Animal; 31-32, Fire; 55-56, Pillar.

V 9-16, Biblical; 17-18, Fire; 19-20, Book; 23-24, Folly; 29-32, Folly; 40, Door.

VI 9-12, Path; 21-22, Money; 23-24, King; 26-28, Folly; 29-32, Folly; 34-36, Agricultural; 37-40, Friendship; 43, Bread; 44, Animal.

VII 1-2, Proberb; 4, Music; 13-16, Water; 32, Biblical; 48, Axe; 49-51, Biblical; 57-59, Paradise; 61-64, Light; 67-68, Water.

VIII 2-4, Courtly love; 5-7, Dance; 10-12, Dance; 16, Proverb; 17-20, Child; 25-28, Robber; 35-36, Sun.

IX 1-8, Prison; 9-12, Biblical; 15-16, Mythological; 19, Folly; 41-44, Door.

X 1-8, Military; 25-26, Bread; 27-28, Bondage of Love; 29-32, Military; 33-40, Military.

XI 1-4, Tears; 9-16, Death; 17-24, Death; 35-36, Humours; 39-40, Military.

XIII 1-8, Tetric; 11-12, Death; 13-16, Historical; 17-24, Mythological; 25-30, Death; 33-38, Death.

XIV 1-8, Fortuna; 10-12, Fortuna; 25-28, Thirst; 29-31, Astrology; 33-35, Fire.

XV 4, Proverb; 5-8, King; 17-20, Sun; 21-24, Fire; 25-28, Mythological; 29-32, Mythological; 35, Folly; 41-48, Feast; 49-53, Military.

XVI 9-12, Sterile Man; 17-20, Wall; 20-24, Table; 25-32, Military; 33, Proverb; 41-44, Folly.

XVII 10-11, Dumbness; 29-32, Prisoner; 37, Proverb; 41-44, Doctor; 45-48, Novice of Love; 49-52, Military; 53-56, Biblical.

XVIII 1-4, Light; 9-12, Fire; 17-20, Animal; 25-28, Light; 33-36, Biblical; 41-44, Philosopher; 49-52, Martyr; 57-60, Money.

XIX 5-8, Devil; 23-24, Death; 33-36, Bitter-Sweet.

XX 1-4, Classical; 17-24, Key; 25, Proverb; 29-32, Courtly Love; 33-40, Fire.

XXI 9-12, Biblical; 23-24, Dice; 25-28, Light; 33-36, Heart; 43-44, Juridical.

XXII 6-8, Tetric; 10-12, Hunger; 25-28, Prisoner.

XXIII 9-12, Eye; 15-16, Petrarchist; 25-28, Biblical; 31-32, Biblical; 33-36, Biblical.

XXIV 3-8, Fortuna; 9-12, Envious Man; 17-20, Sleep; 25-28, Animal; 37-40, Fire.

XXV 21-22, Music; 27-28, Laughing-Crying; 6-8, Deaf and Dumb; 41-42, Heart.

XXVI 6, Deaf and Dumb; 9-12, Historical; 13-16, Biblical; 20, Fire; 27-28, Envious Man; 33-36, Death; 41-42, Classical; 43-44, Biblical; 45-48, Classical; 49-53, Tree.

XXVII 9-12, Weak Man; 15-16, Petrarchist; 17-20, Servant; 25-28, Ship; 33-36, Sea.

XXVIII 1-8, Light; 9-11, Death; 17-20, Bond of Love.

XXIX 1-4, Animal.

XXX 1-4, Coward; 9-10, Proverb; 39-40, Animal; 49-56, Fortune.

XXXI 13-16, Idol; 17-20, Fortuna; 25-32, Fortuna; 33-40, Fortuna; 41-44, Mythological.

XXXII 9-12, Music; 29-30, Proverb.

XXXIII 25-32, Fire; 33-36, Deaf and Dumb; 37-40, Worm.

XXXIV 1-8, Wind; 23, Fear; variant 20-32, Music; 33-36, Miscellaneous; 41-44, Animal.

XXXV 7-8, Sick Man; 25-28, Prisoner; 33-36, Folly.

XXXVI 1-8, Death; 17-20, Laughing-Crying; 27-32, Goddess; 37-38, Folly.

XXXVII 31-32, Hunger; 37-40, Goddess; 43-48, Crucifixion.

XXXVIII 29-32, Path; 37-40, Time; 41-44, Bread.

XXXIX 3-6, Folly; 17-20, Hermit; 27-28, Petrarchist.

XL 21-24, Dwarf and Giant; 25-28, Strong Man; 33-38, Military.

XLI 5-8, Miscellaneous; 13, Trumpet; 31-32, Proverb; 37-40, Friendship.

XLII 1-8, Animal; 12-16, Animal; 23-24, Miscellany; 25-32, Miscellany.

XLIII 9-10, Fear; 17-24, Devil.

XLIV 1-4, Doctor; 17-20, Sun.

XLV 9-13, Fire; 31-32, Military; 37-40, Hostal; 69-72, Power of Love; 73-76, Power of Love; 81-88, Martyr; 89-94, Literary; 97-100, Path.

XLVI 1-8, Wind; 9-16, Biblical; 17-20, Fear; 45-48, Door;

60, Dice.

XLVII 1-4, Astrology; 19-20, Equestrian; 25-28, Fire; 33-35, Hermit.

XLIX 1-6, Heat-Cold (Medical); 13-16, Sleep; 20-24,Biblical; 25-28, Literary; 35-40, Military; 41-44, Bondage of Love.

L 1-6, Devout Man; 10-12, Juridical; 17-18, Paradise; 23-24, Power of Love; 28, Death.

LI 1-6, Prisoner; 13-16, Sick Man; 25-28, Mythological; 30-31, Hostal; 32, Proverb; 37-39, Literary.

LII 1, Proverb; 1-4, Robe; 5-8, God; 14-16, Military; 25-28, Arrow; 30-32, Death; 33-36, Death; 43, Death.

LIII 1-4, Heat-Cold (Medical); 9-12, Religious (General); 21-24, Martyr; 25-26, Goddess; 30-32, Religion of Love; 33-37, Folly; 43-44, Feast.

LIV 1-4, Folly; 9-12, Paradise; 13-16, Death; 25, Proverb; 29-32, Death; 33-36, Fortune; 39-40, Bitter-Sweet; 41-44, Hostal.

LV 17-20, Fire; 35, Deaf and Dumb; 37-40, Death.

LVI 9-12, Music; 13-16, Religion of Love; 21-24, Fortuna; 25-32, Light; 33-36, Fortuna; 37-40, Death.

LVII 5-8, Literary; 11-16, Biblical; 17-20, Biblical; 25-26, Death; 39-40, Biblical.

LVIII 1-4, Rich Man; 9-12, Power of Love; 21-22, Robber.

LIX 1-4, Sick Man; 13-14, Death; 17-20, Death; 21-22, Fear; 27-28, Death; 29-32, Prisoner; 43-44, Power of Love.

LX 15-16, Military; 21-24, Military; 28, Proverb; 31-32, Military; 35-36, Travelling.

LXI 33-34, Blindness.

LXII 4-5, Juridical; 15-16, Death; 20-21, Biblical; 25-28, Path; 33-36, Power of Love; 41-44, Eye; 49-50, Petrarchist.

LXIII 3-4, Prisoner; 5-6, King; 12, Proverb; 16, Proverb;

25-26, Proverb; 27-28, Bread; 30-32, Bitter-Sweet; 33-40, Death; 41-44, Heat-Cold (Medical).

LXIV 1-8, Animal; 10-12, Power of Love; 13-15, Courtly Love; 17-20, Fortuna; 21-22, Robe; 25-27, Animal; 28, Biblical.

LXV 1-4, Petrarchist; 9-11, Blind; 25, Petrarchist; 27, Wound; 29-30, Hostal.

LXVI 1-4, Bond of Love; 9-12, Sick Man; 14-15, Religion of Love; 21-23, Light; 25-28, Sick Man; 33-36, Power of Love; 37-38, Power of Love; 39-40, Blindness; 41-44, Petrarchist.

LXVII 2-4, Heat-Cold (Medical); 9, Petrarchist; 11-12, Heat-Cold (Medical); 13-16, Hermit; 18-20, Power of Love; 33-36, Miscellaneous; 39-40, Fire; 45-48, Robe; 49-50, Religion of Love.

LXVIII 1-8, Servant; 17-24, Solitude; 26, Landscape.

LXIX 15-16, Bond of Love; 25-28, Heat-Cold (Medical); 51-52, Music; 53-56, Sick Man; 57-58, Power of Love; 63-64, Laughing-Crying.

LXX 33-35, Poison; 46-48, Power of Love; 55-56, Proverb.

LXXI 33-34, Castle; 49-52, Golden Age; 53-56, Water; 57-60, Bond of Love; 73-74, Animal; 86-88, Bond of Love; 101, Folly.

LXXII 9-12, Envious Man; 13-14, Blindness; 16, Biblical; 17-22, Biblical; 25-26, Biblical; 27-30, Biblical; 37-40, Power of Love.

LXXIII 5-8, Literary; 17-22, Wound of Love; 41-42, Servant.

LXXIV 9-12, Sick Man; 17-20, Ship; 28, King; 32, Equestrian; 47, Proverb.

LXXV 3-4, Religion of Love; 11-12, Prisoner; 21-22, Religion of Love; 23-24, Mythological; 25-28, Mythological; 33-40, Mythological; 42-43, Hostal; 45-48, Mythological; 49-56, Mythological; 70-72, Power of Love; 73-80, Mythological; 81-84, Mythological.

LXXVI 2-4, Port; 5-8, Travelling; 30, Astrological; 33-36, Old Man.

LXXVII 7, Cruelty; 25-28, Robe.

LXXVIII 41-42, Robe; 43-44, Animal; 49-50, Prisoner; 56, Death; 59-60, Bond of Love.

LXXIX 1-8, Wound; 9-16, Arrow; 17-27, Golden Age; 27-32, Military.

LXXX 1-2, Labourer.

LXXXI 1-4, Death; 7-8, Travelling.

LXXXII 1-4, Ship.

LXXXIII 1-4, Sick Man.

LXXXIV 2-4, Friendship; 13, Proverb; 19-22, Golden Age; 23-24, Heat-Cold (Medical); 33, Deaf and Dumb; 39, Military; 49-51, Power of Love; 57-60, Power of Love.

LXXXV 1-2, Fortuna; 18, Military; 19-20, Bond of Love; 41-44, Fire; 45-48, Bond of Love; 49-54, Fortuna; 55-56, Proverb.

LXXXVI 3-4, Death; 9-10, Death.

LXXXVII 9-10, Fire; 15-16, Miscellaneous; 48, Animal; 49-50, Cloth; 57-58, Military; 67, Sick Man; 91-92, Sea; 95-98, Bond of Love; 113-114, Hostal; 119-120, Eyes; 131-132, Eyes; 159-160, Alchemy; 161, Mythological; 166-167, Sleep; 170, Animal; 173-174, Fire; 175-176, Court of Love; 177-180, Power of Love; 187, Wound of Love; 189-190, Light; 195-196, Prison; 198, Prison; 207-208, Bond of Love; 251-254, Travelling; 271-274, Fire; 277-280, Sick Man; 282-283, Heat-Cold (Medical); 291-292, Money; 295-296, Fire; 299-300, Power of Love; 305-307, Death; 311-313, Military; 328-329, Power of Love; 331-332, Astrological; 335-337, Astrological; 339-340, Power.

LXXXVIII 13-14, Robe; 41, Military; 63-64, Door; 71-72, Power of Love; 76, Eye.

LXXXIX 1-2, Biblical; Bridge, 3-4; 5-8, Path; 17, Hill.

XC 9-12, Landscape; 29-31, Military; variant 32, Fire; 33-34, Bond of Love; 41-42, Literary; 57-60, Fortune.

XCI 9-10, Proverb; 13-14, Time; 15-16, Proverb; 17-20, Folly; 21-24, Blind; 25-27, Time; 30-32, Power of Love.

XCII 1-4, Mythological; 19, Religion of Love; 35-38, Blind; 39-40, Apothecary; 53-54, Bread; 55-58, Traveller; 77-78, Worm; 109-110, Religion of Love; 121-122, Miscellaneous; 129, Paradise; 147, Fortuna; 150, Devil; 153-154, Death; 157-158, Light; 181-184, Alchemy; 195-196, Power of Love; 197-200, Power of Love; 204, Robe; 214, Feast; 221-222, Agricultural; 244-246, Death; 247, Wound of Love; 249-250, Biblical.

XCIII 29-32, Folly; 33-34, Sick Man; 67, Bitter-Sweet; 69-70, Bitter-Sweet; 80, Time; 86, Fire.

XCIV 17-20, Humours; 25-28, Fire; 59-62, Medical Opposites; 63-64, Bitter-Sweet; 67-68, Solitude; 86, Sick Man; 103-104, Child; 115-116, Alchemy; 118-120, Humours.

XCV 10-12, Heat-Cold (Medical); 17-20, Fortuna; 21-22, Juridical; 43, Heart; 45-46, Death; 65-66, Death; 67-68, Death; 69-72, Death; 73-76, Tetric.

XCVI 1-4, Death; 35-36, Military.

XCVII 13-16, Path; 21-22, Sick Man; 27-28, Death; 43-44, Envious Man; 47-48, Tears; 49-50, Tears; 57-60, Hermit.

XCVIII 1-4, Path; 5-6, Folly; 7-8, Winds; 25-28, Military; 29-32, Military; 37-39, Power of Love; 41-42, Sick Man; 57-59, Water.

XCIX 5-6, Lameness; 7, Wound of Love; 16, Path; 23-24, Prisoner; 25-27, Fire; 43-44, Bread; 56, Path; 65-66, Sick Man; 67-68, Musical; 79-80, Sick Man; 81-83, Death; 84-85, Biblical; 91-92, Animal.

C 1-2, Child; 5-7, Sailor; 8, Path; 23-24, Robe; 29-30, Vessel; 31-32, Proverb; 33-36, Military; 37-40, Sick Man; 44, Servant; 53-56, Folly; 57-60, Folly; 61-64, Animal; 71-72, Proverb; 94, Agricultural; 95-96, Path; 101-102, Rich Man; 103-104, Death;

107-108, Animal; 109-111, Time; 143-144, Courtly Love; 145-148, Folly; 157-160, Robe; 168, Robe; 175, Juridical; 177-180, Child; 197-200, Folly; 215-216, Folly; 219-220, Path.

CI 1-6, Sick Man; 9-12, Eyes; 13-16, Petrarchist; 17-24, Child; 25, Eyes; 37-39, King; 41-42, Eyes; 44, Prisoner; 47-48, Heat-Cold (Medical); 49-52, Petrarchist.

CII 17-24, Sailor; 25-26, Biblical; 59-60, Landscape; 61-62, Prisoner; 63-64, Power of Love; 65-68, Labourer; 72, Death; 91-96, Folly; 103, Miscellany, 105-108, Biblical; 115, Bread; 121, Fire; 129-132, Fire; 137-138, Fire; 139-140, Mythology; 145-146, Heat-Cold (Medical); 155-156, Animal; 165-168, Bread; 169-170, Folly; 174-176, Castle; 177-180, Sick Man; 211-212, Military; 214-216, Folly; 221-222, Travelling; 229-230, Petrarchist.

CIII 8, Proverb; 17-20, Robe; 33-34, Child; 41, King; variant between 48-49, B^1 d e, Blindness; variant between 48-49, B^1 d e, Musical; 55-56, Fortuna; 59-60, Money.

CIV 37-38, Ship; 53-56, Animal; 73-77, Fortuna; 84, Hunger; 95-96, Folly; 155-156, Hermit; 157, Biblical; 167-168, Path; 170-172, Sodomite; 189-192, Pillar; 201-202, Fire; 205, Biblical; 214-216, King; 219-221, Folly; 225-228, Mythological; 229-231, Old Man; 240, Path; 247-248, Literary; 256, Animal; 261-264, Idol.

CV 1-2, Hair; 11-12, Juridical; 13, Religious; 27-28, Path; 29-30, Biblical; 31-32, Biblical; 45-46, Biblical; 65-66, Biblical; 80, Travel; 95-96, Eye; Biblical, 109-110; 128, Biblical; 133-134, Biblical; 147-148, Biblical; 162-163, Mystic; 167-168, Biblical; 173-174, Biblical; 185-186, Fire; 189-192, Fire; 197-198, Prison; 199-200, Biblical; 201-203, Death; 210-212, God; 217-218, Biblical; 219-220, Water.

CVI 9, Folly; 33-36, Death; 39, Money; 41, Proverb; 72, Biblical; 137-138, Wall; 144, Proverb; 159-160, Fire; 165, Proverb;

168, King; 191-192, Weak Man; 213-214, Miscellany; 265-268, Animal; 295-296, Folly; 297-302, Blindness; 313-314, Folly; 341-344, Miser; 387-388, Animal; 429-432, Equestrian; 443-444, Animal; 447, Deaf and Dumb; 449-452, Chess; 469-472, Biblical; 476, Proverb; 485-488, Tree.

CVII 76-78, Sick Man; 85-86, Death; 87-88, Heat-Cold (Medical).

CVIII 13-16, Folly; 17-20, Biblical; 43-44, Idol; 46-48, Bread; 59-60, Folly; 64, Folly; 79-80, Robe; 83-84, Folly; 88, Proverb; 93-96, Biblical.

CIX 5-8, Prisoner; 11-12, Miscellaneous.

CX 1-2, Prisoner; 3-4, Fortune; 5-8, Miscellaneous; 13-14, Blind; 15-16, Death; 17-20, Hunt; 22-24, Fire.

CXI 1-8, Traveller; 15-16, Wound of Love; 23, Miscellaneous; 26-28, Sick Man; 37-38, Animal.

CXII 2-5, Death; 38, Death; 50, Death; 71-73, Miscellaneous; 87-88, Astrology; 107-110, Animal; 118-120, Military; 121-130, Death; 137-140, Death; 146-147, Tears; 153, Bitter-Sweet; 175-178, Death; 189-190, Path; 193-198, Robe; 226-227, Literary; 235-237, Death; 255-260, Door; 294, Death; 309-310, Biblical; 324, Tree; 349-350, Fire; 369-370, Biblical; 372-373, Lameness; 377-378, Book, 391-400, Military; 403-405, Path; 411-412, Door.

CXIII 1-4, Literary; 8, Light; 39-40, Alchemy; 81-82, Doctor; 83-84, Military; 87-88, Key; 95-98, Light; 99-100, Bond of Love; 101-104, Path; 115-116, Sick Man; 117-118, Door; 121-124, Path; 125-128, Folly; 139-140, Ship; 145-146, Path; 149-150, Doctor; 156, Miscellaneous; 164 Animal; 165-166, Path; 169-170, Juridical; 171-172, God; 176, Juridical; 179-180, Ship; 181-184, Music; 189-190, Fire; 195-198, Folly; 203-204, Path; 205-208, Traveller; 209-210, Time; 211-214, Bitter-Sweet; 215-218, Blind; 221-223, Sick Man; 245-246, Miscellaneous; 251-254, Religious (General).

CXIV 35-36, Alchemy; 44, Miscellaneous; 45-48, Robe; 61-62, Light; 85-86, Heart; variant 90-91, Worm.

CXV 15-18, Sick Man; 59-60, Bond of Love, 63-64, Worm; 71-78, Sick Man; 83-84, Table; 95-96, Power of Love; 100, Military; 107-108, Tree; 119-120, Death.

CXVI 8-10, Martyr; 27-28, Sick Man; 29-30, Military; 46-48, Path; 53-54, Bitter-Sweet; 61-64, Death; 66-67, Military; 88, Light; 105-106, Hermit; 130, Petrarchist; 139-140, Sea; 151-152, Bread.

CXVII 1-2, Animal; 7-8, Biblical; 25-27, Sick Man; 41-44, Mystic; 57-60, Philosopher; 67-68, Prisoner; 73-74, Hostal; 77-80, Military; 81-82, Blind; 89-90, Folly; 97-98, Blind; 107-108, Tree; 111-112, Robe; 125-126, Military; 141-144, Humours; 169-172, Fire; 179-182, Alchemy; 185-188, Military; 193-196, Folly; 201-204, Miser; 209-212, Miscellaneous; 219-220, Friendship; 233-236, Doctor; variant 240-244, Bitter-Sweet.

CXVIII 1-2, Blindness; 10, Wound of Love; 29-30, Path; 31-35, Miscellaneous; 57-58, Fire; 59, Miscellaneous; 73-74, Bond of Love; 91-92, Historical.

CXIX 1, Biblical; 5-7, Opposites (Medical); 13-14, Fire; 15-18, Fire; 19-20, Sea; 26-28, Wound of Love; 57-58, Juridical; 61-66, Doctor; 81-86, Miscellaneous.

CXX 13-14, Vessel; 17-20, Folly; 45, Bitter-Sweet; 77-78, Hostal; 79-80, Folly; 121-124, Miscellaneous; 129-130, Religious (General); 131-132, Money.

CXXI 15-16, Bitter-Sweet; 27-28, Lameness; 29-32, Robe; 33-35, Friendship; 41-48, Traveller; 56, Servant; 58, Robe; 67-68, Biblical.

CXXII a 13-16, Folly; 26-27, Folly; 29-31, Alchemy.

CXXII b 21-23, Folly; 29-32, Historical; 37-38, Animal; 59-60, Hunger; 71-72, Military.

CXXIII 49-52, Fire; 60-61, Fire; 67, King.

CXXIV 6-7, Castle.

CXXV 1-3, Juridical.

CXXVI 17-20, Book.

CXXVII 17-18, Robe; 23, Child; 24-25, Biblical; 26, Bond of Love; 47, Hunt; 56-58, Wind; 58-60, Death; 79-81, Pillar; 86-92, Miser; 94-95, Hunger; 104-105, King; 115-117, Hunger; 122-123, Path; 133-135, Game; 148-150, Miscellaneous; 151-152, King; 157-158, Power of Love; 169-170, Juridical; 172-174, Military; 208-209, Courtly Love; 217-219, Path; 223, Servant; 230, Tree; 231-232, Vessel; 245-246, Hunger; 280, Water; 282, Door; 285, Bread; 328-329, Path; 354-355, Path; 356-357, Death; 391-392, Tree; 394, Laughing-Crying; 415-416, Bitter-Sweet.

CXXVIII 6-7, Path; 24-25, Short-sightedness; 84-85, Hill; 106-109, Animal; 118-119, Death; 134-137, Path; 193, Servant; 197-199, Folly; 202, Path; 210-213, Folly, 219-222, Blindness; 230, Miscellaneous; 234, Equestrian; 260-263, Musical; 272-275, Dice; 288-293, Folly; 294-297, Folly; 306-307, Apothecary; 316-319, Path; 320-325, Military; 336-339, Doctor; 340-343, Traveller; 352-353, Path; 356-357, Path; 365, Money; 372-377, Child; 382-385, Miscellaneous; 394-399, Sailor; 400-405, Castle; 421-423, Religious; 448-451, Animal; 482-483, Military; 484-487, Military; 488-491, Idol; 492, Idol; 502-509, Sick Man; 510, Apothecary; 514-516, Lameness; 528-531, Thirst; 547-552, Hermit; 553-555, Path; 557-566, Miscellaneous; 599-602, Fortune; 603-604, Biblical; 605-609, Fortuna; 631, Bitter-Sweet; 654-655, Military; 664-666, Fire; 685-686, Cloth; 687-690, Path.

Index to the Imagery of Ausias March

A. Love

1. Arrow

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
LII, 25-28	X	Military	Roman de la Rose, vv. 1689-1690. (Pagès).
LXXIX, 1-8	Wound of Love	X, Tetric	
LXXIX, 9-16	X	Wound of Love, Mythological	Guiraut de Calanson "Celeis cui am de cor e de saber" (Pagès, p.89); Ovid, Metamorphoses, Book I, 89-150.
LXXIX, 17-27	Golden Age	X, Mythological, Wound of Love	
LXXXVII, 187	Wound of Love	X, (spear)	
CXIII, 181-188	Music	X, Sick Man, Death	

2. Bond of Love

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
X, 29-32	Military	X	
XXVIII, 17-20	X	Path, Death, Prisoner	
variant XXIV, 20-32 in E	Music	X	
LXVI, 1-4	X		
LXXI, 57-60	X		
LXXI, 86-88	X	Prisoner	
LXXVIII, 59-60			
LXXXV, 19-20	X		

Bond of Love (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
LXXXV, 45-48	X		Ramon Llull, Arbre de filosofia d'amor (Ramírez i Molas, p. 320)
LXXXVII, 95-98	X	Death	Ramon Llull, Arbre de filosofia d'amor (Ramírez i Molas, p. 320)
LXXXVII, 207-208	X		
XC, 33-34	X	Blind	
CXIII, 99-100	X	Prisoner	
CXV, 59-60	X	Proverb	
CXVIII, 73-74	X	Proverb	
CXXVII, 26	X		

3. Bondage of Love (Service and Vassalage)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
X, 27-28	X		
XXXVII, 43-48	Crucifixion	X, Death	
XLIX, 41-44	X	Sleep, Prisoner, Death	
LXXIX, 34-36	Military	X, Wound of Love	
CI, 13-16	Petrarchist	Armed Man, Military	

4. Bread (Food of Love)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
I, 31-32	X	Bitter-Sweet, Beggar	
II, 41-44	Sick Man	X	
IV, 1-6	Hunger	X, Tree Agricultural	
IV, 55-56	Pillar	X	

Bread of Love (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
VI, 43	X	Folly, Proverb	
VII, 49-51	Biblical	X	
X, 25-26	X		
XVIII, 1-4	Light	X	
XXIII, 25-28	Biblical	X	
XXXVIII, 41-44	X	Bitter-Sweet, Oven	
LXIII, 27-28	X	Bitter-Sweet	
XCII, 53-54	X	Apothecary	
XCIX, 43-44	X	Bitter-Sweet	
CII, 115	X		
CII, 165-168	X	Bitter-Sweet	
CVI, 469-472	Biblical	Path, X	
CVIII, 46-48	X	Folly	
CXVI, 151-152	X	Bitter-Sweet, Sick Man, Apothecary, Medical Opposites	
CXXVII, 217-219	Path	X	
CXXVII, 285	X		

5. Oven

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
IV, 31-32	Fire	X, Heat-Cold (Medical)	
XXXVIII, 41-44	Bread	X, Bitter-Sweet	
XLVI, 9-16	Biblical	X, Animal	
XCII, 181-184	Alchemy	Fire, X	
CII, 129-132	Fire	X, Bed, Heat-Cold (Medical)	

6. Cloth

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XXIII, 9-12	Eye	X, Courtly Love	
XLII, 12-16	Animal	X, Short-sighted Man	
XLII, 23-24	Miscellany (Wet nurse)	X	
LXVII, 45-48	Robe	X	
LXXV, 42-43	Hostal	X	
LXXVII, 25-28	Robe	X, Mythological, Classical	
LXXXVII, 49-50	X		
XCI, 17-20	Fool	Robe, X	
CXIV, 45-48	Robe	X, Religion of Love	
CXXVIII, 685-686	X	Labourer	

7. Court of Love or Fortune

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XXX, 49-56	Fortune	X, Classical	
XXXIX, 17-20	Hermit	Feast, X	
LXVII, 13-16	Hermit	X, Folly	
LXXXVII, 175-176	X	Courtly Love	
XCI, 21-24	Blind	X	

8. Courtly Love

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
I, 43-44	Envious Man	X	
VIII, 2-4	X (Drut)		Gaucelm Faidit, "Lo rossinholet salvatge" stanza V, 10-14, (Pagès, p. 12)
XX, 29-32	X (cors gentil)	Astrology Mythology	

Courtly Love (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XXIII, 9-12	Eye	X (cos gentil), Cloth	
LXIV, 13-15	X (servent)	Religion of Love, Goddess, Servant	
LXVI, 14-15	Religion of Love	X (guardó)	
LXVIII, 17-24	Solitude	X (vassall), Feast, Juridical, Petrarchist	
LXXIV, 38	X (vassall)	King, Servant	
LXXX, 8	X (guardó)	Time	
LXXXVII, 175-176	Court of Love	X (escolans)	
XCVII, 43-44	Envious Man	X	
C, 143-144	X (villans)	Labourer	
CXXVII, 208-209	X (guardó)		

9. Feast

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XIII, 1-8	Tetric	X, Death	
XV, 41-48	X	Eschatological, Musical, Biblical	Verses 43-44, St. Luke XV: 7 (Bohigas)
XXXIX, 17-20	Hermit	X, Court of Love	
XLIII, 17-24	Devil	X, Juridical	
LIII, 43-44	X	Religion of Love	
LXVIII, 17-24	Solitude	X, Courtly Love, Juridical, Petrarchist	
LXXV, 33-40	Mythological	X, Miscellany (flesh)	
XCII, 214	X	Proverb	
CII, 91-96	Folly	X, Agricultural, Proverb, Bitter-Sweet	

Feast (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
CXII, 369-370	Biblical	X	

10. Religion of Love

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
L, 17-18	Eschatological	X, Death	
LIII, 30-32	X		
LIII, 43-44	Feast	X	
LVI, 13-16	X	House	
LXIV, 13-15	Courtly Love	X, Goddess, Servant	
LVI, 13-16	X	House, Courtly Love	
LXVII, 49-50	X		
LXXV, 3-4	X	Bitter-Sweet	
LXXV, 21-22	X	Mythological	
LXXV, 81-84	Mythological	X	
XCII, 19	X		
XCII, 109-110	X	Devout Man	
CVIII, 43-44	Idol	X	
CXIV, 45-48	Robe	X, Cloth	
CXVI, 8-10	Martyr-Saint	Eschatological, X	

11. Goddess

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XXXVI, 27-32	X	Penitent, Poison	
XXXVII, 37-40	X		
LIII, 25-26	X	Death	
LXIV, 13-15	Courtly Love	X, Religion of Love, Servant	

12. Idol

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XXXI, 13-16	X	Death, Folly	
CIV, 261-264	X	Folly	
CVIII, 43-44	X	Religion of Love	
CXXVIII, 488-491	X	Miscellany (veil)	
CXXVIII, 492	X		

13. Hostal of Love

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XLV, 37-40	X		Oton de Granson, Balade: "Salut et paix et bonne entencion" stanza II, and "Chastel d'Amors" (Pagès, p. 142)
LI, 30-31	X		
LIV, 41-44	X		
LXV, 29-30	X	Bed	
LXXV, 42-43	X	Cloth	
LXXXVII, 113-114	X		
CXVII, 73-74	X	Door	Oton de Granson, "Salut et paix et bonne entencion" stanza II, and "Chastel d'Amors" (Pagès, p. 142)
CXX, 77-78	X		

14. Nest of Love

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XXXIII, 33-40	Deaf and Dumb	X	

15. Novice of Love

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XVII, 45-48	X	Folly	

16. Power of Love

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XLV, 69-72	X		
XLV, 73-76	X	King	
XLIX	Biblical	X, Juridical, Blindness, Dumbness, Proverb	
L, 23-24	X		
L, 28	Death	X	
LVIII, 9-12	X	Eyes, Miscellany, (Colours)	
LIX, 43-44	X	Castle, Agriculture	
LXII, 33-36	X	Heart	
LXII, 41-44	Eye	X	
LXII, 49-50	Petrarchist	X, Heart	
LXIV, 10-12	X		
LXVI, 33-36	X	Child, Old Man	
LXVI, 37-38	X	Death	
LXVII, 18-20	X		
LXIX, 57-62	X	Fortuna, Blindness	
LXIX, 63-64	Laughing-Crying	X	
LXX, 46-48	X	Sick Man	
LXXII, 37-40	X	Trumpet	
LXXV, 70-72	X	Light, Nature	
LXXIX, 27-32	X	Military, Castle	
LXXXIV, 49-51	X	Sick Man	
LXXXIV, 57-60	X		

Power of Love (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
LXXXVII, 177-180	X	Bed	
LXXXVII, 271-274	Fire	X, Eyes, Wound of Love, Humours	
LXXXVII, 295-296	Fire	X	
LXXXVII, 299-300	X	Devil	
LXXXVII, 328-329	X	Biblical	
LXXXVII, 339-340	X	Travelling	
LXXXVIII, 71-72	X		
XCI, 30-32	X	Poison	
XCII, 195-196	X	Wind, Fire (Hot-Cold)	
XCII, 197-200	X	Tree	
XCVIII, 37-39	X	Hair	
C, 1-2	Child	X, Fortune	
CII, 63-64	X	Fortuna, Biblical	
CXIV, 35-36	Alchemy	X	
CXV, 95-96	X	Sick Man	
CXVI, 27-28	Sick Man	X	
CXXVII, 148-150	Miscellany (Glue)	X	
CXXVII, 157-158	X		

17. Robe

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
LII, 1-4	X	Heart, Wound of Love	
LXIV, 21-22	X		Anonymous "devinalh", "Sui e no suy, fuy e no fuy", verse 3, in C. Appel, Provenzalische Chrestomatie p. 82-83. (Pagès, p. 78)

Robe (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
LXVII, 45-48	X	Cloth	
LXXVII, 25-28	X	Mythological, Cloth, Classical	Ovid, Metamorphoses Book IX, Shirt of Nessus, 166-169; Hughes de Saint-Victor, "De Unione Corporis et Spiritus", P.L. CLXXVII, p. 288; and see Proverbial phrase CVIII, 79-80.
LXXVIII, 41-42	X	Death	
LXXXVIII, 13-14	X		Ovid, Remedia Amoris, vv. 91-92; (Pagès, p. 96)
XCI, 17-20	Fool	Cloth, X	
XCII, 204	X		
C, 23-24	X		
C, 157-160	X	Military	
C, 168	X		
CIII, 17-20	X	Animal, Bed, Fire (Hot-Cold)	Seneca, "De Vita Beata", XXV, 2; (Pagès, p. 116)
CVIII, 13-16	Fool	X	
CVIII, 79-80	X	Death, Proverb	
CXII, 193-198	X	Tree	
CXIV, 45-48	X	Religion of Love, Cloth	Oton de Granson, A. Pagès, "Le Thème de la tristesse amoureuse en France et en Espagne" Romania LVIII, 1932, pp. 29-43; Bohigas, V, p. 52; Hughes de Saint-Victor, "De Unione Corporis et Spiritus", P.L. CLXXVII, p. 288; and see Proverbial phrase CVIII, 79-80.

Robe (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
CXVII, 111-112	X	Classical, Proverb	Ovid, Metamorphoses, Book IX, Shirt of Nessus, 166-169; Hughes de Saint-Victor, "De Unione Corporis et Spiritus", P.L. CLXXVII, p. 288; and see Proverbial phrase CVIII, 79-80.
CXXI, 29-32	X		
CXXI, 58	X		Ovid, Metamorphoses, Book IX, Shirt of Nessus, 166-169; Hughes de Saint-Victor, "De Unione Corporis et Spiritus", P.L. CLXXVII, p. 288; and see Proverbial phrase CVIII, 79-80.
CXXVII, 17-18	X		

18. Wound of Love

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
LII, 1-4	Robe	X, Heart	
LIII, 21-24	Martyr-Saints	X	
LXV, 27	X		
LXVI, 9-12	Sick Man	X	
LXVI, 39-40	Blind	X, Death	
LXVII, 33-36	Miscellany, (stone)	X, Heart, Military Juridical	
LXXIII, 17-22	X	Bitter-Sweet, Worm, Poison	
LXXIX, 1-8	X	Arrow, Tetric	Guiraut de Calanson, "Celeis cui am de cor e de saber" (Pagès, p. 89); Ovid, Metamorphoses Book I, vv. 468-471.
LXXIX, 9-16	Arrow	X, Mythological	

Wound of Love (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
LXXIX, 17-27	Golden Age	Arrow, Mythological Wound of Love	
LXXIX, 34-36	Military	X, Bondage	
LXXXVII, 187	X	Arrow (Spear)	
LXXXVII, 271-274	Fire	X, Power of Love, Eyes, Humorous	
XCII, 247	X		
XCIX, 7	X		
CXI, 15-16	X		
CXIII, 125-128	Folly	X, Religious (General)	
CXVIII, 10	X		
CXIX, 26-28	X		

B. Fortune

1. Fortuna

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XIV, 1-8	X	Proverb	
XIV, 10-12	X	Mythological	Guiraut de Calanson, "Celeis cui am de cor e de saber" II, 2
XIV, 33-35	Fire	X	
XXIV, 3-8	X		
XXX, 49-56	X	Court of Love-Fortune, Classical	Vergil, Aeneid X, 284, (Pagès, p. 42); Alain de Lille, Anticlaudianus and Philosophiae (Pagès, "Sur un vers d'Auzias March", Romania, LXI, p. 90)
XXXI, 17-20	X		
XXXI, 25-32	X	Agricultural, Hill	
XXXI, 33-40	X	Folly, Sword, Laughing-Crying	
XXXVI, 1-8	Death	X	
XLVI, 45-48	Door	X	
XLVI, 60	Dice	X	
LIV, 29-32	Death	X	
LVI, 21-24	X	Death	
LVI, 33-36	X	Death, Blindness	
LXII, 15-16	Death	X	
LXIV, 17-20	X	Game	
LXIX, 57-62	Power of Love	X, Blind	
LXXVI, 30	Astrological	X	
LXXVI, 33-36	Old Man	X	
LXXXI, 1-4	Death	X, Sea	
LXXXII, 1-4	Ship	X, Port, Death	

Fortuna (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
LXXXV, 1-2	X		
LXXXV, 49-54	X	Labourer	
XC, 57-60	X	Dice	
XCII, 1-4	Mythological	X, Death	
XCII, 147	X	Proverb	
XCV, 17-20	X	Literary Reference	
XCV, 65-66	Death	X	
C, 1-2	Child	X, Power of Love	
CII, 63-64	Power of Love	X, Biblical	
CIII, 55-56	X	Rich Man, Beggar	
CIV, 73-77	X	Sea, Sailor	
CVI, 443-444	Animal	X, Folly, Proverb	
CVI, 449-452	Chess	X	
CX, 3-4	X	Prisoner	
CXII, 121-130	Death	X, Sad Man, Bitter-Sweet	
CXIII, 179-180	Ship	Wind, X	
CXIII, 211-214	Bitter-Sweet	X, Juridical	
CXXVIII, 599-602	X	Chess, Sea	
CXXVIII, 605-609	X	Sailor, Blindness, Laughing-Crying	

2. Game

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
LXIV, 17-20	Fortune	X	
CXXVII, 133-135	X	Fortuna	

2. a. Chess

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
CVI, 449-452	X	Fortuna	
CXXVIII, 599-602	Fortune	X, Sea	

2. b. Dice

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XXI, 23-24	X		
XLVI, 60	X	Fortuna	
XC, 57-60	Fortune	X	
CXXVIII, 272-275	X		

C. Folly-Wisdom-Fool

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
I, 1-2	Sleep	X	
I, 22-24	Child	X	
V, 23-24			Folquet de Marseilles, "Sitot me sui a tart apercebutz", I:1. (Pagès, p. 8).
V, 29-32	X		
VI, 26-28	X	Servant, King	
VI, 29-32	X	King, Labourer, Doctor, Military, Castle	
VI, 43	Bread	X, Proverb	
VI, 44	Animal	X, Proverb	
VII, 13-16	Water	X, Petrarchist, Proverb	
VIII, 10-12	Dance	X, Music	
VIII, 16	Proverb	X	
IX, 1-8	Prisoner	X	
IX, 19	X		
XV, 35	X		
XVI, 9-12	Sterile Man	X, Sick Man	
XVI, 41-44	X	Ship	
XVII, 45-48	Novice of Love	X	
XXVI, 13-16	Biblical	X	
XXVI, 49-53	Tree	X	
XXXI, 13-16	Idols	X, Death	
XXXI, 33-40	Fortuna	X, Sword, Laughing-Crying	
XXXV, 33-36	X		
XXXVI, 37-38			

Folly-Wisdom-Fool (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XXXIX, 3-6	X	Sad Man, Dark Place	
LI, 37-39	Literary Reference	X, Path, Death	
LIII, 33-37	X	Sick Man	Seneca: "Ira furor brevis" (Pagès, p. 70)
LIV, 1-4	X	Laughing-Crying	
LXII, 4-5	Juridical	X	
LXII, 20-21	Biblical	X	
variant LXIV, 21-22 in B	X		
LXVII, 13-16	Hermit	X, Court of Love	
LXXI, 101	X		
LXXV, 73-80	Mythological	X, Equestrian	
XCI, 17-20	X	Robe, Cloth	
XCIII, 29-32	X	Miscellany Biblical	Psalm XIV, 1, and Psalm LIII, 1
XCVIII, 5-6	X	Eschatological, Path	
XCIX, 91-92	Animal	X, Proverb	
C, 53-56	X	Death	
C, 57-60	X	Labourer, Literary Reference, Apothecary	
C, 145-148	X	Agricultural	
C, 197-200	X	Sick Man, Beggar	Aristotle, The Nichomachean Ethics, Book I, IV, 1095 a 24, (Pagès, p. 110-111); (Bohigas, IV, p. 78)
C, 215-216	X	Blind	

Folly-Wisdom-Fool (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
CII, 91-96	X	Feast, Proverb, Agricultural, Bitter-Sweet	
CII, 169-170	X	Alchemy	
CII, 214-216	X	Fire (Hot-Cold)	Summa Theologica II - II, 149, 4. (Pagès, p. 115)
CIV, 95-96	X		
CIV, 219-221	X	Miser, Coward, Rich Man-Merchant	
CIV, 261-264	Idol	X	
CVI, 9	X	Money	
CVI, 39	Money	X	
CVI, 265-268	Animal	X	
CVI, 295-296	X		
CVI, 297-302	Blind	X	
CVI, 313-314	X	Prisoner	
CVI, 429-432	Equestrian	Path, X	
CVI, 443-444	Animal	X, Fortuna, Proverb	
CVIII, 13-16	X	Robe	
CVIII, 17-20	Biblical	X	
CVIII, 46-48	Bread	X	
CVIII, 59-60	X	Proverb	
CVIII, 64	X	Wind, Proverb, Biblical, Petrarchist	St. John III, 8. and, see under heading "Proverbial Phrases". It is also possible that this verse proceeds from the last stanza of Arnaut Daniel's "En cest sonet coind' e leri..." (ed. M. de Riquer, Los trovadores: Historia literaria y textos,

Folly-Wisdom-Fool (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
			tomo II, Barcelona: Planeta, 1975, pp. 628-631: "Ieu sui Arnautz qu'amas l'aura, / e chatz la lebre ab lo bou / e nadi contra suberna' vv. 43-45) Alfred Jeanroy gives another version of these lines: "Je suis Arnaut, qui emprisonne le vent, chasse le lievre avec le boeuf et nage contre le flot" (La poésie lyrique des troubadours vol. II, Toulouse: Edouard Privat, 1934, p. 50). This verse could also have been known by Ausias March through Petrarch's imitation of Arnaut Daniel in sonnet 212, verses 1-2: "Beato in sogno e di languir contento, / d'abbracciar l'ombre et seguir l'aura estiva,".
CVIII, 83-84	X		
CX, 13-14	Blind	X	
CXII, 137-140	Death	X (Wise Man)	
CXIII, 125-128	X	Wound of Love, Religious (General)	
CXIII, 195-198	X	Crying-Laughing, Death, House	
CXIII, 215-218	Blind	X, Death, Path	
CXVII, 89-90	X	Sick Man, Devil	
CXVII, 193-196	X	King	
CXVII, 209-212	Miscellany (Father-Son)	X	
CXX, 17-20	X	Sick Man	

Folly-Wisdom-Fool (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
CXX, 79-80	X		
CXXII a, 13-16	X	Animal	
CXXII a, 26-27	X	Path, Music	
CXXII a, 29-31	Alchemy	X	
CXXII b, 21-23	X	Animal, Proverb	
CXXVII, 86-92	Miser	X, Hunger	
CXXVIII, 197-199	X		
CXXVIII, 210-213	X	Miser	
CXXVIII, 219-222	Blind	X, Equestrian	
CXXVIII, 288-293	X	Sailor, Death	
CXXVIII, 294-297	X	Hunter	

D. Death

1. Death

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
I, 13-16	Prisoner	X	
I, 22-24	Child	X	
IX, 1-8	Prisoner	X	
IX, 15-16	Mythological	X, Animal, Petrarchist	
XI, 1-4	Tears	X	
XI, 9-16	X	Tears, Music	
XI, 17-24	X	Music	
XIII, 1-8	X	Feast	
XIII, 11-12	X		
XIII, 25-30	X		
XIII, 33-38	X	Eschatological	
XVI, 25-32	Military	X	
XVII, 29-32	Prisoner	X	
XIX, 23-24	X	Path	
XX, 17-24	Key	X, Door	
XXI, 43-44	Juridical	X	
XXII, 6-8	Tetric	X	
XXVI, 33-36	X		
XXVIII, 9-11	X		Jordi de Sant Jordi, "Lo setge d'amor" vv. 33-40 (Pagès, 41)
XXVIII, 17-20	Bond of Love	X, Path	
XXXI, 13-16	Idol	X, Folly	
XXXV, 25-28	Prisoner	X	
XXXVI, 1-8	X	Fortuna	Petrarch, "Remediis utriusque fortunae" (Pagès, 48)
XXXVII, 43-48	Crucifixion	X, Bondage of Love	

Death (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XLIX, 13-16	Sleep	X	
XLIX, 41-44	Bondage of Love	X, Prisoner, Sleep	
L, 17-18	Eschatological	X, Religion of Love	
L, 28	X	Power of Love	
LI, 1-6	Prisoner	X	
LI, 13-16	Sick Man	X	
LI, 37-39	Literary Reference	X, Folly, Path	
LII, 5-8	God	X, Juridical	
LII, 30-32	X	Laughing-Crying	
LII, 33-36	X		
LII, 43	X		
LIII, 25-26	Goddess	X	
LIV, 13-16	X		
LIV, 25	Proverb	X	
LIV, 29-32	X	Fortuna	
LIV, 33-36	X	Fortuna	
LV, 37-40	X	Mystic	
LVI, 21-24	Fortuna	X	
LVI, 33-36	Fortuna	X, Blindness	
LVI, 37-40	X		
LVII, 25-26	X	Miscellany (Rest)	
LVIII, 1-4	Rich Man	X	
LIX, 13-14	X		
LIX, 17-20	X	Prisoner	
LIX, 27-28	X		
LIX, 29-32	Prisoner	X	
LXII, 15-16	X	Fortuna	

Death (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
LXIII, 33-40	X	Fear	
LXVI, 25-28	Sick Man	X	
LXVI, 37-38	Power of Love	X	
LXVI, 39-40	Blindness	X, Wound of Love	
LXXV, 45-48	Mythological	X	
LXXVIII, 41-42	Robe	X	
LXXVIII, 56	X		
LXXXI, 1-4	X	Sea, Fortune	
LXXXII, 1-4	Ship	X, Fortune, Port	
LXXXVI, 3-4	X	Dance	
LXXXVI, 9-10	X	River, Path, Mythology	Pagès states that the river referred to in these verses is the Aqueron, Auzias March et ses prédécesseurs p. 259; and Commentaire, p. 92. Pagès generally relates this to the Divina Commedia. Bohigas echoes Pagès theories. I suggest that the river referred to is the Lethe, and is a result of Ausias March's reading of the Metamorphoses. Pagès theory on the Aqueron is unsubstantiated, but March specifically refers to the Lethe in CII, 139.
LXXXVII, 95-98	Bond of Love	X	
LXXXVII, 305-307	X		
LXXXIX, 5-8	Path	X	

Death (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XCII, 1-4	Mythology	X, Fortuna	
XCII, 153-154	X		
XCII, 249-250	Biblical	X	
XCIII, 41-44	Hunting	X, Animal	
XCV, 10-12	Heat-Cold (Medical)	X	
XCV, 45-46	X		
XCV, 65-66	X	Fortuna	
XCV, 67-68	X	Path, Sun	
XCV, 69-72	X	Bitter-Sweet	
XCI, 1-4	X	Eschatological	
XCVII, 13-16	Path	X	
XCVII, 21-22	Sick Man	X	
XCVII, 27-28	X		
XCVIII, 1-4	Path	X, Mythological, Water	
XCVIII, 17-20	Religious (General)	X, Eschatological, Devout Man	
XCIX, 81-83	X	Animal	
XCIX, 84-85	Biblical	X, Echatological, Literary Reference	
C, 53-56	Folly	X	
C, 61-64	Animal	X	
C, 103-104	X	King, Servant	Nichomachean Ethics Book I, V, 1095, b, 19; (Pagès, p. 108) (Bohigas IV, p. 76).
CII, 72	X	Water (River)	
CII, 139-140	Mythological	X, Water (River)	
CIV, 53-56	Animal	X, King, Proverb	
CIV, 214-216	King	X, Animal	

Death (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
CV, 11-12	Juridical	X	
CV, 147-148	Biblical	X, Miscellany (Scythe)	
CV, 167-168	Biblical	X	
CV, 201-203	X		
CV, 210-212	God	X, Religious, Literary	
CVI, 33-36	X	Money, Old Man	
CVI, 72	Biblical	X	
CVII, 85-86	X		
CVII, 87-88	Heat-Cold (Medical)	X	
CVIII, 79-80	Robe	X, Proverb	
CX, 5-8	Miscellany (Fortune-teller)	X	
CX, 15-16	X		
CX, 17-20	Hunt	X, Animal	
CXII, 2-5	X	Path	
CXII, 38	X	Religious (General)	
CXII, 50	X	Equestrian, Proverb	
CXII, 121-130	X	Fortuna, Sad Man, Bitter-Sweet	
CXII, 137-140	X	Folly-Wisdom	
CXII, 153	Bitter-Sweet	X	
CXII, 175-178	X	Animal	
CXII, 235-237	X		
CXII, 255-260	Door	X, Key	
CXII, 294	X		
CXIII, 115-116	Sick Man	X	

Death (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
CXIII, 115-116	Sick Man	X	
CXIII, 117-118	Door	X	
CXIII, 181-188	Music	X, Sick Man, Arrow	
CXIII, 195-198	Folly	Crying-Laughing, X	
CXIII, 203-204	Path	X	
CXIII, 215-218	Blindness	X, Folly, Path	
CXIII, 221-223	Sick Man	X, Bitter-Sweet, Poison	
CXV, 15-18	Sick Man	X	
CXV, 119-120	X	Fire	
CXVI, 61-64	X		
CXXVII, 56-58	Wind	X, Port	
CXXVII, 58-60	X	Path	
CXXVII, 169-170	Juridical	X	
CXXVII, 356-357	X		
CXXVIII, 118-119	X	Miscellany (Hole)	
CXXVIII, 288-293	Folly	X, Sailor	
CXXVIII, 352-353	Path	X	
CXXVIII, 482-483	Military	X	

2. Time

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XXXVIII, 37-40	X	Sleep	
XLIV, 17-20	Sun	X	
LXX, 55-56			
LXXX, 8	Courtly Love	X	
XCI, 13-14	X		
XCI, 25-27	X		

Time (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XCIII, 80	X	Proverb	
C, 109-111	X		Nicomachean Ethics, Book I, VIII, 1099, b, 2 (Pagès, 108)
CXIII, 209-210	X		

3. Worm

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
I, 41-42	X		Nicomachean Ethics, Book VIII, V, 1157, b, 11 (Pagès, p. 3)
XIII, 17-24	Mythological	X	
XXXIII, 37-40	X		
LXXXIII, 17-22	Wound of Love	X, Bitter-Sweet, Poison	
XCII, 77-78	X		
variant CXIV,$_2$ 90-91 in EG^{2}a	X		
CXV, 63-64	X		

4. Tetric

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XIII, 1-8	X	Feast, Death	
XIX, 5-8	Devil	X	
XXII, 6-8	X	Death	St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica II-I, 21, 3. (Pagès, p. 32)
LXXIX, 1-8	Wound of Love	X, Arrow	
XCV, 73-76	X	Humours	

5. Poison

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XXVII, 17-20	Servant	X, King	
XXXIV, 41-44	Animal	X, Heat-Cold (Medical)	
XXXVI, 27-33	Goddess	X, Penitent	
XLII, 25-32	Wet Nurse	X, Hair, Animal	
LIX, 1-4	Sick Man	X, Doctor	
LXX, 33-35	X	Bitter-Sweet	
LXXIII, 17-22	Wound of Love	X, Worm, Bitter-Sweet	
XCI, 30-32	Power of Love	X	
XCII, 39-40	Apothecary	X	
XCII, 55-58	Traveller	X, Port, Path	
C, 37-40	Sick Man	X, Bitter-Sweet	
CXIII, 221-223	Sick Man	X, Bitter-Sweet, Death	
CXIV, 85-86	Bitter-Sweet	X	

E. Religious Imagery (as distinct from that of Religion of Love)

1. Crucifixion

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XXXVII, 43-48	X	Bondage of Love, Death	
LVII, 17-20	Biblical	X	

2. Devil

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
V, 9-16	Biblical	X	
XIX, 5-8	X	Tetric	
XLII, 17-24	X	Feast, Juridical	
LXXXVII, 299-300	Power of Love	X	
XCII, 150	X		
CXVII, 89-90	Fool	X, Sick Man	

3. Devout Man

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XXIII, 31-32	Biblical	X, Blindness	
L, 1-6	X		
XCII, 109-110	Religion of Love	X	
XCVIII, 17-20	Religious (General)	X, Eschatological, Death	
CXVII, 57-60	Philosopher	X	

4. Religious (General)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
LIII, 9-12	God	X	
LXIV, 28	Biblical	X	
LXVI, 41-44	Petrarchist	Biblical, X	

Religious (General) (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XCVIII, 17-20	X	Death, Eschatological, Devout Man	
CV, 13	X	X, Death, Literary	
CV, 210-212	God	X, Death, Literary	
CXII, 38	Death	X	
CXII, 391-400	Military	X	
CXIII, 125-128	Folly	X, Wound of Love	
CXIII, 251-254	X		
CXX, 129-130	X		
CXXVIII, 421-423	X	Juridical	

5. Mystic

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
II, 24	Fire	X	
III, 5-6	Fire	X, Alchemy, Heat-Cold (Medical)	
VII, 61-64	Light	X	
XVIII, 25-28	Light	X, Eschatological	
XX, 33-40	Fire	X, Astrology, Ship, Wind, Port, Sea	
XLV, 9-13	Fire	X, Heat-Cold (Medical), Light	
LV, 37-40	Death	X	
LVI, 25-32	Light	X, Biblical, Sun	
LXXXVII, 89-90	X		
CV, 95-96	Eye	X, Literary Reference, Light	
CV, 162-163	X	Fire	
CXVII, 41-44	X		
CXVII, 45-46	Fire	X	

6. Martyr-Saint

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XVIII, 49-52	X		
XLV, 81-88	X	Sun, Light	
LIII, 21-24	X	Wound of Love	Stigmatization of St. Francis of Assisi. Divina Commedia, "Paradiso" Canto XI, (Pagès, p. 70)
LXIII, 41-44	Heat-Cold (Medical)	X, Fire	
CXVI, 8-10	X	Religion of Love,	Dante, Divina Commedia, "Inferno", Canto V, (Bohigas, V, p. 67)

7. Eschatological Images (Paradise, Glory, Hell)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
VII, 57-59	X		Guillem de Cabestany, "Lo dous cossire", Stanza IV, vv. 5-8 (Pagès, p. 12, Bohigas, II, p. 30)
XIII, 33-38	Death	X	
XV, 41-48	Feast	X	
XVIII, 25-28	Light	X, Mystic	
L, 17-18	X	Religion of Love, Death	
LIV, 9-12	X		
LXXIV, 38	Courtly Love	X, King	
XCII, 129	X		
XCVI, 1-4	Death	X	
XCVIII, 5-6	Fool	X, Path	
XCVIII, 17-20	Religious (General)	X, Devout Man, Death	
XCIX, 25-27	Fire	X	

Eschatological (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XCIX, 84-85	Biblical	X, Literary Reference, Death	
C, 8	Path	X, Proverb	
CII, 137-138	Fire	X	
CV, 27-28	Path	X, Fear	
CXIII, 101-104	Path	X	
CXVI, 8-10	Martyr-Saint	X, Religion of Love	

8. God

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
LII, 5-8	X	Juridical, Death	
LIII, 9-12	X	Religious (General)	
CV, 210-212	X	Death, Religious, Literary	"Le rituel occitan", Ecritures Cathares, ed. et trad. René Nelli, Paris: Denoël, 1959, p. 213; as well as L. Clédat, Le Nouveau Testament traduit en langue provencale, suivi d'un rituel cathare, Paris: Lumière, 1887 (reprint Geneve: Slatkine, 1968, p. XI): "O Senhor juja e condapna los vises de la carn, no aias merce de la carn nada de corrupcio, mais aias merce del esperit pausat en carcer". Of particular importance is that specialists in Catharism refer to this very phrase as being extremely representative of the Cathar sensibility (see Jordi Ventura Subirats, "El

God (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
			catarismo en Cataluña", B.R.A.B.L.P t. 28, 1960, p. 166, and Steven Runciman, The Medieval Manichee: A Study of the Christian Dualist Heresy, Cambridge: University Press, 1960, p. 154).
CXIII, 171-172	X	Laughing-Crying, Proverb, Biblical	Psalm II, 4, and Psalm XXXVII, 13

F. Military

1. Military

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
VI, 29-32	Folly	X	
X, 1-8	X	King	Peire Espanhol, "Cum selh que fon ricx per encantamen". (M. Milá y Fontanals, De los trovadores de España, p. 457). Developed by (Pagès, p. 14-15)
X, 29-32	X	Bond of Love	
X, 33-40	X		
XI, 39-40	X	Armed Man	
XV, 49-53	X		
XVI, 20-24	Table	X	
XVI, 25-32	X	Port, Classical, Death	Seneca, "Epistula 70", 13-15, (Bohigas I, p. 61 and p. 76)
XVII, 10-11	Deaf and Dumb	X	
XVII, 49-52	X		
XXVII, 9-12	Weak Man	X, Strong Man	
XL, 25-28	Strong Man	X	
XL, 33-38	X		
XLV, 31-32	X		
XLIX, 35-40	X		
LII, 14-16	X		
LII, 25-28	Arrow	X	
LVII, 11-16	Biblical	X	
LX, 15-16	X	Armed Man-Sword	

Military (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
LX, 21-24	X		
LX, 31-32	X		
LXVII, 33-36	Miscellany	X, Juridical, Heart, Wound of Love	
LXXI, 33-34	Castle	X	
LXXIX, 27-32	Power of Love	X, Castle	
LXXIX, 35-36	X	Wound of Love, Bondage of Love	
LXXXIV, 39	X		
LXXXV, 18	X		
LXXXVII, 57-58	X		
LXXXVII, 311-313	X		
LXXXVIII, 41	X		
XC, 29-31	X	Ship	
XCVI, 35-36	X		
XCVIII, 25-28	X	Coward	
XCVIII, 29-32	X		
C, 33-36	X		
C, 157-160	Robe	X	
CI, 13-16	Petrarchist	X, Bondage of Love, Armed Man-Sword	
CI, 41-42	Eyes	X	
CII, 174-176	Castle	X, Petrarchist	
CII, 211-212	X		
CXII, 118-120	X		
CXII, 391-400	X	Religious (General)	
CXIII, 83-84	X	Sick Man	
CXV, 100	X		

Military (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
CXVI, 29-30	X		St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica I - II, 48, 2. (Auzias March et ses prédécesseurs", p. 307, note 1). Bohigas indicates that the opposite of Aquinas, and that Pagès has misinterpreted the passage. (Bohigas V, p. 68)
CXVI, 66-67	X		
CXVII, 77-80	X	Coward	
CXVII, 125-126	X		
CXVII, 185-188	X	Castle	
CXXIIb, 71-72	X		
CXXIV, 6-7	Castle	X	
CXXVII, 172-174	X	Trumpet	
CXXVIII, 320-325	X	Equestrian	
CXXVIII, 326-329	X		
CXXVIII, 482-483	X	Death	
CXXVIII, 484-487	X	Bitter-Sweet	
CXXVIII, 654-655	X		

2. Armed Man, Sword

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XI, 39-40	Military	X	
XXXI, 33-40	Fortuna	X, Laughing-Crying, Folly	
LX, 15-16	Military		
CI, 13-16	Petrarchist	X, Bondage of Love, Military	

3. Equestrian

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XLVII, 19-20	X		
LXXIV, 32	X	Proverb	
LXXIV, 73-80	Mythological	X, Folly	
CVI, 429-432	X	Path, Folly	
CXII, 50	Death	X, Proverb	
CXXVIII, 219-222	Blindness	Folly, X	
CXXVIII, 234	X		
CXXVIII, 320-325	Military	X	

4. Hunting

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XCIII, 41-44	X	Animal, Death	
CX, 17-20	X	Animal, Death	
CXXVII, 47	X	Eye	
CXXVIII, 294-297	Folly	X	

G. Science

1. Medicine

a. Bitter-Sweet

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
II, 41-44	Bread	X	
XIX, 33-36	X		
XXXVIII, 41-44	Bread	X, Oven	
LIV, 39-40	X		
LVIII, 17-20	Path	X, Laughing-Crying	
LXIII, 27-28	Bread	X	
LXIII, 30-32	X	Path	
LXX, 33-35	Poison	X	
LXXIII, 17-22	Wound of Love	X, Worm, Poison	
LXXV, 3-4	Religion of Love	X	
LXXXVII, 67	Sick Man	X	
XCIII, 33-34	Sick Man	X	
XCIII, 67	X		
XCIII, 69-70	X	Laughing-Crying, Eye	
XCIV, 63-64	X		
XCV, 69-72	Death	X	
XCVIII, 41-42	Sick Man	X, Humours	
XCVIII, 57-59	Water	X, Tears	
XCIX, 43-44	Bread	X	
C, 37-40	Sick Man	X, Poison	
CII, 91-96	Folly	X, Agricultural, Feast, Proverb	
CII, 165-168	Bread	X	
CXII, 121-130	Death	X, Fortuna, Sad Man	

Bitter-Sweet (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
CXII, 153	X	Death	
CXIII, 149-150	Doctor	X, Sick Man	
CXIII, 211-214	X	Juridical, Fortuna	
CXIII, 221-223	Sick Man	X, Poison, Death	
CXIV, 85-86	X	Poison	
CXVI, 53-54	X		
CXVI, 151-152	Bread	X, Apothecary, Sick Man, Opposites	
variant CXVII, 240-244 in de	X		
CXIX, 15-18	Fire	X, Heat-Cold (Medical)	
CXIX, 19-20	Sea	X, Water (River), Biblical	
CXX, 45	X		
CXXI, 15-16	X	Bed	
CXXVII, 415-416	X		
CXXVIII, 484-487	Military	X	
CXXVIII, 631	X		

b. Doctor

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
III, 9-12	Heat-Cold (Medical)	X	
IV, 29-32	Folly	X	
XIII, 13-16	Historical	X	
XVII, 41-44	X	Sick Man	
XLIV, 1-4	X	Sick Man	
LIX, 1-4	Sick Man	X, Poison	

Doctor (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
CI, 1-6	Sick Man	X	
CXIII, 81-82	X	Sick Man	
CXIII, 149-150	X	Bitter-Sweet, Sick Man	
CXVII, 233-236	X		
CXIX, 61-66	X	Sick Man	Hippocrates, Aphorismi III, (Pagès, p. 145) Bohigas suggests as the specific source, Vincent de Beauvais, Speculum Naturale XXXI, cap 101, referring to ed. Cologne, 1494, f. 405 r., "De signis mortalibus". (Bohigas V, p. 96-97)
CXXVIII, 336-339	X	Sick Man	
CXXVIII, 502-509	Sick Man	X, Apothecary	

c. Heat-Cold

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
III, 5-6	Fire	X, Alchemy, Mystic	
III, 9-12	X	Doctor, Sick Man	
IV, 31-32	Fire	X	
variant XXVII, 17-24 in E	Sick Man	X	
XXXIV, 41-44	Animal	X, Poison	
XLV, 9-13	Fire	X, Light, Mystic	
XLVII, 25-28	Fire	X	
XLIX, 1-6	X		Macrobius, Commentary of

Heat-Cold (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
			Dream of Scipio, ed. William Harris Stahl, New York: Columbia University Press, 1952, p. 96. Book I, V, 5-7. The reference concerning especially verses 5-6 is to the concept of imagination and its relation to what Macrobius calls the "termini", which like imagination represent "the first incorporeality after corporeality".
LIII, 1-4	X	Path	
LXIII, 41-44	X	Saint-Martyr, Fire	
LXVII, 2-4	X	Sick Man	
LXVII, 11-12	X	Fire	
LXVII, 39-40	Fire	X, Eyes	
LXIX, 25-28	X	Eyes, Sea	
LXXXIV, 23-24	X		Bernat de Ventadorn, "Tant ai mon cor plen de joja" Stanza I, v. 11-12. (Pagès, Auzias March et ses prédécesseurs, p. 240) Bohigas remarks that the parallel is very tenuous. (Bohigas III, p. 130)
LXXXVII, 282-283	X	Sick Man	
XCV, 10-12	X	Death	
CI, 47-48	X	Fire	
CII, 129-132	Fire	X, Oven, Bed	

Heat-Cold (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
CII, 145-146	X		
CVI, 159-160	Fire	X, Water	
CVII, 87-88	X	Death	
CXIX, 13-14	Fire	X	
CXIX, 15-18	Fire	X, Bitter-Sweet	

d. Humours

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
IV, 27-30	Animal	X	
XI, 35-36	X		
XLIV, 1-4	Doctor	X	
LXXXVII, 271-274	Fire	X, Power of Love, Eyes, Wound of Love	
XCIV, 17-20	X		
XCIV, 118-120	X	Musical	
XCV, 73-76	Tetric	X	
XCVIII, 41-42	Sick Man	X	
CXVII, 141-144	X		

e. Sick Man

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
I, 31-32	X	Bread	
II, 37-40	Sleep	X, Hill	
III, 9-12	Heat-Cold	Doctor, X	
III, 13-14	X		
XVI, 9-12	Sterile Man	X, Folly	
XVII, 41-44	Doctor	X	
XXVI, 27-28	Envious Man	X	

e. Sick Man (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
variant XXVII, 17-24, in E	X	Heat-Cold (Medical)	
XXVIII, 1-8	Light	X, Robber, Animal	
XXXV, 7-8	X		
XLIV, 1-4	Doctor	X	
LI, 13-16	X	Death	
LIII, 33-37	Folly	X	
LIX, 1-4	X	Doctor, Poison	
LXVI, 9-12	X	Wound of Love	
LXVI, 25-28	X	Death	
LXVII, 2-4	Heat-Cold (Medical)	X	
LXIX, 51-52	Music	X	
LXIX, 53-56	X		
LXX, 46-48	Power of Love	X	
LXXXVII, 67	X	Sick Man	
LXXXVII, 189-190	Light	X	
LXXXVII, 277-280	X	Bed, Eye	
LXXXVII, 282-283	Heat-Cold (Medical)	X	
XCIII, 33-34	X	Bitter-Sweet	
XCIV, 86	X		
XCVII, 21-22	X	Death	
XCVIII, 41-42	X	Bitter-Sweet, Humours	
XCIX, 65-66	X	Humours	
XCIX, 67-68	Music	X	
XCIX, 79-80	X		

Sick Man (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
C, 37-40	X	Bitter-Sweet, Poison	
C, 197-200	Folly	X, Beggar	
CI, 1-6	X	Doctor	
CII, 177-180	X		
CVII, 76-78	X		
CXI, 26-28	X		
CXIII, 81-82	Doctor	X	
CXIII, 83-84	Military	X	
CXIII, 115-116	X	Death	
CXIII, 149-150	Doctor	X, Bitter-Sweet	
CXIII, 181-188	Music	X, Arrow, Death	
CXIII, 221-223	X	Bitter-Sweet, Death, Poison	
CXV, 15-18	X	Death	
CXV, 71-78	X		
CXV, 95-96	Power of Love	X	
CXVI, 27-28	X	Power of Love	
CXVI, 151-152	Bread	X, Bitter-Sweet, Apothecary, Opposites (Medical)	
CXVII, 25-27	X		
CXVII, 89-90	Fool	X, Devil	
CXIX, 61-66	Doctor	X	
CXX, 17-20	Folly	X	
CXXIIb, 59-60	Hunger	X	
CXXVII, 24-25	Biblical	X	
CXXVIII, 336-339	Doctor	X	
CXXVIII, 502-509	X	Apothecary, Doctor	Nicomachean Ethics, Book VI, I, 1138 b, 18 sqq. (Pages, p.154)

f. Opposites

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XCIV, 59-62	X	Apothecary, Alchemy	
CXVI, 151-152	Bread	X, Apothecary, Sick Man, Bitter-Sweet	
CXVII, 177-182	Alchemy	X	
CXIX, 5-7	X		

2. Alchemy

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
III, 5-6	Fire	X, Heat-Cold (Medical), Mystic	
V, 17-18	Fire	X	
LXXXVII, 159-160	X	Philosopher	
XCII, 181-184	X	Fire, Oven	
XCIV, 25-28	Fire	X, Money	
XCIV, 59-62	Opposites (Medical)	X, Apothecary	
XCIV, 115-116	X		
XCVIII, 33-34	X		
CII, 169-170	Folly	X	
CXIII, 39-40	X		
CXIV, 35-36	X	Power of Love	
CXVII, 169-172	Fire	X	
CXVII, 177-180	X	Opposites (Medical)	
CXXIIa, 29-31	X	Folly	

3. Apothecary

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XCII, 35-38	Blindness	X, Light	

Apothecary (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XCII, 39-40	X	Poison	
XCII, 53-54	Bread	X	
XCIV, 59-62	Opposites (Medical)	X, Alchemy	
C, 57-60	Folly	X, Literary Reference, Labourer	
CXVI, 151-152	Bread	X, Opposites (Medical), Bitter-Sweet, Sick Man	
CXXVIII, 306-307	X		
CXXVIII, 502-509	Sick Man	X, Doctor	
CXXVIII, 510	X		

4. Astrology

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XIV, 29-31	X	Mythological, Classical	St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica I, 68, 4 (Pagès, p. 21). Dante, Convito, "Canzone" I, verse 1 (Pagès, p. 22). Dante, Divina Commedia, "Paradiso", Canto VIII, 3, vv. 34-39. (Pages, p. 22) and (Bohigas II, p. 53). R. Lull, Doctina pueril Chapter 98. (Ramírez i Molas, p. 319)
XX, 29-32	Courtly Love	X, Mythological	
XX, 33-40	Fire	X, Wind, Ship, Port, Mystic, Sea	
XLVII, 1-4	X	Fire	
LXXVI, 30	X	Fortuna	
LXXVII, 331-332	X	Biblical	

Astrology (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
LXXXVII, 335-337	X		
CXII, 87-88	X		

H. Marine

1. Sailor

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XXVII, 25-28	Ship	X	
variant XLVI, 17 in H	Fear	X	
LXXIV, 17-20	Ship	X, Wind	
C, 5-7	X	Wind	
CII, 17-24	X	House, Sea	
CIV, 37-38	Ship	X	
CIV, 73-77	Fortuna	X, Sea	
CXIII, 205-208	Traveller	X	
CXXVIII, 288-293	Folly	X, Death	
CXXVIII, 394-399	X (Merchant)	Robber, Ship, Rich Man	
CXXVIII, 605-609	Fortuna	X, Blindness, Laughing-Crying	

2. Port

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XVI, 25-32	Military	X, Classical, Death	
XX, 1-4	Classical	X, Door	
XX, 33-40	Fire	X, Wind, Ship, Sea Mystic, Astrology	
LX, 35-36	Travelling	X	
LXXVI, 2-4	X		See XVI, 25-32, Military, possibly Seneca, "Epistula 70"
LXXXII, 1-4	Ship	X, Fortuna, Death	
XCII, 55-58	Traveller	X, Poison, Path	
CXXVII, 56-58	Wind	X, Death	

3. Sea

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
II, 1-8	King	X, Ship, Castle, Wind	
II, 9-10	Winds	X	
IV, 9-13	X	Wind, Literary Reference	Dante, Divina Commedia, "Inferno" V, 29. (Pages, p. 6) and (Bohigas II, p. 17); also, "Purgatorio" XXXII, 115-116. (Pagès, 6) and El Marqués de Santillana, Cancionero de Stuñiga, 98. (Pagès, 6-7)
XVIII, 41-44	Philosopher	X	
XX, 33-40	Fire	X, Astrology, Wind, Ship, Port, Mystic	
XXVI, 45-48	Classical	X	
XXVII, 25-28	Ship	X, Sailor, Wind	
XXVII, 33-36	X		
XLVI, 1-8	Wind	X, Path	
LXIX, 25-28	Heat-Cold (Medical)	X, Eye	
LXXXI, 1-4	Death	X, Fortune	
LXXXVII, 91-92	X		
CII, 17-24	Sailor	X, House	
CII, 65-68	Labourer	X, Water (River)	
CIV, 73-77	Fortuna	X, Sailor	
CV, 65-66	Biblical	X	
CV, 133-134	Biblical	X, Water (River)	
CXVI, 139-140	X		
CXIX, 19-20	X	Biblical, Water (River), Bitter-Sweet	
CXXVIII, 599-602	Fortuna	X, Chess	

4. Ship

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
II, 1-8	King	X, Sea, Castle, Wind	
XVI, 41-44	Folly	X	
XX, 33-40	Fire	X, Astrology, Wind, Mystic, Port, Sea	
XXVII, 25-28	X	Sailor, Sea, Wind	Dante, Divina Commedia, "Inferno" V, 29. (Bohigas II, p. 17) Bohigas suggests that the sources should be the same as IV, 9-13, (Sea)
LXXIV, 17-20	X	Wind, Sailor	
LXXXII, 1-4	X	Death, Fortuna, Port	
XC, 29-31	Military	X	
CIV, 37-38	X	Sailor	
CXIII, 139-140	X	Prisoner	
CXIII, 179-180	X	Fortuna, Wind	
CXXVIII, 394-399	Sailor	Rich Man (Merchant), Robber, X	

I. Elements

1. Fire-Ice, non-medical Hot-Cold

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
II, 24	X	Mystic	Hugues de Saint-Victor, Commentary on Ecclesiastes, Migne, P.L. 175, p. 117. On the perception of God as Love. "Primum ergo visus est ignis cum flamma, et fumo deinde ignis cum flamma sive (sic) fumo, postremo ignis purus sine flamma et fumo."
II, 27-28	Sun	X	
III, 5-6	X	Alchemy, Mystic, Heat-Cold (Medical)	Hugues de Saint-Victor, Commentary on Ecclesiastes, Migne, P.L. 175, p. 177. Same as II, 24
IV, 31-32	X	Heat-Cold (Medical)	
V, 17-18	X	Alchemy	Hugues de Saint Victor, Commentary on Ecclesiastes, Migne, P.L. 175, p. 177. Same as II, 24
VIII, 35-36	Sun	X	
XIV, 33-35	X	Fortuna, Light	
XV, 17-20	Sun	X, Petrarchist	
XV, 21-24	X	Hermit, Door	
XV, 25-28	Mythology	X, King, Petrarchist	
XVIII, 9-12	X	Light	
XVIII, 17-20	Animal	X, Mythology	
XX, 33-40	X (Hot-Cold)	Astrology, Wind,	St. Thomas Aquinas,

Fire (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
		Ship, Port, Sea, Mystic	Summa Theologica, I, 66, I. Dante, Divina Commedia, "Purgatorio" canto XVIII, vv. 27-32. (Pagès, p. 30)
XXII, 10-12	Hunger	X (Hot-Cold)	
XXIV, 37-40	X (Hot-Cold)	Proverb	
XXVI, 20	X (Hot-Cold)	Proverb	St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica I, 63, 2. (Pages, pp. 35 and 39)
XXXIII, 25-32	X	Hunger	
XLV, 9-13	X	Heat-Cold (Medical), Light, Mystic	Hugues de Saint Victor, Commentary on Ecclesiastes, Migne, P.L. 175, p. 177. Same as II, 24
XLVII, 1-4	Astrology	X	
XLVII, 25-28	X	Heat-Cold (Medical)	
variant LIII, 21-24 in B d e	X		
LV, 17-20	X		
LXIII, 41-44	Heat-Cold (Medical)	X, Saint-Martyr	
LXVII, 11-12	Heat-Cold Medical)		
LXVII, 39-40	X	Eyes, Heat-Cold (Medical)	
LXXXV, 41-44	X		
LXXXVII, 9-10	X		
LXXXVII, 131-132	Eyes	X	
LXXXVII, 173-174	X		

Fire (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
LXXXVII, 271-274	X	Power of Love, Eyes, Wound of Love, Humours	
LXXXVII, 295-296	X	Power of Love	
variant XC, 32 in a	X		
XCII, 181-184	Alchemy	X, Oven	
XCII, 227-228	X		
XCIII, 86	X		
XCIV, 25-28	X	Alchemy, Money	
XCIX, 25-27	X	Eschatological	
CI, 47-48	Heat-Cold (Medical)	X	
CII, 121	X	Water	
CII, 129-132	X	Oven, Heat-Cold (Medical), Bed	
CII, 137-138	X	Eschatological	
CII, 214-216	Folly	X (Hot-Cold)	
CIII, 17-20	Robe	X (Hot-Cold), Bed, Animal	
CIV, 201-202	X	Sodomite, Biblical (Apocalypsis)	
CV, 45-46	Biblical	X	
CV, 162-163	Mystic	X	
CV, 185-186	X (Hot-Cold)		
CV, 189-192	X		
CVI, 159-160	X	Heat-Cold (Medical), Water	Seneca, "Epistula" XCII 21, tome II, p. 356. (Pagès, p. 124) and (Bohigas IV, p. 156)

Fire (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
CX, 22-24	X		
CXII, 349-350	X		
CXIII, 189-190	X	House	
CXV, 119-120	Death	X	
CXVI, 130	Petrarchist	X	
CXVII, 45-46	X	Mystic	
CXVII, 169-172	X	Alchemy	
CXVIII, 57-58	X		
CXIX, 13-14	X	Heat-Cold (Medical)	
CXIX, 15-18	X	Heat-Cold (Medical), Bitter-Sweet	
CXXIII, 49-52	X		
CXXIII, 60-61	X		
CXXVIII, 557-566	Miscellany (Clever Man)	X	
CXXVIII, 664-666	X	Miscellany (Possessions), Proverb	

2. Light-Darkness (Illumination)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
VII, 61-64	X	Mystic	
XIV, 33-35	Fire	X	
XVIII, 1-4	X	Bread	
XVIII, 9-12	Fire	X	
XVIII, 25-28	X	Eschatological, Mystic	
XVIII, 33-36	Biblical	X, Prison, Dark Place	
XXI, 25-28	X		

Light (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XXVIII, 1-8	X	Animal, Robber, Sick Man	
XLV, 9-13	Fire	X, Heat-Cold (Medical), Mystic	
XLV, 81-88	Martyr-Saint	X, Sun	
LVI, 25-32	X	Sun, Biblical, Mystic	"Song of Songs," VI, 9
LXVI, 21-23	X		
LXXV, 70-72	Power of Love	X, Landscape	
LXXXVII, 189-190	X	Sick Man	
XCII, 35-38	Blindness	X, Water	
XCII, 157-158	X		
CV, 95-96	Eye	X, Literary Reference, Mystic	
CXIII, 8	X (Darkness)		
CXIII, 95-96	X (Darkness)		
CXIV, 61-62	X	Music	
CXVI, 88	X		
CXVII, 97-98	Blindness	X	

2. b. Dark Place

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XVIII, 33-36	Biblical	X, Light (Darkness), Prison	
XXXIX, 3-6	Folly	X, Sad Man	

3. Sun

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
II, 27-28	X	Fire	
VIII, 35-36	X	Fire	

Sun (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XV, 17-20	X	Fire, Petrarchist	Petrarch, Amador de los Ríos, Historia crítica de la literatura española, VI p. 502. De los Ríos states that this is a petrarchist reminiscence, but does not specify.
XLV, 81-88	Martyr	X, Light	
LVI, 25-32	Light	X, Biblical, Mystic	
XCV, 67-68	Death	Path, X	

4. Water, b River

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
VII, 13-16	X	Folly, Petrarchist, Proverb	Catullus, Poem 70, "Nulli se dicit mulier mea nubere malle", verse 4. Guido Guinizelli, Canzone I, "Donna, l'amor me sforza", stanza IV, verse 48. Petrarch, Sonnet 212, stanza I, verse 4 (Pagès, 10). Apparently using the Mestica edition, Pagès indicates sonnet 177. For a study of the origins and uses of this myth see J. Frappier, "Variations sur le theme du mirroir de Bernard de Ventadour a Maurice de Sceve", Histoire, Mythes et Symboles, Genève: Droz, 1976, pp. 149-167, in particular, p. 153.

Water-River (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
VII, 67-68	X (River)		
XIV, 25-28	Thirst	X	
LXXI, 53-56	X	Landscape	
LXXXVI, 9-10	Death	X (River), Path, Mythology	
XCII, 35-38	Blindness	Light, X	
XCVII, 49-50	Tears	X, Laughing-Crying	
XCVIII, 1-4	Path	X (River), Death, Mythology	
XCVIII, 57-59	X	Tears, Bitter-Sweet	
CII, 65-68	Labourer (Fisherman)	X (River), Sea	
CII, 72	Death	X (River)	
CII, 121	Fire	X	
CII, 139-140	Mythology	X (River), Death	
CV, 133-134	Biblical	X (River), Sea	
CV, 217-218	Biblical	X	
CV, 219-220	X	Key	
CVI, 159-160	Fire	X, Heat-Cold (Medical)	
CXIX, 19-20	Sea	X (River), Biblical, Bitter-Sweet	
CXXVII, 280	X	Miscellany (Bath)	

5. Wind

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
II, 1-8	King	X, Castle, Ship, Sea	
II, 9-10	X	Sea	
IV, 9-13	Sea	X, Literary Reference	

Wind (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XX, 33-40	Fire	X, Astrology, Port, Sea, Mystic, Ship	
XXVII, 25-28	Ship	X, Sea, Sailor	
XXXIV, 1-8	X	Lameness, Hill	
XLVI, 1-8	X	Sea, Path	"Breviari d'amor" verse 6086 (Pagès, p. 63). Cerverí de Girona, Poem 76, v. 1-2, "Greu pot (nuyl) hom coneixer en la mar" (Bohigas III, p. 8)
LXXIV, 17-20	Ship	X, Sailor	
LXXVI, 5-8	Erring	X, Landscape	
XC, 9-12	Landscape	X	
XCII, 195-196	Power of Love	X	
XCVII, 7-8	X		
C, 5-7	Sailor	X	
CVIII, 64	Folly	X, Proverb, Biblical, Petrarchist	
CXIII, 179-180	Ship	X, Fortuna	
CXXII, 56-58	X	Port, Death	

J. Nature

1. Agricultural Reference

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
IV, 1-6	Hunger	X, Bread, Tree, Proverb	
VI, 34-36	Labourer	X	
XXVIII, 1-8	Light	X	
XXXI, 25-32	Fortuna	X, Hill	
LIX, 43-44	Power of Love	X, Castle	
XCII, 221-222	X		
C, 94	X		
C, 145-148	Folly	X	
CII, 91-96	Folly	X, Feast, Proverb, Bitter-Sweet	
CVI, 485-488	Tree	X	
CXXVII, 115-117	Hunger	X (Thistle), Proverb	
CXXVII, 230	Tree	X	

2. Animal

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
II, 17-18	X	Classical	Vergil, Eglogue I, 59-60. (Pagès, p. 4), and (Bohigas, II, p. 11)
IV, 27-30	X	Humours (Medical)	
VI, 44	X	Folly, Proverb	
IX, 15-16	Mythological	X, Petrarchist, Death	
XVIII, 17-20	X	Mythological, Fire	Cino da Pistoia or Dante, Sonnet "Molti volendo dir che fosse Amore", (Number

Animal (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
			79 in: Dante Alighieri, Rime ed. G. Contini, Torino: Giulio Einaudi, 1965), stanza 9. Pagès attributes this verse to Pistoia, after misquoting and misinterpreting his source, M. Scherillo, "Alcune fonti provenzali della 'Vita Nuova' di Dante", p. 246 (Pagès, p. 25)
XXIV, 25-28	X	Classical	Juvenal, Satire XII, 34-36; Richard de Fournival, Li Bestiare d'Amour, ed. C. Hippeau, Genève: Slatkine Reprints, 1969, p. 31; "Las Naturas d'alcus auzels e d'alcunas bestias", in K. Bartsch, Chrestomathie Provençale, Berlin: Wiegandt und Schotte, 1892, p. 336. (Pagès, p. 37). Bestiaris vol. I, ed. S. Panunzio, Barcelona: Barcino, 1963, p. 110. Faules isopiques, ed. Miquel i Planas, Barcelona: 1908, p. 170. (Bohigas II, p. 90)
XXVIII, 1-8	Light	X, Sick Man, Robber	
XXIX, 1-4	X		According to Bohigas, the image of the bull would proceed from an unspecified bestiairy. As

Animal (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
			his source on this matter he refers to, R. Alòs Moner, "Els bestiaris a Catalunya", Discursos llegits a la 'Real Academia de Buenas Letras'a Barcelona, Barcelona, 1924. p. 32. (Bohigas II, p. 102). Owing to the nature of the image I would also suggest that it may also be inspired by: Nicomachean Ethics, Book III, VII, 3, 1116 b 29 - 1117 a.
XXX, 39-40	X		
XXXIV, 41-44	X	Heat-Cold (Medical), Poison	
XLII, 1-8	X	Tree	San Vicente Ferrer, quoted in D. Roque Chabas, "Estudios sobre los sermones de San Vicente Ferrer" Revista de Archivos t. II, 1903. p. 89. Richard de Fournival, Le Bestiare d'Amour, ed. C. Hippeau, Genève: Slatkine Reprints, 1969, p. 31. (Pagès, p. 57). For unclear reasons P. Bohigas considers improbable the influence of Hugues de St. Victor, "De bestiis et aliis rebus" I, XXV, Migne, P.L. 177, p. 26, as well as, "De propietatibus rerum" de Bartomeu Glanville. (Bohigas

Animal (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
			II, p. 144) The image of the dove being of popular tradition it is also interesting to note that it is found in the romance, "Fontefrida, Fontefrida", and in Anselm Turmeda, Disputa del Ase, Barcelona: Barcino (E.N.C.), 161-162.
XLII, 12-16	X	Short-sightedness, Cloth	
XLII, 25-32	Wet Nurse	X, Poison, Hair	
XLVI, 9-16	Biblical	X, Oven	
LXIV, 1-8	X	Music	Peire Rogier, "Belh Monruelh, aisselh que-s part de vos" stanza II, verses 7-8. To be found in C. Appel, Das Leben und die Lieder des Trobadors Peire Rogier, Berlin: Reimer, 1882, p. 92. Pagès wrongly indicates Appel's Chrestomathie Provençale as the textual source. (Pagès, p. 77)
LXIV, 25-27	X	Petrarchist	Arnaut Daniel, "Canzone X", "En cest sonet coind'e leri", stanza VII, verses 43-45. Arnaut Daniel, Canzoni, ed. G. Toja. Firenze: Sansoni, 1960, p. 274. Petrarch "Sonnet 212" stanza II, verses 7-8, and Rime

Animal (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
			CCXXXIX, Sestina 8, "La ver l'aurora che si dolce l'aura" stanza VI, verse 35-36. (Pagès, p. 78) (Bohigas III, p. 67)
LXXI, 73-74	X		
LXXII, 25-26	Biblical	X	
LXXV, 49-56	Mythology	X	
LXXVIII, 43-44	X	Coward	
LXXXVII, 48	X		
LXXXVII, 170	X	Proverb	
LXXXIX, 1-2	Biblical	X	
XCIII, 41-44	Hunting	X, Death	
XCIX, 81-83	Death	X	
XCIX, 91-92	X	Fool, Proverb	
C, 61-64	X	Death	Nicomachean Ethics, Book 1, IX, 1099 b 32. (Pagès, p. 106)
C, 107-108	X	Music	Nicomachean Ethics, Book I, V, 1094 b 19. (Pagès, 108)
C, 177-180	Child	X	
CII, 155-156	X		
CIII, 17-20	Robe	X, Hot-Cold (Fire), Bed	
CIV, 53-56	X	King, Death, Proverb	
CIV, 214-216	King	X, Death	
CIV, 256	X	Proverb	Nicomachean Ethics, Book I, VII, 1098 a 18. (Pagès, p. 119) (Bohigas IV, p. 119)

Animal (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
CVI, 265-268	X	Folly	
CVI, 387-388	X		
CVI, 443-444	X	Folly, Fortuna, Proverb	
variant CVII, 86 in N	X		
CX, 17-20	Hunt	X, Death	
CXI, 37-38	X		
CXII, 107-110	X	Proverb	
CXII, 129-130	Tree	X, Animal	
CXII, 175-178	Death	X	
CXIII, 164	X		
CXVII, 1-2	X	Proverb	
CXXII a, 13-16	Folly	X	
CXXII b, 21-23	Folly	X, Proverb	
CXXII b, 37-38	X		
CXXVIII, 106-109	X		
CXXVIII, 260-263	Music	Tree, X	
CXXVIII, 448-451	X		

3. Landscape - flowers

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
LXVIII, 26	X	Proverb, Biblical	Psalm I, 3
LXXI, 53-56	Water (River)	X	
LXXV, 70-72	Power of Love	X, Light	
LXXVI, 5-8	Travelling	X, Wind	
XC, 9-12	X	Wind	
CII, 59-60	X		
CXXI, 41-48	Travelling	X	

4. Tree

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
IV, 1-6	Hunger	X, Agricultural, Bread	
XXVI, 49-53	X	Folly	
XLII, 1-8	Animal	X	
XCII, 197-200	Power of Love	X	
CVI, 485-488	X	Agricultural	
CXII, 193-198	Robe	X	
CXII, 324	X		
CXV, 107-108	X		
CXVII, 107-108	X		
CXXVII, 230	X	Agricultural, Proverb	
CXXVII, 391-392	X		
CXXVIII, 260-263	Music	X, Animal	

K. Geography of Love

1. Path-Way-Road

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
VI, 9-12	X		
VII, 49-51	Biblical	X	
IX, 41-44	Door	X	
XIX, 23-24	Death	X	
XXVIII, 1--20	Bond of Love	X, Prisoner, Death	
XXXVIII, 29-32	X	Hill	
XLV, 97-100	X		
XLVI, 1-8	Wind	X, Sea	
LI, 37-39	Literary Reference	X, Folly, Death	
LIII, 1-4	Heat-Cold (Medical)	X	
LVIII, 17-20	X	Bitter-Sweet, Laughing-Crying	
LVIII, 21-22	Robber	X	
LXII, 25-28	X	Traveller	
LXIII, 30-32	Bitter-Sweet	X	
LXX, 55-56	Proverb	X, Time	
LXXXVI, 9-10	Death	X, Mythology, Water (River), Mythology	
LXXXIX, 5-8	X	Death	
XCII, 55-58	Traveller	X, Port, Poison	
XCV, 67-68	Death	X, Sun	
XCVII, 13-16	X	Death	
XCVIII, 1-4	X	Water, Mythology, Death	The water image in these verses subtly refers to the Lethe, as in LXXXVI, 9-10, and CII, 139. The

Path-Way-Road (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
			source is, therefore, probably references to the Lethe found in Ovid's Metamorphoses.
XCVIII, 5-6	Fool	X, Paradise	
XCIX, 16	X		
XCIX, 56	X		
C, 8	X	Proverb, Blindness	
C, 95-96	X	Hill	
C, 219-220	X		Nicomachean Ethics Book VI, II, 1139 a 16 - 1139 b 15. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica I - II, 27, 2. (Pages, p. 111)
CI, 17-24	Child	X, Travelling	
variant CIII, between 48-49 in manuscripts B d e	Blind		
CIV, 167-168	X		
CIV, 240	X	Proverb	
CV, 27-28	X	Eschatological (Fear)	
CV, 173-174	Biblical		
CVI, 429-432	Equestrian	X, Folly	
CVI, 469-472	Biblical	X, Bread	
CVIII, 93-96	Biblical	X, Blind	
CVIII, 100	X		

Path-Way-Road (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
CXII, 2-5	Death	X	
CXII, 189-190	X		
CXII, 403-405	X		
CXIII, 101-104	X	Eschatological	
CXIII, 121-124	X		
CXIII, 145-146	X		
CXIII, 165-166	X		
CXIII, 203-204	X	Death	
CXIII, 215-218	Blindness	X, Folly, Death	
CXVI, 46-48	X		
CXVIII, 29-30	X		
CXXII a, 26-27	Folly	X, Music	
CXXVII, 58-60	X		
CXXVII, 122-123	X	Traveller	
CXXVII, 217-219	X	Bread	
CXXVII, 328-329	X		
CXXVII, 354-355	X		
CXXVIII, 6-7	X		
CXXVIII, 134-137	X		
CXXVIII, 202	X		
CXXVIII, 316-319	X		
CXXVIII, 352-353	X	Death	
CXXVIII, 356-357	X		
CXXVIII, 553-555	X		
CXXVIII, 687-690	X		

2. Traveller-Travelling

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
LX, 35-36	X	Port	

Traveller-Travelling (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
LXII, 25-28	Path	X	
LXXVI, 5-8	X	Wind, Nature	
LXXXI, 7-8	X		
LXXXVII, 251-254	X		
LXXXVII, 339-340	Power of Love	X	
XCII, 55-58	X	Path, Port, Poison	
CI, 17-24	Child	X, Path	
CII, 221-222	X		
CV, 80	X		
CVI, 137	Wall	X	
CXI, 1-8	X		
CXIII, 205-208	X	Sailor	
CXXI, 41-48	X	Landscape	
CXXVII, 127-129	Path	X	
CXXVIII, 340-343	X	Hill	

3. Bridge

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
LXXXIX, 3-4	X		

4. Hill

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
II, 37-40	Sick Man	X, Sleep	
XXXI, 25-32	Fortuna	X, Agricultural	
XXXIV, 1-8	Wind	X, Lameness	
XXXVIII, 29-32	Path	X	
LXXXIX, 17	X		

Hill (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
C, 95-96	Path	X	
CXXVIII, 84-85	X		
CXXVIII, 340-343	Traveller	X	

5. Wall

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XVI, 17-20	X		
CVI, 137	X	Travelling	

6. Door

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
II, 11-12	Key	X	
V, 40	X		
IX, 41-44	X	Dumbness, Path	
XV, 21-24	Fire-Ice	X	
XX, 1-4	Classical	X, Port	
XX, 17-24	Key	X, Death	
XLVI, 45-48	X	Fortuna	
LXXXVIII, 63-64	X		
CXII, 255-260	X	Death, Key	
CXII, 411-412	X		
CXIII, 117-118	X	Death	
CXVII, 73-74	Hostal of Love	X	
CXXVII, 282	X		

7. Key

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
II, 11-12	X	Door	

Key (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XX, 17-24	X	Door, Death	
CV, 219-220	Water	X	
CXII, 255-260	Door	X, Death	
CXIII, 87-88			

8. House

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
LVI, 13-16	Religion of Love	X	
CII, 17-24	Sailor	X, Sea	
CXIII, 189-190	Fire	X	
CXIII, 195-198	Folly	X, Laughing-Crying, Death	

9. Castle

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
II, 1-8	King	X, Sea, Ship, Wind	
VI, 29-32	Folly	X	
LIX, 43-44	Power of Love	X, Agricultural Reference	
LXXI, 33-34	X	Military	Jordi de Sant Jordi, Poem III, "Lo Setge d'Amor", "Ajustat vey d'amor tot lo poder", stanza II, verses 13-16. Jordi de Sant Jordi, ed. M. de Riquer, Granada: Universidad, 1955, p. 119. (Bohigas I, p. 83; II, p. 94)
LXXIX, 27-32	Power of Love	X, Military	
CI, 9-12	Eyes	X, Servant, King	

Castle (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
CII, 174-176	X	Military, Petrarchist	Petrarch, Sonnet LXVII, "Del mar tirreno a la sinistra riva", verse 10. (Amador de los Ríos, Historia de la literatura espanola VI, p. 519) (Pagès, p. 115)
CVI, 168	King	X	
CXVII, 6-7	X	Military	
CXXVIII, 400-405	X		

10. Prisoner

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
I, 13-16	X	Death	Guillamue de Lorris et Jean de Meun, Roman de la Rose tome II, ed. E. Langlois, Paris: Firmin-Didot, p. 135: "Mout est Espernace courtoise: / El ne laira ja une toise / Nul vaillant ome jusqu'au chief, / Ne por perill ne por meschief. / Nes au larron que l'en viaut pendre / Fait ele ades merci atendre (vv. 2631-2636).
IX, 1-8	X	Tears, Death, Folly	
XIII, 13-16	Historical	X	
XVII, 29-32	X	Death	

Prisoner (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XVIII, 33-36	Biblical	X, Light-Darkness, Dark Place	
XXII, 25-28	X		
XXVIII, 17-20	Bond of Love	X, Path, Death	
XXXV, 25-28	X	Death	
XLI, 37-40	Friendship	X	
XLIX, 41-44	Bondage of Love	X, Sleep, Death	
L, 10-12	Juridical	X	
LI, 1-6	X	Death	Guillamue de Lorris et Jean de Meun, Roman de la Rose tome II, ed. E. Langlois, Paris: Firmin-Didot, p. 135: "Mout est Espernace courtoise: / El ne laira ja une toise / Nul vaillant ome jusqu'au chief, / Ne por perill ne por meschief. / Nes au larron que l'en viaut pendre / Fait ele ades merci atendre (vv. 2631-2636).
LIX, 17-20	Death	X	
LIX, 29-32	X	Death	
LXIII, 3-4	X		
LXXI, 86-88	Bond of Love	X	
LXXV, 11-12	X	Mythological	
LXXVIII, 49-50	X		
LXXXVII, 166-167	Sleep	X	
LXXXVII, 195-196	X		

Prisoner (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
LXXXVII, 198	X		
XCIX, 23-24	X	King	
CI, 44	X		
CII, 61-62	X	King	
CV, 197-198	X		
CVI, 313-314	Folly	X	
CIX, 5-8	X	King	
CX, 1-2	X		
CX, 3-4	Fortuna	X	
CXIII, 99-100	Bond of Love	Prisoner	
CXIII, 139-140	Ship	X	
CXVII, 67-68	X		
CXXII b 29-32	Historical	X	

L. Literary

1. Literary References (General)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
IV, 9-13	Sea	X, Wind	
XLV, 89-94	X		Dante, Divina Commedia, "Inferno" Canto V, verses 73-142 (Francesca da Rimini). (Pagès, p. 62) (B. Sanvisenti, I primi influssi de Dante del Petrarca e del Bocaccio sulla Letteratura Spagnuola, Milano: Ulrico Hoepli, 1902, p. 387, note 40); A. Farinelli, Dante in Spagna, Francia, Inghilterra, Germania, Torino: Fratelli Bocca, 1922, p. 86. Bohigas and Torras i Batges, (La tradició catalana, Barcelona: Selecta, 1966, p. 323), as well as Pagès (Auzias March et ses prédécesseurs, p. 258) consider that this reference is simply an exultation of Dante's Beatrice. Furthering this argument I would suggest that it is equally possible that this is a reference to the Vita Nova, which is also a "story". It is an "hystorial", or record of Dante's love.
XLIX, 25-28	X		Dante, Divina Commedia, "Purgatorio" Canto XXVI, verses 120-128. (Milà y Fontanals,

Literary References (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
			De los trovadores en España, ed. G. Martínez y F.R. Manrique, Barcelona: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1966, p. 457. Pagès and Bohigas both reject this theory. (Pagès, Auzias March et ses prédécesseurs, p. 232; Commentaire, p. 64) (Bohigas III, p. 17)
LI, 37-39	X	Folly, Path, Death	
LVII, 5-8	X		St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica II - II, 125, 2. Dante, Divina Commedia, "Purgatorio" Canto I, verses 71-75. (Pagès, p. 73) Seneca, "Epistula LXX" 13-16.
LXXI, 49-52	Golden Age	X	
LXXIII, 5-8	X		Pagès sees in this image an allusion to the novels of chivalry, especially to the Lancelot, and also to some ancient sources. (Pagès, p. 86) For Bohigas this is a reference to Roman antiquity in general. (Bohigas III, p. 101)
XC, 41-42	X		Dante, Divina Commedia, "Inferno" Canto V, verses

Literary References (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
			121-123. (Pagès, p. 97) Boethius, De consolatione, II : iv, ed. S.J. Tester, London: Heineman, 1973, p. 191. (Bohigas II, p. 7; III, p. 171)
XCV, 17-20	Fortuna	X	
XCIX, 84-85	Biblical	X, Echatological, Death	
C, 57-60	Fool	X, Apothecary, Labourer	
CIV, 247-248	X	Historical, Table	
CV, 95-96	Eye	X, Mystic, Light	
CV, 210-212	God	X, Death, Religious	
CXII, 226-227	X		Pagès suggests that this might be a reference to Seneca's "Consolatio ad Helviam, ...ad Marciam, ...ad Polybium". (Pagès, p. 135)
CXIII, 1-4	X	Proverb	Hippocrates, Aphorismi III, 49. (Pagès, 137) (Bohigas V, p. 43)
CXVIII, 91-92	Historical	X, Proverb	

2. Biblical

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
V, 9-16	X	Devil	Refers to the Incarnation
VII, 32	X	Friendship, Proverb	Psalm I, 1
VII, 49-51	X	Path, Bread	Fall of Man
IX, 9-12	X		King Solomon
XV, 41-48	Feast	X	
XVII, 53-56	X		David
VIII, 33-36	X	Light, Dark Place, Prison	Conversion of Saul, Acts IX, 1-9
XXI, 9-12	X		Job
XXIII, 25-28	X	Bread	Song of Songs VI, 1 and 4
XXIII, 31-32	X	Devout Man, Blindness	Song of Songs VI, 4-5
XXIII, 33-36	X	City	
XXVI, 13-16	X	Folly	Solomon
XXVI, 43-44	X		Samson, Absalon, "Rhythmus de contemptu mundi" (Pagès, p. 40)
XLI, 31-32	Proverb	X	
XLVI, 9-16	X	Oven, Animal	Job XLI, 22, (Bohigas III, p. 8)
XLIX, 20-24	X	Juridical, Blindness, Dumbness, Power of Love, Proverb	Miracles of Jesus
LII, 1	X	Biblical	
LVI, 25-32	Light	X, Mystic, Sun	
LVII, 11-16	X	Military	Reference to Jesus as the Redemptor (Pagès, p. 73)

Biblical (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
LVII, 17-20	X	Crucifixion	
LVII, 39-40	X		Redemption. Pagès sees in this image a reference to Genesis II, 5 and the creation of Eve (Pagès, p. 73). Bohigas puts this in doubt (Bohigas III, p. 44).
LVIII, 29-30	X		Job III, 2. (Bohigas III, p. 47)
LXII, 20-21	X	Fool	Psalms XIV, 1; LII, 1.
LXIV, 28	X	Religious (General)	Passion of Palm Sunday (Pagès, p. 78)
LXVIII, 26	Landscape	X, Proverb	
LXVI, 41-44	Petrarchan	X, Religious	
LXXII, 16	X		Life of Jesus Christ. (Pagès, p. 85) (Bohigas III, p. 97)
LXXII, 17-22	X		Life of Jesus Christ. (Pagès, p. 85) (Bohigas III, p. 97)
LXXII, 17-22	X		Life of Jesus Christ
LXXII, 25-26	X	Animal	Annunciation to the shepherds. St. Luke II, 8-20. (Pagès, p. 85) (Bohigas III, p. 98)
LXXII, 27-30	X		St. Luke II, (Pagès, p. 85) (Bohigas III, p. 98)

Biblical (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
LXXXVII, 328-329	Power of Love	X	
LXXXVII, 331-332	Astrology	X	
LXXXIX, 1-2	X	Animal	Psalm LXII, 1 (Biblia Sacra Vulgatae Editionis, London: Bagster, 1970). Pagès (pp. 96-97) and Bohigas (III, p. 167), attribute it to Psalm XLI, 2. Rafael Ferreres (Ausias March, Obra Poética Completa vol. II, Madrid: Castalia, 1979, pp. 8-9; and "Ausias March en algunos poetas del siglo de oro", Estudios sobre literatura v arte dedicados al Profesor Emilio Orozco Díaz, tomo I, Granada: Universidad de Granada, 1979, pp. 470-472) pointedly remarks that the tradition of this imagery, as studied by María Rosa Lida de Malkiel (La tradición clásica en España, Barcelona: Planeta, 1975, pp. 55-60; 76-79; 95-98) indicates that Ausias March may have borrowed this from Galician and Portuguese troubadours in whose work this theme is frequently found.
XCII, 249-250	X	Death	Judgement Day
XCIII, 29-32	Folly	X, Miscellany	

Biblical (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XCIX, 84-85	X	Death, Literary Reference, Eschatological	Judas (Bohigas IV, p. 64)
CII, 25-26	X		Lazarus
CII, 63-64	Power of Love	X, Fortuna	
CII, 105-108	X		Pagès sees this passage as an imitation of "Lo Fasset" verses 1629-1634, Romania t. XV, 1885, p. 219. (Pagès, p. 115) St. Matthew XXVII, 69-75. (Bohigas IV, p. 95)
CIV, 157	X	Robber, Proverb	Psalm I, 1
CIV, 201-202	Fire	X, Sodomite	
CIV, 205	X		Apocalypsis
CV, 29-30	X	Robber	St. Luke XXIII, 39-43
CV, 31-32	X		St. John III, 8. (Pagès, p. 120) (Bohigas IV, p. 130)
CV, 45-46	X	Fire	Psalm I
CV, 65-66	X	Sea	Book of Job
CV, 109-110	X		St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica I, 13, 9. (Pagès, p. 120-121) Psalm LXXXVI, 6. (Bohigas IV, p. 130)
CV, 128	X		St. John the Baptist (Pagès, p. 121)
CV, 133-134	X	Water (River), Sea	Ecclesiastes I, 7.
CV, 147-148	X	Miscellany (Scythe), Death	St. John I, 23

Biblical (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
CV, 167-168	X	Death	St. Paul, I Corinthians XV, 55-56
CV, 173-174	X	Path	St. John I, 23
CV, 199-200	X		St. Matthew XXVI, 24. (Pagès, p. 121) (Bohigas IV, p. 131)
CV, 217-218	X	Tears	Psalm CXIX, 134; Jeremiah XIX, 18
CVI, 72	X	Death	St. Matthew XXIII, 27 (Pagès, p. 122) (Bohigas, p. 154)
CVI, 469-472	X	Path, Bread	St. John VI, 48
CVIII, 17-20	X	Folly	Psalms XIV, 1 and LII, 1
CVIII, 64	Folly	X, Proverb, Wind, Petrarchist	
CVIII, 93-96	X	Path, Blind	St. Matthew XV, 14
CXII, 303-310	X		St. Matthew XIX, 29 (Bohigas V, p. 31)
CXII, 369-370	X	Feast	St. Matthew VI, 24 (Bohigas V, p. 32)
CXIII, 171-172	God	X, Laughing-Crying, Proverb	
CXVII, 7-8	X		Solomon
CXIX, 1	X		Job III, 3. (Pages, p. 144) (Bohigas V, p. 94)
CXIX, 19-20	Sea	Water (River), Bitter-Sweet, X	
CXXI, 27-28	Lameness	X (Rod), Tree	
CXXI, 67-68	X (Rod)		St. John I, 23; Nicomachean Ethics, Book II, ix, between 1109 a 25 and b 15
CXXVII, 24-25	X	Sick Man	Book of Job

Biblical (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
CXXVIII, 603-604	X		St. Matthew XIX, 30; XX, 16; Luke XIII: 30

3. Book

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
V, 19-20	X		
XXV, 41-42	Heart	X	
CXII, 377-378	X	Proverb	Medieval aphorism: "Non dari vacuum in natura" (Pagès, p. 136) (Bohigas V, p. 32)
CXXVI, 17	X		St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica I - II, 40, 5. (Pagès, p. 151) (Bohigas V, p. 136)

4. Classical

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
II, 17-18	Animal	X	
XIV, 29-31	Astrological	X	
XVI, 25-32	Military	X, Death, Port	
XVIII, 41-44	Philosopher	X, Sea	
XX, 1-4	X	Port, Door	Seneca, "Epistula 70", 13-15. (Pagès, p. 29) (Bohigas II, p. 76)
XXIV, 25-28	Animal	X	
XXVI, 41-42	X		"Rhythmus de contemptus mundi" (Pagès, p. 40) (Bohigas II, p. 97)

Classical (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XXVI, 45-48	X	Sea	
XXX, 49-56	Fortuna	X, Court of Love	
LXXVII, 25-29	Robe	X, Mythology, Cloth	
CXVII, 111-112	Robe	X, Proverb	

5. Golden Age

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
LXXI, 49-52	X	Literary Reference	
LXXIX, 17-27	X	Arrow, Mythology, Wound of Love	Ovid, Metamorphoses, Book I, v. 89-150 (The Ages of Man); Book I, v. 469-552 (Apollo and Daphne)
LXXXIV, 19-22	X	Old Man	

6. Historical

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XIII, 13-16	X	Prisoner, King, Doctor	Reference to Janus de Lusignan, King of Cyprus, taken prisoner July 27, 1426 at the battle of Chierochitia, who remained so until May 20, 1427. (Pagès, p. 18-19) (Bohigas II, p. 48)
XXVI, 9-12	X		Refers to the opposing religious beliefs in Africa and Europe.
CIV, 247-248	Literary Reference	X, Table	
CXVIII, 91-92	X	Literary Reference, Proverb	Refers to the rape of La Cava by King

Historical (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
			Rodrigo, and consequently to the treason of Count Julian. Pagès sees the tradition of the "romances del rey Rodrigo" and the Crónica del rey Roderico, cap. CLXV as the source. (Pagès, p. 144) Bohigas only notes that Ausias March draws on a popular legend. (Bohigas V, p. 89)
CXXII b 29-32	X	Prisoner	Refers to the loves of Lucrezia d'Alagno and Alfons el Magnánim, and to their desired marriage which would have been made possible through the intervention of Lucrezia's uncle Pope Calixt III. (Pagès, p. 147-148) and (Bohigas V, p. 121-122)

7. Mythological

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
IX, 15-16	X	Animal, Death, Petrarchist	Petrarch, "Triumphus Cupidinis" III, verse 20. (Pagès, p. 14). Bohigas retells the legend but does not attribute a particular source. (Bohigas I, p. 83; II, p. 36) I would suggest that one of the

Mythological (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
			most probable sources could be Ovid's Metamorphoses, Book IV, verses 55-166.
XIII, 17-24	X	Worm	Vergil, Aeneid VI, verses 529-600. Dante Divina Commedia "Inferno", canto XXXI, 124. (Pagès, p. 14); (Bohigas II, p. 48). Metamorphoses, Book IV, v. 457
XIV, 10-12	Fortuna	X	
XIV, 29-31	Astrological	X	
XV, 25-28	X	Fire, King, Petrarchist	In this two part image, Pagès suggests Seneca's Phedra, translated by A. de Vilaragut, 1396. (Pagès, p. 23) Bohigas also suggests Ovid's Heroidas in general, which was translated into catalan by G. Nicolau in 1390. (Bohigas II, p. 57) Petrarch, "Triumphus Cupidinis", III, verse 79. (Pagès, p. 23)
XV, 29-32	X	Heart, Eyes	Reference to the Fates.
XVIII, 17-20	Animal	X	
XX, 29-32	Courtly Love	X, Astrology	
XXXI, 41-44	X		
LI, 25-28	X		
LXXV, 11-12	Prisoner	X	

Mythological (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
LXXV, 21-22	Religion of Love	X	
LXXV, 23-24	X		Pages suggest as a source, Ovid or Vergil, in general. (Pagès, p. 87)
LXXV, 25-28	X		
LXXV, 33-40	X	Miscellany (Flesh), Feast	Verses 39-40 seem to draw on the work of Bertran de Born "Greu m'es.." (Antoine Thomas, ed. Poésies completes de Bertran de Born, Toulouse: "Bibliothèque Meridionale", 1888, p. 63; unavailable to me but quoted in A. Jeanroy, La poésie lyrique des troubadours tome II, Toulouse: Edouard Privat, 1934, pp. 112-113: "Je dois porter là langue où la dent me fait mal, Je dois inculper ma dame de félonie et de trahison, car son humeur volage souffre les prières de ces perfides, qui vont brigant son amour").
LXXV, 45-48	X	Death	
LXXV, 49-56	X	Animal	
LXXV, 73-80	X	Folly, Equestrian	
LXXV, 81-84	X	Religion of Love	

Mythological (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
LXXVII, 25-28	Robe	X, Classical, Cloth	
CXXIX, 9-16	Arrow	X, Wound of Love	
LXXIX, 17-27	Golden Age	X, Arrow, Wound of Love	
LXXXVI, 9-10	Death	X, Water (River), Path	
LXXXVII, 161	X		
XCII, 1-4	X	Death, Fortuna	Indirect reference to the Fates
XCVIII, 1-4	Path	X (Lethe), Water (River), Death	
CII, 139-140	X (Lethe)	Water, Death	
CIV, 225-228	X	Miser	

8. Petrarchist

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
VII, 13-16	Water	X, Folly	
IX, 15-16	Mythological	X, Animal, Death	
XV, 17-20	Sun	X, Fire	
XV, 25-28	Mythological	X, Fire, King	
XXIII, 17-20	X		Amador de los Ríos saw in these verses an imitation of Petrarch's Sonnet 262: "Cara la vita e dopo lei mi pare". Historia de la literatura española VI, p. 500. Pagès disagrees with him. (Pagès, p. 35)
XXVII, 15-16	X		Petrarch, Sonnet 134, "Pace non

Petrarchist (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
			trovo, e non ho da far guerra", verse 13. Also, possibly, Jordi de San Jordi, Poem XV (Cançó d'Opposits): "Tots jorns aprench e desaprench ensemps", verse 2. Jordi de San Jordi, ed. M. de Riquer, Granada: Universidad, 1955. p. 173. (Pagès, p. 41)
XXXIX, 27-28	X		Petrarch, Sonnet 174, "Fera stella (se'l cielo ha forza in noi quant'alcun crede)"; Sonnet 231, "I' mi vivea di mia sorte contento,"; Sonnet 296, "I' mi soglio accusare, et or mi scuso". Amador de los Ríos sees the general influence of Sonnet 296 on these particular verses of Ausias March. Historia de la literatura española VI, p. 497. Pagès records parallel drawn by Tassoni (Rime di Fr. Petrarca, Modena, 1711. 4th ed. p. 358, 451) between these verses and sonnet 174, verses 12-14, and 231, verses 2-4. (Pagès, p. 52).
LXII, 49-50	X	Heart, Power of Love	Petrarch, Sonnet 5, "Quando io movo i sospiri a chiamar

Petrarchist (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
			voi," verse 2; Jordi de San Jordi, Poem IX (Stramps), "Jus sus lo front port vostra bella semblança", Stanza I, verse 5-8. Arthur Terry has pointed out the relation between these verses and those of Petrarch, but overlooked the equally possible influence of Jordi de San Jordi. (Arthur Terry, Anthology of Spanish Poetry 1500-1580. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1965. p. 149, note to page 43).
LXIV, 25-27	Animal	X	
LXV, 1-4	X		According to Amador de los Ríos, Historia de la literatura española VI, p. 519, this is a general petrarchist imitation. (Pagès, p. 78)
LXV, 25	X		Petrarch, "Triumphus Cupidinis" III, verses 64-66. (Amador de los Ríos, Historia de la literatura española VI, p. 519). (Pagès, p. 78).
LXVI, 41-44	X	Religious (General), Biblical	Petrarch, Sonnet 3, "Era il giorno ch'al sol si scoloraro" (Pagès, p. 79) (Bohigas III, p. 73)

Petrarchist (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
LXVII, 9	X		Petrarch, Sonnet 160, "Amor et io si pien di meraviglia", verse 8. (Pagès, p. 80)
LXVIII, 17-24	Solitude	X, Feast, Courtly Love, Juridical	
CI, 9-12	Eyes	X, King, Servant, Castle	
CI, 13-16	X	Sword, Military, Bondage of Love	Petrarch, "Triumphus Cupidinis" III, verse 91. (Amador de los Ríos, Historia de la literatura espanola VI, p. 498), (Pagès, p. 112) (Bohigas IV, p. 81)
CI, 49-52	X		Amador de los Ríos sees in verses an imitation of Petrarch's Poem 71, "Perché la vita é breve," (Canzone 8), verses 97-98. Historia de la literatura espanola VI, p. 498. Pages rejects this idea. (Pages, p. 114) (Bohigas IV, p. 82)
CII, 174-176	Castle	X, Military	
CII, 229-230	X		Amador de los Ríos sees yet another imitation of Petrarch, Sonnet 101, "Lasso!, ben so che dolorose prede", verse 12. Historia de la literatura espanola VI, p. 519.

Petrarchist (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
			Pagès denies this theory (Pagès p. 116)
CVIII, 64	Folly	X, Wind, Proverb, Biblical	
CXVI, 130	X	Fire	Petrarch, Poem 30, "Giovene donna sotto un verde lauro" (Sestina II), stanza II, verse 10. (Pagès, p. 140); (Bohigas V, p. 69)

M. Infirmity

1. Blind

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XXIII, 31-32	Biblical	X, Devout Man	
XLIX, 20-24	Biblical	X, Juridical, Dumbness, Power of Love, Proverb	
LVI, 33-36	Fortune	X, Death	
LXI, 33-34	X		
LXV, 9-11	X		
LXVI, 39-40	X	Wound of Love, Death	
LXIX, 57-62	Power of Love	X, Fortuna	
LXXII, 13-14	X		
variant LXXXVII, 173-174 in E, d	X		
XC, 33-34	Bond of Love	X	
XCI, 21-24	X	Court of Love	
XCII, 35-38	X	Light, Water	
C, 8	Path	X, Proverb	
C, 215-216	Fool	X	
variant CIII, between 48 and 49, in B d e	X	Path	
CVI, 297-302	X	Folly	
CVIII, 93-96	Biblical	X, Path	
CX, 13-14	X	Folly	
CXIII, 215-218	X	Folly, Path, Death	

Blind (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
CXVII, 81-82	X		
CXVII, 97-98	X	Light	
CXXVIII, 219-222	X	Equestrian, Folly	
CXXVIII, 605-609	Fortuna	X, Laughing-Crying, Sailor	

2. Deaf and Dumb

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
IX, 41-44	Door	X	
XVII, 10-11	X	Military	
XXVI, 6	X		
XXXIII, 33-36	X	Nest of Love	
XLIX, 20-24	Biblical	X, Juridical, Blind, Power of Love, Proverb	
LV, 35	X		
LXXXIV, 33	X		
CVI, 447	X		

3. Lame

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XXXIV, 1-8	Wind	X	
XCIX, 5-6	X		
CXII, 372-373	X	Proverb	
CXXI, 27-28	X	Biblical	St. John 1, 23, Nicomachean Ethics, Book II, ix, 1109a25-b 15
CXXVIII, 514-516	X		

4. Short-sightedness

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XLII, 12-16	Animal	X, Cloth	
CXXVII, 24-25	X		

N. Emotions

1. Fear

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XXXIV, 23	X		
XLIII, 9-10	X		
XLVI, 17-20	X	Pilgrim	Horace, Ode I, 15-18, R. Leveroni, B.H.S. XXVIII, 1951, p. 154
LIX, 21-22	X		
LXIII, 33-40	Death	X	
CV, 27-28	Path	X, Hell	

2. Laughing-Crying

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XXV, 27-28	X	Proverb	
XXXI, 33-40	Fortuna	X, Folly, Sword	
XXXVI, 17-20	X	Solitude	
LII, 30-32	Death	X	
LIV, 1-4	Folly	X	
LVIII, 17-20	Path	X, Bitter-Sweet	
LXIX, 63-64	X	Power of Love	
XCIII, 69-70	Bitter-Sweet	X, Eye	
XCVII, 47-48	Tears	X, Eye	
XCVII, 49-50	Tears	X, Water	
CXIII, 171-172	God	X, Proverb, Biblical	
CXIII, 195-198	Folly	X, Death, House	
CXXVII, 394	X		
CXXVIII, 605-609	Fortuna	X, Sailor, Blind	

3. Tears

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
IX, 1-8	Prisoner	X	
XI, 1-4	X	Death	
X, 9-16	Death	X	
XCVII, 47-48	X	Eye, Laughing-Crying	
XCVII, 49-50	X	Water, Laughing-Crying	
XCVIII, 57-59	Water	X, Bitter-Sweet	
CI, 25	Eyes	X	
CV, 217-218	Biblical	X	
CXII, 146-147	X		

4. Cruelty

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
LXXVII, 7	X		

5. Friendship

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
I, 33-40	Hermit	X	
VI, 37-40	X		
VII, 32	Biblical	X	
XLI, 37-40	X	Prisoner	
LXXIV, 2-4	X		
XCV, 65-66	Death	X	
CXVII, 219-220	X		
CXX, 33-35	X		

O. Music

1. Music

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
VII, 4	X	Proverb	
VIII, 10-12	Dance	X	
XI, 9-16	Death	X	
XI, 17-24	Death	X	
XV, 41-48	Feast	X	
XVIII, 57-60	Money	X	
XXV, 21-22	X		
XXXII, 9-12	X	Proverb	Nicomachean Ethics, Book II, i, 1103 a 34; Book I, vi, 1098 a 11; (Pages, p. 45) and (Bohigas II, p. 112)
variant XXXIV, 20-32 in E	X	Bond of Love	
LVI, 9-12	X		
LXIV, 1-8	Animal	X	
LXIX, 51-52	X	Sick Man	
XCIV, 118-120	Humours (Medical)	X	
XCIX, 67-68	X	Sick Man	
C, 107-108	Animal	X	
variant CIII, between 48-49, in B d e only	X		
CIV, 155-156	Hermit	X (Noise)	
CXIII, 181-188	X	Sick Man, Arrow Death	

Music (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
CXIV, 61-62	Light	X	
CXXII a 26-27	Folly	Path, X	
CXXVIII, 260-263	X	Tree, Animal	

2. Dance

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
VIII, 5-7	X		
VIII, 10-12	X	Folly, Music	
LXXXVI, 3-4	Death	X	

3. Trumpet

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XLI, 13	X		
LXXII, 37-40	Power of Love	X	
CXXVII, 172-174	Military	X	

P. Man

a. Types

1. Child

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
L, 22-24	X	Folly, Death	
VIII, 17-20	X		
XCIV, 103-104	X		
LXVI, 33-36	Power of Love	X, Old Man	
LXVIII, 1-8	Servant	X, King	
C, 1-2	X	Power of Love, Fortuna	
C, 177-180	X	Animal	Nicomachean Ethics, Book IX, iv, and Book IX, viii, 1169 a 11. (Pages, page 110)
CI, 17-24	X	Path, Travelling	
CIII, 33-34	X		
CXXVII, 23	X		
CXXVIII, 372-377	X		

2. Coward

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XXXI, 1-4	X		
LXXVIII, 43-44	Animal	X	
XCVIII, 25-28	Military	X	
CIV, 219-221	Folly	X, Miser, Rich Man	
CXVII, 77-80	Military	X	

3. Dwarf and Giant

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XL, 21-24	X		Nicomachean Ethics, Book VIII, xii, 1168 a 30, and Book IX, viii, 1169 a 13 (Pagès, p. 53), as well as, Book VIII, XII, 1161 b 16. (Pagès p. 53) (Bohigas II, p. 138)

4. Envious Man

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
I, 33-44	X	Courtly Love	
XXIV, 9-12	X		
XXVI, 27-28	X	Sick Man	
LXXII, 9-12	X		
XCVII, 43-44	X	Courtly Love	

5. Old Man

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
LXVI, 33-36	Power of Love	X	
LXXVI, 33-36	X	Fortuna	
LXXXIV, 19-22	Golden Age	X	
CIV, 229-231	X		
CVI, 33-36	Death	X, Money	

6. Sad Man

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XXXIX, 3-6	Folly	X, Dark Place	
CXII, 121-130	Death	X, Fortuna, Bitter-Sweet	

7. Sterile Man

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XVI, 9-12	X	Sick Man, Folly	

8. Sodomite

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
CIV, 170-172	X		
CIV, 201-202	Fire	X, Biblical	

9. Strong Man

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XXVII, 9-12	Weak Man	X, Military	
XL, 25-28	X	Military	

10.

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XXVII, 9-12	X	Strong Man, Military	
CVI, 191-192	X		

b. Occupations

1. Beggar

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
II, 41-44	Bread	X	
C, 197-200	Folly	X, Sick Man	
CIII, 55-56	Fortuna	X, Rich Man	

2. Hermit

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
I, 33-40	X	Friendship	
XV, 21-24	Fire (Hot-Cold)	X	
XXXIX, 17-20	X	Court of Love, Feast	
XLVII, 33-35	X		
LXVII, 13-16	X	Court of Love, Folly	
XCVII, 57-60	X		
CIV, 155-156	X	Music (Noise)	
CXVI, 105-106	X		
CXXVIII, 547-552	X	Philosopher	

3. Labourer

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
VI, 29-32	Folly	X	
VI, 34-36	X	Agricultural	
LXXX, 1-2	X	Juridical	
LXXXV, 49-54	Fortuna	X	
C, 57-60	Folly	X, Literary Reference	
C, 143-144	Courtly Love	X	
CII, 65-68	X	Water, Sea	

Labourer (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
CXXVIII, 685-686	Cloth	X	

4. Penitent

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XXXVI, 27-33	Goddess	X, Poison	

5. Philosopher-Magician

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XVIII, 1-4	X	Sea, Classical	Pelay Briz identifies this reference with Diogenes the Cynic. But, neither Diogenes, nor Seneca, in "Epistula XC" say that Diogenes actually threw his cup, or material possessions into the sea. Pagès suggests that this is inspired by Juvenal "Satire XII", verses 30-61. He also relates this to a passage of St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica II - II, 186, 3, and through this reference identifies the philosopher as Crates the Cynic. (Pagès, p. 26-27) Bohigas follows Pagès' theory. (Bohigas II, p. 69). I would suggest that this is, in fact, a reference to Simon the magician of St. Clement's Recognitions ,

Philosopher-Magician (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
			translated into latin by Rufinus of Aquilea. My interpretation depends on the notion that in the Renaissance a magician was considered to be a philosopher. On this subject see, A. Heiserman, The Novel Before the Novel. Chicago: University Press, 1977, p. 208-212, and G. Worth O'Brien, Renaissance Poetics and the Problem of Power, Chicago: Institute of Elizabethan Studies, 1956, p. 62; Lynn Thorndike, The History of Magic and Experimental Science vol. I, New York: Columbia University Press, 1934, p. 400-427. The Recognitions is accessible in translation in, St. Clement, Ante Nicene Fathers vol. VIII, (American reprint of the Edinburgh edition) Buffalo: Christian Literature Company, 1867-1872. It is also of interest to note that Antonio de Guevara confuses the Magus figure with Socrates in, Menospreçio de corte y alabanza de aldea, ed. Martínez de Burgos Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1952, p. 26.
LXXXVII, 159-160	Alchemy	X	

Philosopher-Magician (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
CXVII, 57-60	X	Devout Man	
CXXVIII, 547-552	Hermit	X	

6. Pilgrim

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XLVI, 17-20	Fear	X	

7. Armed Man (see Military, F:2)

8. Traveller (see Geography, K:2)

9. Rich Man-Merchant

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
LVIII, 1-4	X	Death	
C, 101-102	X	Robber, Proverb	Nicomachean Ethics, Book I, v, 1095 b 25, Book I, v, 1096 a 5; Pagès wrongly indicated I, 3, 1095 b 5, (Pagès, p. 107)
CIII, 55-56	Fortuna	X, Beggar	
CIV, 219-221	Folly	X, Coward, Miser	
CXXVIII, 394-399	Sailor	X, Robber, Ship	

10. Robber

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
VIII, 25-28	X	Servant	
XXVIII, 1-8	Light	X, Sick Man, Animal	
LVIII, 21-22	X	Path	

Robber (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
C, 101-102	Rich Man	X, Proverb	
CIV, 157	Biblical	X, Proverb	
CV, 29-30	Biblical	X	
CVI, 341-344	Miser	X	
CXXVIII, 394-399	Sailor	X, Rich Man, Ship	

11. Prisoner (see Geography, K:10)

12. Sailor (see Marine, H:1)

13. Miser

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
variant CIII, 54-56 in B[1]	X		
CIV, 219-221	Folly	X, Rich Man-Merchant, Coward	
CIV, 225-228	Mythological	X	
CVI, 341-344	X	Robber	Nicomachean Ethics, Book I, v, 1096 a 5 (Pagès, p. 127)
CXVII, 201-204	X		
CXXVII, 86-92	X	Fool, Hunger	
CXXVIII, 210-213	Folly	X	

c. Parts of the Body

1. Eyes

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XV, 29-32	Mythological	X, Heart	
XXIII, 9-12	X	Courtly Love, Cloth	These verses seem to parody and contradict those of Bernart de Ventadorn in "Non es meravella s'eu chan", verses 41-44, especially the passage: "Quan ieu la vey, be m'es parven / als huelhs, al vis, a la color"
LVIII, 9-12	Power of Love	Miscellany (Colours)	
LXII, 41-44	X		
LXVII, 39-40	Fire	X, Heat-Cold (Medical)	
LXIX, 25-28	Heat-Cold (Medical)	X, Sea	
LXXXVII, 119-120	X		
LXXXVII, 131-132	X	Fire	
LXXXVII, 271-274	Fire	X, Power of Love, Wound of Love, Humours	
LXXXVII, 277-280	Sick Man	X, Bed	
LXXXVIII, 76	Eye		
XCIII, 69-70	Bitter-Sweet	X, Laughing-Crying	
XCVII, 47-48	Tears	X, Laughing-Crying	
CI, 9-12	X	King, Servant, Castle, Petrarchist	Petrarch, "Triumphus Cupidinis" III, verse 91-3) (Amador de los Ríos, Historia de la literatura española VI, p. 498) Pagès and Bohigas record this influence but

Eyes (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
			only for verses 13-16. (Pagès, p. 112) (Bohigas IV, p. 81). M. de Riquer has pointed out that these verses seem to be modelled on the first two of Alain Chartier's "Se onques deux yeulx orent telle puissance". (M. de Riquer, "Alain Chartier et Ausias March", Revista de Filología Española, t. XXXIX, 1955, p. 336-338.
CI, 25	X	Tears	This metaphor is an illustration of Epicure's theory of idea-images as used by Scholastic philosophers. It is quite commonly used by the troubadours, such as Hughes Brunet, "Corteza-men mov en mon cor mesclansa", stanza I, verses 7-8; Sordel, "Bel m'es ab motz leugiers de far", stanza II, verses, 13-14. Pagès also refers to other verses such as, Aimeric, quoted by Matfré Ermengau I, 490, and those of other troubadours and Italian poets listed in N. Scarano, "Fonti Provenzali e italiane della lirica Petrarchesca", pp. 294, 295, 309.
CI, 41-42	X	Military	
CV, 95-96	X	Light, Mystic,	St. Augustine,

Eyes (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
		Literary Reference	Confessions vol. I, London: William Heinemann, 1968, p. 32. Book VI, chapter XVI, "quam non videt oculus carnis, et videtur ex intimo".
CXXVII, 47	Hunt	X	

2. Hair

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XLII, 25-32	Wet Nurse	X, Poison, Animal	
XCVIII, 37-39	Power of Love	X	
CV, 1-2	X		

3. Heart

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XV, 29-32	Mythological	X, Eyes	
XXI, 33-36	X	Juridical	
XXV, 41-42	X	Book	
LII, 1-4	Robe	X, Wound of Love	
LXII, 33-36	Power of Love	X	
LXII, 49-50	Petrarchist	X, Power of Love	
LXVII, 33-36	Miscellany (Stone)	X, Military, Wound of Love, Juridical	
XCV, 43	X		
CXIV, 87-88			

d. States

1. Hunger

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
IV, 1-6	X	Bread, Agricultural	Dante, Divina Commedia, "Paradiso" Canto IV, verses 1-6. Aristotle, De coelo, II, 13. (Pagès, p. 6) (Bohigas II, p. 17)
XXII, 10-12	X	Thirst, Fire (Hot-Cold)	P. March, "Al punt com naix", verse 50. (M. Milà y Fontanals, "Resenya Histórica y Crítica dels Antichs Poetas Catalans" Obras Completas, tomo 3, Barcelona: Librería de Àlvaro Verdaguer, 1890, page 159.) (Pagès, p. 32)
XXXIII, 25-32	Fire	X	
XXXVII, 31-32	X	Thirst	
CIV, 84	X	Proverb	
CXXII b, 59-60	X	Sick Man	
CXXVII, 86-92	Miser	X, Folly	
CXXVII, 94-95	X		
CXXVII, 115-117	X	Agricultural, Proverb	
CXXVII, 245-246	X		

2. Thirst

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XIV, 25-28	X	Water	
XXII, 10-12	Hunger	X, Fire (Hot-Cold)	
XXXVII, 31-32	Hunger	X	
CXXVIII, 528-531	X		

3. Sleep

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
I, 1-2	X	Folly	
II, 37-40	X	Hill, Sick Man	St. Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologica, II - II, 147, I. (Pagès, p. 5) Bohigas sees this as a fairly common topos of Provençal poetry, and indicates similar images, in N. Scarano, "Fonti Provenzali e italiane della lirica Petrarchesca", p. 305-307
XXIV, 17-20	X		
XXXVIII, 37-40	Time	X	
XLIX, 13-16	X	Death	
XLIX, 41-44	Bondage of Love	X, Prisoner, Death	
LXXXVII, 166-167	X	Prisoner	

4. Solitude

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XXXVI, 17-20	Laughing-Crying	X	
LXVIII, 17-24	X	Feast, Courtly Love, Juridical, Petrarchist	Amador de los Ríos, sees in this an imitation of Petrarch's Sonnet 320, "Sento l'aura mia antica, e i dolci colli", vv. 12-14. (Historia de la literatura española VI, p. 499) (Pagès, p. 81)
XCIV, 67-68	X		

Q. Civil Structures

1. Bridge (see Geography, K:3)

2. Castle (see Geography, K:9)

3. Door (see Geography, K:6)

4. House (see Geography, K:8)

5. Pillar

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
IV, 55-56	X	Bread of Love	
CIV, 189-192	X		St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica III, 85, 3. (Pagès, p. 119)
CXXVII, 79-81	X		

6. City

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XXIII, 33-36	Biblical	X	

R. Commodities

1. Axe

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
VII, 48	X		

2. Bed

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
LXV, 29-30	Hostal of Love	X	
LXXXVII, 177-180	Power of Love	X	
LXXXVII, 177-280	Sick Man	X, Eye	
CII, 129-132	Fire	X, Heat-Cold (Medical), Oven	
CIII, 17-20	Robe	X, Fire (Hot-Cold), Animal	
CXXI, 15-16	Bitter-Sweet	X	

3. Table

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XVI, 20-24	X	Military	
CIV, 247-248	Literary Reference	X, Historical	
CXV, 83-84	X		

4. Vessel

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
C, 29-30	X	Proverb	
CXX, 13-14	X	Proverb	
CXXVII, 231-232	X		

5. Oven (see Love, A:5)

6. Money-Gold

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
VI, 21-22	X		
XV, 5-8	King	X, Proverb	
XVIII, 57-60	X	Music (Temprare)	
LXXXVII, 291-291	X		
XCIV, 25-28	Fire	X, Alchemy	
CIII, 59-60	X	Proverb	
CVI, 9	Folly	X	
CVI, 33-36	Death	X, Old Man	
CVI, 39	X	Folly	
CXX, 131-132	X		
CXXVIII, 365	X		

7. Sword (see Military, F:2)

8. Closet (see Geography, K:7)

S. Social Organization

1. King-Lord

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
II, 1-8	X	Sea, Ship, Castle, Wind	Folquet de Lunel, "Quant beutatz me fetz de premier" The editions referred to by Pagès are inaccessible. I am giving the indications found in his commentary. The whole stanza beginning "E pren m'en cum al marinier", in the edition of Eichelkraut, Berlin 1872. Also a verse of Cadenet, "Plus que la naus ques en la mar prionda", in the edition of G. Bertoni, "Rime Provenzali inedite", Studj di Filologia Romanza VIII, p. 440; and verses of Bertran Carbonel, "Ar suy en aital balansa / co'l nauchiers..." in C. Appel, Provenzal Inedita, p. 72. (Pagès, p. 4). Bohigas only acknowledges the influence of Folquet de Lunel. (Bohigas II, p. 10)
VI, 23-24	X		
VI, 26-28	Folly	X	
VI, 29-32	Folly	X	
X, 1-8	Military	X	
XIII, 13-16	Historical	X	
XV, 5-8	X	Money, Proverb	
XV, 25-28	Mythological	X, Petrarchist, Fire	

King-Lord (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XXVII, 17-20	Servant	X, Poison	
XLV, 73-76	Power of Love	X	
LXIII, 5-6	X	Servant	
LXVIII, 1-8	Servant	X, Child	
LXXIV, 28	X	Servant	
LXXIV, 38	Courtly Love	X, Servant	
variant XCII, 214 in a	X		
XCIX, 23-24	Prisoner	X	
C, 44	Servant	X	
C, 103-104	Death	X, Servant	
CI, 9-12	Eyes	X, Servant, Castle	
CI, 37-39	X		Gaucelm Faidit, "Sitot ai tarzat mon chen", stanza IV, verses 35-36. (Raynouard, Choix III, p. 291); Ramon Jordà Breviari d'Amor II, stanza 449, vv. 28288-28289 (I was unable to find an accessible edition of this work, and have therefore only repeated and clarified Pagès' indications.); Oton de Granson "Complainte de Saint Valentin", stanza VIII, verses 57-60. (Arthur Piaget, Oton de Granson: Sa Vie et ses Poesies, Geneve: Payot, 1941, p. 185). (Pagès, p. 113-114)
CII, 61-62	Prisoner	X	

King-Lord (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
CIII, 41	X	Servant	
CIV, 53-56	Animal	X, Proverb, Death	
CIV, 214-216	X	Death, Animal	
CVI, 168	X	Castle	Seneca, "Epistula LXXIV" 19-20. (Pagès, p. 125) (Bohigas IV, p. 157)
CIX, 5-8	Prisoner	X	
CXVII, 193-196	Fool	X	
CXXIII, 67	X	Servant	
CXXVII, 104-105	X	Servant	
CXXVII, 151-152	X	Servant	

2. Servant

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
VI, 26-28	Folly	X	
VIII, 25-28	Robber	X	
XXVII, 17-20	X	King, Poison	
LXIII, 5-6	King	X	
LXIV, 13-15	Courtly Love	X, Religion of Love, Goddess	
LXVIII, 1-8	X	King, Child	Guillaume le Clerc de Normandie, "Le Besant de Dieu" (L. Petit de Julleville, Historie de la langue et litterature francaise II, Paris: A. Colin, 1908, p. 196) Peire Ramon de Tolosa, "Si com l'enfas qu'es alevatz petit"

King-Lord (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
			stanzas I-II. (Raynouard, Choix V, p. 326) (Pagès, p. 81) (Bohigas III, p. 78)
LXXIII, 41-42	X		
LXXIV, 28	King	X	
LXXIV, 38	Courtly Love	X, King	
C, 44	X	King	
C, 103-104	Death	X, King	
CI, 9-12	Eyes	X, Castle, King	
CIII, 41	King	X	
CXVIII, 31-35	Miscellany	X	
CXXI, 56	X		
CXXIII, 67	King	X	
CXXVII, 104-105	King	X	
CXXVII, 151-152	King	X	
CXXVII, 223	X		
CXXVIII, 193	X		

3. Juridical

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XXI, 33-36	Heart	X	
XXI, 43-44	X	Death	
XLIII, 17-24	Devil	X, Feast	
XLIX, 20-24	Biblical	X, Blind, Dumbness, Power of Love, Proverb	
L, 10-12	X	Prisoner	
LII, 5-8	God	X, Death	
LXII, 4-5	X	Folly	

Juridical (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
LXVII, 33-36	Miscellany (Stone)	X, Military, Wound of Love, Heart	
LXVIII, 17-24	Solitude	X, Feast, Courtly Love, Petrarchist	
LXXX, 1-2	Labourer	Juridical	
XCV, 21-22	X		
C, 175	X		
CV, 11-12	X	Death	
CXIII, 169-170	X		
CXIII, 176	X		
CXIII, 211-214	Bitter-Sweet	X, Fortune	
CXIX, 57-58	X	Miscellany, Proverb	
CXXV, 1-3	X		
CXXVII, 169-170	X	Death	
CXXVIII, 421-423	Religious (General)	X	

T. Miscellany

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
XXXIV, 33-36	X (Weather)		
XLI, 5-8	X (Good-Bad Man)		
XLII, 23-24	X (Wet Nurse)	Cloth of Love	
XLII, 25-32	X (Wet Nurse)	Animal, Poison, Hair	
LVII, 25-26	Death	X (Rest), Proverb	
LVIII, 9-12	Power of Love	X (Colours), Eyes	
LXVII, 33-36	X (Stone)	Heart, Wound of Love, Military, Juridical	
LXXV, 33-40	Mythological	X (Flesh), Feast	
LXXXVII, 15-16	X (Race)		
XCII, 121-122	X (Weather)		
XCIII, 29-32	Folly	X (Veil), Biblical	
CII, 103	X (Sawing)		
CV, 147-148	Biblical	X (Scythe), Death	
CVI, 213-214	X (Father-Son)		
CIX, 11-12	X (Price of Love)		
CX, 5-8	X (Fortune-Teller)	Death	
CXI, 23	X (Colours)		
CXII, 71-73	X (Stone)		
CXIII, 156	X (Two Faces: Janus)		
CXIII, 245-246	X (Chain)		
CXIII, 249-250	X (Weather)		
CXIV, 44	X (Earth and Heaven)		
CXVII, 209-212	X (Father-Son)	Folly	

Miscellany (cont.)

Poem	Main	Subordinate	Source
CXVIII, 31-35	X (Evil)	Servant	
CXVIII, 59	X (Flesh, Seven Lives)		
CXIX, 57-58	Juridical	X (Purse-Inheritance), Proverb	
CXX, 121-124	X (Weather)		
CXXVII, 148	X (Glue)	Power of Love	
CXXVII, 280	Water	X (Bath)	
CXXVIII, 118-119	Death	X (Hole)	
CXXVIII, 230	X (Wood)	Proverb	
CXXVIII, 382-385	X (Milk)		
CXXVIII, 488-491	Idol	X (Veil)	
CXXVIII, 557-566	X (Clever Man)	Fire	
CXXVIII, 664-666	Fire	X (Possessions), Proverb	

U. Proverbial Phrases

Owing to the philosophical nature of the proverbs, it is difficult to list them in the same way as normal poetic images, or illustrations. I have, therefore, chosen to list them by quoting them and indicating similar proverbial phrases found in the Iberian repertoire. Hence, I have proceeded by first listing the poem and verses at which a proverbial phrase was found, then, if it was related to one of the image groupings from the "Index of Images" I indicated this by listing the various headings under which it could be found and underlining the main one. If it was not listed previously under any heading I have indicated so with: "No Classification".

I have quoted each proverb as it is found in Bohigas' edition of Ausias March's poems. I found no substantial variations in the manuscripts and earlier editions. Therefore, I did not see fit to indicate slight variations which do not affect the meaning, or sense, of the text. Where applicable, I have listed, after each quotation, Spanish proverbs which I consider to be ideologically and thematically related to those used by Ausias March. Certain of the proverbs I have included convey a similar concept as that of Ausias March by using diametrically opposite elements. Such a case is Proverb VI, 43, in which the elements can be said to form a converse structure to that used by Ausias March.

Although I have used various sources in this research, I found that all proverbs could be referred to by using as a standard source; Luis Martínez Kleiser, Refranero General Ideológico Espanol. Madrid: Real Academia, 1953. Consequently, all proverbs referred to in this index are listed according to their number in the Refranero General, which I have abbreviated to R.G.

Part of the choice for the "proverbs" was conditioned by a

list of proverbial phrases found at page 113 of the first volume of Bohigas' edition of the poems of Ausias March. Some of these items were previously in my own list. However, after much hesitation, I have included the examples chosen by Bohigas, although some did not seem proverbial to me; my dissatisfaction was partially confirmed by the fact that I was unable to find counterparts for any of these in the "refraneros" I consulted.

I, 19-20 No Classification

Malament viu qui té lo pensament
per enemich fent-li d'enuyts report

R.G. 12.118; No hay carga más pesada que tener la conciencia cargada.

VI, 43 Bread; X, Folly

negre forment no dóna blanca pasta

R.G. 61.436; Trigo centenoso, pan provechoso

VI, 44 Animal; X, Folly

ne l'ase ranch és animal corrent

VII, 1-2 No Classification

Sí com rictat no porta béns ab si
mas val aytant com cell qui n'és senyor

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics Book I, V, 1095 b 14 - 1096 a 3

VII, 4 Musical; X

manxa bufant orgue fals no ret fi

VII, 13-16 Water; X, Folly

Mal pendrà pint en l'aygua sa figura:
molt menys Amor pendrà lo no dispost;
ne pot estar l'aygua dins un loch rost:
així Amor en cap d'om foll atura!

VII, 32 — Biblical; X, Friendship

car viur• ab mals és d'om perdició

Psalm I

VIII, 16 — X; Folly

foll és perfet qui•s veu menys de follia

R.G. 37.089 Todo el mundo es casa de locos, y el que se cree cuerdo es el mayor de todos.

R.G. 37.112 Entonces eres loco de veras cuando piensas que eres cuerdo.

VIII, 35-36 — Sun; X

e si lo sol és calt naturalment,
si no és fret, no deu ser corregit.

XIV, 1- (8) — Fortuna; X

Malventurós no deu cerquar Ventura

R.G. 59.253 No puede hombre huir su ventura.

R.G. 59.254 No puede hombre huir su ventura, blanda ni dura.

R.G. 59.256 Contra fortuna no vale arte ninguna.

XV, 4 — No Classification

e bé no val mas tant com és preat

XV, 5-8 — King; X, Money

Rey pot ser dit lo pobre dins sa pensa
per un petit do que•l sia offert,
e lo rich hom, de larguesa desert,
gran suma d'or pobretat no•l defensa.

R.G. 55.646 Un rey es más esclavo que un pícaro descalzo.

XVI, 33 — No Classification

Pejor que mort és vida sens plaer

XVII, 37 No Classification

"Sens causa gran null acte gran se fa;"

XX, 25 No Classification

Cascun semblant ab son semblant se guarda.

Nicomachean Ethics, Book VIII, I, 1155 a 32, and 1155 b 7 (Pages, p. 29).

XXX, 9-10 No Classification

Ans del perill se deu fer lo cor fort;
emprenent risch, hom ha dels bons paria,

XXXII, 29-30 No Classification

Aytant és larch l'om menys de fer larguesa
com és escàs si no fall en despendre

Nicomachean Ethics, Book II, vii, 1107 b 9 and v, 1106 a 6 (Pagès, p. 45-46).

XLI, 31-32 X; Biblical

Beneyt aquell qui·l bé sa boca brama
e diu lo mal com bé n'és conexent!

A general attempt to define the "good man" in biblical terms, this proverb seems to echo various psalmic formulations of this concept, such as Psalm 26, with particular attention to verse 7.

XLIX, 20-24 Biblical; X, Blindness, Dumbness, Juridical, Power of Love

per mi Amor son poder torna ·n sella

Bohigas sees a proverb in this phrase (I, p. 112-113); I fail to do so.

LI, 32 No Classification

"sembren los bons, cullen los mals e molen"

LII, 1 X; Biblical

Clamar no·s deu qui mal cerqua e troba

Pagès sees in this allusion to the biblical adagio "Quaerite et invenietis" (Pagès, p. 68), (St. Matthew VII, 7)

LIV, 25 X; Death

Viur·en delit port·ab si por de mort

R.G. 50.501 Placer bueno baja del cielo; placer malo, súbelo el diablo.

R.G. 50.543 Huye del placer presente que te ha de pesar en lo siguiente.

R.G. 50.552 El fin del placer es principio del pesar.

R.G. 50.565 El contento en este mundo es fuego de canas; que es ceniza cuando apenas fué llama.

LVII, 25-26 No Classification

Del viure lonch ja sent lo gran repòs
qui d'aquest curt lo viure avorreix;

LX, 28 No Classification

que tot perill se té·n molt gran bonança

Bohigas considers this to be a proverb (I, p. 112-113).

LXIII, 12 No Classification

no ha lloguer qui no ha treballat.

R.G. 61.226 De Dios abajo, cada cual vive de su trabajo.

R.G. 61.267 Tras el trabajo viene el pago.

R.G. 61.274 Bien cena quien bien trabaja.

R.G. 61.280 Aunque entres en la viña y sueltes el gabán, si no cavas, no te darán jornal.

R.G. 61.283 En casa del pobre, el que no trabaja, no come.

R.G. 61.284 En esta vida caduca, el que no trabaja, no coma.

LXIII, 16 — No Classification

sens tristor no·s pot alegrar

R.G. 50.554 — No hay placer dó no haya dolor.

LXIII, 25-26 — No Classification

Aprés lo mal, qui sent de bé sabor
no pot ser dit del tot malahuyrat;

LXVIII, 26 — Landscape; X, Biblical

erbes no·s fan males en mon ribatge;

Psalm I, 3

LXX, 55-56 — X; Path, Time

hoït é dir que tot mal fa sa via,
si lonch espay de temps és atenyent.

R.G. 60.529 — Ganando tiempo, se gana todo.

LXXIV, 32 — Equestrian; X

Malament viu qui n mal fer no té frens.

R.G. 25.268 — El buen freno, el mal caballo hace bueno.

LXXIV, 47 — No Classification

... (qui s penit grat no val)

LXXXIV, 13 — No Classification

Sol per amor se desij· altr amor

LXXXV, 55-56 — No Classification

de Déu és ja qui viu ab null despit,
car lo pus rich del món és pobrejant.

LXXXVII, 170 Animal; X

De ardiment no pot sentir la labre!

R.G. 10.958 El cobarde es león en casa y lebre en la plaza.

R.G. 10.970 Quien no tiene corazón, huye como lebrón.

XCI, 9-10 No Classification

Lo bé d'Amor clar demostr·ab lo dit,
a l'amador, lo mal qui ·l és vinent;

R.G. 50.553 El placer es vispera del pesar.

XCI, 15-16 No Classification

grat, sobregrat e cambi·s favorí
e ranc és dret no ·l plau bregues partir.

XCII, 147 No Classification

qui·n terra jau, no tem pus aval caja:

R.G. 8.397 Quien no cae, no ha menester levantarse.

XCII, 214 Feast; X

fallint lo sant, defall la sua festa.

R.G. 24.681 Pasada la fiesta, el loco resta.

XCIII, 80 Time; X

temps minva·l mal, e lo bé tots jorns creix.

R.G. 60.622 No hay mal que tanto dure que el tiempo no lo cure.

XCIX, 92 Animal; X, Fool

a quatre peus deu anar qui no·u creu.

Bohigas considers this phrase to be proverbial (I, p. 112).

C, 8 Path; X, Blindness

caure deu l'om, guiat per via cegua;

Bohigas sees a close association between C, 8 and XCIX, 56. (Bohigas IV, p. 75)

C, 29-30 Vessel; X

Qui·n poch vexell molt gran cantitat penssa,
no·s pot aver, car la natura passa;

C, 31-32 No Classification

qui vol rich ser per una mà esquasa,
lo seu desig de aver se deffenssa.

C, 71-72 No Classification

Tot quant és d'om fa sa pròpia obra;
si·u fa per Déu, sa vida és perfeta.

C, 101-102 Rich Man; X, Robber

A les honors grans penssamens sequexen;
a riques gens servex la roberia

R.G. 36.024 Ladrones roban millones, y son grandes señorones.

R.G. 12.149 Para vivir a tus anchas, ten la conciencia con ensanchas.

R.G. 5.688 Llegan a ser ricos los osados y los ladrones, y en llegando, ya son nobles.

CII, 91-96 Folly; X, Feast, Agricultural Reference, Bitter-Sweet

Di·abciach per solemnial col,
mas no del tot d'ignoranca·s conquest,
ans sab que may farta la sua fam,
desvergonyit a dar e pendre larch;
no·y ha bocí que li pareg·amarch
¿què·s deu penssar de les pomes del ram?

R.G. 38.707 La manzana, por de fuera colorada, por de dentro no sana.

Bohigas remarks that this phrase in Ausias March's work must be of popular origin. (Bohigas IV, p. 95)

CIII, 8 No Classification

dins hom està lo seu bé tot complit.

Seneca, "Epistula LXXIV": "Summum bonum in animo contineamus" (Bohigas IV, p. 100). (Pagès, p. 116)

CIII, 59-60 Money; X

fugen del tot cobejança e por,
e pells diners a llur ostal venrran.

CIV, 56 Animal; X, King, Death

e no aquells havents en les mans ungles.

CIV, 84 Hunger; X

sí que jamés fam se part de lur ventre,

R.G. 11.162 A la codicia no hay cosa que la hincha.

R.G. 11.178 De paja o de heno, mi vientre lleno.

Bohigas sees a proverb in this phrase, (I, p. 112); I fail to do so.

CIV, 157 Biblical; X, Robber

Ladre és vist qui ab ladres pratica;

Psalm I, 1-2

CIV, 240 Path; X

al atrevit lo món camí ly obre

R.G. 5.674 A los osados ayuda la fortuna.

R.G. 5.675 Al hombre osado, la fortuna le da la mano.

CIV, 256 Animal; X

un oronell l'estiu no denuncia

Nicomachean Ethics, Book I, VII, 1098 a 18. (Pagès, p. 119) and (Bohigas IV, p. 119).

CV, 80 Travelling; X

no té repos lo qui té fer viatge

R.G. 63.307 El camino no ha plazo.

CVI, 41 No Classification

Si bé·a·n l'om, per lo món l'à trobat.

CVI, 144 No Classification

dient d'aquest no stendre tant ses mans.

CVI, 165 No Classification

Ell vol tant l'om estrènyer dins sa pell,

CVI, 443 Animal; X, Folly, Fortuna

ja no és bo, e més pech és que ruch

R.G. 5.341 Asno mohino, malo de carga y peor de camino.

CVI, 476 No Classification

No és d'alt cor qui tras tal favor va.

R.G. 1.013 El que ha de besar al perro en el culo, no ha menester limpiarse mucho.

CVIII, 60 Folly; X

puys dins breu temps de blanch en negre·s

R.G. 59.471 La rueda de la fortuna, nunca es una.

CVIII, 64 Folly; X, Wind, Biblical, Petrarchist

Foll és aquell qui·l vent fermar volia

R.G. 59.477 La fortuna es un montoncillo de arena: un viento la trae y otro se la lleva.

R.G. 59.485 A la Fortuna más presto la hallarás que la detenrás.

Bohigas thinks that this is a proverbial phrase. (Bohigas I, p. 112-113, and IV, p. 173). It may also refer to St. John III, 8. I am also inclined to think that it is a literary reference, either to one of the many medieval Simal Magus legends, possibly one based on Book II of the Recognitions in which Simon Magus claims to have made a spirit out of air, or a direct reference to Sopater, a disciple of Iamblichus "executed under Constantine on a charge of putting a spell on the winds" (E.S. Bouchier, Syria as a Roman Province, Oxford: Blackwell, 1916, p. 231). See, also under Folly, C.

CVIII, 79-80 Robe; X, Death

Del hom vestit mal pendre fa despulla;
menys és de fer, toire'l ans que la prenga.

R.G. 13.894 Mudar costumbre el viejo cuéstale el pellejo.

CVIII, 88 No Classification

més prop li és lo plorar que lo riure.

Bohigas considers this to be a proverb. (Bohigas I, p. 112-113).

CXII, 50 Death; X, Equestrian

tu est al hom com al cavall mordaces

R.G. 42.275 Adonde quiera que corrieres, allí te encontrará la muerte.

R.G. 42.276 Andes por aquí, andes por allí, el paradero es morir.

R.G. 42.285 La muerte todo lo ataja.

CXII, 110 Animal; X

En semblant cas lo leó torna lebre.

R.G. 10.958 El cobarde es león en casa y liebre en la plaza.

CXII, 373 Lameness; X

lo món sequeix e no ab coxa cama.

Bohigas sees a proverb in this phrase. (I, p. 112-113)

CXII, 377-378 Book; X

açò és test auctèntich, menys de gloses,
que no·s da buyt en la màchina plena.

"Non dari vacuum in natura". (Pagès, p. 136) (Bohigas V, p. 32)

CXIII, 1-4 Literary Reference; X

La vida·s breu e l'art se mostra longa;
l'esperiment defall en tota cosa;
l'enteniment, en lo món no reposa;
al juhí d'hom la veritat s'allonga.

Hipocrates. Aphorismi III, 49. (Pagès, p. 137) (Bohigas V, p. 43)

CXIII, 171 God; X, Laughing-Crying, Biblical

Ja veig estar a Déu ple de rialles.

Bohigas considers this to be a proverb. (Bohigas I, p. 112-113). As I pointed out in the index this proceeds from Psalms II, 4 and XXXVII, 13.

CXV, 59-60 Bond of Love; X

Quant nós pensam qu·ens leixa, ell nos toca;
ab un fil prim se tira una roca.

Bohigas remarks that this is a proverb (Bohigas V, p. 59).

CXVII, 1-2 Animal; X

la cinquèn peu del moltó ab gran cura
yo he cercat -e no·n té sinó quatrel-

Pagès remarks that this is a common French proverb, "chercher cinq pieds à un mouton". (Pagès, p. 141). Bohigas also claims that this is a proverbial phrase. I remember hearing a Peruvian gentleman exclaim that literary critics, "buscan la quinta pata al gato".

CXVII, 112 Robe; X, Classical

per l'àbit pres, que si pèl rau no squinça

R.G. 13.894 Mudar costumbre el viejo cuéstale el pellejo.
(Closely related to CVIII, 79)

CXVIII, 74 Bond of Love; X

pensant que fuig, lo llaç al coll s'enllaça

CXVIII, 91-92 Historical; X, Literary Reference

Per lo garró que lo rey véu de Caba
se mostr•Amor, que tot quant vol acaba.

R.G. 3.737 El amor lo vence todo.

R.G. 3.738 El amor todo lo puede; o todo lo vence.

R.G. 3.743 Todo lo vence amor.

CXIX, 58 Juridical; X, Miscellany

tal heretat, de la bossa tan pobra.

Bohigas considers this to be a proverb. (Bohigas I, p. 112-113)

CXX, 13-14 Vessel; X

Sí com vexell no pot mes recollir
despuix qu•és ple -tot l'àls perdre's cové-,

CXX, 124 Miscellany; X

no•y fa empaig any cech o si molt plou.

CXII b, 23 Folly; X, Animal

més am anar en part hon rompa•l coll.

CXXVII, 115-117 Hunger; X, Agricultural Reference

mas qui menja carts no dejú
e qui no pren conduyt algú
mor-se de fam.

CXXVII, 230 Tree; X

D'un arbre bort volguí bon fruyt,

R.G. 5.152 Árbol que no frutea, bueno es para leña.

R.G. 5.153 Árbol que no frutes nadie lo tenga en su huerta.

R.G. 5.156 Árbol sin fruto, dígote lena.

CXXVIII, 230 Miscellany; X

L'om és de carn e no de fust;

Bohigas sees a relation between the above verse, and CXIV, 87. (Bohigas V, p. 182)

CXXVIII, 664-666 Fire; X, Miscellany

Los altres béns, de altre són,
car són de natura o del món,
e lo saber és casi fum;

Bohigas sees a relation between these verses and, CVI, 177-184, 321-456. (Bohigas V, p. 185)

Onomastic Index of Sources

GÉNÉALOGIE D'AUZÍAS MARCH



Appendix III: Genealogical Tables of Ausias March and His Predecessors

1. A. Pagès, Auzias March et ses prédécesseurs, Paris: Honoré Champion, 1912, p. 52:

2. A. Pagès, "Les origines paternelles d'Auzias March, d'après de nouveaux documents," Bulletin Hispanique, L, 1948, pp. 313-332.



Select Bibliography

Owing to the scope of this thesis a complete bibliography would fill another one hundred pages, needlessly. I have, therefore, chosen to limit it to works specifically quoted in the thesis. This bibliography is divided into two parts. The first concerns Ausias March, primary and secondary sources. The second part refers to other works referred to in the course of this thesis, and is again divided into primary and secondary sources. For Ausias March, except for key works, I have limited references to works not listed in the bibliography of the first volume of Pere Bohigas' critical edition, which stops at 1952. I have also only listed certain recent editions in the primary sources. Manuscripts and early editions, some of which I consulted out of curiosity in Barcelona and Edinburgh, are described in Pagès' excellent study of the manuscript tradition in the first volume of his edition.

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